Yesterday Twitter user @nihonmama released the first two folders from the secret Malaysian police report into MH370. Some parts relating to Zaharie’s flight simulator had been released earlier, but the bulk of this material is coming into public view for the first time. Here is “Folder 1: Pilot” and here is “Folder 2: Co-pilot.”
I was particularly interested in the section containing the psychological evaluation of the pilot, Zaharie Ahmad Shah, found on page 111. As it is in Malaysian, I had to type it into Google Translate to make any sense of it. As I have absolutely no understanding of Malaysian I am copying it and pasting it below without any changes. Corrections welcome!
Hon. Datuk Mazlan bin Mansor
Deputy Director (Intelligence / Operations),
CID,
Royal Malaysian Police,
Bukit Aman,
50560, Kuala LumpurHon. Dato ‘
Expertise help the Ministry of Health in Malysia Investigation Missing MH370: The study “Psychosocial and Behavioural Pattern” crew MH370.
Letter from Hon. Dato ‘no. ref: JSJ KPN (PR) 35/3 dated July 3, 2014 and the terms of reference of the assessment panel “behavioral pattern and psychosocial crew of MH370 is referenced.
2. The sub-committee meeting between Kiraja Malaysia Police (PDRM) and KementerianKesihatan (MOH) was held in Room Mesyusarat, Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta, Perak on 7 July 2014. The purpose of this meeting was to obtain an independent report (independent) The above assessment.
3. Here is the panel sub-committee has been established.
[The letter lists three officials from the Ministry of Health and six officials from the Royal Malaysian Police]
4. Assessment conducted on flight MH370 pilot Captain Zaharia Ahmad Shah and co-pilot, en. Fariq Ab. Hamid, have been guided by reference listed:
i. Quoting witnesses related conversations pilot, Captain Zaharia Ahmad Shah, total of 40 person which includes 5 members, 20 co-workers, friends WeChat 9 and 6 public witnesses.
ii. Quoting witnesses related conversations pilot, Mr. Fariq Ab. Hamid total of 9 people including 3 members of the family, his girlfriend, and five colleagues.
iii. Quotes clips CCTV video at KLIA’s movement, patterns of behavior and expression on the face (facial expression) Zaharie co-pilot En. Fariq before their flight dated 07.03.2014.
iv. Quotes CCTV video clips KLIA Zaharie on 26.02.2014 before his flight to Denpasar, Indonesia and on 03.03.2014 before his flight to Melbourne, Australia.
v. Medical reports Zaharie.5. Based on these reference sources, we have studied the background Zaharie including education, personality and coping (coping style), relationship with spouse, children, family members, friends and colleagues, including his interests and hobbies. Attention has also been given to her relationship with her maid. His physical health problems are investigated including asthma and diseases of the spine, which caused him to have to take treatment drugs painkillers “analgesics.” Religious and political tendencies he observed.
6. We also reviewed the background of the co-pilot Mr. Fariq including education, personality, relationships with family members, friends and colleagues.
7. Highlights are as follows:
7.1 In the field of career, Zaharie is an experienced pilot and a competent and respected by peers.
7.2 Available Zaharie not share the same interests with his family members. However, the difference in interest is acceptable. His family was also not reported any change of pattern of behavior (behavioral pattern) before his flight was on 07/03/2014.
7.3 Information from friends and colleagues Zaharie show that he was a friendly, warm and jokes. They are also not reported any change of pattern of behavior before his flight was on 03/07/2014.
7.4 Problems spinal pain he was a fairly chronic physical problems rather than a new stressor.
7.5 Review of comparisons based recording video clips CCTV KLIA on 26.02.2014, 03.03.2014 and 03.07.2014, found him tending to smoke before her flight and movements of his time smoking was similar in all three videos. At KLIA CCTV video clip on 03/07/2014, Zaharie not show any sign of anxiety or depression.
Finally, we have not found, any changes in terms of psychological, social and behavioral patterns Zaharie Ahman Shah before his flight was on 03/07/2014. We also did not find any demolition of psychological, social and behavioral patterns of co-pilot En. Fariq Ab Hamid before his flight was on 03/07/2014.
