When Australia called off the surface search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 on April 28, Prime Minister Tony Abbot explained that “It is highly unlikely at this stage that we will find any aircraft debris on the ocean surface. By this stage, 52 days into the search, most material would have become waterlogged and sunk.”
But would the debris really have sunk? Modern aircraft are made of metal, composites, and plastic, materials that do not get waterlogged. If, as the Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB) believes is most likely, MH370 ran out of fuel and then crashed, it would have been moving at hundreds of miles per hour when it hit the sea. Much of the resulting debris would have settled down through the water column, but innumerable pieces would have remained afloat. After Air France Flight 447 went down in the middle of the Atlantic in 2009, searchers found some 3,000 pieces of debris scattered across the surface.
With the passage of time, the absence of MH370 debris becomes increasingly puzzling. Recently Emirates Airlines CEO Tim Clarke expressed frustration over the ATSB analysis of the plane’s fate, saying: ”Our experience tells us that in water incidents, where the aircraft has gone down, there is always something.” This is true. As far as I know, there have been no cases where a commercial airliner has crashed into the sea and no parts were recovered, even if the crash occured in an unknown location far out in the middle of the ocean, as MH370’s presumably did.
Consider the fate of the Boeing 377 Stratocruiser “Clipper Romance of the Skies,” which disappeared on the first leg of a planned round-the-world flight somewhere between San Francisco and Hawaii in 1957. An aircraft carrier was dispatched and found floating debris six days later, halfway between its origin and destination and 90 miles from its planned track, some 1,000 miles from the nearest land.
The area where MH370 is now believed most likely to have gone down is a bit further out to sea, some 1,500 miles southwest of Perth. But far more assets were been deployed in the search, including satellite, ships, and land-based aircraft. Indeed, the area was one of the first to be searched for surface wreckage back in March.
Still, it’s easy to imagine that even pieces of debris might have been overlooked in the vastness of the sea, especially given the uncertainty surrounding the plane’s crash site. That’s why many have long thought that the first hard proof of the plane’s fate might well take the form of flotsam washing up on a beach somewhere.
Despite Tony Abbott’s assertion, the ATSB remains open to this possibility, stating on its website:
“The ATSB continues to receive messages from members of the public who have found material washed up on the Australian coastline and think it may be wreckage or debris from MH370. The ATSB reviews all of this correspondence carefully, but drift modelling undertaken by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority [AMSA] has suggested that if there were any floating debris, it is far more likely to have travelled west, away from the coastline of Australia. It is possible that some materials may have drifted to the coastline of Indonesia, and an alert has been issued in that country, requesting that the authorities be alerted to any possible debris from the aircraft.”
It’s not clear why the AMSA believes that the debris’ main landfall would be to the north of the presumed impact area. Pioneering ocean-current researcher Curtis Ebbesmeyer, a retired professor of oceanography at the University of Washington, says that the South Indian Current should have been carrying MH370’s wreckage eastward, at a rate of five to ten miles per day. That implies an arrival window on the beaches of Western Australia of between mid-June and late September.
Computer models of drift patterns suggest a similar conclusion. I created the animated gif below from the website Adrift.org.au. Another website that yields similar results is Ocean Motion (my thanks to Brock McEwen for turning me onto that one).
Ebbesmeyer says that if we assume that the impact generated a million fragments, and that one-tenth of one percent of the fragments reach the coast, “that would give 1000 objects on the shore, or one per mile of Australian coastline. Not too bad odds.” Especially considering that beachcombers have been especially vigilant about collecting the world’s most famous pieces of flotsam. Back in April, a hunk of aluminum that washed up on an Australian beach generated headlines for days, before experts from the ATSB determined that it had not come from an aircraft (the ATSB has yet to reveal what it actually came from).
As I write this, warm weather is coming to Western Australia, and with every passing weekend more and more people are going to the beach. Earlier this month, on October 11 and 12, a nonprofit organization called the Tangaroa Blue foundation held its annual Western Australia Beach Cleanup. Some 1500 volunteers combed 130 beaches up and down the western coast collecting plastic rubbish and other debris. The goal of the event is to keep the coastline litter-free clean, but this year volunteers were well aware that they might well stumble upon evidence that could help solve history’s most puzzling aviation mystery. “When [MH370] first happened, and they said where they thought it went down, I said to myself, ‘Oh crap,” because I knew this is where it would come,” says event organizer Renee Mouritz. With those drift patterns in mind, the organization set up an informal protocol to pass along reports of any suspected MH370 debris to the AMSA. But so far, Mouritz says, “nobody has fed anything back to us.”
There’s an old saw that’s oft quoted in discussions of MH370: “The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” But from a Bayesian perspective, the absence of data is itself data. If the plane crashed into the Indian Ocean, it should have created many pieces of debris, and some of those pieces should have wound up on a shore by now. The more time passes without that happening, the greater the possibility that the plane did not go into the ocean.
