Last week, the Joint Investigation Team conducting a criminal investigation into the downing of idH17 issued their preliminary findings. Here’s what I think are the main takeaways.
— The findings strongly endorse the work of “open source intelligence” pioneer Eliot Higgins and his group, Bellingcat. In the immediate aftermath of the shoot-down, it was accepted by nearly every pundit and journalist that the missile had been fired accidentally by poorly trained militiamen who had somehow gotten their hands on an SA-11 Buk launcher and had a acquired a target without bothering to first identify it. But by painstaking work and great resourcefulness, the Bellingcat team was able to piece together an extremely convincing timeline, by which the launcher was brought across the border from a specific Russian military unit, was transported under the direction of the GRU (Russian military intelligence), shot down MH17, and was sent back across the border that night. As I’ve written previously, the timeline described by Bellingcat does not fit with the hapless-militiaman scenario very well. As the New York Times reported, “It is unlikely that anyone not connected with the Russian military would have been able to deploy an SA-11 missile launcher from Russia into a neighboring country.”
— While still admiting the possibility that the Buk crew acted on its own, the report shifts the emphasis to the once-unthinkable: that the missile launch was ordered by higher-ups:
…an investigation is conducted into the chain of command. Who gave the order to bring the BUK-TELAR into Ukraine and who gave the order to shoot down flight MH17? Did the crew decide for themselves or did they execute a command from their superiors? This is important when determining the offences committed by the alleged perpetrators.
As the New York Times put it, the JIT has signaled that it intends “to build an open-and-shut case against individual suspects and to diagram the chain of command behind the order to deploy and launch.”
One can just about imagine a wet-behind-the-ears lieutenant, newly trained and sitting nervously in the cab of his Buk TELAR, messing up and accidentally firing a missile at an unidentified target. But it is harder to imagine an experienced senior officer mistakenly giving the order. Indeed, the higher one goes up the chain of command, the less likely that the decision was made without explicit or implicit endorsement by an immediate superior. The implication, then, is that the order to shoot down MH17, if it did come from anywhere, came from the very top.
— One new piece of information that was revealed in last week’s presentation was that on the day before MH17 was shot down, a rebel commander was recorded making an emotional telephone call to a superior in the regular Russian military, complaining that his troops were vulnerable to Ukrainian air attacks—specifically, by Su-25 ground-attack jets—and that they needed Buks to protect them.
This could be interpreted as evidence that the delivery of the Buk that shot down MH17 was initiated by the militia. Alternatively, it could be a coincidence that a militia commander happened to ask for a missile system the Russian military had already decided to deploy. I think the latter is more likely, for the simple reason that the Buk missile system was not the most appropriate weapon for defending against Su-25s or the other low-altitude planes then in service against the separatists.
The Su-25 is more or less the Russian counterpart of the American A-10: it is designed for low-altitude strafing attacks, with a maximum altitude of 23,000 feet. Another plane used by the Ukrainian military at the time was the An-26 transport, with a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. A potent defence against these planes would be the Pantsir anti-aircraft system, a mobile rocket launcher that also incorporates self-aiming quad machine guns to automatically blast low-flying attackers out of the sky. Compared to the Buk, which can reach targets above 80,000 feet high, the Pantsir can reach no higher than 26,000 feet. But unlike the Buk it can handle jets flying low under the radar, as the Su-25 can do.
It is known that Pantsirs were present and active in eastern Ukraine at the time of the shootdown. On July 14, an An-26 military transport plane was flying at about 20,000 feet when it was shot down. Ukrainian military assumed that it was downed either by a Pantsir or by an air-to-air missile fired from a Russian fighter jet flying on the other side of the Russian-Ukrainian border. On July 16, a Su-25 flying at nearly the same altitude was also shot down, again either by a Pantsir or an air-to-air missile. The blog Putin@War found satellite imagery of Pantsir units near the Ukraine-Russian border in August of 2016.
The limited reach of the Pantsir is one of the reasons that officials believed that airliners would be perfectly safe traveling higher than 32,000 feet, and so kept the airspace open to airline traffic. Buks were not known to be in the theater—and, indeed, up until the day of the shoot-down, it seems that they weren’t.
