Last month I wrote, in a post entitled “Nowhere Left to Look for MH370,” that recently refined drift models produced by Australia’s CSIRO contradicts both their own premise (that the plane crashed on the 7th arc between 34S and 36S) and an alternative idea presented by intependent researchers (that the plane crashed near 30S).
I’ve only just become aware that CSIRO director David Griffin weighed in on the matter a few weeks ago in a letter to Victor Iannello, which Victor published on his blog. He essentially confirmed the points I raised.
He wrote, for instance, that:
As you correctly pointed out, a 30S crash site would, according to our model, have resulted in debris washing up on Madagascan and Tanzanian shores a full year earlier than was observed. That is a discrepancy that is hard to set aside.
He also wrote that:
The other factor against 30S that we find very hard to discount is that 30S is right in the middle of the zone targeted most heavily by the surface search in 2014. This is the “other evidence” that Richard overlooked. Please see Section 4 of our Dec report, and Fig 4.2 of the April report.
Griffin also defends, rather weakly in my estimation, the idea that the early arrival of the “Roy” piece in South Africa does not contradict his preferred 34s-36S crash point. However, I don’t think this really matters, since there is so much other compelling evidence against it.
The conundrum, therefore, becomes even more impenetrable than before: the evidence indicates that the plane did not go into either of these “hot spots.” And it indicates even more strongly that it did not go anywhere else in the southern Indian Ocean.
The way to solve conundrums is to open up your thinking and to check for implicit assumptions that my be incorrect. In this case, the obvious follow-up question is: is it possible, given the data in hand, that the plane could have gone somewhere else?
Australian officials remain puzzlingly unwillingly to acknowledge the issue.
Damn. Back to ‘anybody’s guess.
JW wrote:
“And it indicates even more strongly that it did not go anywhere else in the southern Indian Ocean.”
That statement is ridiculous, Jeff. You must know that it is 100% false. No credible drift analysis has ever suggested that it is not in the SIO. Let’s get back to a rational discussion about where in the SIO it is.
@ALSM, I have no idea where you could have come up with the idea that my assertion is “100 %” false. I have laid out my argument here, and Victor has laid out his reasoning, which arrives at a similar conclusion, on his web site. If you have some point to make, please make it.
I agree with ALSM. Either: (a) MH370 is indeed in the 32-36S lesser searched zone, or, (b) ATSB has made some incorrect assumptions, or (c) both (a) and (b) above are true.
Based on the Inmarsat Arc ring structure, I believe 32-34S crash zone makes perfect sense for a relatively simple, due south flight path via CTH. ATSB is not “seeing” that simple flight path because they have assumed a dead pilot after 1840.
Seems to me the pilot was probably alive at least another hour to set a 180S course path, probably with a slow down or descent after 1941 Arc2.
If I understand, ALSM advises me the area 32.5-34S has been searched outside of, but not inside of, Arc7 (by the search vessel GO Phoenix). So I feel the obvious logical case of a due South 180S flight path has not been searched adequately.
everything below 25S seems very improbable, let alone 30S
it’s just a fiction
@ALSM
I share your point above.
I feel really good about the BTO data. I have come around to your thinking on a rapid descent at 00:19:XX. Nothing else is as sensible and straight forward.
The BFO data definitely says a turn South (in addition to the rapid descent), exactly when is still debatable.
So I am thinking North of the current search zone for sure. Don’t have a real solid latitude in mind, but my feeling is 35S is not far enough North. I blow hot and cold on the drift analytics. Just not my bag at all.
The drift stuff is a “black art” to me, one that I think none of us here really understand very well, certainly not me anyway (even after a hell of a lot of study).
The takeaway “gut feel” I get from it all though, is that if we accept the BTO arcs as “gospel”, then the drift results heavily imply that the debris must have originated “a lot” further north on the arc, so the “high altitude cruise south” assumption becomes a worring one, and may have to be “discarded” if we are to open our minds to “other possibilities”.
I think the first thing we need to do to solve this riddle, is to establish with some kind of certainty, the time and longitude of crossing the Equator.