This idea makes some people extremely uncomfortable. Indeed, some people insist that we know that the plane is in the southern ocean because Inmarsat’s frequency data tells us that it must be. They argue that there are any number of reasons why the debris cannot be found. One is that the plane might have ditched gently enough to have remained intact, a sort of deepwater Miracle on the Hudson, though this obviously could not be the case if the ATSB’s default flew-south-on-autopilot-until-it-ran-out-of-gas scenario is correct.
Tim Clarke, for his part, appears less than completely convinced by the frequency data. As he puts it, “We have not seen a single thing that suggests categorically that this aircraft is where they say it is.” As time goes by without debris turning up, we can expect sentiments like Clarke’s to become increasingly common.
UPDATE: My assertion that no commercial plane crash at sea prompted Twitter use @fxnighttrader to alert me to the case of the Varig Boeing 707-323C freighter which disappeared off the coast of Japan in 1979. The plane had taken off from Narita and was 30 minutes into a planned flight to Rio de Janeiro when it ceased radio contact and was never heard from again. Intriguingly, among the cargo were 153 paintings by contemporary artist Manabu Mabe, which were valued at $1.24 million, or about $4 million in today’s money. @fxnighttrader writes, “This plane went into the ocean less than 200 miles from Japan and no piece was ever found,” but I think it would be more accurate to say that the plane vanished and no one ever figured out why.
UPDATE 2: Brock McEwan reports, “The ATSB seems to have just removed from their site all reference to the AMSA drift analysis.”
Thanks, good catch, Brock. I’ve updated the post.
Hi,
Anyone knows if, meanwhile, this piece has been identified?
http://www.maldivesfinest.com/mh370-evidence
The ATSB’s pull of the “AMSA debris drift” paragraph from its site may not be all that seismic an event – it was included in the weekly updates of Oct22 and 29, then dropped from the Nov5 update. Since paragraphs come and go in this section (though I note the “gosh, this is hard!” paragraph has yet to be deemed stale), we can’t read too much into this development just yet.
What annoys me is not just the bizarre conclusion (drifted west) – nor just its bizarrely fleeting appearance; it’s how cleverly worded it was:
“…drift modelling undertaken by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority has suggested that if there were any floating debris, it is far more likely to have travelled west, away from the coastline of Australia. It is possible that some materials may have drifted to the coastline of Indonesia…”
Drifted west from WHERE? Away from WHICH Australian coastline? For that matter: toward which Indonesian coastline? Yes, it is POSSIBLE the debris has reached Indonesia – anything is POSSIBLE – but why not explicitly STATE that AMSA’s analysis pointed to that shore, rather than just implying it, by putting the statements side-by-side.
It was the same thing with “flew faster” – a clear attempt to convey – without ever actually STATING – that the faster flying CAUSED the March 28 search move, when in fact both mathematics and Martin Dolan himself confirm that move was DESPITE that assumption change. In court, they can claim they never MEANT to suggest that A caused B; “we just put A and B in the same sentence, to preserve punctuation”. Budget cuts, you know.
We are not communicating with searchers, or even investigators. We are communicating with lawyers.
Hey Matty:
I think your previous posts re private planes getting intercepted/forced down over Indonesia (but if you buy their claims, MH370 wasn’t spotted) – and “but the Indonesian anti terror police unit is funded by Australia and cooperation on terror has taken a lot of massaging?” underscores how much of an iceberg lies (unexplored) beneath the surface.
As to the debris story (because it’s slowly becoming one unto itself), not hard to imagine that depending on size, density weight and other factors, pieces of MH370 (and its contents) would be strewn hither and yon. But again, why there doesn’t seem to be any popping up (yet) begs a thousand questions…
On that note, take a look at this video by @aussie500: https://t.co/eaU7BUZ9tz
Don’t know that I’d agree that there were/are survivors IF 370 went into the SIO. But she’s done an extensive bit on the debris (or should I say, lack of) and has some very interesting observations – including a Chinese fishing ship that has curiously shown up on the scene.
Brock:
“Drifted west from WHERE?”
Exactement. And perhaps why AMSA’s drift analysis (not insignificant information) was dropped from the Nov 5th update – without mention or explanation.
“We are communicating with lawyers.”
Highly likely. Or civil servants running a play in consultation with the lawyers. Even scarier.
Ambiguity is a formidable weapon in the hands of those who’ve been trained to use it.
So how will people respond to it?
@Niels: That fire suppression bottle along with sighting of a low flying airliner in the Maldives is a strange page in the chapter on MH370. The fire suppression bottle certainly has a serial number that can be used to trace its origin. Boeing has been quiet on this matter, and the media has not followed up in some time.
The existence of the data from the Maldives as well as the satellite data pointing to a path ending in the SIO are what led me to explore the possibility that two planes were involved in this incident. There is no other way to reconcile the two sets of evidence, assuming both sets are valid.
