The above graph is taken from the DSTG book “Bayesian Methods in the Search for MH370, ” page 90. It shows the probability distribution of MH370’s endpoint in the southern Indian Ocean based on analysis of the different autopilot modes available to whoever was in charge of the plane during its final six hours. It was published earlier this year and so represents contemporary understanding of these issues. As you can see, the DSTG estimated that the probability that the plane hit the 7th arc north of 34 degrees south longitude is effectively zero.
I interviewed Neil Gordon, lead author of the paper, on August 11. At that time, he told me that experts within the official search had already determined that the BFO values at 0:19 indicated that the plane was in a steep descent, on the order of 15,000 feet per minute.
Such a rate of descent would necessarily indicate that the plane could not have hit the ocean very far from the 7th arc. Nevertheless, Fugro Equator, which was still conducting its broad towfish scan of the search area at the time, spent most of its time searching the area on the inside edge of the search zone in the main area, between 37.5 and 35 degrees south latitude, about 25 nautical miles inside the 7th arc. At no point between the time of our interview and the end of the towfish scan in October did Equator scan anywhere north of 34 degrees south.
Shortly thereafter, the ATSB hosted a meeting of the experts it had consulted in the course of the investigation, and the result of their discussion was published on December 20 of this year as “MH370 – First Principles Review.” This document confirms what Gordon told me, that the group believed that the BFO data meant that the plane had to have been in a steep dive at the time of the final ping. What’s more, the report specified that this implied that the plane could not have flown more than 25 nautical miles from the 7th arc, and indeed most likely impacted the sea within 15 nautical miles.
By the analysis presented above, a conclusion is fairly obvious: the plane must have come to rest somewhere south of 34 degrees south, within 25 nautical miles of the seventh arc. Since this area has already been thoroughly scanned, then the implication is that the plane did not come to rest on the Indian Ocean seabed where the Inmarsat signals indicate it should have.
I would suggest that at this point the search should have been considered completed.
Nevertheless, the “First Principles Review” states on page 15 that the experts’ renewed analysis of the 777 autopilot dynamics indicates that the plane could have crossed the 7th arc “up to 33°S in latitude along the 7th arc.”
Then in the Conclusions section on page 23 the authors describe “a remaining area of high probability between latitudes 32.5°S and 36°S along the 7th arc,” while the accompanying illustration depicts a northern limit at 32.25 degrees south.
In other words, without any explanation, the northern limit of the aircraft’s possible impact point has moved from 34 degrees south in the Bayesian Methods paper in early 2016 to 33 degrees south on page 15 in the “First Principles Review” released at the end of the year. Then eight pages later within the same report the northern limit has moved, again without explanation, a half a degree further north. And half a page later it has moved a quarter of a degree further still.
Is the ATSB sincere in moving the northern limit in this way? If so, I wonder why they did not further search out this area when they had the chance, instead of continuing to scan an area that they apparently had already concluded the plane could not plausibly have reached.
I should point out at this point that the area between 34 south and 35.5 south has been scanned to a total widtch of 37 nautical miles, and the area between 32.5 and 34 has been searched to a total width 23 nautical miles. Thus even if the ATSB’s new northern limits are correct, they still should have found the plane.
As a result of the above I would suggest that:
a) Even though most recent report describes “the need to search an additional area representing approximately 25,000 km²,” the conduct of the ATSB’s search does not suggest that they earnestly believe that the plane could lie in this area. If they did, they could have searched out the highest-probability portions of this area with the time and resources at their disposal. Indeed, they could be searching it right now, as I write this. Obviously they are not.
b) The ATSB knew, in issuing the report, that Malaysia and China would not agree to search the newly suggested area, because it fails to meet the agreed-upon criteria for an extension (“credible new information… that can be used to identify the specific location of the aircraft”). Thus mooting this area would allow them to claim that there remained areas of significant probability that they had been forced to leave unsearched. This, in effect, would allow them to claim that their analysis had been correct but that they had fallen victim to bad luck.
c) The ATSB’s sophisticated mathematical analysis of the Inmarsat data, combined with debris drift analysis and other factors, allowed them to define an area of the southern Indian Ocean in which the plane could plausibly have come to rest. A long, exhaustive and expensive search has determined that it is not there.
d) The ATSB did not fall victim to bad luck. On the contrary, they have demonstrated with great robustness that the Inmarsat data is not compatible with the physical facts of the case.
e) Something is wrong with the Inmarsat data.