If we can agree on a “most probable” Equatorial Crossing Time and Longitude (ECTL) then it may be worth everyone “working scenarios” from there / then”.
To that end, all the analysis seems to suggest that the aircraft passed close to ISBIX.
ISBIX Waypoint △
Lat: 0.366742 Lon: 93.675108
Lat: 0° 22′ 00 N Lon: 93° 40′ 30 E
Mag Var: 1.37 4West
DrB’s latest 19:41z position (per DennisW’s blog) is 0.018000°N 93.719000°E
So, let’s say we start with the ECTL Waypoint as:
19:42 UTC at △ 0.00°N 93.718°E
and go from there ?
Can we all agree on that ?
A long time ago, DennisW proposed Christmas Island as the intended destination.
He has since gone cold on it, but for me, it is still a “viable” theory.
On the other hand, one of my early thoughts, was that the intended destination was most probably Barrow Island, which is near Learmonth. I went cold on it for a long time, but I am now beginning to warm up to it again.
DrB’s latest 20:41z position (per DennisW’s blog) is 7.540000°S 93.191000°E.
From a “planning perspective”, Barrow Island / Learmonth is a “safe run” fuel wise from the ECTL above, and a “getting a bit tight”, but still “doable” run from DrB’s 20:41z position.
The BTO arcs however suggest that the speeds on the basically south easterly headings from either start point towards Learmonth were not normal cruise speeds or altitudes, they had to be both lower and slower. The problem would be to find a scenario or two that might explain a major speed and altitude reduction post 19:41z or up until just post 20:41z, that would “fit” the range and time from either start point to the subsequent arcs.
In any case, to bother to do so, would require a plausible scenario to suggest that Barrow Island / Learmonth was “the” actual intended destination.
Having done so, a simple look at the charts, suggests that from either start point, the aircraft would have crossed the 7th arc between and 12.5°S and 17.5°S.
I find it “interesting” that the only truly “independent”, that is, the “non-ATSB-aligned” drift studies, all seem to suggest this area, indeed, the METRON results for the flaperon were centered on this portion of the 7th arc.
So we need a “real reason” to suppose that Z was headed for Barrow Island / Learmonth.
Some time back (a few weeks ago) I worked up the following.
A hypothetical m’lud.
Going back to the early days ……….
Go back to The “EARLY simulator stories”.
These stories initially concentrated on “practising landing on a short runway” (relative – for a B777), on a “remote island” in the “Indian Ocean”.
There are three specific points there:
(1) “Short Runway,
(2) “Remote Island”,
(3) “Indian Ocean”.
Most people know that no such place exists, “as such”.
The clincher is in the “as such”, which I will explain in a minute or two.
First, if we assume Z was acting politically, that he was part of a “blackmailing hijacking” against the Malaysian Government, we have to further assume a number of “requirements”.
(1) He had no intention of killing anybody,
(2) He had no intention of destroying the aircraft,
(3) He wanted maximum world wide “media exposure”,
(4) He wanted a “safe haven” for his own “political assilam”.
Then we have to ask the quetion, where could he go, that satified all of those requirements, from 19:41 zulu, or more specifically, from 20:41 zulu ?
Before we can figure that out, we have to answer the question, “where was he at 19:41 zulu or 20:41 zulu to begin with ?”
Most analysis by the IG, ATSB, and others, has suggested that his most likely position on the 19:41 arc was very near to the equator, around 93.72 East, and that an hour later, his position on the 20:41 zulu arc is estimated to be around 7.5 degrees south, ie, around 7.5 South 93.0 East.
From 20:41 to 00:11 zulu (the time of the so-called 6th ping, with some fuel still remaining) is three and a half hours, precisely, ie, 200 minutes, precisely.
At an average cruising speed of 480 knots, (8 nautical miles per minute) he can go a maximum of 1,600 nautical miles, (to 00:11 zulu) with the fuel remaining at 20:41 zulu.
So, his “radius of action” from there (7.5 South 93.0 East) is 1,600 nautical miles.
