It’s been more than six months since MH370 vanished, and in some ways we know no more now than we did in late March: no new clues have emerged, no more data has been discovered. In a sense, though, we have come a very long way. For one thing, we now understand how many of the “breaking news” developments that occurred in the early days were actually untrue. (There were no wild altitude swings, no “fighter plane-like” maneuvering, and probably no cell-tower connection with the first officer’s phone.) What’s more, thanks no doubt to a drumbeat of public pressure, the authorities have released a tremendous amount of data and provided useful explanations of how that data is being interpreted. And finally, a spontaneous collaboration between technical experts and enthusiasts around the world has provided a trove of insight into avionics, aerodynamics, satellite communications, and a whole host of other topics that collectively shed light on what might and what might not have taken place on the night of March 7/8, 2014.
While a great deal of information has become available, it has not always been easy to find; much of it, for instance, has been exchanged via email chains and Dropbox accounts. For my part, I often find myself rummaging through emails and folders looking for information that I’m pretty sure I’ve seen, but can’t remember where. So what I’d like to do with this post is try to aggregate some of the most basic facts — a set of canonical values, if you will, of the basic data on MH370. Necessarily, some of this data comes with implicit assumptions attached, so as far as possible I’ll try to make these assumptions explicit.
Okay, on to the data. What we know now:
The bedrock data. In the wake of MH370’s data, there were numerous news reports concerning information leaked by anonymous sources from within the investigation and elsewhere that have subsequently been either disproven or inadequately verified. For the purposes of the present discussion, the following are considered the bedrock sources of information upon which our understanding of the incident can be built — the “Holy Trinity” of MH370 data:
- Up to 17:21: radio communications, ACARS, transponder, ADS-B
- 17:22-18:22: military radar track. This information is of uncertain provenance but has been endorsed by the governments of both Malaysia and Australia. Furthermore, it plausibly connects the prior and following data sets.
- 18:25-0:19: Inmarsat data, especially BFO and BTO values. There is some discussion as to how this data is best interpreted, but the numbers themselves are assumed to have been received and recorded by Inmarsat from MH370 via their 3F-1 satellite. The “ping rings” in particular are derived through relatively simple mathematics and should be regarded as established fact unless someone comes up with a specific mechanism by which some other result could be obtained.
Timeline. Courtesy of Richard Godfrey and Don Thompson, here is a basic timeline of MH370’s disappearance (all times UTC):
- 16:41:43 MH370 departs runway at KUL runway 32R
- 17:01:14 MH370 flight crew report top of climb at 35,000 feeet
- 17:07:48.907 Last acknowledged DATA-2 ACARS message sent from plane
- 17:19:29 Last radio voice transmission
- 17:21:04 Plane passes over IGARI waypoint
- 17:21:13 MH370 disappears from air traffic control (secondary) radar screens
- 18:22 Last primary radar fix
- 18:25:27 Inmarsat log-on request initiated by aircraft
- 0:19 Final transmission from aircraft to satellite
A more complete table of values, including the location of the plane at each point in time, can be found here, courtesy of the inimitable Paul Sladen. And Don Thompson has created an impressively detailed breakdown of the sequence of events, with a special focus on radio communications between the aircraft, ground, and satellite, here.
More stuff after the jump…
Physical characteristics. MH370 was a Boeing 777-200ER. Its “zero fuel mass” (ZFM) was 174,000 kg. With 49,200 kg of fuel aboard, its takeoff weight was 223,200 kg. (We know the fuel aboard on takeoff at 16:41 thanks to Paul Sladen’s deciphering of ACARS data shown briefly onscreen during a CNN segment. Note that in a press statement Malaysia Airlines indicated that the fuel load on takeoff was 49,100 kg.) UPDATE: Thanks to the October ATSB report, we now know that the fuel remaining at 17:07 was 43,800 kg.
UPDATE 2: Don Thompson has rounded up four publications which contain a wealth of 777 technical information: Boeing 777 Flight Management System Pilot’s Guide, Qatar Airways 777 Flight Crew Operations Manual, United Airlines 777 Aircraft Maintenance Manual/Satcom System, and Honeywell Multi-Channel SATCOM System Description, Installation, and Maintenance Manual.
Communications. In addition to a traditional transponder for use with ATC secondary radar, MH370 was equipped with ADS-B equipment that was operational the night it disappeared. The plane was equipped with VHF and HF radios for voice and data communication, which could also be sent and received via a satcom system that relied on one low-gain and two high-gain antennae mounted near the rear of the aircraft. (Specs, courtesty of Don Thompson, here.) These antennae were connected to a Honeywell/Thales MCS6000 satellite communications system located in the ceiling beneath them; this unit received location and velocity information needed to aim the high-gain antenna and to precompensate the transmission frequency via ARINC cable from the Inertial Reference System in the E/E bay. After the plane disappeared from primary radar, Malaysia Airlines made three attempts to reach its crew via satphone, but the calls did not go through; Don’s signal analysis of the three attempted phone calls suggests that the high-gain antenna might not have been working properly, perhaps because the antenna was not steered correctly.
Wind speed and temperature aloft. Stare at this for a while if you want to. If you like your data a bit rawer, you can find historical radiosonde data at the website of the University of Wyoming. For a more granular idea of what the weather was doing on the night in question, Barry Martin has compiled a large table of reanalyzed weather-model data from NOAA here.