As a general principle, you do not want to send equipment into a poorly regulated battlespace that is any more powerful than it needs to be. The potential danger is too great. Retired U.S. military intelligence officer Peter Akins told me that, having had experience with many brushfire wars on its perimeter, the Russians know better than to carelessly hand out strategically powerful weapons like the Buk. “My guess is that they’re pretty carefully controlled,” he says. “We ran into real problems in Afghanistan with giving mujahadeen all those Stingers (MANPADS) that they used to take out Russian helicopters. Stingers have a relatively long shelf life. So once the mujahadeen became Taliban, if they could get to the top of a mountain in Afghanistan they could increase the operational envelope of the missile so that they could target US aircraft. So that’s one of the lessons that we learned, which is don’t give out MANPADS. I don’t know where the idea for ‘Let’s give an SA-11 to a separatist movement in the Donetsk National Sovereignty Front’ would have come from. That’s not the actions of a responsible government.”
— The weight of the JIT’s authority has, I think, severely undermined the army of Kremlin trolls who have been promoting a fog of pro-Russian conspiracy theories almost from day one. As Finnish defense writer Robin Häggblom put it, “the amount of evidence found in both open and non-open source has reached such levels that the question of whether a Russian supplied Buk shot down MH17 can now be considered a litmus test for whether you are under the influence of Russian propaganda or not.”
— The slow, grinding, meticulous building of the case against Russia feels unstoppable—and it could lead to a huge and potentially dangerous political crisis. In the wake of the JIT’s presentation, Moscow responded with such fury that the Dutch foreign minister summoned the Russian ambassador. In response, the Russian foreign minister summoned the Dutch ambassador in Moscow. Meanwhile, Australia’s foreign minister said that whoever was responsible for the shoot-down could face an international tribunal like the one who found Libyan agents guilty for the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie Scotland. Russia has already used its security council powers to block a UN investigation.
As I’ve been saying for a long time now, if it is determined that the Russian leadership deliberately ordered the shoot-down of MH17, the implications for MH370 are obvious—one of the difficulties in trying to understand MH370 is that, though it was clearly a deliberate act, there was no plausible motive. MH17 provides, if not understanding of what the motive was, clear evidence that a motive existed, in mid-2014, for a great power to take down a Malaysia Airlines 777. If an international Lockerbie-style commission is ultimately set up to assign criminal blame for Ukraine tragedy, then it is not too far out to imagine a similar body being established to do the same for MH370.
UPDATE: The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab has published a nice overview of the anti-aircraft weapons systems that Russia has deployed in Eastern Ukraine. It seems that the Buk TELAR deployed from July 16 to 18, 2014, was the only one that threatened civil air traffic over the region.
That is pretty obvious if you read the first sentence of that same paragraph: “The ADIRU supplies magnetic variation for present position.”
So when the airplane gets to the next waypoint, the CDU gets the magnetic variation for that waypoint, the next course becomes the active waypoint course and can be referenced to magnetic north.
All this applies to Alternate Navigation, when the CDU’s are used as a ‘poor-mans’ substitute for two failed FMC’s. It doesn’t apply to headings or tracks selected on the Mode Control Panel (MCP) on the glareshield.
@Oleksandr
I think I did not succeeded in making my point clear enough.
I meant just like Duncuan Steel suggested to you in that post to take the simplest AP-mode that would satisfy the data.
This would apply to a ghost flight as well as to a piloted flight after FMT IMO.
If it was a pilot flying the plane (mad or not) it would still be a pilot acting like a pilot most probably would IMO.
In this case; flying on a constant heading/track, altitude and speed in a certain AP-mode till reaching destination preparing for landing(or crashing..).
Look at what some ‘mad’ suicidal pilots did in the past.
They mostly flew their plane quite rational till the point they decided to crash.
I meant in such a case it ‘could’ be not the whole flight was different than the data show but only the end of flight after 0:11/0:19.
I feel it’s still hard to make my point clear. Hope it’s better now.
Oleksandr asked: “Why DSTG does not show higher probability area corresponding to the magnetic HDG/TRK?”