@Middleton
Perhaps because ir was reported early in newspapers that the FO had switched off his phone before take off, so switching it on again indicates something unusual happened, although the report seems to be more interested in what this may tell us about the plane’s altitude.
@DennisW
“Even the Malays can’t be that inept.”
At 8:19am on 9/11/01, a flight attendant told Ft. Worth that AAL11 had been hijacked.
It was 27 minutes before the first scramble out of Otis. The got no intercept vector and were still in a hold off of Long Island 25 minutes after AAL11 hit the North Tower.
UAL175 went off transponder at 8:51am. NORAD didn’t learn it had been hijacked until 9:03. It hit the South Tower at 9:03am.
George W. Bush began reading “My Pet Goat” at 9:05am.
@Middleton asked, “In the negotiation scenario (all passengers still alive at that point), why were no other phones detected at Penang?”
We don’t know whether other phones connected. My guess is that only the crew’s phone numbers were investigated.
@VictorI,
What power source is used to return and hold the rudder in its trimmed position when the main engines shut down? Batteries? Does this rudder control require hydraulic power? I assume the FMCs also continue to run on batteries, right, until the APU comes on line?
@Matt Moriarty: The story of AA77 on 9/11 is also interesting. It has parallels to MH370. The plane took off from Dulles Airport outside of Wash, DC, and flew west with a destination of Los Angeles. Near the borders of West Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky, the transponder was turned off and the plane turned back towards Washington, DC, right where the Washington Control Center would normally pass off the plane to the Indianpolis Control Center. The ATC, unaware of the turn back, naturally assumed that the plane continued west and possibly crashed. Because of this confusion, the plane went undetected on primary radar for another 36 minutes as it traveled east across West Virginia and Virginia. It crashed into the Pentagon 6 minutes later.
@Matt M
“At 8:19am on 9/11/01, a flight attendant told Ft. Worth that AAL11 had been hijacked.
It was 27 minutes before the first scramble out of Otis. The got no intercept vector and were still in a hold off of Long Island 25 minutes after AAL11 hit the North Tower.”
AAL11 hit the North tower at 18:46AM.
It was about 1.5 hours between the loss of contact with MH370 at IGARI and the last radar contact West of Penang. Essentially nothing had been done by the Malays during that time. In fact nothing was done before the plane ran out of fuel and crashed. Your comparison is pointless.
Your reason for selecting that flight so that cabin personnel would not notice a lack of a pilot potty break was pretty funny, however.
@DrBobbyUlich: I don’t know the answer without reviewing documents. I am quite sure that what Brian reports is correct, as I have seen the same statement made in other places.
DrBobbyUlich:
The rudder is moved using hydraulic power, controlled by electronics. After the first engine flames out, the TAC quickly moves the rudder ~3-4 degrees to compensate for the thrust imbalance. When the second engine flames out, the TAC moves the rudder back to the manually set position. It happens very fast (~1 second). Apparently, there is sufficient hydraulic pressure and electrical power available to do this before the RAT deploys. At least, that is what happens in the simulator.
@all
The major “tell” in my opinion is the flight, why that flight?
The problem with the Ibrahim association on that day is that the verdict was already a given, surprising no one. Similar to the lack of reaction when the stock market has already “discounted” information, the shock of injustice toward Ibrahim should have already been absorbed.
If it was related to destroying someone or something on the plane, how would there have be enough time to plan, the flight association would have been fairly spontaneous.
When you physically look at a map of the alleged flight path and you think of the coordinated timing maneuvers, you almost have to respect this as a well executed plan, one that may have taken months or years to formulate.
Perhaps looking for an immediate culprit (such as a disgruntled pilot or dangerous cargo) to solve an old transaction, is very naive.
@VictorI
That is very interesting re: AA77 on 9/11, with the same transponder trick again. I dare say today that probably would not happen, as far as NORAD missing the intercept opportunity.
@Susie
“The problem with the Ibrahim association on that day is that the verdict was already a given, surprising no one. Similar to the lack of reaction when the stock market has already “discounted” information, the shock of injustice toward Ibrahim should have already been absorbed.”