Speed. As part of his paper detailing his estimate of where MH370 might have gone, Dr. Bobby Ullich has produced an impressive analysis of MH370’s speed before it disappeared from radar. While I’m agnostic as to the correctness of Bobby’s conclusions, I think he makes an excellent point with regard to the plane’s speed, which is that it clearly accelerated after the diversion at IGARI. The ground speed before the turn was about 470-474 knots, after, it was around 505-515 knots. Given that the winds aloft at the time were somewhere around 20 knots from the east-northeast, this would be broadly consistant either with an acceleration in airspeed or with a steady airspeed in the range of 490-495 knots.
In his ongoing analysis of MH370’s performance, Barry Martin points out that a likely speed for the plane to fly would be “Long Range Cruise,” or LRC, which can be selected through the flight management system. LRC is faster than the Maximum Range Cruise speed and 1 percent less fuel efficient. To quote a Boeing manual: “This speed… is neither the speed for minimum fuel consumption nor the speed for minimum trip time but instead is a compromise speed somewhere in between. It offers good fuel mileage but is faster than the maximum range cruise speed.” LRC is given as a Mach number, and varies with weight. At MH370’s takeoff weight, LRC at 35,000 feet would be Mach 0.84, which translates to 481 knots in a standard atmosphere. At the time, however, the temperature was 11 deg C higher than that of a standard atmosphere, so its true airspeed would be 494 knots.
It’s worth noting as well that Brian Anderson has devised an entirely different means of calculating airspeed, based on the observation that between 19:40 and 20:40 the plane reached its point of closest approach to the satellite; by calculating this distance, and estimating the time at which it occured, one comes up with a groundspeed that turns out to be, by Brian’s (and other’s) reckoning to be in the neighborhood of 494 knots. Brian observes that “by removing the wind vector, the answer becomes about 486 knots TAS.”
Richard Godfrey has run the numbers for the early part of the flight and come up with slightly different figures from Bobby Ullich.
The last ADS-B data shows a speeds around 471 to 474 knots. Last calculated Ground Speed was 474.3 knots. The average Ground Speed required to follow this path from the turn back point and get to Pulau Perak by 18:02:37 for the start of the Beijing Radar Trace is 510.7 knots. The difference between 474.3 and 510.7 is accounted for by an 18 knot head wind that becomes an 18 knot tail wind after turn back. The wind in the area was around 18 knots at the time. This would make the Air Speed 492.5 knots. The Ground Speed required to get from the start to the end of the Beijing Radar Trace by 18:22:12 is 503.6 knots.
He adds:
The major turns and turn back flight path occur at borders between Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand and India. Indonesian Airspace is carefully avoided in the Malacca Strait. The major turns are just out of range of the Malaysian, Thai and Vietnam radars. The Satcom Login at 18:25:27 is just 14 seconds after reaching NILAM which represents the point just out of range of the Malaysian and Thai radars.
Performance. As the plane flew along, it burned fuel, and thus became lighter. As a consequence its optimum altitude — that is to say, the altitude at which it would experience the greatest fuel efficiency — became higher, and its LRC at a given altitude would become lower. Additionally, as the plane moved to higher latitudes, the air would have gotten colder, which would reduce its true airspeed for a given Mach number. All these factors would tend to gradually reduce the measured ground speed of the plane, which is indeed what we see geometrically for straight-line flight through the ping rings. For more on aircraft performance, see Barry Martin’s excellent Analytic Fuel Flow Analysis.
The Satellite. From 18:25 onward the sole evidence we have of MH370’s fate comes from the analysis of a handful of electronic exchanges between the plane and Inmarsat satellite 3F-1, which occupies a geosynchronous orbit above the equator at 64.5 degrees east longitude. Its position was not fixed; two years before, due to the fact that its hydrazine thrusters were getting low on fuel, Inmarsat had begun to let its inclination slowly increase. By March 7/8, it had reached an inclination of 1.7 degrees. Paul Sladen has published a table of ephemera. Here is a chart produced by Duncan Steel, showing the progression of the subsatellite point during the course of MH370’s final hours (click to enlarge):
The Search. Via Don Thompson: As announced at a JACC press conference 28th April, on the occasion of the end of surface search, “Australia has been coordinating the search for 41 of the 52 days since MH370 went missing. In this period, more than 4.5 million square kilometres of ocean has been searched. There have been 334 search flights conducted, an average of eight a day for a total of over 3000 hours.”
On September 24, 2014, the ATSB announced that “over 106,000 square kilometres of the wide search area have been [bathymetric] surveyed.”
Inmarsat Raw Data and ATSB report. For two months after MH370 disappeared, members of the press and the general public begged and pleaded for the authorities to release the raw data logs of transmissions between Inmarsat and the missing plane. On May 27, 2014, they finally did.
In June, the Australian Transport Safety Board released a report (later updated) that provided even more useful information, this time explaining how the raw data had been interpreted. More recently, Inmarsat’s Chris Ashton was the lead author of a paper in the Journal of Navigation explaining how the company conducted its analysis.
Thanks to these documents, we now have a much better understanding of what transpired, and have the wherewithal to undertake a critical assessment of the official investigation–which, as I described in my last post, seems to be paying off.
Burst Frequency Offset is a measure of how the signal received by the satellite from the airplane has been shifted by various factors. You can measure how closely a prospective route matches the values recorded from MH370’s actual flight by using Yap’s BFO calculator.
