Yesterday, officials responsible for locating missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 announced that their two-year, $150 million search has come to an end. Having searched an area the size of Pennsylvania and three miles deep, they’ve found no trace of the plane.
The effort’s dismal conclusion stands in marked contrast to the optimism that officials displayed throughout earlier phases of the search. In August, 2015, Australia’s deputy prime minister Warren Truss declared, “The experts are telling us that there is a 97% possibility that it is in [the designated search] area.”
So why did the search come up empty? Did investigators get unlucky, and the plane happened to wind up in the unsearched 3 percent? Or did something more nefarious occur?
To sort it all out, we need to go back to why officials thought they knew where the plane went.
Early on the morning of March 8, 2014, MH370 took off from Kuala Lumpur en route to Beijing. Forty minutes passed the last navigational waypoint in Malaysian airspace. Six seconds after that it went electronically dark. In the brief gap between air-control zones, when no one was officially keeping an eye on it, the plane pulled a U-turn, crossed back through Malaysian airspace, and then vanished from military radar screens.
At that point the plane was completely invisible. Its hijackers could have flown it anywhere in the world without fear of discovery. But lo and behold, three minutes later a piece of equipment called the Satellite Data Unit, or SDU, rebooted and initiated a log-on with an Inmarsat communications satellite orbiting high overhead. An SDU reboot is not something that can happen accidentally, or that airline captains generally know how to do, or that indeed there would be any logical reason for anyone to carry out. Yet somehow it happened. Over the course of the next six hours, the SDU sent seven automated signals before going silent for good. Later, Inmarsat scientists poring over the data made a remarkable discovery: due to an unusual combination of peculiarities, a signal could be teased from this data that indicated where the plane went.
With much hard work, search officials were able to wring from the data quite a detailed picture of what must have happened. Soon after the SDU reboot, the plane turned south, flew fast and straight until in ran out of fuel, then dived into the sea. Using this information, officials were able to generate a probabilistic “heat map” of where the plane most likely ended up. The subsequent seabed search began under unprecedented circumstances. Never before had a plane been declared lost, and its location subsequently deduced, on the basis of mathematics alone.
Now, obviously, we know that that effort was doomed. The plane is not where the models said it would most likely be. Indeed, I would go further than that. Based on the signal data, aircraft performance parameters, and the available autopilot modes, there is a finite range of places where the plane could plausibly have fetched up. Search vessels have now scanned all of them. If the data is good, and the analysis is good, the plane should have been found.
I am convinced that the analysis is good. And the data? It seems to me that the scientists who defined the search area overlooked a step that even the greenest rookie of a criminal investigator would not have missed. They failed to ascertain whether the data could have been tampered with.
I’ve asked both Inmarsat scientists and the Australian mathematicians who defined the search area how they knew that the satellite communications system hadn’t been tampered with. Both teams told me that they worked with the data they were given. Neither viewed it as their job to question the soundness of their evidence.
This strikes me as a major oversight, since the very same peculiar set of coincidences that made it possible to tease a signal from the Inmarsat data also make it possible that a sophisticated hijacker could have entered the plane’s electronics bay (which lies beneath an unsecured hatch at the front of the business class cabin) and altered the data fed to the Satellite Data Unit.
A vulnerability existed.
The only question is: Was it exploited? If it was, then the plane did not fly south over the ocean, but north toward land. For search officials, this possibility was erased when a piece of aircraft debris washed ashore on Réunion Island in July of 2015. Subsequently, more pieces turned up elsewhere in the western Indian Ocean.
However, as with the satellite data, officials have failed to explore the provenance of the debris. If they did, they would have noticed some striking inconsistencies. Most notably, the Réunion debris was coated completely in goose barnacles, a species that grows only immersed in the water. When officials tested the debris in a flotation tank, they noted that it floated half out of the water. There’s no way barnacles could grow on the exposed areas—a conundrum officials have been unable to reconcile. The only conclusion I can reach is that the piece did not arrive on Réunion by natural means, a suspicion reinforced by a chemical analysis of one of the barnacles by Australian scientist Patrick DeDeckker, who found that the barnacle grew in water temperatures that no naturally drifting piece of debris would have encountered.
