Earlier today, the Australian Transport Safety Board released a document entitled “MH370 — Search and debris examination update.” Perhaps occasioned by the recent completion of the towfish scan of the Indian Ocean seabed search area, the document updates earlier ATSB reports and offers some intriguing insights into what may have happened to the plane. Some thoughts:
— The first section of the report expands upon an assertion that the ATSB made in an earlier report: that the BFO values recorded at 0:19 indicate that the plane was in an increasingly steep dive. Indeed, the newly published calculations indicate that the plane was in an even steeper dive than previously reckoned: between 3,800 and 14,600 feet per minute at 00:19:29, and between 14,200 and 25,000 feet per minute at 00:19:37. On the lower end, this represents an acceleration along the vertical axis from 37.5 knots to 144 knots in eight seconds, or 0.7g. On the higher end, this represents an acceleration along the vertical axis from 140 knots to 247 knots, likewise about 0.7g. If the plane were freefalling in a vacuum, its acceleration would be 1.0g; given that the airframe would be experiencing considerable aerodynamic drag, a downward acceleration of 0.7 would have to represent a near-vertical plunge, which a plane would experience near the end of a highly developed spiral dive.
— The second section describes end-of-flight simulations carried out in a Boeing flight simulator in April of this year. These tests were more detailed than others carried out previously. Evidently, modeled aircraft were allowed to run out of fuel under various configurations of speed, altitude, and so forth, and their subsequent behavior observed. Thus, the exercise modeled what might have happened in a “ghost ship” scenario. Notably, it was found to be possible for the plane to spontaneously enter the kind of extremely steep dive described in the previous section. This being the case, the report states, the plane “generally impacted the water within 15 NM of the arc.” This is not surprising, considering that the plane had already lost altitude and was plummeting straight downward. This offers a tight constraint on where the plane could plausibly be if the 0:19 BFO analysis is correct.
— The third section describes the results of debris drift modeling that has been informed by tests involving replica flaperons “constructed with dimensions and buoyancy approximately equal to that of the recovered flaperon.” An important point not addressed by the report is the fact that the French investigators who tested the buoyancy of the flaperon were unable to reconcile its observed behavior with the observed distribution of the Lepas anatifera barnacles found growing on it. So when the French ran their own drift models, they had to run them twice, one for each buoyancy condition. Apparently the Australians overcame this paradox by discarding one of the states.
— The third section notes that, according to modeling carried out by the CSIRO, debris which entered the ocean in the southern half of the current search area would not likely reach Réunion by the time the flaperon was recovered. Meanwhile, debris that entered the water significantly north of the current search area would reach the shores of Africa much earlier than the time frame in which pieces were actually discovered there. Using this logic, the report concludes that the northern part of the current search area is probably correct. However, this seems dubious reasoning to me: one would expect a gap between the time debris arrives in Africa, and the moment when it is discovered. Also, debris can move quickly across the ocean, only to be trapped in a local gyre and move around randomly before beaching. Therefore I think the argument that the pieces couldn’t have originated further north is flawed.
— The fourth section, describing the damage analysis of the flap and flaperon, is the most interesting and newsworthy of all. In short, it makes a persuasive case that the flaperon and the inboard section of the right-hand outboard flap (which, rather remarkably, turn out to have been directly adjacent) were in the neutral, non-deployed state at the moment of impact. Assuming this is correct, this eliminates the IG’s flutter theory, as well as the widely discussed theory that the flap was deployed and therefore indicative of a pilot attempting to gently ditch the plane. Proponents of these theories will continue to argue on their behalf but in my opinion they were dubious to begin with (given the shredded condition of much of the recovered debris) and are now dead men walking.
— No mention was made of Patrick De Deckker’s exciting work with Lepas shells.
— Overall, the thrust of this report is that the plane went down very close to the seventh arc in a manner consistent with a “ghost ship” flight to fuel exhaustion, exactly as the ATSB has assumed all along. There is, however, one very large elephant in the room: the fact that Australia has spent two years and $180 million demonstrating that the plane’s wreckage does not lie where it would if this scenario were correct. Therefore it is not correct. The ATSB’s response to this conundrum is rather schizophrenic. On the one hand, it has recently floated the idea of raising another $30 million to search further—presumably the small remaining area where a plane just might conceivably have come to rest in a ghost-ship scenario, as I described in an earlier post. On the other, it has today convened a “First Principles Review” consisting of experts and advisors from Australia and around to world to scrap their previous assumptions and start with a clean sheet of paper. This implies an understanding that they have proven themselves wrong. I wonder how many assumptions they will scrap. Perhaps, as Neil Gordon mused in his interview with me, that the plane wasn’t really traveling south at 18:40? Or perhaps they’ll dare to go even deeper, and contemplate the provenance of the BFO data… ?