I think it was VictorI who pointed out the following from the DSTG book.
p. 20: “An initial Mach number was selected from a uniform prior between 0.73 and 0.84, which is the feasible range of speeds for sustained periods for the aircraft.”
p. 58: “The aircraft air speed is limited to the range Mach 0.73 to 0.84. Fuel consumption becomes very inefficient at speeds higher than this and at lower speeds the aircraft is not able to match the measurements.”
It is not clear what is meant by “match the measurements”. However, magnetic track and heading routes favor speeds lower than Mach 0.73 (but still above holding speed.)
@Oleksandr @GeRijn, How can an aircraft descend/crash into the SIO and not break up into a million pieces? I was at La Guardia when Sullenberger was landing on the Hudson. It was a freezing cold day, but blue skies and a pretty serene and flat hudson river. I have followed that event closely since then and from what I understand it would not have taken much for the aircraft to break up. The SIO is a completely different ball game IMO. For this reason I find a so called “death dive” near impossible to accomplish and keeping the aircraft in tact. Even a controlled landing would be very tricky, right? Would really like to know your thoughts.
@Matt Moriarty. On October 4th you mentioned ICAO rule 4.3.6.3.b was applicable to a VFR Beijing and specified reserve fuel based on 2 hours flying.
However I gather that rule has been replaced circa 2012 under Amendment 36 and is now Annex 6, Chap 4, Para 4.3.4.3:
“a. the duration of the flight and the meteorological conditions prevailing are such that there is reasonable certainty that, at the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome of intended landing, and for a reasonable period before and after such time, the approach and landing may be made under visual meteorological conditions; or
b. the aerodrome of intended landing is isolated and there is no suitable destination alternate aerodrome.”
Evidently ‘b.’ now requires the 2 hours you mentioned but for ‘a.’ no reserves or alternatives are required.
A second point is that as you know the FI p.30 refers to an ‘ATC flight plan’ estimating 11,900kg fuel remaining at Beijing including 7,700kg for diversion. I am not up with much of this not being a professional pilot but since the ATC flight plan in the FI (p.9 and p.100) had no such information, apparently that FI reference should have been to the operational flight plan, which would have had the data.
Thence the diversion fuel at p.30 would apply to the other alternatives mentioned including the 4,800kg required to get to Jinan. A mandatory reserve for 30 minutes would be required also, say 3,000kg, bringing the total to around the 7,700kg listed. I am told also that the other 4,200kg might have been contingency fuel/variable reserve plus some discretionary fuel for unexpected holding in Beijing, where evidently there can be delays. Apparently the conditions there would have proved marginal.
There would be insufficient fuel to get to Hangzhou, noting the 10,700kg listed at p.30 to get there plus the 3,000kg for 30 minutes’ reserve.
So the explanation for FI p30 then would be that it should have referred to the operational flight plan and the fuel carried was compatible with a diversion to Jinan.
@Keffertje
while you’re waiting for their thoughts, I cannot resist giving you a few of mine. I hope you don’t mind.
Sully made a near textbook ditching in optimal weather conditions (the extreme cold, excepted). Even in this situation, the aircraft suffered damage. Most interestingly, the trailing edge flaps were extensively damaged/destroyed, one engine pod was ripped off, the other badly damaged, and the rear fuselage underside was breached as it impacted the Hudson. A lucky escape for all.
There was a 20Kt wind blowing when MH370 ditched into the SIO (my interpretation) and the sea was rough, estimated 3 to 4 metre waves have been mentioned by others. To bring off a controlled ditching in these conditions, would have taken a great deal of skill, especially after a 7.5 hour flight, with probably no meal or coffee breaks during. I don’t want to sound callous or dismissive, but these aspects have to be taken into account, don’t they?
The debris tells the story, as far as I can see. Trailing edge flap components dominate. The fuselage would have been breached. as Ge Rijn pointed out previously, even the most carefully controlled ditching would result in appreciable damage to the cabin interior fixtures and fittings, ref. Asiana crash at San Francisco. No surprise then, that at a couple of interior items escaped from the cabin and made it to shore.
Death dive? Hardly.