If the plane didn’t go south, then where did it go? Not all the Inmarsat data, it turns out, was susceptible to spoofing. From the portion that wasn’t, it’s able to generate a narrow band of possible flight paths; they all terminate in Kazakhstan, a close ally of Russia. Intriguingly, three ethnic Russians were aboard MH370, including one who was sitting mere feet from the electronics bay hatch. Four and a half months later, a mobile launcher from a Russian anti-aircraft unit shot down another Malaysia Airlines 777-200ER, MH17. A year after that, the majority of pieces of debris wind up being discovered by a man who had spent the last three decades intimately involved with Russia.
Whether or not the Russians are responsible for MH370, the failure of the seabed search and the inconsistencies in the aircraft debris should undermine complacency about the official narrative. When MH370 disappeared, it possessed an obscure vulnerability that left its Inmarsat data open to tampering. Having spent $150 million and two years on a fruitless investigation, search officials have an obligation to investigate whether or not that vulnerability was exploited.
@Hank: “It seems like you are in agreement now.”
We are in agreement on the physical aspects. We differ in what we consider a special case.
@TimR
Personally, I’m not looking for a suicide scenario but for one where the original intention was to divert the plane and land it, but that didn’t work out and the plane continued as a ghost flight. I don’t think the evidence suggests a suicide scenario. According to the ATSB first principles review, it is likely the plane continued on a magnetic heading, and in that case ended up further north. All debris finds seem to support this, although the last ping rings are a bit more trickier to reconcile with that assumption, as far as I see.
@TimR
Remember the whole 7th Arc is valid, but only a fraction was searched. It could have been a more complex/curved path ghost flight. ATSB favored simple/straight path ghost flight.
As far as why a such a long flight: crashing the plane in an unfindable location is obviously one theory (if so, it worked!). Another reason could be to wipe evidence such as voice recorder.
We do not know what the PIC or hijacker had in mind, but it has the outward appearance of a bit of a stunt to demonstrate weaknesses.
@Rob. “Exactly which control surfaces are operable on RAT power only?”
Here is the Continental page. https://www.dropbox.com/s/ahv8y7ao82jqjzj/Actuators.pdf?dl=0
With the RAT providing hydraulics to the centre system and electrical power to the L1 and centre ACEs (and the left and centre PFCs, from http://www.davi.ws/avionics/TheAvionicsHandbook_Cap_11.pdf ) you will see that the actuators operative are the left aileron inner, spoilers 1, 7, 8 and 14, right flaperon outer, left elevator inner, left stabiliser jackscrew and top rudder, plus another on the rudder.
If there were power to the DC buses the inner of the right aileron would come on line and with AC power (IDG windmilling, APU) the whole lot. This takes us back to TBill’s remark about Byron Bailey, “… suggesting dive to get more power, not sure if he was thinking IDG source”.
I do not think you can say the left flaperon remained attached. One question I have never seen answered by the drift analysts is what are the prospects of a floating object like this not being beached anywhere?
In VictorI’s simulator observation of right aileron movement, nominally under RAT power, the same could apply; that it was supplemented.
So unless someone can come up with definitive statements of windmill engine speeds at which the backup generators then IDGs come on line and engine driven hydraulic pumps likewise, together with the relevant RR engine spool (No3?) windmill speed/aircraft speed graph we will get no further.
To that, add the complication of konowing what the engine speed was and if, when and for how long the APU came on line. In particular, aircraft speed against time will be enmeshed in probabilities which, without detailed research and wind tunnel trials, may be doubtful as to accuracy and confidence in that.
On another question I think the left flaperon with both actuators in by-pass would float to its the full up position.
@Ge Rijn. If under windmilling the IDGs came back on line, or if the APU was operating then my supposition that just the centre hydraulic system was operating at flaperon separation goes out the window.
“ I hope one day soon the French will give their full detailed report on the flaperon.” As does Kenyon. I would have thought that had there been evidence of fatigue at its hinges the ATSB would know of this and would have said, though there is little certainty around.
@BuyerNinety. Thanks for the home simulator limitations comments.
@VictorI. “But in general, the relative orientation of the free surface changes as flight conditions change, and only for special cases does it remain constant. For this reason, I take no issue with the ATSB’s statement”. Yes, the back up generators keeping the autopilot on line make a difference. According to the first BFO, 2 mins after fuel exhaustion the aircraft was descending nose down then but had the APU stated a minute before with the aircraft for most of that minute, it had to operate only for another 8 seconds for the log-on to complete. During that time I would expect with the dive getting steeper that residual fuel suction would be disrupted (as Hank says, difficult to model) but even so the APU might well have got enough; again supposing a left engine relight had not got to it first. So the importance of windmilling is not to IDG restoration but to backup generator retention.