@Niels, Victor:
There was massive back-and-forth re the unidentified suppression bottle on pprune and finally, someone posted a drawing of a B777 fire bottle – doesn’t match the one found on the Maldives beach:
http://i.imgur.com/flkmadS.jpg
That being said, where’d the found bottle come from? Agree with Victor. This story has not been settled.
Regarding the redaction of the ACARS data prior to the diversion at IGARI, one can only wonder at the motive.
Inmarsat was quite clear (or alternatively, intentionally vague) in stating at its Royal Dog-and-Pony show in London that they had provided all of the data pertaining to the flight to the Malaysian authorities either directly or via the AAIB and/or ISAT. One can assume, then, that the Malaysians are responsible for the redaction, while Malaysia maintains authority over the investigation thanks to international convention; there is also the issue that the data is the property of MAS (and perhaps others) and thus Inmarsat is constrained from releasing it directly to the public.
Suppose the motive for the redaction was that the ACARS data would reveal that the FMS had been reprogrammed prior to the diversion at IGARI. Furthermore, the data would also reavel the new programmed waypoints, from which one could infer the destination for the diversion.
If the data were to reveal that the destination for the diversion was KL or some other airport in Malaysia, AND there was evidence redacted from the Preliminary Report that knowledge of the destination for the diversion had passed up the Malaysian civil and military chains of command in a timely enough manner to have reached a superior communication node while the aircraft was yet over Malaysia, then we could conceivably have a motive for the redaction of the logs.
I do recall the redaction of the name of a miltary officer in the preliminary report; I wonder as to the identity of this person and how long he had been ‘in the room.’
The destination for the diversion is a key element to answering any number of quesitons, while it also opens the door to a host of others areas that could be explored in a matter that increasingly appears to be wholly intrinsic to Malaysia, no matter that the flight terminated in the SIO. If the FMS was in fact reprogammed prior to the diversion at IGARI, it would be great to know the intended destination of the flight, while it would appear that the ‘redacting party’ may be in posession of such information. Finally, whether the motive was solely to cover-up having misplaced a B-777 or something other, it would perhaps be quite revealing to know of it.
Any thoughts here?
Sent from my iPad
Rand:
“Suppose the motive for the redaction was that the ACARS data would reveal that the FMS had been reprogrammed prior to the diversion at IGARI…from which one could infer the destination for the diversion.”
GREAT question.
And(related to yours) –
NEW (Nov 6): Des Ross follows up his provocative piece on the MH370 mystery
“The question remains … how did the RMAF air defence system know, with such certainty, that they were tracking a civilian aircraft heading from the Gulf of Thailand over mainland Malaysia, and in fact over Penang, the main RMAF base in the area, and that it was not going to threaten the security of the State of Malaysia in any way? Why did they not follow the same internationally recognised procedures as did Indonesia and the UK, and send up interceptors to ensure that it was not a threat?”
http://t.co/spI1UEXNQF
The bottle, the drift predictions, the Curtin boom, and the Maldives all lead me to wonder if there is a secondary theory being watched carefully.
I believe some of drift models took debris from the middle of the IO to Indonesia.
It’s entirely possible that the agencies have some evidence that doesn’t quite fit. To the extent that the evidence fits the SIO, they mention it. If it doesn’t, it’s held back, but maybe they misjudged the reaction to the drift data. In a criminal case, this would be akin to withholding a secondary suspect’s name.
I’d like to point out at least two “non-standard” airplane parts that have changed history.
First, a piece of aluminum was found near Nikumororo, possibly from Earhardt’s plane. But it wasn’t a match. Until a few weeks ago, that is, when a photo of a non-standard window plug was re-examined.
Next, the piece of aluminum that took down the Concorde was a non-standard repair to a DC-10.
I believe there are a few other notables, just among the fatal accidents. Which means there are likely many more examples of cheap parts out there.
So, non-777 debris does not necessarily mean it didn’t come from MH370. In some situations, like the bottle, the obvious question is, as Victor alludes, “who’s is it?” I’m open to either a two plane incident or a non-standard
part. Neither is ridiculous anymore. The searched area is now the size of Rhode Island.
FYI, here’s a good Reddit thread, which includes close-up shots of the fire suppression bottle found in the Maldives: http://t.co/qJekp5Y3Pv
@ Rand
Those are great questions. That the FMS was potentially reprogrammed prior to IGARI is something I have suspected ever since having many close listenings to the released (and probably doctored, which effectively assigns them a meaningless sum, some would argue) ATC tape.
I believe that BOTH FL350 confirmations were made by Zaharie, the first at 1:01 and the second (and redundant) at 1:07. This places Fariq’s voice as last being heard at 12:50, a full 31 minutes before the IGARI turn back.
Most (though not all, Cherryl) believe that Fariq was handling comms that evening from pushback until the handoff read back (where we have 2 sources identifying that final transmission as coming from Zaharie).
From my countless listenings, I feel something took place between 12:50 and 1:01 that rendered Fariq incapable of intervention (at this point he was probably just locked out). This scenario also supports the FMS reentries.