@Rob 🙂 Thank you for posting. My pin is in 31.7S – ZZZZ’s DoB. A death dive seems really implausible, but who am I? Even a landing of sorts, without any debris, that takes skill or shere luck, idk. Maybe he just got lucky?
@Keffertje
To me there is no obvious reason to assume an all piloted flight should be more complicated than the data show.
In fact after FMT the data show what you would expect from a normal pilot controlled flight till 0:11 IMO.
After this starts the uncertainty concerning fuel, BFO’s, the re-log-on, descent rates, dives, phugoids, possible glides.
The plane is still not found in the area based on a ghost flight and steep high speed dive scenario. This is telling. The debris tell a mixed story till now. IMO not a high speed dive impact but also not a textbook ‘Sully-ditching’. I assume something in between happened. We now have an overwhelming number of parts from control/wing/engine surfaces compared to confirmed cabin pieces (1). Some in a shape impossible to be in if it was a high speed dive crash. The latest piece is confirmed to come from the left wing outboard flap pointing also to a level horizontal entry in the water.
The IO in summer is not that violent and can actualy be flat as a lake on a windless day. Waves at the time where 0.5 to max 1.5 meter estimated. Not ideal but not impossible to surfive relatively intact.
The amount of pieces found to date correspond widely with the drifter-models done by MPat and Griffin.
Out of ~180 drifters ~30 did wash up on East African shores and islands after ~1 1/2 year.
Nothing in Australia or anywhere else.
Assuming a small concentrated debris field not that far from the current search area.
The kind of debris found is most telling in this regard too. As said; control surface parts (some largely intact), wing panel parts, flap fairing parts and an engine cowling part. Only one confirmed cabin part that was right next to a door.
No human remains, no confirmed personal items, nothing else from inside the fuselage after 2 1/2 years. AF447 left a lot more debris and this was not considered a high speed dive crash.
IMO all evidence till now can only mean it was a pilot controlled flight with an attempt to ditch the plain with the least possible amount of debris and evidence left.
All actions after ‘Goodnight Malaysia 370’ point to not wanting to be detected or to be found.
It might have been hijackers on a failed mission or Zaharie himself.
But IMO this must have been the ultimate goal for the flight into the SIO: vanishing and leaving as little evidence as you possibly can.
To add and correct; Nothing in Australia or anywhere else regarding drifters north of 36S.
@Keffertje
I wouldn’t say he got lucky. If he had been fortunate enough to arrive on the scene, with the sea like a proverbial millpond, then he would have had a sporting chance of sinking her intact, with nothing coming loose in the process. Unfortunately, this was one part of the whole exercise that he had to leave to chance. I mean the weather in the terminal area. I think he took a calculated gamble on the weather – he could hardly ask the Met boys at the airport – and he figured that ditching in the most unlikely place possible would do the trick. If a few bits came off, they might eventually make landfall, but no one would would be able to guess where they had floated from. Remember, he thought it was going to be impossible to reconstruct his flight path, even to an approximation, because he hadn’t thought about the BTO and BFO implications, which is totally understandable.
He didn’t get lucky. Some bits came off, mostly from the wing trailing edge, bits that have been identified as belonging to MH370. No civil jet transport this size had ever been successful ditched, so it must have taken a leap of faith, on his part, or perhaps he had an overriding confidence in his own piloting skills.
@ Jeff
I find the Aug 25 2016 post on Duncan Steel’s website quite facinating because it supports the ‘loiter near the Andamans’ theory.
In the following news item, an Indian Navy officer claims that the only Indian Radar facility in the Andamans is located north of Port Blair, and it keeps an eye on air traffic on the Burmese island of Coco which has a Chinese airbase.
This radar has a range of 200 nautical miles.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/if-mh370-made-it-to-andaman-sea-did-indian-radars-fail-to-detect-it/story-sFLTNwJ8pXzxbSRuUNBg7J.html
This means Car Nicobar Island was, and probably is not covered by primary radar.
So the loiter and subsequent constant heading to the SIO suggested by the Duncan Steel paper is plausible.
The ‘loiter’ allows for the highjackers to descend (hence the strange BFO value at 18:40) to a safe altitude and escape via parachute to land on some spot like a beach on Car Nicobar Island. They would have programmed the constant heading into the AP before escaping.