Therefore, any autopilot retention like this would support the ATSB characterisation of what happened and would leave the aircraft crashing close to the 7th arc, if unmanned.
Does the autopilot in the simulator hold until nigh on the two minutes?
“Looking at the simulations that Mike witnessed, it is hard to be certain, but it looks like there is no electrical power from the IDGs or backup generators after the second flameout.” This goes back to the engine deceleration rate and that spool in the RR in particular. The simulation was with a US engine I expect though that really should not be crucial. What might be is the modelling of that deceleration. Also while the IDGs will drop off line at idle, the backup drop off engine speed for the same, despite your own simulation, is uncertain: the Level D simulator would need to be up with all those things.
The RR spool. I have a cutaway drawing of the Trent 900, which shows the bevel accessory drive gear between the two compressors (not including the fan) and I believe mounted on the HP shaft, ie the 3rd spool.
I suppose the MH 370 Trent 892B-17 would be the same.
@Hank
Thanks for your comments. I completely accept your point AF447/France/Airbus paradigm is quite different to MH370/Malaysia/Boeing.
AF447 could have been a ‘therefore for the grace of God go I’ error. In fact it was a safe hours issue, the only person capable of handling the stall was the Captain who was asleep in the crew rest. The French, to their credit, sought answers and paradoxically may have increased their liability. I accept the facts about the response to the pitot tubes icing up as being the initial cause of the stall.
MH370 seems fundamentally different. As @VictorI pointed out the first honest comment was MY authorities denying that a reward had been offered to help find MH370.
@SteveBarratt
“As @VictorI pointed out the first honest comment was MY authorities denying that a reward had been offered to help find MH370.”
Even that seems bizarre to me. I find it hard to believe that a deputy transport minister made up a reward narrative all by himself. He is fully aware that he does not have that authority. My sense is that he was told that story, and someone higher up the food chain had second thoughts, and Liow was forced to toss his deputy under the bus.
@DennisW
A more accurate description of events. Thank you.
@VictorI. Readability. In place of my, “..but had the APU stated a minute before with the aircraft for most of that minute…”, please read, “…but had the APU started a minute before with the aircraft steady for most of that minute…”
@Havelock @JW
Hello Sir, thank you for your time and effort to look into the videos of Shah and to try an evaluation of his state of mind.
Since there is a lot of intellectual cannibalism on this blog, your contribution makes one of the more enlightened, while cooperative views in the course of a serious scientific discussion, which, after all, seems bitterly needed after the blatant failure of the commissioned search bodies from ATSB to RMP and FBI.
Maybe you can ask a colleague to peer review your findings and Jeff Wise can open a separate thread for your findings?
I am still a bit in shock that engineers and mathmaticians try to call their laymens speculations about psychic conditions part of their science.
@David: In the Level D simulations witnessed by Mike, the engines spool down fast (around 1 second) and I don’t see evidence of any electrical power supplied by either the IDG or the backup generators. The flight controls are on battery power until the RAT starts and then the APU brings up the AC busses until the APU runs out of fuel. From thereafter, it is only RAT power.
The stability of the plane seems to change over time. At times there is a tendency to enter into an increasing bank, and other times there is a tendency to stabilize to wings level. Since the flight mode should remain in Secondary after the engines spool down, I don’t know why things change. I do see that the wind conditions were varying, so perhaps that partially explains it.
I’m not sure we can take this much further. I don’t see how we can’t do better than Boeing did.
In the ATSB report that summarized the Boeing simulations, there is a statement:
“In an electrical configuration where the loss of engine power from one engine resulted in the loss of autopilot (AP), the aircraft descended in both clockwise and anti-clockwise directions.”
I’m not sure how this could occur unless the breakers for the IDG and backup generator were open for the engine that flamed-out second. Perhaps they considered that at some point, the electrical system was reconfigured by the pilot.
@VictorI: The report states: “The results of the simulation are presented in Figure 6.” I think they mean sometimes clockwise, sometimes anti-clockwise, rather than alternating directions in any single simulation.