— A postscript: Richard Cole recently posted an update of the seabed search (below). I’m intrigued by the fact that the Fugro Equator has deployed its AUV near the northern end of the search zone. When I interviewed him for my last blog post, Fugro’s Rob Luijnenburg told me that the northern end of the search zone was flat enough that it could be scanned by the towfish alone; there was no need for an AUV scan to infill the craggy bits. So why is the AUV looking there now? Especially given that it’s very close to an area just reinspected by Dong Hai Jiu 101’s ROV. Another MH370 mystery.
UPDATE 11-2-16: I emailed Rob Luijnenburg and he immediately responded: “The AUV is scanning in a section in the north part of the priority search area in the very rugged terrain south of Broken Ridge (the east -west mountain range at approximately the 33rd parallel)… Generally the AUV is deployed in spots of extremely rugged seabed to complete the 120,000 sq km priority area survey.” Worth noting is that if the search gets expanded northeastward, it’s going to be into very rough terrain indeed.
I just don’t know from where to start! If this Aircraft hit the waters with that speed, it must have had been in thousands of pieces, which I think we should have seen by now, right? I just don’t see any evidence of such impact or am I asking the wrong question?
@Qayyum- No not really..If MH370 did descend up to 25000ft per min..It is very possible the plane broke apart before impact with the ocean..Therefore the main fuselage might be in a few pieces..This presents the question..
If the ATSB is looking for a mostly intact plane..They could very well have overlooked MH370 final resting place..
Question for anyone…
What is the 777 absolute structural load limit?
I’ve been trying to find this out..But have only come across test video’s of a wing flex test at which the wing breaks under a load..
If it is in thousands of pieces then dividing the mass of the jet by such a large number produces objects that wouldn’t be seen by a towfish at a few hundred metres, and they wouldn’t comprise a large and obvious debris field. This would be the more so if the jet came apart in mid-air after exceeding its airframe limitations. I think the conclusion that the ATSB has spent $180m proving the jet isn’t there isn’t necessarily correct. The ATSB has proven that if it is there (and it may not be there at all) they have not been able to see it.
Finding very small scattered pieces requires the use of the ROV or AUV, and that only happens if something very odd or ambiguous is discerned from the low resolution towfish scans which are capable of picking up well defined shipwrecks or debris fields.
@Ben, @Aaron, Fugro and the ATSB feel confident that regardless of the impact speed, there will be pieces large enough to be detected by the towfish’s side-scan sonar, which has a resolution of 70 cm. In particular, the engine cores will be on the scale of 3m by 3m by 3m. And note that, while many of the recovered debris pieces are quite small, the flaperon and flap fragment are both quite a bit larger than 70 cm. So I think it’s difficult to make the case that the plane was so atomized that its debris field on the seabed would be invisible.
@ Ben Sandilands
The engines, the APU and the main gear structures would imho represent recognizable debris parts.
The report also states there were among the end flight simulations some where the plane stayed airborne for 20 minutes after second engine flame out. Details are not given.
I wonder how those end flights looked like.
20 minutes leaves quite a possible distance to cover beyond 40NM imo.
How I understand it the drift analazis mentioned seem to indicate a consensus north of ~35S till ~30S as the most probable crash area now. Ruling out more soutern latitudes due to no debris finds on Australian shores.
North of ~26S are considered less likely for they don’t meet the drifting time frames.
They not only used flaperon copies but also panel-like debris copies that reinforced this observations.
Note btw this are all subjects mentioned and discussed here months ago.
IMO the 19:37 BFO’s don’t necessarily indicate impact speeds. If it was on the low end of 14.200ft/m it could also mean imo it was descending at that speed at ~5km altitude coming from ~30.000ft with another ~5km left to the surface.
The fact that no IFE log-on was established can also mean the IFE was switched off.
IMO the debris-damage-problem and the planes attitude when entering the water are not settled yet at all.
So I don’t consider myself a dead man walking yet 😉
All with all the report has positive implications IMO that help narrowing the possibilities and invite further discussion.
