Last month, I published an article in New York magazine about a secret Malaysian police report which included details of a simulated flight into the southern Indian Ocean. As Victor Iannello revealed in a comment earlier today, that information came from French journalist Florence de Changy, who had come into possession of the full police report but only shared a portion of it with me.
I have not seen the full report, but would very much like to, because I would like to form my own judgement of what they mean, and I think everyone who is interested in trying to figure out what happened to the missing plane, including the next of kin, are entitled to the same. Some people who have read the full reports have suggested that they give the impression that the recovered simulator files do not in context seem all that incriminating. Other people who have seen the full report have told me that the report contains material that makes it hard to doubt that Zaharie is the culprit. Of course, it’s impossible to rely on someone else’s say-so. We need to see the full report.
The reason I am writing this post now is that earlier today Florence published an article in Le Monde in which she describes having the full report as well as another, 65-page secret document on the same topic. Meanwhile, another French newspaper, Liberation, has also published an article indicating that they, too, have a copy of the report. And private correspondence between myself and a producer at the television network “France 2” indicates that he has as well.
Meanwhile, I know that independent investigators here in the US have the documents as well.
At this point, the secret documents are not very secret. Someone within the investigation has been leaking them like crazy, obviously with the intention that their contents reach the public. My understanding is that this source has placed no restrictions on their use. So journalists and independent investigators who have copies of these documents need to do their duty and release them — somehow, anyhow. Some people that I’ve begged and implored to do so have said that they fear legal ramifiations. Well, if it’s illegal for you to have these documents, then you’ve already broken the law. Use Wikileaks or another similar service to unburden yourself.
Free the data!
UPDATE 8/14/16: Apparently Blaine Alan Gibson has the document, too, according to a rant he post on Facebook. He reveals that the entire set of documents is 1,000 pages long.
@Lauren H,
Thank you for your comments and opinion on the question of fuel adequacy to reach the 7th Arc inside the current search area. You also said: “A couple of things that I do not understand is the various analyses use an altitude of FL350 and a speed around LRC. If the altitude in FS is FL400 and speed prior to the last radar was in the neighborhood of 500 kts,why are these dynamics not being evaluated? Can they not make a track that meets the BFO? A conscious pilot who is still trying to get away as fast as possible could continually vary the altitude to achieve maximum efficiency for 500kts. The resulting impact area would be far enough west for all of the debris to drift away from Australia.”
The FL350 assumption appears to come from two facts: (1) the last reported altitude before diversion was FL350, and (2) the military radar track is consistent (barely) with being flown at FL350 at LRC (actually FL360 matches the observed speed a bit better).
My initial attempts to fit routes at ~500 kts constant TAS suffered in two ways: (1) the BFO residuals are fairly large, but even more importantly they have a linear dependence along the post-FMT route which indicates an (unfitted) systematic course/speed error, and (2) a detailed fuel consumption model I developed later shows that the fuel is inadequate to maintain that high speed even with optimized step climbs all the (longer) way to the 7th Arc. These routes end outside of and to the SW of the ATSB search area, which is why I now say those end points are unreachable due to insufficient fuel.
Changing the speed model from a constant 500 knots to LRC or MRC reduces the average speed because the southernmost part of the route is far enough from the equator for the air temperature to drop, thereby reducing the sound speed. It also reduces the TAS since the LRC table at optimum altitude is basically a constant Mach. Thus the more likely case of speed control (based on LRC/MRC/ECON instead of constant air speed) results in reduced average speed, and therefore the end points move NE up the arc compared to a constant 500 kts TAS. Now you end up inside the current ATSB search area, and if the flight were made at standard ISA conditions, the fuel is adequate to reach the 7th Arc.
The detailed assumptions used in the Boeing range calculations have never been made public. There are at least two major unknowns from my perspective. First, exactly how far north was the FMT made? The path after 18:22 was a mystery back when the estimated fuel ranges were first presented by the ATSB (with incomplete description). Second, was the deviation from ISA temperatures actually taken into account for these calculations? One would hope so, but even the existence of very non-standard air temperatures has ever been mentioned by the ATSB, so it is not clear the first set of range calculations took this into account. Elevated temperatures have the rather large effect of a ~3% reduction in achievable endurance and range. This is the reason why I now question the possibility of any routes ending near the center of the ATSB search area. The ATSB has also been almost nonresponsive to my questions on this subject, their lawyer telling me that this is considered privileged/proprietary competition-sensitive information that Boeing will not release.