@David
Thank you, that helps give me a clearer picture. I know you might think I’m sticking my neck out when suggesting that the LH flaperon must have stayed on the plane, but this is my reasoning: Firstly, if the LH flaperon had come off the wing, it would have be recovered by now, and I don’t believe there is anything else out there waiting to be discovered. Secondly, three sizable, adjacent parts from the RH trailing edge have been recovered: the RH Flaperon, RH Outboard Flap inner section and the RH Outboard Flap Inboard Hinge Fairing. The Flaperon and Flap were directly adjacent to each other on the wing. To me this has to be significant. On the other hand, only one piece from the LH side has turned up: a small section of trailing edge from the LH Outboard Flap.
The aircraft appears to have impacted right wing-down.
There might be a link between the RH Flaperon being powered by the RAT and also being broken off by the impact. The flaperon trailing edge was extensively damaged, but the directly adjacent Outboard Flap trailing edge was not. This suggests to me that the RH Flaperon was deflected down at the time of impact – inferring pilot control?
The ATSB mentioned earlier that the electrical system may have been reconfigured by the pilot. Report of 26 June 2014, SDU power-up after fuel exhaustion:
@Gysbreght: My statements about changing stability referred to the simulations that Mike witnessed.
@VictorI: I replied to your closing paragraph: “I’m not sure how this could occur …”. Sorry for not being more clear.
@VictorI: Since you bring up the simulations that Mike witnessed- I’ve always wondered how the fuel management was done for the APU and the main engines.
The ATSB states in its Update of Nov. 2, 2016: “Specifically, flight simulators are unable to accurately model the dynamics of the aircraft’s fuel tanks. In the simulator, when the fuel tank is empty, zero fuel is available to all systems fed from the tank.”
That implies that in the simulations that Mike witnessed the engines were shut down manually with fuel remaining in the tank(s), and the APU was also shut down manually in those simulations.
@Gysbreght: In the simulations, the engines flamed out at the point the fuel went to zero in the tanks without manual intervention. They call out the fuel level readings as they fall so there is no doubt. The APU seems to start with the fuel in its line as there is no fuel in the tanks, and the APU also shuts down when that fuel is depleted. They make a comment in the video about the APU running out of fuel. I don’t know how the simulator models the fuel system, but evidently the model includes a small amount of fuel supplied to the APU that is not in the main tanks.
@VictorI: Thank you for that clarification. Is it possible to indicate when the APU ran out of fuel in the simulation that Mike made available on this blog?
The file was named “Right_Eng_1st_Transcription.xlsx”.
@Gysbreght, You wrote “‘As this power interruption was not due to engine-flame outs, it is possible that it was due to manual switching of the electrical system.'”
I can’t emphasize enough how important a clue the reboot of the SDU is. As you know, this forum has spent an enormous amount of time trying to identify an innocent explanation how SDU came to be rebooted, and failed. Also important to note is that as a rule airline captains don’t know what the SDU is, how it works, or how to reboot it. Yes all the data from which the seabed search area was derived came from this box. Given that, an examination of the possibility of tampering should have been first on investigators’ list.
There are great many people who think that an accident, fire, or suicide theory is more “reasonable” than a spoof, but they are only able to hold this belief by averting their eyes from the SDU. I think Mike Exner’s position sums it up nicely: “We don’t know what happened to the SDU.” By ignoring the reboot, he is even able to imagine that a fire/depressurization/accident scenario is possible.
@Jeff Wise: Apart from de-powering, then re-powering the SDU, there are are more reasons than we can think of for de-powering, then re-powering the left main AC bus.
@Gysbreght, Not really! The only good one I can recall was turning off the CVR, but that would be incurring a massive change to the electrical system, with no certainty regarding what systems would get turned off, for no benefit, since if the plane went into the far ocean then the CVR would only have the last two hours on it.
So, to reiterate: prior to July 2015, we had a situation in which everything that was known about the plane came from the SDU; the SDU looked very clearly to have been tampered with; and yet no one thought it worthwhile to even raise the question of whether the data might have been tampered with.
Think about that.
Oh, and by the way, they spent $200 million looking for where the data indicated the plane would have gone, and it wasn’t there. And they still don’t want to even address the possibility.
@Jeff Wise: “The only good one I can recall was turning off the CVR, …”.
One reason for turning off power to the CVR could have been to prevent that the recording it contained would be overwritten.
I recall a discussion of the cockpit door security, and someone suggested the system that provides for dropping the passenger oxygen masks.
Basically we don’t know all the systems powered by the left AC bus.
@Jeff
“Oh, and by the way, they spent $200 million looking for where the data indicated the plane would have gone, and it wasn’t there. And they still don’t want to even address the possibility.”