The diversion had nothing to do with Ibrahim. Even if they government had agreed to do something with respect to Ibrahim, that agreement could be reversed as soon as the plane was safely on the ground. The demands had to involve something that:
1> Was easy to verify
2> Could not be readily reversed
The only thing I could think of that fit both criteria was a money transfer involving the funds embezzled by Najib.
The selection of the flight to Beijing (instead of a flight West) was designed to make the diversion obvious as early as possible to maximize the time for negotiations. A flight West would have taken at least another hour for a diversion to be verified. Z was not trying to hide the diversion, he was waving a flag to let to let the authorities in KL know that he had, in fact, diverted the aircraft.
@Susie Crowe
–“So, if a plane is flying at normal altitude and the cockpit becomes inaccessible, all contact/communication with the outside world is gone? Never really thought of it like that, but it really is kind of a mind blower”
I’m really happy to see you consider that. Glad that someone who “didn’t think of it like that” actually paused long enough to think of it “like that.” You went right back to Pollyannaville thereafter, but I want you to know it was nice hosting you for a spell here in Eviltown.
The factual answer is, no, not cutoff in a normal emergency because, as I mentioned in the comment about 9/11, flight attendants can and have rung the company on the ship phone.
But if someone in the cockpit has disabled that feature, among many others, then, yes…the cabin is fully cutoff from the outside world, other than holding a cell phone up to the window or having your own handheld sat phone.
Anyone interested in the full RMP go here:
https://mobile.twitter.com/nihonmama/status/816805565531754500
@Matt Moriarty
I may never fly again
@DennisW
–“AAL11 hit the North tower at 18:46AM.”
8:46:40am, which I rounded to 8:47. The F-15s exited the hold at 9:12a. That’s 25 mins after Tower 1. My math is sound here. How’s yours?
–“It was about 1.5 hours between the loss of contact with MH370 at IGARI and the last radar contact West of Penang. Essentially nothing had been done by the Malays during that time. In fact nothing was done before the plane ran out of fuel and crashed. Your comparison is pointless.”
No, Dennis, my comparison is AWESOME! The point being that if we were inept on 9/11, the Malays are absolutely EXPECTED to be inept. OF COURSE they’re that inept. Something Z knew and had an itch to prove, which he certainly did.
You just didn’t get the memo?
–“Your reason for selecting that flight so that cabin personnel would not notice a lack of a pilot potty break was pretty funny, however.”
The amusement-of-DennisW is a condition of Jeff letting us all post here. It’s item 14b in the “read me” right above the “agree” button.
Nobody told you?
@SusieCrowe
Eviltown is reachable by bus if you ever want to come back.
@MattM
Think about what you are saying. The hijack message came in at 8:19. The plane hit the tower 27 minutes later. What could reasonable be done in 27 minutes?
The Malays did nothing for more than 7 hours. I don’t understand how you can possibly compare the ineptitude. We responded, the Malays did nothing. That is the simple answer that does not require any math at all.
@Matt Moriarty
Thanks Matt, you will be the first to know if I go to the dark side
@DennisW
We are a superpower with decades of air-intercept experience and our very own NORAD and the world’s most trusted and copied civilian airspace system (which we invented) and when you listen to the 9/11 tapes and look at the timeline, the system failed.
The bar for us is set high, no?
Malaysia is a mid-level regional power with less military capability than its neighbors.
The bar for them is much lower, ya?
They responded too. Just took longer and looked really silly.
@Middleton
@Ge Rijn said:
“And with it a pre-planned human controlled flight from beginning till end-point.”
@Middleton said:
“Why do you assume there was anyone alive on board to control the aircraft after BEDAX?
That would not be necessary.”
To be sure the flight ended at a chosen destination it must have been necessary a pilot/hijacker was still alive at the end.
I assume it’s not possible to program an auto-landing following a chosen end-waypoint before that end-waypoint is reached (?).
@Susie Crowe
“Anyone interested in the full RMP go here:”
>>Are we allowed to look at it?
Quick scan I stopped at ZS flight history and it is interesting to me. So Z deletes MicroSoft Flight Sim FS2004 on 20-Feb. Then on 21-Feb he takes 9M-MRO to Beijing, which I knew, but looks like the only two MH370 flights in his entire history seem to be both 9M-MRO on 21-Feb and 8-Mar-2014.