End of the flight. The BFO data associated with the final “half ping” at 0:19 is anomalous in comparison to the preceding pings; it values that could not be generated by any combination of speed, location or heading that is physically possible for a 777. The data is compatible with a steep descent into the ocean at an acceleration of 0.7 g, which Mike Exner, Victor Iannello and others have interpreted as a spiral dive resulting from the fuel tanks running dry. There is some dispute at present as to whether fuel exhaustion would result in such a dramatic maneuver. While plans to enlist a professional-grade simulator are underway, John Fiorentino reports that he has already researched such an experiment, and says that the plane did not spiral dive but instead descended wings-level in a phugoid oscillation, that is to say, with the plane pitching down and gaining speed, then pitching up and losing speed, then pitching down and gaining speed, and so on. I’ve excerpted his report here.
More to come…
@Matty, Rand, and Brock, from the other thread…
I find it very interesting that the search is finally listening to the IG. I don’t, however, think it’s a good sign.
The minute the ATSB feels the IG is ahead of them, something is very wrong. Not because there’s anything wrong with the IG’s work, but because the ATSB has lost confidence in their own. That means whatever assumption was keeping their model so much further northeast had fallen apart.
I’ve been reading Barry Martin’s paper Analytic Fuel Flow Analysis. Does anyone know the source for the coëfficients in the appendices?
JS – Agree, and I thought it was a bad sign very early as well when Inmarsat were allowed to run with this ball, even ostensibly. The hands off attitude of the big boys meant one of two things. They had either done their own analysis or they put no weight in it. If the crowd source team have overtaken the A-Team, what’s going on? I always thought it would unravel, but if it does I won’t be gloating because there are so many implications to that.
The new search for MH370 is expected to start on Sunday, using three state-of-the-art vessels towing scanning sonar devices.
“They’re towed by a 10,000 metre long fibre optic cable to the sea floor and can scour the sea floor very, very carefully and survey in great detail at high resolution,” Fugro Survey project director Paul Kennedy said.
“So the areas we search we know 100 percent that if we run over an airplane we’ll know for sure.”
Read more: http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/confidence-increasing-in-the-search-for-mh370-20141001-10ota2.html#ixzz3Et6QbT1F
@Jeff Wise:
You posted September 30, 2014 at 2:18 PM “In my opinion we should regard all BFO values as speculative.”
I wouldn’t go quite as far. We just have to be aware of the limitations of the BFO, in particular its sensitivity to FFB and V/S. So, while we cannot say “18:40:08.068 BFO data shows the aircraft heading south on 180.83 degT”, we could say, for example:
At 18:39:55.354 the BFO was 88 Hz. Assuming level flight and FFB=150 Hz the airplane was moving southwards at 450 kts, which is consistent with a groundspeed of 500 kts on heading 206 degrees.
Likewise, at 18:28:14.904 the BFO was 143 Hz. Assuming level flight and FFB=150 Hz the airplane was moving northwards at 215 kts, which is consistent with a groundspeed of 500 kts on heading 295 degrees.
Gysbreght, You’re right, I stand corrected. I shouldn’t have said that we should regard the BFO values as speculative; what I meant to say was that we should regard any conclusions drawn from them as speculative, in that they rely on assumptions that are hypothetical.
@JeffWise
Can I assume then that you will not respond to any of the questions in my posts?
Such as you did to Gysbreght re: the BFO values.
Based on your correction do you then believe the “spiral dive” scenario to be speculative?
I do regard it is as speculative.
@JeffWise
Thank you Jeff.
So, can I assume the driving force behind the idea is Exner?
And, it is really the sine qua non for reasoning a reduction in the search area width?
JS: “That means whatever assumption was keeping their model so much further northeast had fallen apart.”
…or was never “together” to begin with.
Hence the citizen’s audit. Stay tuned.
@Luigi: In the March 14 Bloomberg article I cited earlier, their source, “a person familiar with the investigation”, reported that investigators themselves had by then already “discounted” the altitude indications of primary radar.
To me, the fact that different (?) official sources decided to blow wind into that theory’s sails for a few weeks in April and May says vastly more about the sources than it does the theory.
Timing.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released a rule Oct. 1 requiring airlines to replace within five years the Honeywell Int’l cockpit displays on more than 1,300 Boeing 737 and 777 jets. Tests found Wi-Fi, mobile phones, weather radar and satellite communications affected the displays.
“could result in loss of airplane control at an altitude insufficient for recovery, or controlled flight into terrain.”
CONTROLLED FLIGHT into terrain.
http://t.co/Zkor66C1Wv
@JohnFiorentino:
Months ago, a number of us came to the conclusion that the plane’s fate ended with a steep descent. For instance, see the comments of mine and others on July 31:
http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/899#comment-9294 .
One might argue whether the steep descent was actually a “spiral dive.” However, regardless of the character of the rapid descent, the BFO value does indicate that the final location of the plane is very near to last ping arc.
Two questions: Per the ATSB report, Inmarsat used the March 7, 2014, BFO data to predict the flight paths of MH021 and MH009. Presumably, they were able to calibrate their BFO model to the known actual location of each of these flights. At the point where these flights crossed the 7th Arc, their predictions were off by 145nm and 200nm, respectively.
Is there a reason why current models are believed to be more accurate?
Also, as Rand posted a few months ago, the flight deck emergency oxygen supply is about one hour. Back then, the thinking was the use of this supply was started around 18:25. Is it a coincidence that the turn back was at 17:22 and the SDU was restarted just about one hour later?