Thank you.
“CARING, TEAMWORK PROFESSIONALISM AND WE ARE WORKING CULTURE”
I who am following orders,
Dr. HJH. RABA’IAH BINTI MOHD. sALLEH
MMC NO: 25878
Director & Consultant Psychiatry (Forensic)
Special Grade “C”
Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta
Perak Darul Ridzuan
I find this to be a truly remarkable document. We’ve been hearing rumors that the investigation found no evidence that suggested Zaharie could have a psychological predilection for suicide/mass murder, but here it is at last in black and white, with details such as the fact that his pattern of smoking before a flight was unchanged before MH370. It is hard to imagine that anyone contemplating his own imminent death could exhibit such sang froid.
Indeed, I don’t think there has ever been a case where someone who is known to have carried out such an act had such an outward appearance of being balanced and well-adjusted. Andreas Lubitz, for example, had experienced years of psychological upheaval trouble, at one point temporarily washing out from Lufthansa’s flight training program, before destroying Germanwings 9525.
In my estimation this psych evaluation must be regarded as powerful evidence that Zaharie did not hijack MH370.
After the jump, the letter in the original Malay, as re-typed by me from the report.
YBhg. Datuk Mazlan bin Mansor
Timbalan Pengarah (Risikan/Operasi),
Jabatan Siasatan Jenayah,
Polis Diraja Malaysia,
Bukit Aman,
50560, Kuala Lumpur
YBhg. Dato’,
Bantuan Kepakaran Kementerian Kesihatan Malysia dalam Siasatan Kehilangan MH370: Kajian “Behavioural Pattern dan Psikososial” krew MH370.
Surat daripada YBhg. Dato’ no. ruj: JSJ KPN (PR) 35/3 bertarikh 3 Julai 2014 dan terma rujukan utama panel pengkajian “behavioural pattern dan psikososial krew pesawat MH370 adalah dirujuk.
2. Mesyuarat sub-committee antara Polis Kiraja Malaysia (PDRM) dan KementerianKesihatan Malaysia (KKM) telah diadakan di Bilik Mesyusarat, Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta, Perak pada 7 Julai 2014. Tujuan mesyuarat ini diadakan adalah untuk mendapatkan satu laporan yang berkecuali (independent) di atas penilaian tersebut.
3. Berikut adalah panel sub-committee yang telah ditubuhkan.
4. Penilaian yang dijalankan terhadap juruterbang pesawat MH370 Kapten Zaharie Ahmad Shah dan pembantu juruterbang, en. Fariq Ab. Hamid, telah berpandukan sumber rujukan yang tersenarai:
i. Petikan percakapan saksi berkaitan juruterbang, Kapten Zaharie Ahmad Shah, sejumiah 40 orag yang merangkumi 5 orang ahli keluarga, 20 orang rakan sekerja, 9 orang rakan WeChat dan 6 orang saksi awam.
ii. Petikan percakapan saksi berkaitan pembantu juruterbang, En. Fariq Ab. Hamid sejumlah 9 orang yang merangkumi 3 orang ahli keluarga, teman wanita beliau, dan 5 orang rakan sekerja.
iii. Petikan klip-klip video CCTV di KLIA mengenai pergerakan, corak tingkah laku dan mimik muka (facial expression) Kapten Zaharie bersama pembantu juruterbang En. Fariq sebelum penerbangan mereka yang bertarikh 7.3.2014.
iv. Petikan klip-klip video CCTV KLIA Kapten Zaharie pada 26.2.2014 sebelum penerbangan beliau ke Denpasar, Indonesia dan pada 3.3.2014 sebelum pnerbangan beliau ke Melbourne, Australia.
v. Laporan perubatan Kapten Zaharie.
5. Berpandukan sumber rujukan tersebut, kami telah mengkaji latar belakang Kapten Zaharie termasuk pendidikan, personaliti dan daya tindak (coping style), perhubungan dengan isteri, anak-anak, ahli keluarga, kawan-kawan dan rakan sejawat termasuk minat dan hobi beliau. Perhatian juga telah diberi kepada perhubungan beliau dengan pembantu rumahnya. Masalah kesihatan fizikal beliau juga diteliti termasuk penyakit asma dan penyakit tulang belakang yang menyebabkan beliau perlu mengambil rawatan ubat-ubatan penahan sakit “analgesics.” Kecenderungan keagamaan dan politik beliau juga diamati.