If he continued basically south, he would intersect the 6th arc at about 34 degrees South 92.5 degrees East. But there is nothing there, he has to go “east”.
What is possible if he goes “east” ?
The answer is interesting.
There are three, and only three, “remote island(s)” within range, with suitable runways, that meet all the necessary conditions.
They are, Cocos Island, Christmas Island, and Barrow Island.
Of the three, Barrow Island Airport (IATA: BWB, ICAO: YBWX) is the “perect” choice.
Google Earth 115.406,-20.862,8
The Runway (03/21) is 1900 metres long by 30 metres wide, (6,000 feet by 100 feet) a bit “tight” for a B777 mind, but not overly so, certainly “not a problem” for an experienced captain like Z, “not a problem at all m’lud”.
Furthermore, “close by”, on the Australian “mainland”, there are a number of other Airports / Airfields, with “suitable runways” for an “emergency diversion” in a B777, should it become necessary.
After all, the “safety” of his passengers was paramount.
These options, in order of “safety” are:
(1) Learmonth (10,000 feet) (where the Qantas 72 (A330) landed after it’s ADIR went rogue)
(2) Karratha (7,000 feet)
(3) Onslow (6,000 feet)
(4) Carnarvon (5,500 feet)
(5) Shark Bay (5,500 feet)
@Ventus45
A splendid example of objective thinking, it is that process of information we need to see more often.
There is no remotely credible reason why Z (or a hijacker) would head for Australia or its islands. Z could not make a case for asylum, and why would he do it in such a complicated way? The certain outcome of a successful landing would have been his immediate arrest, and return post-haste to trial and imprisonment in Malaysia.
@damon – maybe that process was already done behind the scenes …
@ventus45 – maybe it does not have to be a proper runway, just some kind of road
@damon
Q1. Are you an Australian ?
Q2. Are you familiar with the way the legal system handels those claiming asylum, and “how long” it takes ?
(I am – both)
Your “post haste” – is rubbish – “you are dreaming mate”.
It would be precisely what Z wanted – a media frenzy to rival a gathering of great whites feeding on a whale carcas.
Yes I am, and I am very familiar with the controversies about asylum seekers. How a well-paid commercial pilot, under no evident threat from persecution, could claim asylum in Australia would certainly have attracted media attention, but it would have attracted even more ridicule, and not a lot of sympathy. He had, after all, stolen a multi-million dollar plane, and kidnapped a couple of hundred people. And potentially caused great embarrassment not to Malaysia, but to the Australian Government, which would have found itself embroiled in an international scandal. Z (if it was he) would have been returned to Malaysia (which would have unconditionally demanded it)
asap, because there would have been real great whites (China and Russia) circling, that Australia could not afford to offend on such a flimsy pretext.
asap, because there would have been real great whites (China, especially, because most of the passengers were Chinese) circling, that Australia could not afford to offend by offering protection to one of the most spectacular criminals in aviation history, on some flimsy, and probably fabricated, plea for asylum.
Z was a fervent supporter of western democracy, Australia was only such country around…
He’d likely face death penalty if extradited back to Malaysia, it wouldn’t be that easy for Australia to hand him back (although it wouldn’t be any guarantee for him).
CI/Learmouth, Barrow Island were all probable destinations.
@Ventus45
(1) Re: ISBIX
I currently feel 180S CTH from ISBIX works well and hits Arc7 at S32.5-33.5 near 94E. It makes sense because ATSB did not search inside Arc7 there (per ALSM), so that could easily where the aircraft is located – no excuses needed – they simply did not search there, and they probably should have. Also makes sense based on overall Arc structure and bathyemetry that pilot was trying to get over Broken Ridge summit at about 31S into deeper waters. An optional turn to the East at S32.5 gets into deep trenches as an optional bathymetry-based end-of-flight plan.
(2) re: Learmonth
I can get there too, but it is less likely at the moment. You are already aware of Ed Baker’s flight path that goes in the direction of Learmonth to head East into the Sun. Part of Ed’s rationale as a pilot, he sees very thick clouds that day south of S21 so he argues the aircraft follows the cloud line (which points approx. to Learmonth).