What I find most notable and intriguing here is the redundant FL350 transmission at 1:07. Was this Zaharie inadvertently and unnecessarily transmitting, or was he perhaps uncomfortable for some reason and wanted to let KLATCC know all was ‘well’? Or something else entirely?
Or, am I quite incorrect about whose voice was transmitting when, everything being normal up until that redundant transmission.
In which case:
Was this Fariq, sensing the energy of the man next to him and the impending doom (or real possibility of), and not wanting to alert Zaharie to his suspicions, surreptitiously contacting KLATCC in said redundant manner, desperately trying to alert then to a potential situation?
Much has been said about the ability to turn a switch in the cockpit to lock the door electonically. It is true that such a switch exists. But, according to line pilots I know, it is also true that for some airlines (all?) it is SOP for the flight crew to carry, or have access to, a physical key that will unlock the door from the outside.
Since the discussion has drifted back to IGARI, I want to mention something we learned in the sim last Sunday about the turn back to Malaysia after IGARI. Many have wondered, why did they make two closely spaced turns, each roughly 90 degrees, near IGARI? When we simulated this part of the flight, we learned that the PFD shows very little of the area behind the aircraft. If the pilot had an emergency, and wanted to bring up the 4 closest alternate landing strips on the PFD, he would not have been able to see them on the display without first turning at least 90 degrees. After turning 90 degrees left, you see the alternates on the left side of the display. At that point, it is easy to select one, hit a button, and the aircraft autopilot makes another turn to the alternate. This might also explain why the first 90 degree turn appears to be a steeper turn to the left, followed a few seconds later by a more normal turn of about 70 degrees back in the direction of an alternate airport.
Mike – I’m surprised to hear that the crew may carry a key to the cockpit door. To me that says the door isn’t really secure if there is a key or keys floating around the cabin? Having worked on an armoured truck many years ago it’s all electric solenoids and a static crew member in the back. The road crew don’t have any way in once out of the vehicle. I once had 23 million in cash at my feet, another time tubs and tubs of diamonds value unknown, the guys in the cockpit have all those lives.
I had always imagined there was no key, and perhaps a rule where at least two had to be in the cockpit at any one time? Sounds like I was wrong?
@airlandseaman,
The PFD (Primary Flight Display) shows among others airspeed, attitude and altitude). I believe you are referring to the ND (Navigation Display), a.k.a. horizontal situation display.
Matty: I was surprised to hear about the keys too. But that is what Paul (a current 777 line pilot) told me. This practice may not be the same for all airlines.
Gysbreght: Please excuse my lack of precision. Yes, I was referring to the Nav display. Don tells me there is a PLAN mode for the 747 Nav display that does put the aircraft at the center. I’m checking to see if that is also available on the 777 Nav display. If so, not sure why Paul did not think to bring that up.
Gysbreght: No offense, but was not your reply to Mike a tad pedantic? Mike was simply sharing a bit of his experience in the simulator when he had no obligation to do so. Furthermore, I happened to note how that, even in the context of simulated flight, his passion for flying is so evident that his little technical blurb on the PFD/ND brought a little warmth to my guts.
I hope that this is neither too intrusive nor too public, but you make valuable, highly salient contributions to this forum, and I you see as more as a full-fledged peer amongst the technically savvy, rather than a critic. I suppose one could argue that we need someone to chase down errors in presentation, but I really don’t see this as your role, given your level of technical awareness.
Now, if I could please ask you to get your noodle around whether the columnar redactions in the data logs could perhaps include redacted ACARS transmissions of FMS mid-flight waypoint inputs, I would greatly appreciate it.
@airlandseaman: Mike, evidence that the plane made two turns at 17:26 that are consistent with a pilot choosing an alternate airport through the navigational display is an important observation. Thank you for sharing this.
Matty: keys, a keypad, an electronic lock…I have been on hundreds of flights and have always marveled at how rather un-secure flight decks remain. The flight deck crew are forever coming and going, leaving the door ajar while completing a conversation, etc. If one wanted ingress to a flight deck, it is really rather only a matter of timing in most situations. My favorite example is the post-911 retrofit of a collapsible stainless steel gate outside the flight deck entrance on the upper deck of a 747-400. On the aircraft that flies SFO-PVG-SFO, the gate has been malfunctioning for years, so that a flight attendant needs to hold the bottom of the gate with her foot whenever a pilot exits to use the lavatory.
The only way to make a flight deck truly secure would be create a forward bulkhead, where the flight deck is fully self-sufficient (e.g., lav and coffee maker) and only an emergency protocol would have either the Captain or the FO ever making a showing in the cabin. The Chief Purser would then need to be elevated in terms of their authority/proficiency, of course, but any other solution would only provide more of the something-less that we have now. Ironically, a 777 is perfectly suited to the creation of a forward bulkhead, as the forward galley area is quite spacious. Why, even the internal EE bay hatch could be secured behind such a retrofit.
Rand posted November 6, 2014 at 9:41 AM :
“ Gysbreght: No offense, but was not your reply to Mike a tad pedantic?”