6. Kami juga telah mengkaji latar belakang pembantu juruterbang En Fariq termasuk pendidikan, personaliti, perhubungan dengan ahli keluarga, kawan-kawan dan rakan sejawat.
7. Rumusan kami adalah seperti berikut:
7.1 Di bidang kerjaya, Kapten Zaharie adalah seorang juruterbang yang berpengalaman dan kompeten serta dihormati oleh rakan sejawat.
7.2 Didapati Kapten Zaharie tidak berkongsi minat yang sama dengan ahli keluarga beliau. Walau bagaimanpun, perbezaan minat ini adalah sesuatu yang boleh diterima. Keluarga beliau juga tidak melapurkan apa-apa perubahan dari corak tingkah laku (behavioural pattern) sebelum penerbangan beliau pada 7.3.2014.
7.3 Maklumat dari kawan-kawan dan rakan sejawat Kapten Zaharie menunjukkan bahawa beliau merupakan seorang yang peramah, mesra dan boleh berlawak jenaka. Mereka juga tidak melapurkan apa-apa perubahan dari corak tingkah laku sebelum penerbangan beliau pada 7.3.2014.
7.4 Masalah sakit tulang belakang beliau merupakan satu masalah fizikal yang agak kronik dan bukannya merupakan suatu stressor baru.
7.5 Kajian berpandukan perbandingan rakaman klip-klip video CCTV KLIA pada tarikh 26.2.2014, 3.3.2014 dan 7.3.2014, mendapati beliau cenderung merokok sebelum pnerbangan beliau dan gerak-geri beliau semasa merokok adalah sama di ketiga-tiga video tersebut. Pada klip video CCTV KLIA pada 7.3.2014, Kapten Zaharie tidak menunjukkan apa-apa tanda kegelisahan ataupun kemurungan.
Akhir kata, kami tidak mendapati, apa-apa perubahan dari segi psikologi, sosial dan corak tingkah laku Kapten Zaharie Ahman Shah sebelum penerbangan beliau pada 7.3.2014. Kami juga tidak mendapati apa-apa perubuhan dari segi psikologi, social dan corak tingkah laku pembantu juruterbang En. Fariq Ab Hamid sebelum penerbangan beliau pada 7.3.2014.
Akhir kata, kami tidak mendapati, apa-apa perubahan dari segi psikologi, sosial dan corak tingkah laku Kapten Zaharie Ahman Shah sebelum penerbangan beliau pada 7.3.2014. Kami juga tidak mendapati apa-apa perubuhan dari segi psikologi, social dan corak tingkah laku pembantu juruterbang En. Fariq Ab Hamid sebelum penerbangan beliau pada 7.3.2014.
Sekian, terima kasih.
“PENYAYANG, PROFESSIONALISM DAN KERJA BERPASUKAN ADALAH BUDAYA KERJA KITA”
Saya yang menurut perintah,
Dr. HJH. RABA’IAH BINTI MOHD. SALLEH
MMC NO : 25878
Pengarah & Pakar Perunding Psikiatri (Forensik)
Gred Khas “C”
Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta
Perak Darul Ridzuan
Premature.
Contributions in kind.
In another radio interview, in answer to an assertion from Tony Jones that the cost to Australian taxpayers was $90m ($A 1.0 about $US 0.75), “…the total cost of the underwater search has been in the order of $200 million, of which $60 million has been from Australia. There were some additional costs associated with the air search in the early stages which may be where you have got that, the $90 million figure from”.
Then in this the Chinese contribution is discussed a few paras from the bottom.
http://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/chester/interviews/2017/dci017_2017.aspx
@TBill,
I believe FlightRadar24 has no data after loss of ACARS on MH380.
I recall that there was a report of one radar station operator who had seen the plane but had no idea whose it was. The data were not recorded. He was interviewed several days after the fact. Not sure if this was Sabang. Others may know and chime in.