No. You have to get off this fallacy. It makes you look bad. There was no compelling reason to look where they looked, and failure to find the plane says absolutely nothing.
I told you and everyone else the search was likely to fail before they started it. Am I clairvoyant? No. Just realistic about what the data is able to tell us.
Your view remains – the plane was not found, therefore the ISAT is wrong. Rubbish.
http://tmex1.blogspot.com
@DennisW, You wave your ignorance of the DSDTG paper like a flag. It makes you look bad.
You have long said that the Inmarsat data is under-determined, that the plane could be anywhere on the 7th arc. When I asked you to show me a route that wound up somewhere else, you came up with a loiter scenario — that is, one which required the plane to be descending at just the right rate of descent to mimic the turn to the south that the DSTG presumes. This is exactly the kind of unlikely coincidence that you would (rightly) mock if it came from someone else.
The absence of the plane from the search area seabed is a strong indicator that something is wrong with the Inmarsat data.
@Gysbreght, You wrote, “Basically we don’t know all the systems powered by the left AC bus.” Exactly!!! And if we don’t, after three years of wracking our brains, how could a lone pilot bent on suicide?
BTW the CVR argument doesn’t make sense, it wouldn’t prevent the data from being overwritten if you turn it back on.
The larger point is that you have to do backflips in order to come up with an SIO scenario that makes any sense at all. In the absence of reasons not to consider a spoof, all you can do is what DennisW and the IG do — pooh-pooh it.
@jeffwise: Starting at around 18:25, it is very possible the pilot was reconfiguring the electrical system and performing a lateral offset manoeuver. But for some reason, you consider the possibility of an ongoing descent at 18:40 an unlikely coincidence. (The descent could last more than 10 minutes, so there is no precise timing required.) They seem very consistent to me. Is there some reason why you believe that a pilot that performed a lateral offset manoeuver would not also initiate a descent?
@VictorI, What looks to you like an offset maneuver, whatever that is, looks to me like a turn to the north, but might just be an artifact. And no, I don’t think a descent is likely, given that the plane flew for another six hours, and that planes that fly long distances tend to get higher as they go, not lower.
Also, it’s probabilistically unlikely that it would have conducted this maneuver at just the right vertical speed to match the observed BFO value.
It’s summoning an incredible coincidence in order to salvage a bad scenario. One which BTW also has other problems at the other end — namely, as the ATSB observed in its most recent paper, an absence of surface debris north of 32 degrees south, or whatever it was.
All SIO scenarios are having to thread a very small needle in order to conform with the data. So, again, you don’t have to agree that a spoof definitely happened, but at this point to dismiss a spoof without seriously engaging with it smacks to me of bad faith.
@Jeff Wise @Gysbrecht
I like to tune in on this.
I believe @Gysbrecht’s attached note is significant in this regard;
Footnote 19: The earlier SDU log on request at 18:25 UTC was also considered likely to have been due to a power interruption. As this power interruption was not due to engine-flame outs, it is possible that it was due to manual switching of the electrical system. Therefore it is possible that the aircraft’s electrical configuration was not in the normal state (i.e. the left IDG powering the left AC bus and the right IDG powering the right AC bus) at the time that the first engine flamed-out.”
IMO the note leaves two options;
-engine flame out(s)
-manual manipulation
Further it mentions the left IDG powering the left main bus or the right IDG powering the right AC main bus the elec. configuration was not in a normal state (in both options).
I think we can assume the plane had no engine flame out just before or after IGARI till at least 18:22. The registrated speeds and altitudes exclude this option till that point.
So only the other option stays open: it was due to manualy manipulating (just before IGARI), switching off the electrical system that shut down, SDU, ACARS, transponders, radios and other connected systems all in a short time.
The SDU log on request at 18:25 was not due to a power interruption but due to a power restoration.
Considering the ATSB options mentioned this could have only been caused by engine flame out(s) or manual manipulation/switching of the electrical system putting the SDU (but not the ACARS or transponsers!) back on line.
Since there not could have been an engine flame out at IGARI that caused the systems to shut down till 18:25 it must have been manualy induced.
Manualy induced could have been disabling ACARS, transponders, IFE and isolating the left IDG.
Bringing the left IDG on line again at ~18:25 could have resulted in activating the SDU agian but not the switched off other systems (transponders, IFE, ACARS etc.)