@Jeff Wise. “….an acceleration along the vertical axis from 37.5 knots to 144 knots in eight seconds, or 0.7g…….a downward acceleration of 0.7 would have to represent a near-vertical plunge.”
From my looking into this, gravity in an upright aircraft, about level, will not give the answer. What will is pointing a near constant velocity vector of a couple of hundred knots from a bit downhill to a lot. This requires a bunt (I forget, but a reduction to about zero g in the aircraft for some seconds) or a similar nose downwards but with wings vertical at start and finish, like the rear end of a wing over.
Why is it that nothing has surfaced floating anywhere to be link with plane MH370 ?????
Just some back-of-the-envelope calcs:
Transport Category airplanes like the B777 are designed for a limit load factor of 2.5 g plus a factor of 1.5 to ultimate load.
The video of a B777 wing structural test shows failure at 154% of limit load.
MH370 Zero Fuel Weight was 89.4% of max ZFW.
Therefore the MH370 wing would be expected to fail at a load of 1.54 x 2.5 / 0.894 = 4.3 g.
Some time ago I showed that the trajectory of the unpiloted airplane after fuel exhaustion in ALSM’s simulator test can be explained by assuming a constant lift coëfficient after autopilot disconnect, corresponding to the airspeed of about 200 kts CAS at that point. In the conditions of that simulation the wing would therefore have been expected to fail at an airspeed of about
200 x 4.3^0.5 = 415 kt CAS.
@Gysbreght
Thanks for that info…
Jeff, concerning the following statements you made in the opening piece:
“In short, it makes a persuasive case that the flaperon and the inboard section of the right-hand outboard flap (which, rather remarkably, turn out to have been directly adjacent) were in the neutral, non-deployed state at the moment of impact.” and “Assuming this is correct, this elimates (sic) the IG’s flutter theory,..”.
You should re-read the report. Nowhere does it state that “…non-deployed state at the moment of impact…”. It states in several places that the flap section was not deployed at the “time of separation”, not the “time of impact”. This is consistent with my view that there was no ditching attempt and my view that separation may have occurred in flight. The confirmation of my Nov 2,2014 simulator implications and confirmation of my 2014 00:19 BFO rate of descent analysis is further evidence that separation probably did occur prior to impact.
Near-vertical dive did you say… ???
MAS did you say… ???
and 777… ???
Now if I was a conspiracy man (…) I’d draw the conclusion that somebody desperately wanted to nuke (or BUK…) these jets out the sky…
Jeff, I am sure you know this but the resolution of the side scan sonar is only sub-metre perpendicular to direction of travel. Along track it is several metres (a figure of 8m is quoted in published brochures for the DT-1). Detecting an engine core towards the edge of the swath width is likely not a trivial exercise, especially in rugged terrain.
@MPat, Don’t forget, though, that all the swaths are overlapping, so that nothing will be resolved only at the edge of one. Rob Luijnenburg of Fugro was quite emphatic that the entire area will have been scanned to sufficient resolution, and that multiple layers of checking and re-checking will have been performed by the various organizations involved in the search.
@JeffW
Isn’t the elephant in the room the tacit model assumption of straight flight path?
If flutter and deployed ditching are dead men walking, what explains the damage on the back edge of the flaperon?
@TBill, Yes, that’s another elephant in the room. As for the damage on the back edge of the flaperon, I wish the ATSB would say!
@airlandseaman, On page 23 of the report it states, “The flap seal pan was also fractured adjacent to the rear spar. The fracture resulted from external impact…”
@Gysbreght
“The video of a B777 wing structural test shows failure at 154% of limit load.”
If the video you saw is the one I’m thinking of, then you should read the
youtube comments for that video – you’ll read that although the video is
titled as a ‘777’ wing, in actual fact that is a wing test test from an
earlier model of Boeing aircraft and definately not a 777.
(If anyone is able to sign in to youtube, they should consider sending a
complaint via youtube complaint process, about the misleading/false title
of that video i.e. it is not a 777 wing).
@JeffWise
I’m very surprized that you continue to quote a size of the engine
core postcrash as 3m x 3m x 3m. The reply and reference I gave in this
post;
https://jeffwise.net/2016/10/25/towfish-scan-of-mh370-search-zone-completed/comment-page-2/#comment-191982
acts as evidence that a figure of 1m x 1m x 2m is what the ATSB would
regard as the size of the engine core.