@Jeff:
Congrats! I am already looking forward to reading it. These days I guess you might need a trump to get into the WP.
@DrBobbyUlich
There were several reports on this, for example:
“Plane said to have flown around Indonesia
As searchers tried to find the aircraft, investigators pieced together new details about the plane’s path.
After reviewing radar track data from neighboring countries, officials have concluded that the passenger jet curved north of Indonesia before turning south toward the southern Indian Ocean, a senior Malaysian government source told CNN on Sunday.
Whoever was flying the plane, the source said, could have been trying to avoid radar detection.”
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/06/world/asia/malaysia-airlines-plane/
“A spokesman from Djoko’s office, Agus Barnas, later elaborated on Djoko’s statement, saying the most likely route taken by the plane was via the northern Indian Ocean, west of Sumatra, then heading south to a location Najib indicated was the plane’s crash point.”
“Agus said, ‘another military radar suggestion said that it was once detected in the Andaman Islands. So, it could very likely have cleared Sumatra island in the north before making another turn to the south until it was 2,500 kilometers from Perth.'”
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/03/26/govt-insists-mh370-did-not-fly-indonesian-airspace.html
Apparently, Sabang radar was operational on the night:
“Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said the Indonesian military radar placed in the country’s western-most city of Sabang did not detect an airplane FLYING OVER INDONESIAN TERRITORTY.”
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/93270/indonesian-military-radar-did-not-detect-missing-airplane
@David:
Thanks for the media links.
All things considered, isn’t Chester suggesting there shouldn’t have been a search to begin with — on those premises?
@DennisW:
I would never have guessed. 🙂
But who am I to say, who appear drunk just from making use of your language.
@Johan, It’s worth noting, I think, that when the search was first proposed, the ATSB (and the IG) were extremely confident that the plane was in the search area, and practically guaranteed that it would be found. Then, as the search proceeded, searchers’ estimation of the a priori likelihood went down, so that by the time I talked to Neil Gordon last year, he was saying that the search area only contained two-thirds of the total probabibility distribution.
@Johan. Yes if the motivations had been the same then as now, though they weren’t. The flavour is now more dispassionate, less eager.
I maintain that there was inadvertent misleading of leadership and some confirmation bias all round.
In particular it has not been disproved that there was a pilot, which could outflank the most major assumption made.
It would certainly make irrelevant the most recent Boeing end of flight simulations, as Ge Rijn pointed out. That possibility remains and was not addressed at all in the Review. The aircraft COULD be in the same locality but beyond the search area past and contemplated for all we know.
@Jeff:
I am not really holding it to him, more like pointing to the troubles they seem to have dealing with it mentally while trying to justify what they did and what they won’t continue doing. You are right that the optimism was much grander when they started, as it often is.
Was it as much as 1/3 left out from the area of the probability distribution? But didn’t they have layers of probability, suggesting that these 2/3 represented 90-ish per cent of the most probable turn-outs?
Further, it seems to me that some results from debris analyse are still pending. How is that coming along — do you know?
@David:
Yes. It may be hard to tell the white lies from the greyer perhaps. And there is very little talk, none actually, of what may be the cause of the disappearance.
This one won’t rest very peacefully, is my sense of it.
@Johan, I don’t know what conclusions, if any, have been reached with regards to the debris analysis. I’m hoping that we’ll learn more from the Malaysian final report, and/or that once the investigation is formally put on ice, the experts who’ve done some of this consulting work (such as De Deckker) will be more forthcoming about their work.
For what it’s worth, I feel that the outlines of the solution are now coming well into focus, and it’s just a question of reporting out the details in order to convince the world that we know what happened.
@Nederland: We have the Indonesians saying there was a capture by (non-Indonesian) military radar in the Andamans. We also have the statement from the ATSB to Niels Tas disclosing that the “NW Point” used for path reconstructions was 8.5953,92.5858 based on Singapore radar captures. These statements contradict a turn to the south before 18:40 UTC.