Sure, it was certainly pedantic, and I hesitated quite a bit before posting it. However, it reflects my difficulty, with a picture of the PFD in mind, of understanding “that the PFD shows very little of the area behind the aircraft”. I’m looking forward to more of Mike’s observations in that simulator, and understanding those would benefit from correct identification of displays, panels, controls, switches, etc.
BTW, for several reasons I do not share Mike’s speculation about the turns, but see little point in putting my speculation against his’.
“Now, if I could please ask you to get your noodle around whether the columnar redactions in the data logs could perhaps include redacted ACARS transmissions of FMS mid-flight waypoint inputs, I would greatly appreciate it.”
I know a thing or two about sailplanes (private life) and about transport airplanes (professionally). About Satcom I merely absorb and interpret information provided by more knowledgeable contributors to this and other forums. It seems to me that it is sometimes ignored that Inmarsat provides a communication service, and does not ‘own’ the information that its customers transmit over its network. The communications log contains ‘administrative’ data about communications, that enable Inmarsat to monitor the functioning of its facilities and to bill the customers. The released log extract gives an example of a log entry, and identifies the columns that have been omitted for ‘readability’. It also identifies the nature of the messages, i.e. ACARS, IFE, telephone, or ‘technical’. I’m not sure I understand what you are asking.
@Nihonmama, VictorI
So a “negative identification”, which is something, thanks! Still would be important to know where the bottle possibly came from.
I wish to add that I do have high expectations for the current SIO search zone, also based on my own BFO calculations:
http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/899#comment-8781
I really hope this search will reveal the final resting place of MH370, as a first step to understand what happened.
Nevertheless, difficult to close the Maldives chapter. I find the sighting of low flying a/c intriguing. It was surprising that authorities did not seem to take it serious; I recall they even denied it happened.
I’m curious for the exact time of the event. Is the 6:15 am a rough estimate given by one of the residents and picked up by the local media, or is this solid data based on several witness reports?
Rand, in reply to post November 5, 2014 at 9:35 PM, “Regarding the redaction of the ACARS data…”
Malaysia’s reticence for transparency is certainly a problem. I don’t believe that the FMS Reporting over the datalink would include ‘intent’, i.e. waypoints related to a pre-stored, alternate route, but I doubt that. The core objective for the reporting is performance and dispatch reliability so “what might be” is really of no interest to those functions.
Any data transferred over the satcom datalink, prior to 17:07 & assumed to be normal ACARS encapsulated status reporting & comms, is likely unrelated to the deviation. The aircraft progress before 17:07, indeed, 17:21 has been logged via public ADS-B trackers and it was apparently normal. However, I am keen to see full disclosure of the information exchanged over the link, it will be extremely valuable to get the exact time & position data from the flight progress reports prior to 17:21. I am assuming that all 1115 signalling units recorded in the [satcom] Data Communications Log from 16:00:43.406 are the complete record albeit with 19 fields of metadata redacted. That is, no SU after 16:00:43.406 has been omitted.
Post deviation, at 17:21 we have no evidence of any messages initiated by the avionics systems (there’s simply no transfers of sufficient SUs that are typical of such messages). However, there is still a wealth of useful information as yet undisclosed because of the redaction.
The paucity of factual information is the highlight of the story to date.
Consider the totality of factual information released by Mlsia concerning MH370 to date. Do note my emphasis, I can only relate what Mlsia has chosen to release.
1) Inmarsat Doppler Analysis, 25th March. Three (3) pages providing a summary explanation for the outcome derived from satcom datalink metadata. (Inmarsat has now published a comprehensive account in the Journal of Navigation paper.)
2) The MoT/MY Preliminary Report, 2nd May 2014.
Five (5) pages dated 9th April 2014 and annotated with a protective marking of ‘Confidential’;
Finally released for public consumption on 2nd May 2014 (initially via Facebook)
Further information simultaneously to the Preliminary Report but unreferenced by it: a) log of ‘Actions Taken (between ATC bodies and MAS OCC); b) incomplete cargo manifest; c) passenger manifest; d) a number map graphics showing tracks considered to be viable paths taken by 9M-MRO.
3) MH370 Data Communication Logs, 26th May 2014.
47 pages recording only 9 of the 28 items of metadata and user data associated with 1115 Signalling Units exchanged between 9M-MRO and the SATCOM Ground Earth Station at Perth.
By way of comparison and illustration of what should be expected as a public interim or preliminary report from an air accident investigation:
BEA, France, concerning AF447. Date of incident 1 Jun 2009; date of Premliminary Report 28 Jul 2009, one hundred twenty eight (128) pages.
RADAR surveillance reports: Y
ATC exchanges: Y
Air-Ground Datacomms: Y
Weather: Y
OVV, Netherlands, concerning MH17. Date of incident 17 Jul 2014, date of Premliminary Report 9 Sep 2014, thirty four (34) pages.