Interestingly, I arrived at a similar path as Ed for completely different reasons. I took Victor’s McMurdo path and got off at POLUM and set UXORA waypoint which puts MH370 crashing inside of a 22,000-ft trench south of Batavia Seamount. Also Richard Godfrey has a flight path that ends near there in his paper “The Long Hunt for a Diversion Airport”
@Ventus
I agree with the theme of your approach. It was fairly obvious to me from the get-go that pure analytics could not be used to determine a terminus. I think motive and scenarios related to motive are an important qualifier.
I also share your thoughts on drift analysis. Dumping stuff in the water and watching where it goes simply does not appeal at all to me. There are really two very different questions here.
1> If I dump a flaperon here, could it reach ReUnion in a time compatible with the finding?
2> Given the flaperon finding on ReUnion, where is the highest probability place where it could have originated.
Obviously, the second question is the best posed. CSIRO keeps answering the first question.
The more time passes, the more I think that plane is in the area close to the Broken ridge. If the crash was a deliberate action as it is assumed, maybe someone wanted to minimize the probability of finding and recovering the wreckage by landing the plane above the rugged seafloor terrain. Especially if someone was familiar with the difficulties investigators had with finding the Air France 447. Therefore, broken ridge seems like the best remote place in the Indian ocean.
no Marijan, it has been discussed many times before, there is just no point in that
Sorry first time i comment here but i cannot help to share my frustration and pain for the victims.
The main problem is that whether this plane ended up in SIO or not has become a matter of opinion, intuition and informed judgement based on the data released so far.
My day to day job is to analyse complex accidental scenarios including all possible causes and consequence events including common causes). It is of course natural for everyone to believe in one story and defend the story they believe in, however, in my experience, only a systematic and unbiased (and maybe here also independent)analysis/investigation could determine the actual scenario and help refine the search. The problem here is that only one scenario was investigated which is the FMT scenario from a radar location assumed to belong to the plane and with plane ending up in SIO (correct me if i am wrong but also with constant speed, altitude and heading). This approach is puzzling and looks like a lucky shot attempt. Despite the data appearing to the investigators to indicate this scenario is “likely” (still not proven), it is an odd scenario to start with given all the assumptions associated with it (some of these suggested by data).
If a Valid/Not-valid question is applied to any of these assumptions, you could imagine the multitude of “possible” scenarios (some of these scenarios of course could be discarded if the data is robust enough to do so – that process was clearly not transparent to the public so it is difficult to verify independently). The consequence of some of these scenarios also could be difficult to identify. The event tree of scenarios could even be bigger if including the possibility of erroneous data (radar and/or satelite and/or information on debris).
From a systematic analysis point of view, there are so many other “possible” scenarios (with different apparent likelihood levels) that to date have not been officially discarded with evidence to support.
In my opinion, whichever possibility has been identified merits a proper investigation. The same applies to every possible clue including witness accounts, possible findings from member of the public such as satelite images, inconsistency in the data itself etc.
In summary, a systematic analysis will invole the identification of all the event tree (either likely or unlikely), the data and clues could be mapped to each scenario to indicates the probabilities but in no circumstances a scenario can be 100% discarded. If it has been identified, it remains a possibility until the entire chain of events have been positively proven for the valid scenario.
Therefore, my suggestion is to expand the event tree and not to narrow it down to start with.
Since, a number of you in this forum have notoriously a very good knowledge of this case, it will be interesting to see what tree of “possible” scenarios will come up applying this systematic technique ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Event_tree_analysis )
@HB, Welcome, and thanks for your comment–it’s entirely apropos given the current state of the investigation.
Perhaps a way of rephrasing your point, search officials have taken as their starting point the assumption that the Inmarsat data is 100 percent reliable and that the plane definitely flew south after 19:40. Whereas I’ve argued that there should be a prior split in the decision tree, with a non-zero probability accorded to the possibility that the Inmarsat data was tampered with.