What do you think?
@ROB
@Ge Rijn
How do you reconcile with controlled ditching the state of the vertical stabiliser piece?
Sk999,
Re your citation of DTSG p. 58: “The aircraft air speed is limited to the range Mach 0.73 to 0.84. Fuel consumption becomes very inefficient at speeds higher than this and at lower speeds the aircraft is not able to match the measurements.”
FCOM, PI.21.3, FF in LRC mode:
GW200, M0.695 at FL250: FF/Eng=3123;
GW200, M0.840 at FL390: FF/Eng=3054;
GW180, M0.667 at FL250: FF/Eng=2881;
GW180, M0.840 at FL410: FF/Eng=2773;
As you may note, the difference is rather subtle: increase in FF by 2.3% at GW200 and by 3.9% at GW180 compared to the optimal rates at respective altitudes.
Also, in the case of “Engine Inop”:
GW180, M0.492 at FL100 FF/Eng = 5490, which is even lower than the optimal when both the engines are operating.
Therefore, lower speeds are mainly limited by BTO data (i.e. by the condition to reach the respective arcs in time) rather than higher fuel consumption rates.
Thus my question stands: where did the peak of the probability corresponding to the magnetic TRK/HDG HOLD disappear in DSTG study?
Btw, DSTG stated “The altitude after manoeuvre was uniformly selected in steps of 1,000ft between 25,000 and 43,000 ft” (p.49).
I am not sure how to interpret their statement you cited. Why M0.73? I suspect they implicitly “cut off” magnetic HDG/TRK modes by imposing a-priory M0.73 limit (p. 60, assumptions, #7).
Gysbreght,
Thanks for the explanation.
Keffertje,
“How can an aircraft descend/crash into the SIO and not break up into a million pieces?”
Do we know how many pieces 9M-MRO was broken into? The discovered fragments are not representative of the whole picture. I believe only residual deformation analysis of the found fragments allows to judge on the impact energy. You may also read on Ethiopian flight 961: it did not break up into million pieces.
@Nederland
I believe the ditching was designed to be violent enough to cause the aircraft to sink quick quickly. I also believe he hit a problem as he ditched, due to the rough sea state and 20kt wind. The RH engine pod shattered, hence the RR piece. Debris from the engine and wing could have hit the horizontal stabilizer to break away the NO STEP piece, and the nearby fin piece. Their separation mechanism was probably similar. They are close together on the tail. There is also the possibility that door R1 was forced in ref the Rodrigues panel. It must have been a violent event. If flaps were not extended. it would definitely have been violent. That’s the best explanation I hsve
@Keffertje
…and the terrain looks difficult at 31.7s
That would suggest a manual Waypoint other than the apparent simulator cases to McMurdo, as the Iannello-shown paths are a little more Easterly. Interesting question raised by Iannello/Godfrey if the NcMurdo waypoints are even programmed into a MAS 777?
@David
“but for ‘a.’ no reserves or alternatives are required.”
My IFR check airman had a great saying: “The rules are designed to kill you.” If you want to get into the absolute specifics of fuel for air-carrier flights, it’s actually 4.3.6.3:
Taxi fuel
Trip fuel (to reach intended destination)
Contingency fuel (higher of 5% of “trip fuel” or 5 minutes of holding flight)
Destination alternate fuel (to fly a missed and reach an alternate)
Final reserve fuel (30 minutes for jets)
Additional fuel (if needed to guarantee ability to reach an alternate with an engine failure or at lower altitude due to a pressurization loss)
Discretionary fuel (if the pilot in command wants it)
The only variable affected by VFR -/1+1hr is the alternate requirement. For whatever reason, MAS dispatch apparently had a practice of filing two alts for Beijing even in VFR -1/+1 (ICAO uses the phrase “reasonable period” and, in practice calls this -1/+1hr while in the US we specifically state “1 hour before and 1 hour after).
“There would be insufficient fuel to get to Hangzhou…”
To understand this, you have to look at the geography and compute it against the fact that two alts were listed when neither were legally required.