There was one other flight to Beijing MH392 in 2012. Not sure what it all means, but it would appear MH370 was not common for ZS. He only took it once that actually made it to Beijing?
@ROB
“The debris could have come from 40S. The CSIRO have admitted that themselves.”
I won’t argue your statement here. I think you are right. But this was not my point.
Debris coming from that latitude should have also arrived on South-West Australian shores.
This did not happen.
South of ~36S debris should have arrived on Australian shores.
The fact that this did not happen (at least nothing found still) makes latitudes South of ~36S very unlikely.
And adding the fact nothing was found in the current search area from 35S up to 40S makes it virtualy impossible the plane ended South of 35S. That was my point.
@Matt M, The double confirmation of FL350 could be indicative of a mistake on the part of ZS, if we are to trust the ATC tape version spooned up to us. Given that ZS flew the same flight on February 21st, parts of those conversations could have been used to doctor the ATC tapes resulting in the double level off statements. I am not so trusting as it relates to the info we are fed. IMO, killing Fariq in the way you explain seems not only elaborate but risky as well. Easier to just send him on some flimsy errand outside the cockpit. Since MH370, I have asked crew on flights whether they would noticed a 180degree turn, day or night flights. All of them have told me THAT would not go unnoticed, without exception. The turn at IGARI would have alerted the crew immediately and triggered them to contact the cockpit for answers.
@TBill, You asked a very interesting question in an earlier post, i.e. why would they not have called twice each time, since natural instinct is that you may have dialed the wrong number? I could not agree more. It’s not like MAS/ATC dials these numbers on a regular basis. With an aircraft thathas basically gone dark, one would assume they would atleast place calls 2 consecutive times in a row, if only to be sure they used the correct number. Food for thought.
@TBill,
You missed one; Saturday 23rd Feb 2013 MH370. One year back from Friday 21st Feb 2014.
OZ
@OZ
Right you are! The sum up page lists 3 flights so I guess that does not count 8-March, that would be 4 flights.
@KarenK
Maybe they would know if they got the right sat number? Re: negotiation case, strikes me we do not know if it was successful or not successful. Can we get an account no? Just a thought.
@Nederland
I connected to a Cell network on a recent flight with my iPhone 5s seated next to centre isle only for a few seconds at 36000ft at a GS of 431mph in MH370 case it could have been possible.
@Matt Moriarty
The response at 9/11 was investigated because it took just over 5 minutes to alert the military, but it should have been within 5 minutes.
The response at MH370 was not investigated because the military was never alerted.
Does this sound like a fair comparison?
It doesn’t matter how big or developed their economies are as those emergency phases are international standards. There is difference in the ability to handle a military situation, but no difference in notifying. 9/11 can not therefore be a valid point of comparison.
@TBill, others:
Telephone call: it would be all about the calling technique, wouldn’t it? If you get a paper with digits and you are supposed to enter these into a machine with a display, you might read the line of digits back to yourself (or the one who sought you out), corroborating against the paper, before you hit the call button. No?
Z flight history: That is much fewer than I thought. Anyone who have an idea if Z used to fly more pleasant departures earlier, and if redeye flights with noisy Chinese was becoming a new career step for Z, since the last parliamentary elections?
Difficult EOR revert-to-default-mode y/joke: It can’t be sound because it’s strait?
@Matt M
“—”The comparison to German wings is too simple. … Captain and crew took immidate action to enter the cockpit, but ran out of time.”
Germanwings was a day flight where the captain was locked out of the flight deck. Plenty of reason for people to take action. In my scenario, there is nothing whatsoever that would have made the cabin crew take action until it was too late. Why can you not comprehend this?
You need to explain how exactly a passenger or flight attendant knows what’s going on behind a closed cockpit door in a plane that is otherwise behaving normally. And if you use the phrase “peep hole” with respect to a night flight, you are a clown.”
I stopped reading at that point. I’m used to an educated exchange of arguments. Your repeated personal attacks for whatever reason have no place there.