Jeff, et. al,
It was reported that two satellite calls were made with no answer. From these two calls, is there anything more precisely could be learned 1) receiver active (most likely plane still in the air) 2) receiver inactive (as if parked on land with no power) 3) receiver non-exist (for example the plane gone underwater or disintegrated). Another question would be through which satellite the calls were made through? The same Inmarsat satellite or other GEO sat or other LEO ones (if other than the same Inmarsat then the question would be where was the satellite relative to earth ground)? And if it was truly went though with no answer I would imagine there were extended ringing period before hung up so there should be long periods of time the satellite was talking to the receiver and vice versa. If the handshaking Inmarsat data could be tampered with it would be inconceivable hard to tamper these data.
@CharssenG, The satphone calls were routed through the same Inmarsat satellite that the “ping arc” signals were received through.
They indicate that the phone system aboard the plane was operational. However, no one answered the calls.
The metadata for these calls would be no easier or harder to tamper with than any of the other metadata.
@CharssenG
Also MAS senior management said they assumed MH370 was still in the air during the flight time, perhaps suggesting they inferred that from the sat calls.
@HB
The Inmarsat (satellite) data and debris evidence extremely strongly support SIO end point.
Where the Event Tree analysis probably comes into play is interpreting the Inmarsat data. The search to date was based on assuming a dead pilot at 1840 and subsequent “accidental” ghost flight causing the aircraft to fly in an unintentional, unprogrammed manner into oblivion. That 2014 assumption appears very questionable since 2015, but MY is not interested in re-evaluating.
I believe it is relatively obvious that the aircraft could be between 32-34S inside Arc7, if the flight was intentional due South 180S heading.
@StevanG
“no @Marijan, it has been discussed many times before, there is just no point in that”
why not? Many assume hiding the crash was goal.
@TBill
“Also MAS senior management said they assumed MH370 was still in the air during the flight time, perhaps suggesting they inferred that from the sat calls.”
It is difficult to understand how you find that statement worthy of repeating.
“The Inmarsat (satellite) data and debris evidence extremely strongly support SIO end point.”
I think @HB was already clear about this being an opinion, from you or anyone else.
“why not? Many assume hiding the crash was goal.”
I would say the SIO category narrows considerably, when you point to the deepest darkest depths of the sea, to fool and never be found theory.
@Susie, et. al, I brought this up. On one side, there are still people thinking of other alternatives such as the plane never left ground. On the other side, just because the phone call went through and nobody answered does it guarantee someone(s) didn’t answer? What if the receiver talking to the sat was functioning (which may located at one place) but the ear-phone piece to the pilot(s) was not working (so the phone actually never rang)? Like if you unplug the phone from your cable modem and then call in. You hear ring-back tone thinking the other side is ringing with no answer but in reality there is no actual ringing? Is there a third possibility goes beyond chose not to or non-responsive when phone not answered? If so, even if crew might want to make communications but couldn’t to.
I don’t know airplane much into detail so this is a question – could it possible that communication was made between sat and aircraft but in fact never into cockpit?
@CharssenG, I’ll cut to the chase: there are really only two remotely viable possibilities for MH370: either the pilot stole the plane and committed suicide, or the Russians hijacked the plane and took it to Kazakhstan. In light of recent debris evidence, the plane did not go into the southern Indian Ocean, so option 1 is looking increasingly to be off the table.
If you rummage around the web, including the comments on this site, you will see a lot of activity from people proposing alternative scenarios. No doubt some of them may be sincere. But I am operating under the assumption that many may not be. Here’s a section of a fascinating piece in Time magazine I came across today (link: http://time.com/4783932/inside-russia-social-media-war-america/)
Don’t believe that just because a large number of people support a given perspective that that perspective has any validity. Judge each contribution on its own merits.
@SusieC
I apologize if I was insensitive in my language.