Correction: About a week ago, I quoted that the maximum speed for a B777-200 is 490 kts. That is incorrect. 490kts is a typical cruise speed. The maximum speed at 35,000 feet is listed as 512kts. This validates the possibility of a 503kt ground speed during the portion over the Indian Ocean. I wonder if this means they were “flat out?”
@VictorI
“One might argue whether the steep descent was actually a “spiral dive.” However, regardless of the character of the rapid descent, the BFO value does indicate that the final location of the plane is very near to last ping arc.”
I disputed this with excellent backup in my response to the IG report of 26/Sept/14, which I’m sure you read and I will dispute it again shortly re: the IG’s most recent update, Ulich’s white paper and Exner’s recommendations.
@JohnFiorentino: If you have already stated your position, you don’t need to restate it on my account. I was only trying to show that many people have looked at the last BFO value and determined that the plane was in a steep descent. (Dare I use the word “consensus”?) Planes that are in a steep descent don’t go very far.
@VictorI
The fact that you ask me IF I’ve already stated my position indicates to me you haven’t read it, though it was sent to you and the IG
Exner got it and it’s posted right here on the blog.
I’m not restating on YOUR account, I’m restating because the IG is restating.
Perhaps if you haven’t read my response is the reason your “consensus” is so good?
BTW, you have no “consensus” with the sims I’ve run and researched, the commercial pilots I’ve spoken with or my contact at Boeing.
You’re welcome to use any word you wish.
“Planes that are in a steep descent don’t go very far.”
Can’t argue with that…. 🙂
@VictorI,
It is mildly surprising to me that the persons who disregard most of the BFO values place a blind faith in the last two, extremely suspect values, to the least significant digit.
A steep descent results from either a sustained stall or a sustained dive, neither of which the airplane will do by itself. Both require a person mishandling the controls which is somewhat at odds with supposing no action by a cockpit occupant in the preceding hours.
@Gysbreght: We have not disregarded most of the BFO values as you have said. Rather, we disregard the values just after the COLD power up at 18:25. The SDU was not cold when it was powered up at 00:19.
And we have not accepted the final BFO values to the last significant digit as you have stated. However, the rate of descent is so large that the precision is not very important.
I won’t speculate here as to what caused the rapid descent, but there are possibilities, whether or not the plane was on autopilot in the preceding hours. Others may choose to ignore the final BFO data points and speculate as to the final behavior of the plane.
@Gysbreght
I’m going to include some sim descriptions and other information in my response to the IG, Ulich, Exner and partially the ATSB
The logic used is simply atrocious I’m sorry to say.
I researched several and ran several sims which were quite helpful. I;m aware you need to be cautious in this regard,
I’m wondering also how many people are aware that the simulators used by Geoffrey Thomas and CNN were not rated by Boeing?
Soon after the response I’ll be putting what I believe to be a very valid scenario of what I believe happened to MH370 along with my current priority search area and recommendations.
Hope to get this all out asap but have a few bad days due to diabetes and staring at my computers isn’t helping.
@VictorI;
” The SDU was not cold when it was powered up at 00:19.”
The 00:19:29.416 BFO value of 182 Hz was logged for the log-in request after a power interruption of the SDU. The BTO value logged for that same message was not valid, unless corrected by a fixed offset of 4600 mus. At 00:19:37.443 the last transmission was received from the aircraft terminal. According to the ATSB report the BTO value logged for that message should be ignored. That’s why I think the BFO value for that message is highly suspect. Yet your estimate of a high rate of descent is based on that value.
John (at October 1, 2014 at 5:51 PM)
It’s not a question of the simulators being rated by Boeing, it’s the FAA (and their opposite numbers, globally) who certify full flight simulators for their fidelity to an airframer supplied data pack. FAA Level ‘D’ is the highest level of fidelity. Just as pilots are subject to recurring flight checks & aircraft to a schedule of maint checks so are those simulators.
It’s unlikely that the fixed base simulators depicted in many of the TV segments are much more than procedures training devices and do not use the airframers’ (very expensive) aero models.
The IG is aware of the fidelity inherent in a Level ‘D’ FFS vs other FTDs.
:Don
Could the BTO be valid for the same SSU the BFO is invalid for? Or vice versa? Or is it all or nothing?
It seems there would be different mechanisms responsible for faulty values – heat for BTOs, message length or startup delays for BTOs.
Correction – heat for BFOs
@Matty-Perth:
Following on from your comments two posts ago, this is an exclusive from @jenanmoussa (Alaan.tv)
“What the Americans call Khorasan, is in fact the Wolf Unit and other groups of foreign fighters within Jabhat al Nusra”
Video, pics & text (scroll down) in English:
http://t.co/MPTRBzo58T
JS – It could be anything I reckon. During the entire cold war and ever since countries have been detecting signals – transmissions/radar etc – coming from planes outside their own screens. It’s inconceivable to me that plenty of resources didn’t go into collecting/interrogating those traces over a long period. So where is the military on this one? Doppler shift radar was refined sufficiently in the 60’s to detect/guide missiles onto moving planes. Watching the manful effort of the IG rummage from scratch makes you realize more fully just how valuable technical info on your enemy’s equipment/communications really is.