Basically, the metal interior of the engine, (blades missing or mostly
broken off) would be what is considered the engine ‘core’. For ref;
http://cloud-3.steamusercontent.com/ugc/494654861407462027/DCD7170900CB499A4D65BAFF4F82A390F50CD504/
@Ben Sandilands
Re; “objects that wouldn’t be seen by a towfish at a few hundred metres”
(I don’t agree with your assertion, as the towfish sonar resolution is
quoted as 70cm.) Regardless of your assertion, the reference given at the
post I quoted above in my reply to Jeff, (an Answer given before a
Australian Parlimentary Committee), states;
“Key points to note in the SOR relating to the search method and equipment are:
• the feature detection capability, or resolution, of 2 cubic metres
which must be achieved by the search system which was conservatively
selected on the basis that the B777 engines (which may well be some
of the largest pieces of debris) are approximately 3 m x 3 m x 4 m
with the aerodynamic cowlings in place. If just the core of the engine
remains this can be further reduced to 1 m x 1 m x 2 m.”
I believe the answer acts as evidence that, even if you took the view
that the majority of the pieces would be too small for the sonar to
detect, the expectation of those who devised the search is that the
sizeably most significant piece (the engine core) will be detectable.
@All
Interesting read Jeff. Just noticed the image above is the Approximate area near centre of Bayesian. Will Bayesian not be used within the future search proposal if all 50 possible objects come as not from MH370?
@airlandseaman
IMO there’s some room for interpretation but I think you’re right they only state ‘seperation from the wing’ concerning the overall flaperon and flap.
When they mention ‘impact damage’ several times they seem to mean internal impact damage caused by the support track and with ‘external impact’ the impact between the flaperon and flap edges.
Both upper and lower stiffener damage then can possibly also be caused by up and down movement of the flap during flutter but this would leave the corresponding damage on the flap and flaperon edges unexplained IMO.
Byron Bailey has an interesting editorial which is behind paywall, but I had a look via Google of MH370
@TBill, Thanks for the heads up, here it is:
“MH370: why is the ATSB blind to pilot’s deliberate, calculated action?
BYRON BAILEY
The Australian12:00AM November 3, 2016
ATSB spokesman Peter Foley, who is a mariner not a pilot, recently released a statement saying the wing flap belonging to the MH370 was in the retracted position when it was torn from its parent wing upon high-speed impact with the southern Indian Ocean.
This, if correct, negates the theory of an attempted slow-speed ditching at 250km/h with the flap lowered so as to lessen the ditching speed.
What it does point to is the probability of Captain Zaharie Shah flying the aircraft in cruise at 900km/h at high level to maximise range, deep into the southern Indian Ocean, until both engines flamed out because of fuel exhaustion.
He then would have glided the aircraft at about 400km/h for a further 200km in the “clean configuration’’ (with flap retracted). This would fit with the assumed intent of Shah to hide the aircraft in as remote a location as possible.
Limited hydraulic and electrical power would be available via the automatically deployed ram air turbine for powering the flight controls and manual flying (no autopilot) but Shah, as an experienced and competent pilot, would not find this difficult. It would fit in with the doppler shift associated with the last satellite ping, as Shah may have needed to dive briefly on final engine flame-out to ensure the turbine was providing full output, which is speed-dependent to an extent.
I have done a couple of test flights with a ram air turbine deployed to test functionality. The auxiliary power unit would try for an autostart passing 22,000 feet in descent but would shut down due to fuel shortage. Shah would then have faced the scenario of “ditching’’ the plane at about 350km/h in the clean configuration, because without engine-driven hydraulic power the flap could not be lowered.
The subsequent massive impact with the ocean would wreck the aircraft and kill the pilot but, since it appears Shah was intent on suicide, this would be part of the plan.
The ATSB is suggesting that on fuel exhaustion (autopilot disconnect) and dead pilot the aircraft would have crashed into the sea, but a vertical dive from 35,000 feet at 1200km/h would smash the aircraft into smithereens, producing hundreds of thousands of pieces of debris and flotsam which would have floated for a long time. The ATSB members, who are not pilots, are still pushing an unresponsive (dead) pilot theory to fit in with their initial March 2014 absurd decision of the pilots being rendered “unresponsive’’. If that were so, the aircraft would have flown on to Beijing or, if the autopilot disconnected, would have crashed at 1200km/h in a vertical dive. Instead, as pointed out by the Malaysian PM seven days after the disappearance, it appears to have been “deliberate action by someone to control the aircraft”.
It appears to me that the taxpayer-funded ATSB members should be more focused on having an open, transparent and truthful inquiry into MH370.