In fact, the path reconstructions in the ATSB report published in June 2014 show a turn to the south after 18:40 and endpoints much further north on the 7th arc. It was the analysis of the BFO value at 18:40 that led to an earlier turn and a predicted terminus much further south on the arc. If you consider the possibility of an ongoing descent at 18:40 and a later turn, once again the northern endpoints considered in the June 2014 report are viable.
In the recent First Principles report, northern points on the arc are dismissed because nothing was detected by the surface search in the weeks following the disappearance. Yet, just on the heels of this surface search, this is exactly the area recommended for the underwater search in the June 2014 report. By the time the surface search was initiated in the SIO, weeks after the disappearance, the debris field would have been very scattered. That, combined with the enormity of the search area, could have easily led to a failure to detect the debris.
@VictorI
I think the Indonesian statement above is related to their own radar, but that this only confirms an initial northern route. I am unaware of the statemet by Niels Tas, is there anything in the public domain, please?
It is interesting to note that the surface search was directed to this northern area on 28/3 at a time when first information emerged on the the investigation into the flight sim.
In June 14, Warren Truss said that the choice of search area at the time could have to do with the flight sim, but that he can’t say more about this.
http://jacc.gov.au/media/interviews/2014/june/tr014.aspx
I also feel China may know more about the case than we do. There was a hacker attack on 9/3, two logs into Z’s gmail accounts on 19/3 (all from Chinese IPs), and China have full access to WeChat content, but don’t appear to have shared with Malaysia.
It is therefore interesting to note that the first vessel to conduct surveys in that early search area was a Chinese one, the Zhu Kezhen. That was the most pro-active part China took in the search operation. They later declined to participate in the tripartite meeting during which the search area was reduced to the most southern part.
@DrBobbyU
Re: FlightRadar24, I know MH370 disappeared but I was wondering what the other air traffic was doing (to explain the lateral offset move). I see there was another jet southbound east of IGARI, perhaps accounting for the oil rig worker siting, and 5 or 6 jets heading up Malacca Straights when MH370 was at IGARI. I assume military (Singapore AWACS) is not on FlightRadar24.
@VictorI
Yes that is good history, seems like the first ATSB report is best as far as location. McMurdo route still seems to make the most sense to me, as far as skirting radar and other elements. Descent at 18:40 has two or three or more possible reasons: radar evasion, re-pressure of aircraft if it was depressured, avoid air traffic in hold, etc.
@Nederland
Watching FlightRadar24 the Andamans commercial air traffic seems to pop onto the screen right at your 200 nM radius, so must be Sabang? Conceivably below FL350 and without transponder, the radius could be smaller (although I now calc FL200 needed to get below military radar at Indonesian boundary and closer to FL100 further inside).
@TBill
I took the 200 nm radius from an earlier post by @RetiredF4 on military primary radar and it also matches exactly the distance from Maimun Saleh to waypoints AKINO and TOPIN.
Forbes aritcle by Mary Schiavo
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ranawehbe/2017/01/18/no-end-to-mh370-tragedy-for-families-of-victims-could-things-have-been-different/2/#7047e29a14c2
@VictorI
Could Z(assuming it was Z) have timed the offset manoeuvre and SDU logon to coincide, to make it look as if he were travelling north, maybe? We think he wasn’t aware of the subsequent interrogation pings showing him going south.
@TBill
Two points in the Schaivo article that you linked I would object to.
1> Plane crashes are always avoidable
While this statement is true, it has no value whatsoever. Plane crashes are going to continue to occur with statistical certainty. Just like car crashes.
2> Aviation safety has improved dramatically over the last two decades.
Sounds great, but I doubt that it is true. I will follow up on it.
@Rob: If the pilot desired to leave a trail of flying northwest while actually flying northwest, he could have enabled the ACARS. Or turned on the transponder. He or she wouldn’t have to resort to the intricacies of BTO/BFO data.
@VictorI,
Thank you, Victor, for your analysis of the possible route offset error at ANOKO. I am looking into that some more to see if there is a way to have such an error.
Regarding an IGOGU to ANOKO leg followed by a constant heading, such a route does not fit the BTO/BFO/wind/fuel data, so I don’t think that’s what happened.
Closing comments here. Please add your thoughts to the most recent post. Thank you!