Only a flame out of the right engine (with an isolated left engine IDG) at ~18:25 could probably have caused a restoration of power to the SDU by the starting of the APU and then causing the reboot.
Speculating again on an earlier scenario..
The Malaysian military intercepted the plane just before leaving radar range at 18:22.
They shot at it with a heat seeking missile hitting the right engine taking it out but not destroying the plane.
The plane descended steeply. APU started and caused the re-boot. The jets had to go back to base due to range restrictions.
The plane flew on crippled on its left engine for a while and then the hijacker/pilot descided to steer the plane into the SIO knowing his mission had failed.
The plane was to low by then to be detected by Indonesian radar.
Maybe it tried to reach an airport but in such a case I think the hijacker/pilot would like to get rid of all evidence.
In case of mission-failure the SIO maybe was his plan B of escape practiced on a SIM.
The plane climbed back to altitude 25.000ft on one engine.
With slightly lower speed and endurance it ended up North of the current search zone.
A scenario like this would be a scenario the Malasians would do anything for to cover up.
Didn’t Hiss say unasked; ‘We did not shot the plane, the Americans would’, when the journalist replied; ‘That are your words not mine’
@jeffwise
You said, “What looks to you like an offset maneuver, whatever that is, looks to me like a turn to the north, but might just be an artifact.”
First, an offset manoeuver is not some crazy pattern I made up. It is a standard manoeuver for planes following airways, and is accomplished with several button pushes in the FMC. But then you want to attribute the BFO pattern (which also matches the BTO pattern) to an “artefact”.
You said, “Also, it’s probabilistically unlikely that it would have conducted this maneuver at just the right vertical speed to match the observed BFO value.”
You can match the BFO at 18:40 as a combination of horizontal speeds, tracks, and vertical speeds. If you assume the plane was actively piloted and performing manoeuvers in this time interval, any combination within the limits of the performance of the plane are equally likely.
If you think the BFO pattern at 18:25 shows a turn to the north, why do the first and last values correspond to a track parallel to N571? Now that would be quite a coincidence.
You said, “And no, I don’t think a descent is likely, given that the plane flew for another six hours, and that planes that fly long distances tend to get higher as they go, not lower.”
Actually, a hold at FL200, consistent with a descent, would conserve fuel before the turn to the south was made. Again, very consistent.
As for a spoof, I did seriously consider it, if you recall. New evidence that surfaced pointed in a different direction. I moved on. You didn’t. If you consider that “bad faith” on my part, that’s your problem.
@Jeff
DSTG???
Are these the same people who computed the mean and variance of a random walk? Funny shit, actually.
The loiter scenario is far more likely than the planting of debris. You are living in a glass house.
@Gysbreght: It looks as though for that simulation the APU power stopped about 1m10s after it started.
One quick question, what is basis for thinking there was a possible offset maneuver at NILAM? BFO?
OK two quick, could closing the offset account for 18:40 BFO?
@VictorI: Thank you for the APU runtime. APU stopping at about 0:08:04 (from 1st eng out) apparently did not affect controllability.
@VictorI, Okay, we agree on this point: I stuck with the spoof, you moved on. But you understand the physical/electronic basis for the possibility of spoof. Even if your gut told you to trust Blaine, and that caused you to downgrade the possibility that a spoof occurred, surely you would agree that it’s still conceivable that he’s not an honest dealer. If that’s the case (the possibility, I mean) can you think of a reason why the ATSB should not at least address whether the vulnerability existed that could have been exploited?
@jeffwise: My beliefs are based on more than what my gut told me about Blaine Gibson. It’s not productive for me to again lay out here the case for what I believe is the most likely scenario and why a spoof involving Putin is extremely unlikely. You dismiss what I believe to be relevant evidence and you link whatever you believe is an anomaly to Putin. In the process, you accuse many people that disagree with you of being Putin sympathizers, if not co-conspirators. You’ve also accused me on multiple occasions of deliberately misleading because of my own agenda. In this environment, there is little room for a rational discussion.
@VictorI: You wrote to @David, about the Level D simulations witnessed by Mike:
Perhaps you noted that similar tendencies can be observed in some of Boeing simulations.
@Gysbreght: Yes. With the correct parameters tracked and recorded, all can be explained based on physical principles. Unfortunately, we are operating blind.
@Jeff
The most important pieces of debris are not linked to Gibson – flaperon and outboard flap. The SA finds also had nothing to do with Gibson. Blaine has found crumbs by comparison.