As I knew all along, according to the investigation, this can’t be framed on Shah.
@buyerninety:
The video I saw: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ai2HmvAXcU0
showed Alan Mulally among the spectators. He was director of engineering and chief engineer f the B777 development team.
Where Bailey comes acropper is the idea that Zaharie pushed the plane into a near-vertical dive, then leveled off and held the plane in a glide beyond the search zone.
At any rate, whatever the cause of the 0:19 dive, it’s an extraordinary stroke of luck that the transition from steep to precipitous descent just happened to coincide with the moment the SDU came back online.
Again, the horrific Catch-22 of MH370:
The agency tasked with finding the plane is rigidly bound to an end-of-flight scenario that cannot possibly match what was happening between 17:21 and 19:41.
The same “pilot incapacitation” theory that our illustrious host, Jeff Wise, has politely asked many a commenter here to give up on due to its outlandishness. And yet the ATSB – the lead agency in the entire affair – not only plugs that theory, it refuses to even broach the subject of how incapacitated pilots made the several turns between Penang and FMT.
Excuse me while I throw up in my mouth.
Although the ATSB gets a lot of grief, this latest report shows (at least to me) that they are trying to look at all data, including drift data, to investigate what happened. The analysis of the flaperon and right flap is something I have been wondering about ever since the flap was discovered. At least someone who knows crash physics is involved. I still believe that Boeing engineers can interpret the debris and give a pretty good idea of the crash conditions – perhaps they just have.
The fact that ATSB are stuck on no pilot at the end is puzzling but otherwise I think they have done a pretty good job. Imagine if the plane had crashed in China’s area of responsibility, there would have been little or no transparency and probably little or no ocean search. Australia stepped up and if someone can find another $30 million, going North on the 7th arc seems like a good choice. Bill Gates or some other billionaire can afford it!
@Gysbreght
Thanks for the attributation, always helps to see what the
heck someone is basing their assertions on…
@Airsealandman :
“In short, it makes a persuasive case that the flaperon and the inboard section of the right-hand outboard flap (which, rather remarkably, turn out to have been directly adjacent)”
Sounds like you think the wing folded on the way down?
@Jerry M
Trump would make a nice impression at last?
@Jerry M
“Although the ATSB gets a lot of grief, …”
The ATSB deserves a lot grief. They wasted a bucket of taxpayer money in the last couple of years. The Aussie government should pull the plug on those bozos.
@DennisW: “The Aussie government should pull the plug on those bozos.”
Wasn’t that bucket of taxpayer money provided by that same Aussie government?
I’m confused. Does the new Australian report seem to support the “hypoxia” theory? Or does it debunk the hypoxia theory?
@Gysbreght
Yes, of course it was. Ultimately it was provided by taxpayers who have every right to be furious.
The Nuremberg defense will ultimately prevail – we were only doing what we were told (by the experts). No one in a position of authority was able to correctly assess the inherent frailties embedded in the analytics, and the analysts were not particularly forthcoming about drawing attention to them (the frailties).
I’m not surprised you’re confused: the report essentially insists that the data conforms with what the ATSB has been assuming all along, that the pilots were incapacitated by the time the flight went south, whether due to hypoxia or something else; however, the fact that no seabed wreckage has been found effectively nullifies this scenario.
So it both supports the ghost ship theory and debunks it.
The search is still not over so there is still a minuscule chance that the wreckage could be found by the AUV in one of the few remaining rugged bits.
BTW, I’m seeing reports in the general media that the fact that the flaps were undeployed, and the fact that the plane appears to have been in a steep dive at the end, are both inconsistent with a plane being actively piloted at the end. I don’t agree with this assessment at all. The fact that someone flew the plane into the remote ocean indicates an intention to die, and when people kill themselves in airplanes they generally do it at high speed, without flaps deployed.
@Jeff Wise:
Perhaps the ‘fact’ is not so clear cut. The damage to the trailing edges of flaperon and outboard flap is consistent with hitting the sea in a nose-high attitude at high rate of descent, similar to AF447.
@Jeff Wise:
“…When I interviewed him for my last blog post, Fugro’s Rob Luijnenburg told me that the northern end of the search zone was flat enough that it could be scanned by the towfish alone; there was no need for an AUV scan to infill the craggy bits…”
Then an update…
“…”I emailed Rob Luijnenburg and he immediately responded: “The AUV is scanning in a section in the north part of the priority search area in the very rugged terrain south of Broken Ridge…”
Please can you clarify what looks on the surface like Rob Luijnenburg has contradicted himself?