@Gysbreght: You are confusing the BTO with the BFO. It is as JS implied. The BFO is affected by the drift of the oscillator, which is stabilized by a temperature-controlled oven, and so when cold it is less stable. The BTO is related to the timing of the data burst within the allocated time window, in synchronization with the P-channel data. During a “warm power up”, the BFO value should be valid even if the BTO is not.
Nihonmama – There were about 47 cruise missiles fired that night and plenty of other stuff, maybe the wolf unit was part of the mix? Chilling to see a tunnel though – they could be doing that in western cities now.
Re: Honeywell vulnerabilities – When I posed a while back just how the Khorosan mob planned to get past the ballistic cockpit door I was alluding to the cyber question. That the radical Shiite regime of Iran was hosting a bunch of Sunni radicals up to six months before MH370 going missing might indicate a conspicuous level of cooperation. Iran is the biggest sponsor of state in the world and they two of their nationals on the plane with fake passports. Aged 19 and 27 but coming from that part of the world you don’t really know for sure anyway. Multiple identities is a part of that mideast/Muslim culture.
Hi Lauren H,
I’ve been thinking along those same lines regarding the ~1 hour between diversion at 17:22 and power restoration at 18:23. I read somewhere else that the regs are to have a 2-hour oxygen supply for the flight crew. I don’t know which is correct – 1 hour or 2 hours. One hour could explain why the sudden flurry of activity happened around 18:25 followed within a few minutes by zero activity.
Regarding the speed, my 503 knot route is only Mach 0.83 = Long Lange Cruise at FL390 at a temp of 244K (estimated for March 7 at 2100 UTC). So you can either speed up by increasing the Mach number at FL350 or go to FL390 and keep LRC at Mach 0.83. My estimate of the software limit on max speed is 513 kts TAS on that night. They were well below that.
Bobby
Depressurization – why would a pilot fly around on oxygen for an hour after diverting and not get it below 10,000 feet?
@Matty – it makes a little sense if you have a perp on oxygen watching the clock and trying to maximize the time the cabin is depressurized.
But, of course, to then re-pressurize simply to fly south for six hours makes no sense.
Sounds more like it’s timed around radar coverage.
@Matty
The (putative) eyewitnesses I was referring to were the fisherman at Khota Baru, not the folks in the Maldives. I have not seen any analysis on this point, but on the face of it their testimony corroborates the early reports that that the plane was flying well below normal cruising altitude for at least some of the period it was on military radar. Note that it was not generally acknowledged or accepted that the plane was in the vicinity at the time this report came out.
By and large the early reporting on this case seems to have stood the test of time, including the Daily Mail’s breakthrough work on Capt. Zaharie, while the complicated, speculative models based on number crunching have repeatedly been revised and retired and have yielded little of import. Of course, by far the most interesting and telling datum that has so far emerged is that MH370 did double back to the homeland, just as at least one Malaysian military official (speaking out of school) leaked to the press shortly after the disappearance. We were distracted from that hugely significant revelation for some weeks (no doubt to the Malaysian leadership’s great relief) by endless chatter about pings and arcs and satellite images and speculation about whether the plane finally ended up in the SIO or Kyrgyzstan. (Of course, on understanding that the plane first came back to Malaysia, there would be little reason to entertain any theory involving a plot to achieve an ultimate destination in Western China or Kyrgyzstan.) A post mortem analysis would conclude that this misdirection (partly passive, but nurtured by H2O’s stonewalling) was the greatest wrong turn in achieving a proper understanding of the MH370 incident.
With regard to the cellphone reconnect, which is almost dispositive on the altitude question, it seems unlikely that US intelligence would undercut the Malaysian government spokesman on this issue unless their assessment was it’s a solid find. The US has a lot of business (political/military/commercial) to transact with Nijab, whether we like him or not, and our press briefers aren’t going to jeopardize that relationship without good reason. Not only did they confirm press reporting regarding the Malaysian police’s finding, in effect they endorsed the finding itself by electing to reveal it.
Matty and JS: I suppose a more cynical view of the ATSB’s process can be assumed and then validation of this view pursued, but then what does this serve, other than to tautologically validate ones own cynical view of the search process in general? Matty, the brakes that you put on any sense of gloating: head that way, maybe?
For starters, we don’t even know that the ATSB is actually pursuing the analysis of the IG. Think about it: the aircraft if located in only one location; the aircraft will be found in only one location; there are different forms of analysis pursued by different parties that could lead to the same location. In other words, the ATSB could very well be pursuing the location identified by the IG as a result of their own, wholly separate analysis.
The courageous embrace of the clunky yet effective process of trial and error is a hallmark of not only science, but natural selection, biological adaptation – and even dating practices (I can certainly recall the days where additional trials were the primary end of virtually all activity). Would you rather have the ATSB get confidently all hung up on its own thinking by way of hubris and pursue locations where the aircraft is NOT located, come hell or high water? My guess is that you do not think this way. So, then ask yourself how you would actually like them to behave.
The airplane is to be found somewhere in a grid of tens of perhaps even hundreds of thousands of square kilometers below the surface of a very deep ocean of water on an unmapped seabed: this generalization is actually the precision with which the search began back in March. We have indeed come a long way.
Bring on the multiple failures and the continuous thread of dead ends. Let’s find the damn airplane.
@Luigi
You are a wise man! A tale of two men, really. I would just like to once more refer interested parties to the ABC 4corners interview with H20. If you pay careful attention to what this man reveals, it is CLEAR that HE HIMSELF was made aware of the plight/problem of MH370 EARLY on (during the course of the ‘event’) on the morning of the 8th.