@KarenK
” Easier to just send him on some flimsy errand outside the cockpit. Since MH370, I have asked crew on flights whether they would noticed a 180degree turn, day or night flights. All of them have told me THAT would not go unnoticed, without exception. The turn at IGARI would have alerted the crew immediately and triggered them to contact the cockpit for answers.”
My thoughts as well. Once locked out of the cockpit a cabin announcement to the effect that the captain was diverting the flight to an alternate airport, and an apology for the inconvenience. All will be well if the PAX and flight crew behave themselves. Otherwise the aircraft would be destroyed…
@TBill, “can you get an account no”…sadly there is no way to ascertain account numbers or banks where they are held. But if I were to guess, Najib would have made sure his embezzlements are out of reach, i.e. in a country where his assets can never be touched and are safe. That includes Saudi Arabia, amongst others like the Caymans and Panama. He would have a back up plan, a good nest egg (dinasaur size), if ever he were to be prosecuted for stealing from IMBD1 (and Lord knows what else) and needed to escape MY and request asylum elsewhere. His account numbers would only be known to a select few. As for MAS, or MY government accounts, only the banks where they bank would know (and actually see any transfers made).
@DennisW, Agreed. It would be the simplest way to control PAX/crew. Also, if MattM’s theory holds as it relates to Fariq’s demise, the crew wouldn’t know better other than that there was some kind of issue and the aircraft had to turn back. They would be preparing the cabin for landing.
@DennisW
“I think the top of the Malay chain of command knew exactly what was happening to the aircraft. How else can you explain the lack of response after IGARI, and the delayed initial search phase? Even the Malays can’t be that inept.”
Unfortunately they can…I’m living in a 3rd world country so I know first hand how nepotism and corruption could impact the government/military structure.
It was night and they were likely asleep together with radar operator. IMHO they didn’t have a clue until they reviewed radar logs.
@TBill,
Interesting that you mentioned Z’s 21st Feb 2014 flight being 9M-MRO. That flight departed 4 minutes early and then the 8th Mar flight departed 8 minutes early; both flights under the command of Z.
4 questions arise;
1/ Was there any significance in the 21st Feb flight being almost exactly one year from his previous flight to Beijing?
2/ Was the 21st Feb just a practice run or the intended mission?
3/ Was 4 minutes early departure on the 21st inadequate for what may have been planned?
4/ Was the next rostered flight departing 8 minutes early the optimum mission?
OZ
@ScottO:
Thanks. There’s more to it of course, but what can you do. I should say that I have not looked into the CMB and their situation much. Still, even with a more violent profile, with a few bombings (if any, I don’t now) of local ethnic Chinese politicians / businessmen / bureaucrats, a group such as CMB could always claim they’d been harassed, persecuted, financially ruined etc., which is not at all incredible, at leat on an individual level — and word would stand against word in the greater picture (and in cases like that, a mutuality between wrongdoing and revenge is to be expected, i.e. few would kill for no reason and the asymmetry in (political, social, economic) power (if one) is also often telling that there is no (substantial) financial or similar gain that the perps expect from their deeds. So it is first (starting there at least) about getting back at personal oppressors. Which is not to be recommended, but isn’t from Mars either. It is part and parcel of this that their own view of things can be shared and understood by many, many others, if there is something to the oppression — and that makes it “universal”. It is about getting even, getting your rights, being human among humans. Most people can identify with that in one way or the other. Indiscriminate killing of hundreds of innocent people of a variety of nationalities far away is not on their checklist. It is hardly on any one group’s checklist these days by the way, except the merry Islamist lot — who are really their own chapter/s.
It was interesting to see the conclusions about the profiles of suicide bombers. There is really not much to be surprised of there, and there is a logic in the differences, depending on the setting. It is, schematically, all about the setting. There are on the one hand those who spring from simple families in pretty tight local communities who commit to it as a form of socialization (as a confirmatio from Hell, or Paradise, and as an alternative to the boyscouts), and on the other those who are already urbanized or living as individuals in the greater metropolitan / national / global setting, but with weak bonds or roots there compared to others. Here, “Paradise” is no longer a valid reality, it is lost — in a double sense. And there is the risk and temptation of “falling” — or believing that a form of “falling” really is Paradise Regained, which it is not, not in that sense. (Finally I get some use out of John Milton.)