As far as why mention MAS statement about MH370 status and sat telcons? I believe it is fairly interesting interview/account that the MAS exec officer (CEO?) gave. He happened to heading to KLIA for a 6AM flight, so he got to KLIA early enough to take part in the effort to locate MH370 while (as we know now) it was still in the air.
@TBill
Not insensitive at all and definitely not your style to be like that anyway
@CharssenG
In my opinion the 2 sat phone calls, are a big red flag.
Everyone should consider, if you are responsible for communicating with someone, be it for love, a job, the law, whatever the reason and they went missing, what would you do?
If they had a phone and you had a phone, how many times would you call them, over a six hour period, how many times would you call? Twice? In what world is that anywhere close to understandable?
This part grips me the most, 239 lives missing, deserve more than 2 phone calls, but that is what they got. They were given freedom to fly unimpeded and remained uninterrupted by constant communication, mostly, what they were given, was privacy.
It is a travesty.
Jeff,
I can’t believe a whole bunch of soberminded civil servants and well credentialed scientists would fail to consider the ‘non-zero’ possibility of spoofing unless they have good information to believe it is indeed ‘zero’ possibility.
Just found this new video of 4 Australian officials involved in the search giving a brief description of what they did/achieved.
Registration required on this website:
http://www.themandarin.com.au/79160-video-how-australian-public-servants-managed-the-mh370-search-party/
Found the same video here at VIMEO:
https://vimeo.com/217799261
0:37 gets interesting after this
0:40 intriguing comment from Alan Foley when he points to Peter Foley & Neil Gordon as his ‘Defense’ colleagues who ran through different scenarios about what may have happened at FMT, but that is not explained by either of them in the video.
Neil Gordon’s presentation is the best.
Also, we have a better understanding of why the ATSB is reluctant to share inside information, and it’s because they have to clear it first with China & Malaysia.
@Susie Crowe
“In what world is that anywhere close to understandable? This part grips me the most, 239 lives missing, deserve more than 2 phone calls, but that is what they got …. It is a travesty.”
Agreed. It does seem a travesty because we do not have full information from the prime investigative authority, Malaysia.
Perhaps the Malaysians already knew repeated attempts by Sat phone would be useless?
Perhaps they had being openly communicating (by standard VHF radio) for hours and knew the situation did not require further use of Sat phone?
We are only given the information Malaysia wants us to have in order to mask the truth. Think of the aircraft cargo manifest as an example.
Any information coming from Malaysia ought to be considered suspect or tainted – this includes Inmarsat, transcripts, radar, SIM “discoveries”
Get back to first principles to focus on the (scant) information we can better trust:
1. Independent eyewitnesses : Kate Tee and Maldives residents – they saw what they saw and have no reason to mis-inform.
2. (Independent) Curtin “sonic boom” provides timing and (weak) directional clues.
3. (Independent) wreckage analysis, bio-fouling and drift analysis – again full disclosure is lacking and this analysis has been warped to fit other peoples pet theories but on balance it looks as though anything south of 20 degrees is unlikely (otherwise where is Western Australia’s debris?).
Recollect the (day 1) shocked faces of the Malaysian authorities (remembering Razak vividly) and it wasn’t a look of “OMG our plane is missing” innocence but more of a “OMG the truth must never get out” fear.
After that the surface searches where deliberately misdirected by Malaysia so as to distract attention with the aim of allowing the evidence to sink or disperse. Moreover, debris discovery and recovery has never been taken seriously by the Malaysians – again for good reason.
In summary the Malaysian response could well be expected as a result of the information only they have. We do not have that same information and thus feel their response a travesty.
@Susie/CargoHandler
The events in the early stages of the diversion and in the week or so after the diversion are really what lead me to conclude that high level Malay officials were involved from the turn West at IGARI.
@CliffG, Thanks very much for the link to the conference video, very much looking forward to watching it.
You wrote, “I can’t believe a whole bunch of soberminded civil servants and well credentialed scientists would fail to consider the ‘non-zero’ possibility of spoofing unless they have good information to believe it is indeed ‘zero’ possibility.” One would think so. However, I’ve done my best to explore out this point, and the people I’ve talked to within the investigation, including Neil Gordon, told me that they simply assumed that the data was good.