RADAR surveillance reports: Y
ATC exchanges: Y
Air-Ground Datacomms: N
Weather: Y
METD, Mali, concerning AH5017. Date of accident 24 Jul 2014, date of Premliminary Report 20 Sep 2014, sixty two (62) pages.
RADAR surveillance reports: N (no coverage)
ATC exchanges: Y
Air-Ground Datacomms: N (not equipped)
Weather: Y
It is expected that a preliminary report details the communications, flight progress and circumstances up to and during the incident. Those details are evident in the 3 reports noted above whereas the Mlsia MH370 report comprises :
RADAR surveillance reports: N (significant coverage, no data presented)
ATC exchanges: Y
Air-Ground Datacomms: N (significant coverage, no data presented)
Weather: N
Obfuscation is similarly evident in Malaysia’s communications related to its commitments to sIO bathymetrix survey and search activity. On 4th August KD Mutiara left Lumut Navy base for a 4 month bathymetric survey deployment in the sIO: it never reached the sIO. It has been twice reported in the South China Sea during October, most recently locating a sunken tug boat off Kuantan. In July, Mlsia announced a commitment to provide 2 search vessels for the sIO, only one has materialised & only under a six month commitment funded by Petronas while Australia has openly contracted Fugro to provide two vessels for a 12 months search program.
:Don
It sure seems strange that after the aircraft turned back it had at least three airports;
Kota Bharu, Penang, and Maimun Soleh,
to land if under emergency…
RE: ACARS and FMS
Unless MH370 was navigating under ADS-C (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Contract), I don’t think it likely that ACARS on 9M-MRO was configured to transmit changes to the active flight plan in the FMS. The following extract is for an A330 operated by Air France, but may contain some useful background (some acronyms annotated by me).
Extract from BEA Interim Report #1 on AF447:
1.6.8 ACARS communication system
The ACARS system, integrated in the ATSU (Air Traffic Service Unit) on Air France’s Airbus A330, is used to transmit non-vocal messages between an aircraft and the ground by VHF or satellite communication. It can be used in particular by operators to transmit information in real time (meteorological data, flight progress information, etc.).
There are three major categories of message that can be transmitted:
non-vocal (ATC) communication messages with an air traffic control center (CPDLC – Controller-Pilot DataLink Communications – in particular),
operational communication messages (AOC – Airline Operational Control) with the operator’s operations centre,
maintenance messages, exclusively from the aircraft to the maintenance centre.
ACARS messages are transmitted as a priority by VHF or by satellite if VHF is unavailable. They pass through an ACARS service provider’s server (ARINC or SITA) before arriving at the operator’s centre.
Information relative to the network (processing by the ground station and/or service provider’s server) and information relative to the satellite (type of message, channel used, etc.) is added to the useful message.
The ATC and operational messages are generated by the ATSU. The maintenance
messages are generated by the CMC (Central Maintenance Computer) and transferred to the ATSU before being transmitted. Of these three types of message, it is the ATC messages that have the highest priority.
Note: the operator can configure part of the ATSU (the AOC part in particular) so as to filter the maintenance messages transmitted or to send specifi c types of information relative to the fl ight.
F-GZCP was programmed to automatically transmit its position approximately every ten minutes.
@Niels, Victor, (Rand):
Per the WSJ:
“Mohamed Zaheem, president of the local council on Kuda Huvadhoo island, around 110 miles from the Maldivan capital, Malé, said in a telephone interview Wednesday that about five residents came to him separately on March 8 to say they had seen a large plane flying low overhead at about 6:15 a.m. local time.”
https://twitter.com/nihonmama/status/446326016626024448
Coming full circle Niels. Reading back through the convo connected to that tweet, I also see a tweet re your very interesting post on DS re the Mega Maldives flight, Were you ever able to learn more about it?
And — a very interesting excerpt from an IBTimes article that I missed originally — it came out the same day as the Haveeru article you cited on DS (03.18), the day before the WSJ:
“But the fire plus emergency diversion theory, as compelling as it is and similar to other known incidents, leaves one question unanswered. If the pilots tried for a landing at Langkawi and missed because they became incapacitated, the autopilot would have kept them flying straight and level on the last compass heading. (Which would have taken MH370 more or less over Kuda Huvadhoo, by the way.)
So, either someone was entering those waypoints in the flight management computers, or the computers had been programmed earlier to send the plane there. The former option is not consistent with an unconscious or dead crew. The latter makes no sense for a crew in a dire emergency, looking for the closest place to land — unless one wants to believe the improbable and now-debunked scenario that hackers were steering the plane.”
http://bit.ly/1tMHECA
@Niels, Victor, (Rand):
Have a response for you (with URLs) that’s in the queue.
Gysbreght,
That is a useful summary from BEA. The FMS flight progress reporting will be separate to the ATC comms (ADS-C, CPDLC, AFN, etc). The messages will involve different endpoints beyond the SITA ACARS hub (on the ground) & have different formats.