Another consideration is that the Boeing range estimates are apparently Equivalent Still Air Distances (ESAD). I do not recall any statement that headwinds or tailwinds were considered to get “ground” distances. That difference is a fairly small effect for MH370. A larger error comes about if the actual track was curved, not straight. I believe the ATSB range arcs simply took the Boeing range estimates and applied them to some FMT boundary in a straight (probably great circle) path. If the path were curved, as I now believe is the case, the actual distance of the end point from the FMT point is reduced. In other words, the ATSB’s “maximum range arcs” contain an assumption that the route was straight, and this was a quite reasonable thing to do at the time. The DSTG analysis also favors straight post-FMT routes. However, locations farther up the 7th Arc cannot be reached on autopilot with straight routes, and therefore the ATSB’s maximum range arcs overestimate the actual achievable distances from the FMT in this case.
The “curved” routes require speeds significantly below LRC. Therefore they can also be called “slow.” My best solutions show that even MRC is too fast in some cases, with Holding LRC more closely providing the required speed and endurance.
Concerning the issue you raised of whether or not the Boeing fuel consumption tables are “conservative”, I assume by that you mean the actual aircraft would use less fuel than shown in the tables. I agree with @Gysbreght on this issue. I very much doubt this is the case for the simple fact that those figures are perhaps some of the most critical parameters for an airline to consider when making a purchasing decision. If they show higher than actual fuel flows the airline might choose a competitor’s aircraft instead. If there were any systematic deviation in the cruising fuel flow tables (which I doubt), I would expect it to be in the opposite direction, showing better fuel economy (i.e., reduced fuel flow) in order to enhance aircraft sales.
@DennisW
You had a post on your blog (way back) on calculating the BTO arcs. It seems to have disappeared. Could you post the link please if it is still up, as I can’t find it again ?
ATSB clarify the planned drifter experimental work, a cross-calibration of the flaperon models with standard drifters. This is ‘Phase One’, implying later phases?
“The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has been working with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation over the past 18 months to model the drift of MH370 debris. Over the coming months a further intensive study will be undertaken.
Phase one involves setting adrift ocean drifter buoys used in the Global Drifter Program along with models of the flaperon which have been fitted with satellite trackers. The models will be tracked to establish the rate and direction of drift relative to the drifter buoys in open ocean conditions when subject to similar winds, currents and waves. Thirty years of real life Global Drifter Program data will then be used to model the drift of the flaperon.”
@sk999: appreciate the critique. I really do.
Re: “which two acoustic events?”: yes, the Curtin Boom, but also the Chinese seismologists’ event, triangulated to 1 of 2 points (NE = near IGARI, SW=just SW if Sumatra), reported mid-March, 2014. I’ve posted a link to this forum a couple of times over the past year.
Re: “debris from an Arc 7 impact just north of 36s might easily all miss Oz”: you may be right. But an open-minded read of, e.g. The full set of Dr. Pattiaratchi’s full set of Arc7 forward drift runs suggests otherwise. It suggests Oz shoreline hits up to well into the 20’s.
Re: #3: in my post immediately following the one you critiqued, I gave 2 examples of what I meant (“debris drifted to Indonesia”, “What Kudahuvadhooans saw was DQA149”). Others include “Flew faster, therefore moved search 2,500km NE”, and the “acoustic pings were MH370’s FDR” fiasco. My first audit documented several others.
Re: #4: yes, that is what I meant. Note that I am only suggesting incompatibility with the COMBO of the signal data and the assumption of a ghost flight scenario (unpiloted); the seabed search is thus “incompatible” with the ISAT data only to the extent a ghost flight was not the “a priori” most reasonable scenario to infer from the data. My read of the experts – before the seabed scan – was that this was a strong favourite.
I’ll end with the broader point with which you began: it is true that comparing the signal data’s predictions to those of other types of analysis (acoustic, drift) etc. brings with it the risk that it is the comparator – not the signal data – that is flawed. This is why I publish the details of my work in full, and beg for tough peer review, to minimize errors in data, models, or inference. But I consider the risk of NOT comparing to these independent predictions to be greater still. “Huh”, studies like mine say: “…a gap. What does this mean?” We all propose and test different ways to reconcile the gap. Perhaps the other analyses are off. Perhaps the signal data is off. Either way, our knowledge increases.