The condition of the debris is consistent with crash damage. How in the world are you going to simulate crash damage that would fool someone with forensic experience? Hacksaws and sledge hammers are not going to get it done.
Then their is the question of radar avoidance which is not easy to dismiss.
If the ISAT data itself was tampered with (not a spoof of the actual AES hardware), it would not have gone unnoticed. A whole lot of people have poked and prodded the data logs, and despite a couple of anomalies associated with reboot activity, it hangs together really well.
Simulator data is also quite compelling, IMO.
You have to ignore (or explain away) a great many things to make the spoof viable. Ignoring things is not at all symmetrical with postulating an activity such as a loiter. Actually, a loiter is entirely consistent with a plausible theory of the crime.
@DennisW “Actually, a loiter is entirely consistent with a plausible theory of the crime”
As is a descent to a lower altitude, say to FL200 as Victor pointed out
@VictorI “….. a hold at FL200, consistent with a descent, would conserve fuel before the turn to the south was made. Again, very consistent”
The reboot and other data anomalies could be related to where the spoof wasn’t operating optimally. These breadcrumbs were then misrepresented as fmt and calls from MAS operations.
@All
Frankly, I think MY has deliberately “duped” everybody, beginning with the relatives at the Lido, the showing of the alleged Malacca Strait returns, and then, to “back it up” in the “credibility stakes”, conveniently generating the “ten second data” (which the “public” has never seen) for a “trusted confidant” (the DSTG) to chew on, and produce their (wonderful ?) Bayesian – yadda yadda .
In my initial thinking on this, I (like everyone else) considered the Malacca Strait radar as “plausible”, but I recognized that it was “dangerous”, because it all depended way too much on “timing”. There had to be enough “time” to “get out of reach” to survive the “Mexican Stand Off”.
I wrote up a scenario here: http://ventus45.blogspot.com.au/2016/06/what-if-zs-motive-was-political.html
However, my “survival instincts” kept chewing away at me. My misgivings about the “timing” got to me, going up the “Strait” was just “not on”, way too bloody dangerous.
As a long time “Black Buck-One to Five” analyst, I decided to “step back” and do a real “mission planner” analysis, to ENSURE SURVIVAL, and thus, possibly, mission success.
I determined, that if I was Z, and if I was going to take the aircraft, and wanted to survive, the absolute LAST place I would take it after passing Penang, was up the Malacca Strait, where I would be virtually inviting the RMAF to shoot me down. The only place to go was “strait ahead”, directly into Indonesian Airspace, so that the RMAF COULD NOT FOLLOW”. To survive, it is first necessary to ESCAPE, so I “planned” and ESCAPE, and, low and behold, according to Barry Martin’s spreadsheet (which I used), it complies with the ISAT data.
See: http://ventus45.blogspot.com.au/2016/11/the-escape-to-southern-fmt.html
So, how to reconcile all that with the Lido “RADAR” ? The answer may surprise some.
See: “Radar Games” at:
http://auntypru.com/forum/-MH370-time-to-think-of-it-as-a-criminal-act?pid=5785#pid5785
@JeffWise
In your article you state “I am convinced that the analysis is good.” Therefore the SDU data has must have been spoofed and MH370 must be in a hanger in Kazakhstan. I and others, such as @DennisW, don’t believe that DSTG got it right and the data may still be OK.
Dr. Neil Gordon was one of the inventors of the particle filter numerical method in UK and he moved to Australia and became leader of the DSTG team.
The filter creates a probability distribution for the location around arc 7. But the prediction is only as good as the assumptions, which are all listed on page 60 of their report.
I noted in an earlier post that the infinite fuel assumption and not explicitly modelling fuel burn was a serious flaw.
The filer works by simulating many thousands or millions of random flights and uses the BTO and BFO data to rank them in some way. But the flights were constrained by assumptions on frequency of turns and other maneuvers which were based on actual commercial flights between destinations. It was not possible for any sample flight to do a 360 degree clearing turn or even two 180 degree turns in short sequence or even S-turns.
So the 120,000 km2 zone is the probability for the case where MH370 would have flown a nice airline type flight. And fuel limits were ignored except for some undisclosed post analysis.
I expect there are some strong egos at stake. Inmarsat used a different numerical method to define the zones for air search, which did not rely on assumed flight models. But Inmasat’s method was slow rolled – because of the “superior flight dynamics” provided by the particle filter method.