Yet, he refuses to say HOW it was that he was first informed (i.e., who first told him), AND, around what time it was that he was first told of the incident.
But he KNEW that MH370 was NOT hostile…and knew better than to shoot it down! He justifies his inaction (not scrambling fighters) by invoking quite the defense mechanism, saying “the Americans would have (shot it down)”. The implication is clear. he is positioning himself as morally superior to the Americans
He is justifying his actions internally here (as he was that night actively in the middle of a situation, as prompted by Zaharie, that was difficult beyond description). We
surely cannot begin to comprehend the the degree of compromise Zaharie placed upon him, so he must feel!
If you acknowledge this and accept it as factual (I realize many here perhaps do not), the pieces to the puzzle begin to fit neatly together, yielding what is unquestionably, IMO, the most (and only) plausible scenario/explanation.
To chalk up the evasiveness and pointed lies of H20 as ‘saving face’, covering up for gross incompetence, is to miss the larger picture and context of what took place…particularly when coupled with the known facts of the flight!
I suppose I’d repeat my earlier view: ATSB are holding the baby while Inmarsat hold the cards. Logically they look in areas where it’s most likely to be according to the math, and if it doesn’t show up there it must be an uncomfortable feeling. If I was ATSB I think I would do the IG box first just to get it out of the way if nothing else, but the further they have to go up that arc the more likely it is the whole thing is wrong? That will be a sinking feeling – IF.
What I know: If this is unsuccessful the rumour mill will be cranking in overdrive. They will be out there ready to spring just monitoring events. It could make the March flurry look like a picnic. General McTiernan will be back in demand and every witness that got discarded(all of them) will be back in demand.
I’d be very nervous about betting on a good outcome. It would be interesting to see a list of all the things that could be wrong with this analysis and why.
@Luigi:
The ignoring/dismissal of multiple witness accounts and the cell phone reconnect. Couldn’t agree more – big elephants in the room.
Lauren H.,
I’ve referred to that one hour time frame several times as well, between the turn and the SDU reboot, or the loss of SDU and then reboot of SDU.
How about if that one hour oxygen supply ended shortly AFTER 18:25 with now an earlier than before “18:40 turn” to the SIO? Maybe the 18:25 SDU reboot was one of the last coherent things done?
Spencer,
I am not sure I agree with you entirely on all that about Mr. Hishamuddin Hussein. I think that is just his overall m.o., divulge nothing or very little. He was the perfect “face” for Malaysia, handsome, well dressed, well spoken. The constant redacting of information and withholding of information though made him look as if he was afraid to speak and being controlled by a puppeteer (or the regime). He did say in the Four Corners piece that he did not want to be tied to date, time, or rank, and that they were not at war with anyone. And we don’t know if the military saw MH370 on a 2 hour radar loop delay or in real time yet I don’t think.
If Hishamuddin Hussein knew that Captain Shah was behind this and in communication with him during it then MH370 was indeed “hostile” at the point of the traversing of the peninsula, yet he says it was deemed not to be. I think it is all a matter of semantics and country’s image as far as what Hishamuddin said. If they knew it was Captain Shah behind this then why even bother with hijacking or mechanical failure on the table as two of the 4 possible motives and why bother compiling info on all the other passengers in that hunman faction of the 3 groups set up? I just think it was a lot of damage control about all the missed red flags.
…..sorry, typo there, I meant human resources faction of the 3 groups set up to investigate this.
It’s late, 2AM on the east coast, bonne nuit!!!
@VictorI;
“During a “warm power up”, the BFO value should be valid even if the BTO is not.”
Well, that’s an opinion, for which I would like to see authoritative/experimental confirmation.
I’m not confusing BTO and BFO and am well aware of the different mechanisms affecting them. The point I’m making is that the BTO values do not show the SDU acting as a ‘warm’ unit.
P.S.
I also know that in the satellite the oscillator is placed in a temperature-controlled oven, but haven’t seen that mentioned for the airborne terminal. Have you?
John (at Oct 1, 2014 at 5:51 PM)
It’s not a question of the simulators being rated by Boeing, it’s the FAA (and their opposite numbers, globally) who certify full flight simulators for their fidelity to an airframer supplied data pack. FAA Level ‘D’, & the various national equivalents, is the highest level of fidelity. Just as pilots are subject to recurring flight checks & aircraft to a schedule of maint checks so are those simulators.
It’s unlikely that the fixed base simulators depicted in many of the TV segments are much more than procedures training devices and do not use the airframers’ (very expensive) aero models.
The IG is aware of the fidelity inherent in a Level ‘D’ FFS vs other FTDs.
:Don
@Gysbreght
“Well, that’s an opinion, for which I would like to see authoritative/experimental confirmation.”
Yes, some of that would be nice!
Instead we rely on incomplete/redacted data regarding an aging communications satellite and speculation about the state of affairs on a wayward aircraft with its RAT whining like a wailing air raid siren and its APU popping and sputtering as it sucks the last vestiges of Jet Fuel into its dying engine.(If indeed any of that is even true)
Then draw conclusions from ridiculously small sample sizes, throw in a good measure of “haughty,” a sprinkle of fairy dust……and there you have it!
Take all of that and mix the brew (which has never been done before) with some “eye of newt” as you dance along a ghostly “arc” generated by some not so warm and friendly handshakes.