@Gysbreght/airlandseaman,
The trim range of the rudder is a function of rudder ratio function.
At zero knots 1 unit of trim is approx. 1 degree. At zero knots total rudder movement is approx. 27 degrees, at >430 knots total this reduces to approx. 3 degrees (in normal mode) under the rudder ratio function. So we are talking small fractions for what has been described as 1 degree (unit) of trim.
Here’s the important bit; at fuel exhaustion the flight control PSA’s will power the flight controls for a short period of time…after that the flight controls will revert from normal to direct mode (and possibly a short period of secondary mode) during this phase.
As a consequence of entering direct (or secondary) mode; whatever the rudder trim input is, it will be increased by a factor of approx. 3 (based on 430 knots).
OZ
@OZ:
Well, I may be wrong on that one.
However:
@Ventus
Yes, it took me awhile to find it. It was on another person’s blog, and I was not even sure I had saved it.
http://tmex1.blogspot.com
@OZ:
Sorry, my last post was in response to yours of August 24, 2016 at 12:42 AM. When writing it I hadn’t read your post of August 24, 2016 at 2:23 AM. In the latter you write:
“So we are talking small fractions for what has been described as 1 degree (unit) of trim.”
What ever 1 unit of trim is in degrees at cruise speed, it creates an asymmetry equivalent to 1/3rd of one engine max cruise thrust.
Incidentally, considering that Vmo=330 kIAS, are you sure the rudder ratio function goes to 430 kts?
@Gysbreght, “When the second engine quits, the flight control system goes into secondary mode, causing the AP to disconnect. In secondary mode the envelope protections, including the bank limiter, are lost.”
As yet I have been unable to confirm this. The PFCS will go to secondary mode when, “there is loss of…data from the ADIRU and SAARU” (AAM). After the APU autostarts I would assume these would be re-booted, potentially restoring the primary (bank angle protecting) mode. I appreciate the autopilot will not re-engage but I can find nothing definite on the PFCS, which supplies bank angle protection, “in both manual and autopilot operation”. The FCOM says, “The autopilot disengage bar disables bank angle protection”. I am supposing this applies to a manual selection.
Also in the AMM under “Manual Switching” I read that when the PFC disconnect switch is put to the DISC position the PFCS “goes to the direct mode” which is no great surprise. However it adds, “If the PFCS is in the secondary or direct modes and the normal mode becomes available, the PFCS may select the normal mode.” That sounds clear enough but then it adds, still under Manual Switching , “To do this in the air, you must cycle the PFC disconnect switch”, going on to say that, “on the ground…the PFCS selects the normal mode automatically”.
I have no particular view to push in interpreting this but scope for ambiguity is there, to my eye. You may have a reference in which case I would be pleased to hear of it.
The significance of course is whether the APU might have kept bank down in various simulator runs, until it stopped, the RAT taking over, controlling and operating limited PCUs in secondary mode.
Also you said, “The cL/cD of about 17.5 is consistent with the FCOM data for idle descent, and is quite normal for similar airplane types.” I mentioned the APU inlet door and, in a later post, the RAT, which would add drag compared to a normal idle descent. However the door will close automatically on APU failure.
The sequence is somewhat cryptically described in the FCOM Non-Normal Checklist for double-engine flame-out.
– When all generated electrical power is lost, pitot heating is lost
– Loss of pitot heating causes the Flight Control System (FCS) to go into secondary mode
– The autopilot requires the FCS to be in normal mode, therefore it disconnects
– Autostart of the APU restores pitot heat automatically
– After restoration of pitot heat, the pilot can reboot the FCS to restore normal mode, then re-engage the autopilot.
In the mean time I have made two changes in the EXCEL file I put in Dropbox:
– (T-D)/W changed to -0.08
– Roll rates changed to 0.5 deg/s.
If you scroll to the right in the GoPro Data sheet, you will see a graph showing values of (T-D)/W derived from the GoPro data in column R of that same sheet.
@Gysbreght,
The >430 knots is the referenced figure provided in the AMM, 2.9 degrees at full rudder pedal deflection.
In secondary and direct modes the systems default to flap position. In both cases flaps/slats up results in a change to 10 degrees max at full rudder pedal.
Flaps and slats not up results in 27 degrees in secondary mode and 23.5 degrees in direct mode (all figures under no load).