@JeffW
” however, the fact that no seabed wreckage has been found effectively nullifies this scenario.” (hypoxia)
But they could be hypoxic and have a McMurdo waypoint and end up outside of the search areas. Basically the implication is ATSB is making 2 assumptions (1) ghost flight and (2) no intention to program the MH370 to fly into SIO, just accidentally pointed to SIO at the time of loss of pilot control.
@Gysbreght
–“…hitting the sea in a nose-high attitude at high rate of descent, similar to AF447.”
Anyone in the pilot incapacitation camp needs to be really careful about comparisons with AF447. That plane was in a full stall the entire way down from 38,000′ and upon impact its engines were ABOVE 100% N1, producing a substantial positive pitching moment.
In a Part 121-certified jet whose CG is within the flyable limits, there is NO WAY to achieve a continuous stall without substantial if not maximum UP ELEVATOR input (as was tragically commanded by AF447 F.O. Bonin right down to impact) because the range of horizontal stabilizer trim is designed to meet only the normal flight envelope (specifically, the normal CG range throughout every weight and airspeed combination within buffet margin in level flight).
Today’s ATSB report doesn’t describe the actual attitudes/AOAs demonstrated during the sim-test, but I seriously doubt an alpha of 35 degrees (which AF447 had on impact) would be remotely achievable without a combination of substantial thrust from the engines and full UP elevator.
So the notion that an unpiloted MH370 with zero elevator input and only a high (or even maximum stab trim setting) could hit the water in a stall with zero pitch help from the engines or the elevators is something I find utterly ridiculous. A textbook phugoid never exceeds stall alpha.
Regarding the flaperon: Are you suggesting that water caused the shredding of the trailing edge of the flapper? If so, I beg to differ.
What notable object is just ahead and below the flaperon and would, upon impact with the ocean, almost certainly detach and be flung violently backward into not just the trailing edge of the flaperon but into its leading edge as well?
Hint: it’s the same notable object required to attain the extreme alpha demonstrated by AF447.
@DennisW
Is the entire world in your whacko category after this article?
@Matt Moriarty:
I’m not, and have never been, in the pilot incapacitation camp.
@Trond
Like I said earlier, the article (and I assume you are referring to the latest ATSB drivel) added nothing new for me. BTW, the ATSB was put in the whacko category the moment the sonar search commenced. There was no reason to start the search when they did, and there were good reasons not to start the search at that time.
In my view there is still not enough information available to begin an expensive underwater search. Now they are talking about continuing what has been a total waste of time and money. What has changed since the last time they made a bad call? The so-called new information is no more prescriptive relative to a terminus than the ISAT data and geek sheets they used the last time they tossed $200M in the toilet.
Very poor decision making in that process unchecked all the way up to and including the PM.
@Gysbreght
–“I’m not, and have never been, in the pilot incapacitation camp.”
Then why do you argue for a nose-high attitude on impact?
Matt Moriarty:
Hint: I’m not in the “ZS did it” camp either.
@Gysbreght
Ok, I’ll ask again: Why do you argue for a nose-high impact?
@TBill, You wrote, “they could be hypoxic and have a McMurdo waypoint and end up outside of the search areas.” No, because once the plane runs out of fuel the autopilot goes off, the plane enters a spiral dive, and hits the water close to the 7th arc.
@Boris, Great question. The answer is that Fugro Equator is far to the northeast of the 120,000 sq km search area, where it starts to get rugged again on the fringes of Broken Ridge.
@Matt Moriarty: “Why do you argue for a nose-high impact?”
Simply because that is what the damage looks like. It is not at all like the flaperon was hit by a solid object like an engine pod. It looks like a high pressure on the lower surface acting uniformly over the span, caused the lower skin to tear along the line of fasteners that connect it to the rear spar. Similar observations can be made for the inboard section of the outboard flap.
@Gysbreght
“Hint: I’m not in the “ZS did it” camp either.”
Hard to understand, really, how an otherwise intelligent and well educated person can say something like that.
@Dennis
Latest CSIRO drift modeling – “Funny Shit”
🙂
@DennisW: “Hard to understand, really, …”
Everybody has to live with his/her limitations.
@Gysbreght
Just how is it possible for predominantly RH wing trailing edge debris to be interpreted as evidence of a high speed, nose-first impact? This is a big problem.