Oh, and while you’re at it, don’t forget to tell your well seasoned and professional gardener how to “mow the lawn.”
No thanks,..give me a ticket to the matinee…..the crowds are too big at night!
@GuardedDon
“The IG is aware of the fidelity inherent in a Level ‘D’ FFS vs other FTDs.”
And (respectfully) your point is what?
The Honeywell MCS7200 manual refers to the temperature controlled oscillator in several places and particularly:
“The correct operation of much of the internal circuitry of the SDU depends
on clocks derived from the high-stability frequency reference generated by
the oven-controlled crystal oscillator (OCXO). Therefore, it is inappropriate to
perform BITE tests until this clock frequency has achieved gross stability. If
the SDU is powered on after having stabilized at a cold external temperature
(e.g., -55° C), it can take several tens of seconds for the frequency drift rate
to be low enough before the phase locked oscillators (PLO) that derive the
dependent clocks can lock onto the OCXO frequency reference.”
So there will be frequency drift on power-up.
John,
My point is simply that if one is going to run a “simulator” exercise as part of research then the simulator employed should exhibit the necessary level of fidelity.
I assumed your post referred to exercises on aircraft training simulators, rather than offline, mathematical model simulations, given the reference to Geoffrey Thomas, CCN & Boeing.
:Don
@GuardedDon
“My point is simply that if one is going to run a “simulator” exercise as part of research then the simulator employed should exhibit the necessary level of fidelity.”
I couldn’t agree more………that was sort of MY point.
“…offline, mathematical model simulations…”
Both were utilized actually.
Perhaps the IG should run some similar sims…..If they haven’t already?
I hope any “hi-fi” sims run by the IG can include a test of whether MH370 had the fuel to reach the location at which Ocean Shield “found” the FDR, at “about 20 degrees South”.
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-26956798s21 (star on map)
It would be interesting, for example, to solve for the degree of path circuity NW of Sumatra required to access that point.
Sensitivity of this degree of circuity to assumed Malacca Strait excess fuel burn would be of keen interest, as well.
Profuse thanks, in advance.
@ALL
My current update and response to the IG on MH370
Latest Reports on MH370
Still Exhibit Faulty Logic
(Combined Special Report and Press Release – For Immediate Release)
October 2, 2014
By: John E. Fiorentino
Herewith we issue our
Response to
Further Progress Report from the IG, and Updated MH370 Search Area Recommendation 26th September 2014
The Location of MH370 – Dr. Bobby Ulich – 25 September 2014
and
MH370 Search Priorities
and Strategy
Michael L. Exner
MH370 Independent Group Member
September 10,
2014
Background
Almost immediately after the loss of Flight MH370 on March 8, 2014. I instituted an independent investigation of the tragedy. Since that time the data (such as it is) from Inmarsat has been analyzed and modeled. A preliminary review of the available audio recordings was undertaken with audio expert Steve Barber. Several leads were developed from the audio review which are still being investigated. And, we have researched and reported on the putative underwater acoustic “pings,” as well as communicating with various aviation experts and scientists. Findings in many cases have been reported to the media, investigative authorities and the general public.
Acknowledgement
I would just wish to acknowledge Dr. Bobby Ulich for his hard work in producing his White Paper.
Scope of Response
Again, in the interest of brevity this report will focus on the major flaw in all 3 reports being reviewed rather than serve as a line by line analysis. Those wishing more detailed information may wish to consult my previous response of 13/Sept/14. The contacts provided at the end of this report may also be used to request further information.
Narrowing the Width of the Search Area
In the previous response of 13/Sept/2014 I dealt with the critical issue of narrowing the width of the MH370 search area. All 3 reports make this recommendation. However, the reasoning utilized to come to this conclusion suffers from numerous questionable assumptions and poor logic.
I will not quibble here about any minor differences between the papers but rather target the idea universal to all 3 reports that the 9M-MRO aircraft was in a spiral dive at 00:19:29.
Assumptions and Leaps of Logic
In order for the 3 papers to maintain the aircraft was in a “spiral dive” at 00:19:29 they MUST assume that:
The BFO values are accurate
The BFO values reflect a substantial loss in altitude
The BFO values are not influenced by power variations or load variability
The APU functioned as designed
The ATC (Thrust Asymmetry Compensation) did not function as designed
The RAT deployed as designed
The Pilot(s) or hijackers were dead (or not at the controls)
The Pilots or hijackers if alive wanted to commit suicide
The BFO values, even if accurate do not represent the descent phase of a phugoid mode
The “Log On” request by the SDU was caused by power restoration from the APU and not some other cause.
The “partial handshake” at 00:19:37 was caused by an impact only several seconds later and not by a simple power loss.
The absence of logged records after 00:19:37 was due to aircraft impact and not simple power loss to the SDU.
The Most Likely Scenario
Aircraft can either have inherent aerodynamic stability (the typical case), or de-facto stability, in which stability requirements are met with the aid of a control system augmented with sensors and feedback. For example, in order to achieve maximum maneuverability, the F-18 lacks inherent stability, and can’t be flown without some operational brainpower on board in addition to the pilot. The Boeing 777 has relaxed inherent longitudinal static stability, which produces efficiencies in cruise from a more rearward c.g. and a physically lighter tail structure than otherwise possible.