No, Z does not fit the “descriptions”, and shouldn’t do. There is nothing surprising in that when he is compared to people with largely adolescence or socialization issues. If Z did this, it is a very “private” undertaking, although not (then) lacking in schematic characteristics for his age. But it is hard to see him do something like that without (camouflaged) suicide being his main interest and motivation.
I hope that makes sense.
There are some interesting items to note relative to the simulator data and Zaharie Shah’s schedule. All times are local to Malaysia.
1. The flight path and take-off fuel load extracted from the simulator data is consistent with a diverted flight between Kuala Lumpur and Jeddah, where the diversion occurs at the FIR boundary between Malaysia and Indonesia.
2. Zaharie did not work on Feb 1 and Feb 2, 2014.
3. On Feb 3, 2014, his start of duty was 7:50 for a 9:05 scheduled departure for Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, on MH715. He scheduled arrival back in Kuala Lumpur on MH714 was 16:06 on the same day with an end of duty of 16:51.
4. The Shadow Volume containing the recovered simulator data was dated Feb 3, 2014.
5. On Feb 4, 2014, his start of duty was 14:00 for a 15:14 scheduled departure for Jeddah on MH150. His scheduled arrival back in Kuala Lumpur on MH151 was 11:12 on Feb 6, 2014, with an end of duty of 11:57.
6. On Feb 20, 2014, Flight Simulator 2004 (FS9) was uninstalled from the MK25 drive of his simulator.
7. On Feb 21, 2014, he piloted MH370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. His scheduled arrival back in Kuala Lumpur was 15:31 on Feb 22, 2014, with end of duty of 16:16 on Feb 22, 2014.
8. On Feb 26, 2014, he piloted MH149 from Kuala Lumpur to Melbourne, Australia. He arrived back in Kuala Lumpur on MH148 on Feb 28, 2014. Media reports say that Zaharie met with his daughter in Melbourne just before the disappearance of MH370 on March 8, 2014.
9. On March 7, 2014, Zaharie started his duty at 23:20 for MH370 with a scheduled departure time of 00:27 on March 8, 2014.
Some questions:
1. Why didn’t Zaharie divert Jeddah flight MH170 on Feb 4, 2014?
2. Why didn’t Zaharie divert Beijing flight MH370 to Beijing on Feb 21, 2014?
3. Did Zaharie visit with his daughter during his time in Melbourne on Feb 27, 2014?
Important information to pair with the chronology is
pilot/flight assignment. Would Z select his own schedule pending airline approval or was it based on seniority but scheduled strictlly by the airline
@SusieC, From what I know is, pilots can request certain flights(as can any crew member). I know KLM pilots and crew do that all the time since certain destinations are preferred or they wish to have family tag along on stand-by. I would assume MAS would honor requests as well (if put in well in advance). The Melbourne trip could have been requested.
@Matt Moriarty and others: ineptitude
I don’t think you could expect many countries to necessarily have behaved any better at that time of day in a situation like that (apart from say an Ivy League of airline hubs or something). And if we turn that around, who — with means and opportunity – would have been in a better position to know and exploit that than Z? That should in my mind take some precedence over e.g. choice of direction when choosing the flight. What is the probability (rhetorical, I know) for anyone else, single or group, to pull something like that off? I don’t believe in a scenario where Z leaves the pax and crew alive to discover the sunrise, but Matt has got something there with the supposed lack of phones connecting, whichever alternative it would be an argument for. That does indicate a hijack, or, that Z was clever enough to announce to everyone something like that not only had the FO fallen seriously ill, but most of our communications systems have also broken down, due to an electrical failure, and everyone onboard is advised to turn off their phones and electrical equipment while we are making our way back to the first open airport that can take us and is convenient for you and could have an ambulance waiting for the FO. The cabin crew will see to your needs.
@VictorI
On your questions 1 and 2 I suggested before:
If Z. planned it all and the trial/conviction of Anwar Ibrahim was one of his prime motivations I assume he had to await the outcome of the trial on March 7. He had to be sure Anwar would be convicted or not.
For a long time he would have known the date of the trial and probably expected a conviction like it happened but without a true conviction those earlier flights would have given him the opportunity but not enough motivation yet to carry out a possible plan.
@Ge Rijn: Possibly. Or originally the plan was to divert the plane to Jeddah and it got derailed. Or he wanted to see his daughter before carrying out the plan and MH370 was the next suitable flight. Or something else? We should be asking ourselves about the timing and choice of flight.