OZ
@DennisW, Thanks for the link to that very informative blog post. FYI, I just plotted your value in Google Earth, and found that for whatever reason it produces a ping arc lying 8.8 nautical miles west of where the DSTG has calculated the 18:25 ping arc to be, based on the image presented on page 22 of the book version of “Bayesian Methods” (http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-10-0379-0).
@Jeff Wise
To come back on your remark on my post about the left wing spoilers together with the right wing flaperon perhaps could give bank-angle/roll control in case only the RAT was available (inspired by @LouVilla’s posting).
This would be strange as you replied, for then only a left bank/roll could be compensated and not a right one. As far as I can see I can only agree on this.
Such assymetric flight control would be unlogic. But under RAT only, I thought maybe a choice of different priority control surfaces is chosen to work together.
This seems not to be the case.
I found the following on the B777:
‘Mechanical Backup In the event of a complete electrical system shutdown, cables from the flight deck controls to the stabiliser and selected roll spoilers allow the pilots to maintain straight and level flight until the electrical system can be restored’.
So I understand from this; if MH370 was actively piloted end of flight the pilot had control over straight and level flight under all circumstances. Even when the RAT was not supplying sufficient power anymore.
The site-reference (B777 at end of article):
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Flight_Control_Laws
@Jeff
I am sure the difference has to do with the value used for the radius of the earth plus aircraft altitude. I used the WGS84 equatorial radius of 6378km plus a compromise altitude of 7km (~23,000 feet) for a total radius of 6385km. I don’t know what value the DSTG group used.
The mean radius of the earth (again WGS84) is 6371km. If that value is used you get ring radius of 3518km vs my value of 3526. Which would move the ring West by 8km.
Could also be related to whether or not the DSTG used the nominal or actual sub-satellite point to produce their ring.
Perhaps some other people here will weigh in on the value they calculated. In any case, there are a lot of ways to screw it up. I may have found one. Who knows?
Damn! Can’t seem to post anymore due to changes to my browser. Tried posting the following comment a few weeks ago with everyone was discussing the ‘FBI’ leak…
“(An aside): among all this talk of anonymous sources and mysterious tip-offs in the previous comments, I have to let slip that an anonymous source told me that as of December 2015 the crew and many of the passengers were still alive. I desperately wish this were true, but unfortunately the world is full of fantasists, so I never really gave it a second thought.”
I missed the Second Coming of Trond. How the hell did the happen?! But I’m glad he’s back and was sad to see him leave, great to hear opinions from all sides…
…Here’s hoping my browser plays ball with my future posts!
@DennisW
Thanks muchly. I have saved it this time.
@ventus
You are most welcome.
We have not talked too much lately about the secondary data of the cloud trails satellite photos, which my impression showed the final major turn and approach to 7th arc in decent resolution. Have we dismissed that data or is still secondary proof of SIO flight path?
@Sajid UK, so where are they being held ? I am truly curious location.
@MH
I was never given any indication of location. I was told that passengers were slowly dying off one by one but the majority of crew and PAX were alive.
Its not lost on me how cruel hoaxes are on PAX and it seems to me to be someone’s own pet fantasy. But we can never know for sure, can we?
The small chance there was some credibility in the claim, would indicate – to me, at least – an island or jungle location. (But this just adds to the impression of it being someone’s daydream).
During the comments about the anonymous FBI leak I thought I’d write a brief post and mention it but I was having browser issues.
To be totally honest, I do desperately wish it were true – wouldn’t it make an amazing feel-good story?! And part of me is selfish and I don’t want this adventure to end in some lame dead-end suicide.
Captain Cox doubts 7th arc BFO interpretation:
MH370 ‘death dive’ theory doubted by US expert
The Australian12:00AM August 25, 2016
ReporterSydney
@EanHiggins
A leading international air crash investigation expert has cast doubt on the Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s “death dive” theory for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370, saying the satellite data is not good enough to conclude the aircraft crashed in a fast and unpiloted descent.
Captain John Cox, an American former airline pilot and now air safety consultant, said the evidence was not reliable enough to support with confidence either the ATSB’s contention or the increasingly canvassed competing theory that captain Zaharie Ahmad Shah flew the plane to the end, either ditching under power or in a controlled glide.
MH370 disappeared on a flight from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on March 8, 2014 with 239 people on board, with the radar transponder turned off and radio contact lost soon into the flight.
Military radar tracked it flying back over Malaysia and over the Andaman Sea, and satellite “handshake” data from the aircraft showed it turned to take a long final leg south to the southern Indian Ocean.