It was interesting to read that AF447 failed to establish ADS-C prior to the incident as Senegal was operating a trial with Eurocontrol and the AFN log-on failed because of a registration error.
We know for sure 9M-MRO was sending AOC “OOOI” messages: one – the Off msg – has been decoded in full from some printed material waived in front of a CNN camera and the Out msg is also evident in the log. That Off message confirmed the fuel qty at take off. After that Off message the ACARS transmissions are longer, multi-block, messages more typical of CPDLC or FMS reporting.
MAS stated at an early press conference that their B777‘s report route progress at 30 minute intervals.
On the B777 these various communications functions and prioritisation are managed within the AIMS platform.
Also, CPDLC wasn’t mandatory for KL ATCC. ICAO working group reports indicate that the staff weren’t yet fully competent in working CPDLC alongside established radio procedures.
Readers should note these are very terse & rigidly structured messages. Terse in that each signalling unit carries only 8 characters of a message so the equivalent to a 160 char SMS/cellphone text message requires approximately 20 signalling units. There are no long sequences of T channel SUs recorded in the log after 17:07 (but there is a number of other events that warrant analysis).
:Don
I think we should demand precision from the Oz government on:
“flew faster”
[by how many kts? between where and where? why was speed assumption not pinned by primary radar track?
“we know the position of the (FDR) to within some kilometres”
[how many kms, exactly? what precise coordinate range contained them?]
“passed close to a NW point at 1912”
[what exact coordinate was this? when and why did you add this path loop? when and why did you drop it?]
“(surface debris) far more likely to have travelled west”
[at what exact coordinate did AMSA’s model start it drifting? from which Oz shore did it then retreat, and to which Indo shore did it eventually head?]
Enough is enough.
@GuardedDon:
Thanks. I had some misgivings whether the BEA report would interest anyone.
@airlandseaman, @victorI, et. al.,
To aid quantification of Mike’s observation, below is a marked up zoomed view of the turn back (which I prepared in another context from the radar image in the ATSB reports). The first turn is about 110°.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/gx20mul24ojn7yx/TurnRadiiToScaleV3.pdf?dl=0
And the scaling calcs relating the marked up dimensions to the lat/lon grid.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/3hhc8toqwx5pdgc/TurnRadiiToScaleV2Calcs.pdf?dl=0
It may be interesting to see which airports become visible on the ND at that point and flight path direction.
If you can give me a rough estimate on the angle behind the plane that is visible on the ND, I could mark up another drawing on a larger scale and see which airports come into view.
Cheers,
Will
Gysbreght,
The Air Accident Investigation reports are significant publications & all have valuable insights (if you’re aero minded). BEA’s work on AF447 was comprehensively described in their reports, it’s a good example of how-to.
Niels, Victor, Rand:
“Circling back. A very interesting nugget re the Maldives that I missed. #MH370”
http://t.co/YVvmA6Qi72
Niel, Victor Rand, all:
From my previous post (re the Maldives):
“If the pilots tried for a landing at Langkawi and missed because they became incapacitated, the autopilot would have kept them flying straight and level on the last compass heading. (Which would have taken MH370 more or less over Kuda Huvadhoo, by the way.)”
Now, another nugget pops up – from @petrossian, who, for some time, has been tweeting very quietly (and very cryptically) about his own expedition to learn more about MH370. His tweets also suggest that he (formerly) worked in intelligence.
From June:
“They saw a low flying jet too 60 nm n of Peros Banhos flying south. No fire but blinking pos lights.”Very loud”!”
https://twitter.com/lucybarnes_/status/530541817423757312
Peros Banhos, nearest to the Maldives, is an atoll in the (now uninhabited) Chagos Archipelago, which also includes Diego Garcia.
Thanks much to Lucy Barnes for flagging this tweet.
Airlandseaman,
Thank you for sharing your simulation findings with us. Very great post from you as usual. That supports my KISS theory as well, (keep it simple, stupid) about the 90 degree turns and possibly lending credence to trying to get to the nearest airports as a result of some on board emergency. I’ve always thought that and I am by far no aviation expert.
As far as cockpit keys or gaining access via the Air New Zealand way, avionics bay, or whatever, I don’t necessarily buy that Fariq Hamid was “locked out” of the cockpit, especially if, and that is a big if, the MH88 findings are true and they heard a “mumbling co-pilot” circa 17:30. If he was “locked out” it seems there are ways to get back in, unless armed perps were in there.
Spencer,
I thought it was a general consensus on Duncan’s site that the redundant line could be prompting KLATC for the higher flight level (390) if previously requested.
I don’t recall where most thought Fariq Hamid was on comms most of the way, wasn’t it exactly the opposite with Captain Zaharie starting out and Fariq Hamid coming in later?
All I know is I discern two distinctly different voices, one is younger sounding than the other, has a quicker delivery time, and has less of an accent.
All normal prior to the redundant line you think? I don’t see it that way. Take Mr. Hamid for example, he’d be “on” like an actor would, excited and primed for his script on his first unsupervised flight, slurring over the flight number? That doesn’t jive with me.