While the particle filter might be a fine tool, the assumptions were terrible and the optimal probability distribution generated is not where MH370 crossed arc 7. The answer is a direct consequence of the assumptions. Bad assumptions, bad result. The heat maps will look great – just not where MH370 could be located.
Also the time and distance from crossing arc 7 and hitting the water is highly dependent on whether this is an uncontrolled dive, as assumed, or a glide.
It does no good to question the analysis after the search has been done. I expected if the assumptions were “fixed” the PDF would move. Maybe to the north.
But as a journalist you might want to really investigate the story of how DSTG, Inmarsat, and the other players actually worked together and why assumptions were made. Even more, why not test several sets of assumptions to test sensitivity of the result. Very arrogant to bet everything on one set of assumptions. I expect there are some interesting stories about each of the investigators and how this team interacted. How much was ego and how much was teamwork?
You might be able to write a book by digging into why ATSB bet this entire search on the analysis conducted by Dr. Neil Gordon’s team.
You can still suspect Putin has it hidden in a hanger in Kazakhstan and Russian agents hacked the SDU.
@VictorI. “I’m not sure we can take this much further..”
“…we are operating blind.”
I agree.
@Hank
My take on the ISAT data is, and always was, that it is a qualifier, not a predictor. If the data is correct you can use it to rule out the Maldive’s, Bay of Bengal, Diego Garcia, Kazakstan,…
In order to put a pin in map, you have to make assumptions (as you point out) relative to the flight dynamics. The fact that a straight path was found that is a good fit to the data was a curse. How often have I heard “what is the probability that a straight path could fit the data?”. Well, it turns out that it is no greater than the probability of any other path that fits the data. It is called serendipity or in Silicon Valley vernacular – the talking dog effect i.e. everyone is so amazed the dog can talk that no bothers to ask if the dog is saying anything intelligent.
It is very easy to get sucked in by talking dogs. Never ever buy a beer for one.
@Dennis
Perhaps you should get off your high horse.
I visit this forum and often see you claiming other people’s ideas are “funny shit” and now that Jeff is “living in a glass house”. How about swallowing some pride and considering the spoof with sincerity as a scientist?
You will probably say that you have considered the spoof theory but I think this would be analogous to swimming while holding onto the sides of a pool.
@PatM, Thank you!
@DennisW @JeffWise
Inmarsat used a method that did not rely on modelling flight dynamics. Their method predicted that MH370 was located at 34.7E 93.0E at 00:19 UTC. This is north of the 120K km2 zone defined by DSTG.
Inmarsat stated in their article: “What we present here is a simplified flight
path reconstruction technique to illustrate how the measurements may be transformed into a reasonable flight path. It should be emphasised that other members of the international investigation team developed far more sophisticated models factoring in aircraft and avionics performance characteristics to determine the final underwater search area.
Dr. Gordon’s (DSTG) model centered on 38.0S 88.1E and the 120K km2 box ended at about 35.5S 92.0E.
The DSTG zone (with IMO questionable assumptions) is southwest of the Inmarsat location which did not rely on modelling the flight profiles. They used a very different type of logic than the particle filter.
The wording in the Inmarsat article is polite but it looks to me that they were thrown down the stairs by Dr. Gordon. And since Inmarsat had no stake in the game, it was fine to just let ATSB do whatever they want.
Now they have an Australian $200m debacle and the new 25K km2 zone is where Inmarsat first defined using their “crude” model.
As I said in the prior post, I expect there is an interesting story about how the multi-national participants in the Flight Path Reconstruction working group really interacted and how all agreed to the defined 120k km2 zone.
Assuming that Jeff is not correct that Putin had the SDU spoofed, this was a very expensive lesson for Dr. Gordon and ATSB that their model failed. Must have been some interesting discussions in Australia.
Why was Inmarsat thrown down the stairs. Inmarsat was vert polite in their article. Must be hard not to smile when ATSB is now suggesting a search where Inmarsat predicted using their “unsophisticated” method.
@Rob. “Firstly, if the LH flaperon had come off the wing, it would have be recovered by now…”. Not if it had vamoosed unbeached Rob, which I suspect is where a large portion of objects floating durably have gone.
“The flaperon trailing edge was extensively damaged, but the directly adjacent Outboard Flap trailing edge was not. This suggests to me that the RH Flaperon was deflected down at the time of impact – inferring pilot control?”
Plausible in my view.
I am tryng to find the maximum flaperon deployment down, no flaps.