Captain Cox, who has served on many major air crash investigations of the US National Transportation Safety Board, believes the most likely theory is Zaharie hijacked his own aircraft, but said how the jet finally came down had not been determined. The “end of flight” scenario is crucial because the ATSB, which is conducting the underwater search for MH370, has designed the target area based on what media have dubbed the “death dive” theory, although the ATSB does not use that term.
A controlled glide would have taken the Boeing 777 well outside that designated search area.
The ATSB has denied claims it has played down the “rogue pilot” and “controlled glide” theories at the behest of Malaysia. ATSB chief commissioner Greg Hood has insisted analysis of Inmarsat satellite tracking data by defence scientists had concluded that MH370 rapidly descended in an unpiloted crash after fuel exhaustion.
Captain Cox told The Australian: “I do not believe there is sufficient data in the Inmarsat data to draw any conclusion on the rate of descent.”
He said while this sort of data, derived from hourly “pings” between the aircraft and the satellite, was reliable for tracking an aircraft’s course, it was not sufficiently accurate to determine rates of ascent and descent.
In a statement, the ATSB maintained its position on the validity of the satellite data as analysed by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation.
“This analysis concludes that the metadata associated with the final two satellite communications from the aircraft to the ground earth station indicates that the aircraft was in a high, and increasing, rate of descent,” the statement said.
@David
Cox said:
“He said while this sort of data, derived from hourly “pings” between the aircraft and the satellite, was reliable for tracking an aircraft’s course, it was not sufficiently accurate to determine rates of ascent and descent.”
That is just plain wrong. I would even argue that rate of climb or descent are even more sensitive that tangent plane velocity components since they are not compensated at all by the AES. If the final Doppler values are valid, I know of no other conclusion that can be drawn other than that the aircraft was in a steep descent.
I hope “Phase 1” uses drifters representing a broad array of confirmed and promising debris – and drops them into the ocean in a broad array of possible impact locations.
The Klein Brak (or “Roy”) piece is far more important to emulate than the flaperon: it had to cover over 45% more ground, and – if the Dec. 23 “pre-find” was authentic – had only 30% more time to do it in. 7th Arc supporters have a much bigger job explaining “Roy” than they do the flaperon. See, for example, the last slide in my “Aggregate” drift analysis, which focuses exclusively on the impact implications of this piece by itself.
@Gysbreght. “The sequence is somewhat cryptically described in the FCOM Non-Normal Checklist for double-engine flame-out.”
Thanks. That will have to do. The oddity of the 35 deg bank holding then suddenly increasing, which you mentioned, remains unresolved as does the 85 deg in the Exner sequence vis a vis what purportedly is (or used to be) the comparatively low bank of the Boeing runs. If the latter were briefer that would help explain it.
One pretty obvious conclusion from your model is that the descent rate beneath Mach exceedance is constrained by induced drag. Which means high stress if speed is up. I will not hold my breath but it would be interesting to learn what a typical Boeing descent now looks like: I assume the same would apply. Also (and for DennisW about the sudden steep early descent, unpiloted presumably), the explanation this might contain of what happens at the top and which would explain the 2 BFO descent rates with the sudden acceleration between.
I speculate that there has been something uncovered in more recent Boeing runs.
@DennisW
Thanks for reposting your link up there. Good read.
Given this:
That is just plain wrong. I would even argue that rate of climb or descent are even more sensitive that tangent plane velocity components since they are not compensated at all by the AES. If the final Doppler values are valid, I know of no other conclusion that can be drawn other than that the aircraft was in a steep descent.
That is similar in intent to this:
Foley said Australian analysis of the flap in Canberra suggested that it had not been deployed when it hit the water. It had been retracted inside the wing. A pilot attempting a soft landing would have extended the wing flaps. The Australians are awaiting the verdict of a Boeing accident investigation team on their findings.
Recent analysis of the final satellite signals also suggest the plane was descending at a rate of between 3,700 meters (12,000 feet) and 6,100 meters (20,000 feet) a minute before it crashed. A rate of 600 meters (2,000 feet) a minute would be typical of a controlled descent.
“The rate of descent combined with the position of the flap — if it’s found that it is not deployed — will almost certainly rule out either a controlled ditch or glide,” Foley said.
Do you think that it was a death dive, graveyard spiral or something similar if the BFO value holds?