@TBill @KarenK
About the two phone calls to the plane.
As I understood it the calls where recieved and acknowledged by the plane. This would show to the caller. I don’t know how long the caller let the phone ‘ring’. A minute? 5 minutes? Is this mentioned somewhere in a report?
@VictorI, The Jeddah flight would still have been at daylight. Too many wide awake ATC controllers perhaps. Increased risk of detection or too many other flights. March 8th, 2008 was a memorable date for PKR and Anwar Ibrahim. Although PKR did not win the elections, they scored a major victory against the opposition. March 8th, is a date PKR would never forget. March 8th, was special.
@Victor re:”4. The Shadow Volume containing the recovered simulator data was dated Feb 3, 2014.”
Do you have a time when this was created?
@RetiredF4
You’d really like it to be a personal attack but the truth is, if it was, Jeff probably would have deleted it.
I have a grand total of…zero…comments deleted by Jeff. So clearly there are no “repeated” personal attacks, other than you calling me chickens**t in a few posts. So that’s rich, the guy who calls me chickens**t demanding more reasoned arguments.
Your comment is beyond lame.
@Johan
–“I don’t think you could expect many countries to necessarily have behaved any better at that time of day in a situation like that (apart from say an Ivy League of airline hubs or something).”
Thank you!
@Nederland
You’re not making the same comparison I’m making so I don’t really have an opinion on its fairness.
@VictorI @OZ @all
Below I attach link to 9M-MRO specific aircraft flight history that was posted on Reddit. That’s why I am saying the 21-Feb flight is also 9M-MRO (the same aircraft). Presumably this gives a chance to check 9M-MRO FMC for waypoints, other preps not sure.
Yes Victor I was also looking at the Melbourne flight. Seems to be just one Melbourne flight, right? I was surprised the stay in Melbourne was only one day.
9M-MRO aircraft flight history (for some reason the return flights from Beijing are not consistentky shown).
http://i.imgur.com/UUW6ReX.png
@VictorI
I assume you’ve got the ‘SIM-route’ in mind?
The end-of-turn there (while still banking) at ‘FMT’ does not head towards Jeddah but more towards Sri Lanka and the Maldives.
So I see no divertion to Jeddah in the SIM-points. The flight after Penang to Jeddah would be almost straight on course without an obvious divertion needed as far as I can see. But I’ll sure miss something here..
It possibly was the preferred flight going straight from KLIA to the West. Far less complicated than a Being flight.
Then this would be the kind of flight he possibly practised on his simulator.
But then he needed the opportunity in time, soon after the trial (in my thinking).
If he had no West bound flight soon he had to improvise. And he knowing the date of the trial long before, he had lots of time to think about a ‘plan B’. A Being flight f.i.
I argued before, if his plan was to let vanish the plane and all evidence as best as possible in the SIO this flight had to apply to some special criteria.
It had to be a flight in the dark as long as possible from take-off till the end.
Prefferably a moonless night (which it was) and with a to him unknown FO.
Fariq being on his first authorized B777 flight would have been a bonus too probably.
He then probably also considered expected wheater conditions along the way and in the SIO and maybe even sunrise times.
This would limit his options of flights in a time frame. For in the SIO it was end of summer with heavy seas and bad wheater closing in soon.
His time window was closing in this regard.
If he planned to ditch the plane more or less succesfully to avoid as much debris as possible he would need relatively calm seas.
The longer he would wait the slimmer the chance on those circumstances would become.
@Ge Rijn
R.e the two MAS phone calls: the INMARSAT Communications Log might show how long the calls were maintained for, before MAS hung up. I am no expert in interpreting the logs, but the call durations could have been measured in minutes,both times.
@Ge Rijn: You are misunderstanding me.
The simulated flight leaving KLIA followed a path consistent with waypoints of a flight plan to Jeddah, which includes a departure along R467 to GUNIP, and then along B466. At 5N, which is close to the FIR boundary between Malaysia and Indonesia, the plane leaves B466 is tracking exactly towards VAMPI, which is not the same flight plan. So 5N would near the point of diversion. The takeoff fuel load was also consistent with a flight to Jeddah.