I would like for the ATSB to address this issue directly, as it seems to me crucial to the whole issue, but so far they haven’t been willing to do so.
@SusieC
The only good thing about MAS lack of sat phone calls is we got one BTO (distance) ping for every hour that MAS did not call. When they called it stopped the pings.
@CliffG
For this accident cause, all we have right now is (a) more likely possibilities and (b) less likely possibilities.
I applaud those who have the energy to investigate the less likely causes. I would do so myself if I thought I saw something that I believed could explain the accident. However, we should not mislead the public from knowing the apparent most likely cause(s). We need to say, as Jeff said above, intentional diversion by pilot is “way up” there as a more likely scenario, until such time (if ever) we have better understanding of the facts if the case.
The rouge pilot scenario has rather profound implications for future aircraft safety measures that we should not ignor. I accept spoof as one thing to prevent, but there are more basic things like not letting pilots turn off transponders and ACARS during flight without at least an automated distress signal.
@Nederland
I am working with your flight path. You have a nice match to Arc2 BFO. Since nobody else seems to match Arc2 BFO, your path almost proves MH370 hit Arc2 from the West, but alternately it was ascending. I think we probably have to discount Arc2 as a time period where speed/altitude/direction changes were probably taking place.
Overall I think your flight path makes perfect sense: (a) “circumnavigate” Indonesian radar; followed by (b) long trip South. I am trying to combine your Step (a) with my Step (b) 180S from ISBIX
@Cargo Handler
“Perhaps the Malaysians already knew repeated attempts by Sat phone would be useless?”
Or, did they know repeated attempts by Sat phone calls would NOT be useless?
@TBill
“The only good thing about MAS lack of sat phone calls is we got one BTO (distance) ping for every hour that MAS did not call. When they called it stopped the pings.”
In MH370 101 we learned, when someone on the ground used the satellite phone to call the plane, this automatically triggered data used to position the aircraft and the direction it traveled.
Given this information, it is obviously logical to make these calls as often as humanely possible, because calling incessantly
•keeps providing opportunity for someone to respond
•disrupts anyone trying to avoid that contact (i.e. hijacker)
•gives data used to track the plane
Except….we are told, the data that the sat phone call triggers, has never been applied in this manner before. Which means, no one on the ground supposedly had a clue that this data for the plane’s position and location was correlated to the number of sat phone calls to the plane.
Therefore, only calling the cockpit twice
•meant the most significant method of contact, was attempted only 2 times
•by only calling the plane twice, it constricted the data generated by the sat phone call to reflect 2 reads
How does the almost instinctive response to save others, translate to the actions of those locating the plane during that time? Who are these people, what is their story, how and why do they remain nameless?
The individuals responsible for the decisions that were made on March 8 while the plane was missing, will at some point become legally obligated to speak the truth.
It was never Malaysia’s legal obligation to assign blame anyway so it is time to close that door. The dozens upon dozens of filed lawsuits will dictate requirements that are legally compelled. This may provide the best opportunity for transparency.
I am only referring to data generated from sat phone
@TBill
“why not? Many assume hiding the crash was goal.”
if you want to “hide the crash” you’d want to drop the plane in calm waters and leave as little debris as possible… not in roaring forties where it would be scattered all around
@StevanG
I am coming back to the low Southern latitudes myself.
1> They fit the debris collected.
2> The fit motive and a motive based flight path – Banda Aceh, Cocos, CI, Bandung.
3> The simulator data could have been the result of a Cocos waypoint followed by going to watch TV while the simulated flight ran out of fuel.
4> The crash beyond CI could have been the result of a disturbance on the aircraft as you and Freddie have suggested.
@ DennisW “The fit motive and a motive based flight path – Banda Aceh, Cocos, CI, Bandung”
It appears something definitely went wrong towards the end (that is an understatement).
To fit the 7th arc accurately two things had to happen.