@David
I blow hot and cold on the 00:19 BFO values. Don’t really have a dog in that fight since I am not a fan of 38S, and don’t want to beat a drum relative to expanding the search width in that latitude or beyond. I might really get into it if and when the search moves farther North.
Note: I said farther and not further. My SO, being an attorney, constantly reminds me that farther is the correct form when physical distance is involved. We have similar issues with fewer and less – crosses for me to bear.
@Wazir
If the BFO values are correct, it was a steep descent as advertised. There can be no doubt about that. The math and the physics are truly unambiguous.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/mh370-pages/updates/operational-update/
“It is anticipated that around October weather conditions will have improved sufficiently to allow the deployment of a Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) from Dong Hai Jiu 101. This equipment will be used to further investigate a range of sonar contacts.”
This confirms investigation of the sonar contacts is within current funding.
Richard Cole has posted on the second part, the drift modelling study.
@DennisW. Thanks for sharing farther vs further, fewer vs less. New ones for me to bear now also.
I retain the right to retaliate with subjunctives, split verbs and infinitives.
@DennisW
But pilot could still be at the controls, regardless of the dive, right?
@Wazir
Yes, I don’t think the analytics can rule that out, although the rate of descent (assuming BFO correct) would be beyond the envelope of typical piloted flight.
@DrBobbyUlich
Could you please check BFO / Fuel Analysis for the following.
The FMC/autopilot was programmed for a diversion to Banda Aceh, via (MIMOS)-(KENDI)-VAMPI-MEKAR-NILAM-SANOB-BAC-route discontinuity-WITT
Speed Mach 0.84 at FL340 (34,000ft)
Assume crew incapacitated after programming route to Banda Aceh.
At Top Of Descent to WITT (approx 15NM prior to MEKAR), speed reduces to VNAV descent speed of 275 KIAS (471 KTAS – maintain FL340).
At 40 NM prior to BAC (still at FL340), speed reduces to 240 KIAS (415KTAS – due to speed restriction below 10,000).
Passing BAC aircraft maintains LNAV/VNAV but actually flies Heading at BAC in degrees True (~191).
At 40 NM south of BAC, speed increases back to VNAV descent speed of 275 KIAS (471 KTAS still at FL340).
Move last primary radar point to 6 NM past MEKAR due to inaccuracies of primary radar at long range.
At this reduced speed, do you estimate the time of fuel exhaustion to be 00:30 UTC, thus making first (right) engine failure around 00:16 UTC?
@LouVilla
Could you please check the above flight path on your Flight Simulator and see where it ends. Is it within a 100NM radius of the ATSB hotspot? Change Centre of Gravity if it ends up in orbits. Note when the APU autostarts based on the failures below.
Assume oxygen bottle has ruptured and caused damage to wiring near P100 Power Panel and adjacent equipment.
Fail;
Left Generator (voltage regulation wiring)
BackUp Converter (Left and Right Backup Generators)
Left Aims Cabinet,
Left AFDC,
AMU,
TRU C1,
TRU C2,
Left DC Bus.
Thanks Oxy.
An acceleration of the rate-of-descent from 5000 fpm to 15,000 fpm in 8 seconds requires a pilot actively pushing the nose down. An airplane does not do that by itself.
@DennisW, it could plausibly be a dead pilot given what you say or if as @Gysbreght puts it, a live one.
I know some pictures in the link below may be troubling to some but the link below details some incidents where plane impacted terrain at high speed:
http://killtown.911review.org/flight93/crash-comparisons.html
Of those incidents, what caught my eye were two things i.e., the nature of the debris and a snapshot from a newspaper caught my eye. Could MH370 gone down in the manner as portrayed in this newspaper graphics (the original report unavailable anymore) and thus validate that final BFO value:
http://newspagedesigner.org/photo/28-seconds-of-horror
@Gysbreght’s input also reminds this well written piece from the Atlantic which I share with you here:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/11/the-crash-of-egyptair-990/302332/
Extra reads:
http://www.ibtimes.com/pilot-suicide-when-its-captain-who-crashes-plane-1519756
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-32610497
Case for suicide in MH370? Likely but not conclusive subject to technical data but even if it is, more personal related than anything else.
@Jeff Wise
Jeff I have a question for you or any other learned expert can answer if for me, what if I fly a drone like Global Hawk equipped with navigational aids and system like we had on MH 370 on the same route and simulate its flight path according to Data available and try to come up with possible crash site? It should work, right? Your input will be highly appreciated.