Flightlab Ground School 7. Longitudinal Dynamic Stability
Copyright Flight Emergency & Advanced Maneuvers Training, Inc. dba Flightlab, 2009. All rights reserved. (Used under “Fair Use” for Non-profit, educational or news reporting purposes)
So, the Boeing 777 has “inherent aerodynamic stability.” It is extremely unlikely then that the 9M-MRO aircraft would behave like a fighter jet, or drop like a rock under normal conditions even after a dual engine flameout.
Simulation Example Explains Aircraft’s Motion
Reproduced below is a description of a Flight Simulation in a 777-2 full motion zero flight time approved simulator.
We let it run out of fuel at FL 250 in track hold and alt capture. However it would not make any difference what mode it was in as everything would drop out. In real life one engine uses fractionally more fuel per hour than the other and there is typically a difference between main tanks of a few hundred kilos, so we had a 300 kg difference between the contents of the left and right tank.
When the first engine failed TAC (Thrust asymmetry compensation) automatically applied rudder. The speed reduced from 320 knots indicated to 245 knots indicated. It was able to maintain 245 knots and FL250. When the second engine failed the rudder trim applied by TAC was taken out and the trim went to zero. The autopilot dropped out and the flight controls reverted to direct mode. The speed initially came back to 230 knots but then the nose started to lower. The nose continued to lower and the rate of descent increased to 4,000 feet per minute, the nose kept lowering and the descent rate increased to 7,500 feet per minute with a bank angle that increased to 25 degrees. The speed at this point had increased to 340 knots indicated, above VMO but there was no horn as it was on limited electrics. About this point the RAT (Ram air turbine) chipped in and the CDUs and copilot’s PFD (Primary flight display) came alive. The flight controls stayed in direct mode. The eicas screen was full of messages like pitot heat, flight controls, APU fault (The APU had tried to autostart due to double engine failure but failed due to no fuel to start it) low fuel pressure etc.
Then with a max descent rate of almost 8,000 feet per minute the nose started to slowly rise and keep rising. We had dropped to about FL170 but the nose slowly rose up to 6 degrees pitch up and we started climbing at about 3000 feet per minute and the bank angle reduced to only 5 degrees. It climbed back up to FL210 at which point the speed had come back to 220 knots and then the nose dropped down again and we were soon back to descending at 8000 feet per minute. So basically a series of phugoid oscillations with bank angle between 5 and 25 degrees and pitch attitude between about 9 degrees nose down and 5 degrees pitch up. It was losing about 8000 feet and then gaining about 3 or 4000 feet with airspeed fluctuating between 220 and 340 knots.
We didn’t watch it all the way down due to time constraints and stopped the experiment at 10,000 feet but it was consistent all the way down.
Only Indicator of a “spiral dive” are Questionable BFO Values
Based on our prior response to the IG and the data presented here I believe there is no empirical evidence to back up the notion of a “spiral dive” by the 9M-MRO aircraft The IG in its latest report injects a one line mention of a possible “phogoid mode” which was completely absent from its report of 9/Supt/2014 which I have already addressed. This small “concession” I believe is a direct result of an e-mail exchange between myself and Mike Exner, an IG member.
The above flight simulation also gives a good description of the TAC (Thrust asymmetry compensation) component which the IG seems to indicate was a catalyst to their “spiral dive” scenario. In reality, if TAC functioned properly, it would have acted to prevent the aircraft from entering a spiral. Regardless of which way the TAC system was deflected , upon the flameout of the second engine TAC would have returned to its pre-flameout mode and the aircraft would again be trimmed for normal flight/glide.
Recommendation
I wish to stress again in the strongest terms my opposition to any narrowing of the MH370 search area. I believe the implementation of this idea is without merit and if implemented could possibly be the cause of a complete failure in the search effort. If I am wrong, the aircraft may still be found under the current search parameters. If the IG’s suggestion is implemented it increases the chances the plane will never be found.
Special Note:
I will shortly be releasing a report detailing the coordinates where I believe the Flight of MH370 terminated. This complete analysis will provide the flightpath and desired final destination of Flight MH370 as I see it. The report also accounts for the lack of wreckage found to date.
Copyright 2014 – J.E. Fiorentino – All Rights Reserved
A PDF copy of this report may be attained by making a request by e-mail at the address provided.
For further information contact:
John E. Fiorentino
Fiorentino Research
PO Box 324
Oakhurst, NJ 07755 USA
e-mail: jefiorentino@optimum.net
Tel: 732-361-8599
@Cheryl:
“If they knew it was Captain Shah behind this then why even bother with hijacking or mechanical failure on the table as two of the 4 possible motives and why bother compiling info on all the other passengers in that hunman faction of the 3 groups set up? I just think it was a lot of damage control about all the missed red flags.”
Logically, your question (and answer to it) makes perfect sense. But (and this cannot be stressed enough)if the actions+ behaviour of Malaysian government officials (and their counterparts elsewhere in Asia) are not viewed through the prism of CULTURE, the whole picture cannot be had.
I don’t know if Capt Shah is behind what happened to MH370 or not, but IF he or other crew are culpable and the Malaysians are aware but have been playing a Kabuki game, one word will explain that – and it defies logical analysis: FACE.
Anyone here who has lived in Asia or had extensive exposure to the region will understand.
http://geert-hofstede.com/malaysia.html
http://www.pri.org/programs/pris-world/pris-world-32014
@ALL
Typo correction in my post ATC should read TAC