First is that an attempt would have needed to be made to try and land on Christmas Island from a timing point of view and secondly the plane was deflected from its intended planned destination due to something happening on the flight deck for whatever reason.
Captain Zaharie was keen to try and land on Christmas Island but was concerned about the challenge and had accepted he would probably have to continue on to Bandung airfield on Java.
It is not difficult to imagine why he did not land there.
It would not be easy to put a plane down on the island after a traumatic flight from hell, the early morning gloom, probably no lights on the runway, thunderstorms overhead and low cloud.
Apparently he spent some time attempting a landing, based on the BTO’s, before heading to the previously mentioned Bandung airfield.
We know Captain Zaharie didn’t land at Christmas Island but we can estimate time spent attempting a landing based on the BTO’s
If similar ground speed continued before and after Christmas Island he could have spent anywhere up to about 14 minutes and still been able to make the 7th arc.
that’s an interesting theory, I know there is no primary radar coverage around CI (well, most of the time) and it was very early morning but someone would have probably heard/seen the plane if it tried to land
indonesian airport(s) as primary goal are suspicious to me because he could just fly through Malacca along indonesian border from the north side while negotiating and he’d be intercepted and forced to land by indonesian airforce anyway, there would be no need to get around Sumatra and land from the south
@TBill
Glad you liked the flight path. I should perhaps try and circulate it a bit more on the internet.
The one bit where I still feel a bit unhappy is the segement TOPIN – ISBIX via UPROB, although I feel the explanation I provide makes some sense in terms of ultimate confusion.
At the end of the day, the proposed flight path circumpassing Indonesian radar is simply an exercise to show that this assumption provides a good fit with the BTO/BFO data, before moving on to ISBIX. If the assumption of a waypoint route ISBIX – BEBIM – NOBEY (McMurdo) is correct, then the exact route MH370 took before that doesn’t matter much. This is only to show that the route meshes well with the assumption that MH370 was bypassing Indonesian radar. In comparison with all drift studies (‘offical’, academic, independent) ~ 30.9S seems to be good match (and that area has never been searched).
For anyone interested, here is the link (again, I still have to include the recent CSIRO drift study):
https://www.docdroid.net/idroxeX/mh370-waypoint-20.pdf.html
@StevanG
I think the route was designed to maximize negotiating time. He took the flight to Beijing (instead of diverting a flight West to make it clear that a diversion was taking place early in the flight). If his intention was simply to disappear in the SIO at 35S a Western flight is so much better for that. He would not be missed until well after the turn South.
Basically the diversion at IGARI and the flight past Penang were designed to let the other parties know without a doubt early on that a diversion had been done, and the situation was serious. The slight loiter past Penang was then followed by the FMT to the Cocos, and then to CI and perhaps on to Bandung. Things just did not work out the way the perps planned.
@StevanG “…. someone would have probably heard/seen the plane if it tried to land …”
That is a very good point regarding CI, is anyone aware if there was any report of an aircraft seen or heard overhead around daylight on that day?
no there wasn’t such report
DennisW could be, however if maximizing the time was the only goal he could just continue flying west with bunch of airports around to choose after negotiations are over.
Also if his goal was to negotiate he’d maybe announce that immediately and RMAF wouldn’t have other option but to shoot him down if they didn’t want to accept the terms.
One of his goals was to embarrass the military&government and overfly them without getting intercepted. I’m more and more convinced he got the idea from that ethiopian copilot who did the same over Switzerland just a week before MH370.
@StevanG
The scenario comparison may be vastly different, yet there is something to be gleaned from both of these flights. Although the 1996 flight lacked security of a 2014 flight, it illustrates how a veteran pilot (11,500 hours) runs out of gas and ditches the plane in the Indian Ocean.
The flight 2 1/2 weeks before MH370 could be relevant not only as an example of asylum, but of an exit strategy for the perpetrator from an impenetrable cockpit.
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/world/europe/ethiopian-airlines-hijacking/
http://www.airlive.net/onthisday-in-1996-ethiopian-airlines-flight-961-ditches-in-the-indian-ocean/