@Qayyum, This idea has been proposed in the past: that is to say, take a plane or a drone with the same satellite communication system as MH370 and find a route that matches the Inmarsat metadata. Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as that: the data recorded for MH370 was affected by many conditions that no longer exist, such as the weather and the state of the satellite orbit. Also, on any given day there are multiple routes that could generate the same set of data. So unfortunately your idea wouldn’t provide a solution to the mystery.
@Qayyum A Global Hawk is much slower than a 777.
@Qayyum:
The simplest way would be for Inmarsat to provide spoof data to confirm the current SIO search area. The company has links to various security services via their military division. They also have high level military personnel amongst their board of directors. I suspect that the SIGINT for western security services is an important part of their business.
@Jeff Wise @others
On your reply a lot of wing parts are composite/honeycomb structures and the fuselage is mostly aluminium/metal without honeycomb (I fill in a bit if you don’t mind..).
I assume you suggest most parts of the fuselage will sink soon while wing parts won’t. And this reflexs the large amount of wing-related parts found against the small amount of cabin parts.
I think you are right in general conserning the metal parts of the fuselage which is mostly the whole structural fuselage.
But a lot of cabin parts are made either of light-weight plastics (monitor mounting f.i.) with a smaller SW than water or honeycomb/alu structures like the Rodrigues piece.
If the fuselage broke up in a high speed impact thousants of those cabin parts would be released and floating in the ocean.
Only 2 are found confirmed MH370/B777 to date.
On the other hand more than 20 wing-related pieces have been found. Many of them confirmed to be from B777/MH370.
All those pieces are related to control surfaces or engines. Most of them to trailing edge wing parts (and one elevator piece). Two pieces (flaperon and flap) are largely intact.
IMO the significance of this is not that those pieces are more likely to float than pieces of the fuselage but that particulary those pieces all can be expected to seperate in a ditch attempt. Till now we see no other wing related pieces not related to this possibility. And the fact that the flap and flaperon from the same wing have hardly leading edge damage proves it was not a high speed impact (‘death-dive’).
IMO the debris-evidence is clear enough; no high speed impact, seperation of the flaperon and flap-part due to impact on the water during an attempted ditch. Engine seperation (cowling pieces), flap fairing seperation, trailing edge flap-covering wing panels, elevator piece all show this.
That’s all they found so far besides 2 cabin pieces that were far from unrecoqnisebly shattered as would have happened in a high speed impact.
Maybe the fuselage broke in two pieces like the Comores crash/ditch but the debris tells clearly this was a relatively low speed, horizontal impact with the water surface, under power or after an unpowered glide.
And it was actively piloted.
The whole assumption taken for reality by the ATSB and the IG (and many others) that this flight turned into a ghost flight somewhere after FMT is based on nothing and irrational.
The flight was complety and skillfully controlled till 18:22 and there is no plausible reason at all this changed afterwards at some point.
IMO it would be wise the ATSB, the IG and many others left this (IMO, foolish) assumption now the debris-evidence is so clear and start to concentrate on a completely actively piloted flight till the end.
This now should be the leading assumption IMO.
Take your defeat and don’t be ashamed of it.
There was no debris before July 2015.
The data then where the best available.
But times and evidence have changed the facts dramaticcaly.
Interview with Darren Chester:
THERE is unlikely to be any inquiry into the MH370 plane search when it is completed later this year, even if nothing is found.
Mr Chester said all the sonar data gathered in the course of the 120,000 square kilometre search would be publicly released by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
A “comprehensive report” on all aspects of the search would also be made public when the operation ended in late December.
http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/no-inquiry-needed-into-mh370-search-says-minister-responsible-darren-chester/news-story/e751c7366aab96029ea6ac0bf3c1f44c
@OXY
I salute your attempt to theorize an aircraft flight path
that could match some of the facts of 9M-MROs possible flight.
Although my view is that there is no likely reason why WITT
would be specified as a destination airport, may I point out
that I believe your choice of waypoints SANOB to BAC results
in a (continuation) Track heading through BAC of 193°, whilst
a choice of (SANOB to) ANSAX to BAC gives 190°, which seems
closer to the desired Track you apparently want.
@Ge Rijn
I sincerely hope I am reading you wrong here:
“Take your defeat and don’t be ashamed of it”.