The redundant line is interesting to say the least, I don’t know what it means, but is has several characteristics to it:
a. Contains another misnomer of the Flight #
b. Comes 6 or 7 minutes after the first line
c. Has a sound or sense of urgency to it
d. Could be prompting for a higher FL390
e. Could be prompting something else
f. Could be one of them or the other not realizing it was already said
g. None of the above
Cheryl:
Your post just reminded me of another small detail noticed during the simulation to IGARI. We had the aircraft configured for ECON Mode with a CI of 50. Paul said that virtually all airlines use this autopilot mode to minimize cost. Other 777 and 747 pilots have told me the same thing. In ECON Mode, the autopilot & autothrottles will hold whatever altitude is set in the VNAV, and optimize the speed (mach), but the computer also calculates the best altitude to fly for any given point (as the fuel burns off). Anyway, as we approached IGARI, I recall Paul bringing up a display to check on our ECON details and it showed that as of that point in the flight (down to ~97,000 lbs), the optimum altitude for best economy was already FL370. Thus, if the repeated “FL350 report” was intended to be a subtle reminder that a higher altitude was desirable, that would be consistent with the computer recommended FL at that point in the flight.
Airlandseaman,
Wow that is interesting. You may have just nailed two puzzles pieces, why the 90 degree turns and why the redundant line. As far as pilot jargon goes and protocol with ATC in communications, why do they have to be so cryptic if they want to attain a higher flight level? Why can’t they just more explicitly say to ATC “We’re getting a computer recommended FL370 here, can we get it?” That’s not many more words than “Malaysian (8,H,or A) 370 maintaining flight level 350,” it’s not disrespectful and what the model is recommending.
Cheryl;
Pilots are trained to minimize the time occupying the channel because it is a shared channel, often with a lot of traffic. So routine exchanges are often “coded” in shorthand. That said, I have never understood why some people put so much weight on the second report at FL350. I don’t think it is that unusual. To me, it was just a redundant report. I don’t read anything else into it.
Airlandseaman, Cheryl,
Link to image with dimensions on the first of two turns in queue (I hope).
First turn appears about 110°. KLIA still “behind” the plane on direction after first turn, but 110° could just be enough to have it pop in view on ND.
Cheers
Will
Airlandseaman,
Perhaps because MH370 was never heard from again shortly after that redundant line that folks have attached some significance to it I don’t know. It may not stand out so much in any other normal flight. I see it as hinting at the higher flight level. But what gets me more about it is that they can’t get the flight number right yet at that point. And I think it’s the beginning affects of hypoxia or something about to overcome them. Whatever reared it’s ugly head happened shortly thereafter prompting the IGARI turn I assume.
@Cheryl, airlandseaman,
I will let this topic slide on by, as we will simply run around in vagaries.
However, IF you believe MH370 to be intentional (criminal), then the redundant FL350 transmission doubtless deserves a level of scrutiny otherwise perhaps unwarranted.
It seems most improbable (this from my pilot friends, directly) that this was simply a ‘hint’, hoping to be instructed to a more desirable altitude.
As for the notion of hypoxia, there is NOTHING that supports this theory in the slightest. It’s frankly absurd, given what we know. Sorry.
@Spencer,
Agreed. The crew requested FL350 prior to takeoff. If they had wanted a step climb to a higher altitude half an hour later they would have requested it.
JS – MAS operate a whole fleet of 777’s so an inspection of all fire suppression bottles might be interesting?
JS/Victor/Nihonmama – Maldives: They are good place to head to if you had high value cargo to move. Lots of remote airstrips and an Islamic govt that is increasingly radical. The laws there almost seem designed to allow laundering by terror groups which is precisely what happens there. They also happen to be about the only remote IO strips that really exist(simulator?).
The Curtin mob have backed off a little saying further analysis tends towards a seismic event but it’s not conclusive either. And the timing? And not a bad spot to dispose of a plane either.
A quasi-instantaneous heading change of 110 degrees as depicted in the radar trace is physically impossible in level flight at about 500 kTAS. If it is not an artefact of the rendering of recorded radar data, it would indicate a highly unusual dynamic aerobatic manoeuvre of the airplane.
The distance between the track towards BITOD and the reciprocal track is about 12 NM, corresponding to a steady turn at about 31 degrees of bank. The maximum bank angle an airline pilot would normally use at FL350 is 25 degrees.
It seems to me if the dynamic manoeuvre of the airplane was done, maybe it was trying to avoid another aircraft (military)??
At night, and the other aircraft is unknown and invisible to the (military) radar?
@Gysbreght, Why would the other plane be invisible to military radar? If it was invisible to military radar, it also would have been invisible to MH370, so how would they have known to avoid it?
@Jeffwise: Quite. Why would MF370 silence its transponder one minute earlier? Not report a near-miss and divert towards the SIO?
@jeffwise:
In short: Myron’s collision avoidance doesn’t make much sense. Please feel free to delete the last three posts.