I doubt @Jeff or anyone else for that matter are looking to be winners in this issue. It is more about accountability,and transparency rather than personal triumphalism that motivates their involvement. And most of all closure for the NOK. I cannot vouch unequivocally that that is what they (2Jeff et al) feel but my gut instinct tells me that is so having followed this blog for sometime now.
Your description of the debris (if high impact) is spot on…but there is also a very high possibility that much of it is trapped and swirling about as flotsam in the giant SIO gyre:
“But as hundreds of objects sighted off the Australian coast as possible aircraft debris turn out to be discarded fishing equipment, cargo container parts, or plastic shopping bags, a new narrative is emerging in the hunt for the missing plane: There’s more garbage out there than you think. Most of it is plastic. And marine life ingests it, with catastrophic consequences.
“This is the first time the whole world is watching, and so it’s a good time for people to understand that our oceans are garbage dumps,” says Kathleen Dohan, a scientist at Earth and Space Research in Seattle, Washington, who maps ocean surface currents. “This is a problem in every ocean basin.”
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/04/140404-garbage-patch-indian-ocean-debris-malaysian-plane/
with the odd one making landfall in within human habitation as in Pemba and Rodgrigues or probably in some other remote areas not frequented by people and even if so, by people who dont give a toss about seemingly common flotsam.
I sincerely apologise if I misread you but until the plane fuselage is found or at least a significant portion of its debris is located, I would be cautious in making preemptive statements or delivering verdicts based on scant data. Right now, the best fits seems (and i stress “seems) to be the official version but admittedly that may change……
@Wazir Roslan
With that remark I did not mean Jeff Wise but others named.
I have the strong impression those have an urge to keep defending their ‘ghost-flight’ and ‘death-dive’ assumptions against IMO obviously odds for whatever reasons.
IMO this is hampering succes in the investigation.
The debris tells a clear story.
Refusing to let go of those earlier (in that time plausible) assumptions is a waste of scientific knowledge and experience from now on.
Just my opinion.
@Ge Rijn
I am still of the opinion that the nature of the impact cannot be positively determined from facts available. I have yet to see anything resembling professional forensics on the recovered debris. While Vance has some pedigree in that domain, he did not actually have an opportunity to examine the debris much less subject it to any diagnostic testing. I am surprised he commented as definitively as he did.
The 00:19 BFO values strongly suggest a high rate of descent, and I am not prepared to discard that data.
Not saying you are wrong. Just saying that you are projecting more certainty than the current facts are able to support.
Let me add that Mike Exner from the IG also stated it was impossible the flap and flaperon could have survived a high speed impact in the condition they have been found only if they where seperated by flutter.
The ATSB states that the outboard flap piece probably seperated in a retracted position when it hit the water.
Whit that they declare it did not seperate by flutter.
And with that they declare it was not a high speed impact as Mike Exner rules out also in such a case.
Conclusion; no high speed vertical ‘death-dive’ but a more horizontal relatively low speed impact on the water.
No other conclusion possible IMO so then change your assumptions accordingly despite of the, in their opinion mathematical ‘flawless’ BFO’s, fuel data and all possible ghost-flight AP configurations.
There was no high speed ‘death-dive’ impact and there was no ghost-flight.
That’s what the debris tells and proves till now.
@Ge Rijn and Y’all
The debris is unequivocal: no out-of-control, high speed impact.
@Ge Rijn
So two questions for you:
1> On what basis are you rejecting the 00:19 BFO data other than your opinion. What would make it incorrect?
2> If the pilot were making a controlled ditch why would the flap be in the retracted position?
Just a reminder to those, who think 00:19:37 BFO of -2 Hz indicates ‘vilent’ descent.
If you consider -2 Hz as a valid value, you have also to consider 18:25:34 BFO of 273 Hz as a valid value, which would indicate ascent. Consequently there is a problem to explain the absence of radar data, and also find any plausible/logical justification for such a maneuver (so far only Victor’s lateral offset makes some sense).
On the other hand, if ADIRU was not functioning and pitot were frozen in both the cases, the only source of data would be GPS, probably only one of them (if the left bus was depowered). When other instruments come online after power restoration, FMC does not have any way to know what data is correct and what data is wrong. A year ago I suggested zero Doppler compensation to explain abnormal BFOs, but now I lean to think that some more complicated averaging algorithm took place, which resulted in the corruption of the output. And this is why the first BFOs in both the sequences were correct: FMC had nothing but only one GPS to rely on immediately after the reboot.
@Oleksandr
Liking your work.