Both alts are on the way to Beijing from KUL. Huangzhou is roughly 330nm closer than Beijing and would represent a contingency choice in the event Beijing had been ruled out while en route for whatever reason. There would be no expectation of ever actually getting all the way to Beijing and then going all the way back to Huangzhou. Thus the apparent lack of diversionary fuel.
In practice, had MH370 flown missed out of Beijing, Jinan, which is less than 200nm away, would have been the sole alternate. (Though many other options would exist in an emergency).
The point of all of this being, I again find nothing even remotely suspicious about the fuel loaded onto MH370 for that very specific flight to Beijing and I hope in my many posts that I’ve explained this sufficiently to put the issue to bed for good.
Thx for the thoughtful questions!
@David
One other thing I forgot to address. You characterize the DETRESFA message on p100 of FI as a “flight plan.” This is actually the “Distress Phase” data issued by ATC just prior to beginning SAR.
Only p9 shows the coded PLN.
@Matt Moriaty. Thanks. I agree it is clear that there is, “nothing even remotely suspicious about the fuel loaded onto MH370”, which was the original posit.
@Oleksandr,
The ATSB statement regarding magnetic track and magnetic hold navigation using the MCP is unambiguous. The quote you provided from the FCOM with respect to waypoints is not relevant. No waypoints are involved when the course is set via the MCP. As I said before, there does not appear to be a means to set such a route using the FMC alone.
With respect to your other questions, from my fits the nominal end point for a constant magnetic track route is near 33.5S to 34S. For constant magnetic heading the nominal terminus is near 31S. By the way, I checked the mag heading route you posted on Duncan Steele’s blog back in 2014. My result for your coordinates has very large air speed errors once you actually achieve a constant mag heading by tweaking the leg bearings. So I maintain that (so far) there is no acceptable mag heading route. Perhaps that is why the DSTG result does not show a signifificant probability near 31S. It may not exist.
I have never read that the IG disputes the possibility of magnetic track or magnetic heading navigation methods. They may think, as I do, that it is unlikely that they were used.
With respect to a “ghost flight”, I think you mean an auto-piloted route such that, after the FMT was commanded, no additional pilot inputs were made to modify the navigation. In my opinion, I think this is certainly possible. Yes, Jeff Wise has repeatedly indicated he thinks that the unsuccessful search disproves a ghost flight scenario. As I have responded several times, in my opinion this is an incorrect conclusion, because there are at least two auto-piloted routes that satisfy all the Inmarsat data and end outside the current search area (both near 34S). This particular area has already been searched by the ATSB near the 7th arc, but not wide enough to draw a firm conclusion. The DSTG also assigns it a meaningful probability. My current thinking is that a true heading route was caused by the route discontinuity which occurred when the last entered waypoint (BEDAX) was passed.
@sk999,
You said: “It is not clear what is meant by “match the measurements”. However, magnetic track and heading routes favor speeds lower than Mach 0.73 (but still above holding speed.)”
Faster is also possible. My best-fit magnetic track route averages M0.74 at FL350, and my best-fit true heading route averages M0.75 at FL360. Both are flown at Holding speed.
@Oleksandr, Thank you for responding. Isn’t it safe to asume that 9M-MRO did not break up, upon ditching? And therefore a limited amount of (mostly) external pieces have been found? Ethiopian 961 broke up on impact close to shore and cabin debris was floating everywhere. This does not seem to be the case with 9M-MRO.
@GE Rijn, Thank you for posting. AF447 hit the water at a speed of 280km and broke up on impact. A so called “death dive” as many claim with 9M-MRO, would have ditched at a much higher speed right? and thus broken the aircraft and left cabin debris everywhere. The evidence to date does not support this, AP or no AP scenario. That leaves a controlled ditching IMO, with the given winds and waves at between 0.5M – 1.5M. That still requires a lot of skill to glide the aircraft and leave it relatively in tact. This to me is mind boggling.
@Rob, Would be interesting to know all of the SIM simulations on Z’s computer :).
@lkr,
There are two strong pieces of evidence arguing against visible contrails or distrails being visible from 9M-MRO in the SiO. The first is that the humidity at cruise altitudes was too low for normal contrail creation (as pointed out by Simon Proud). The second is that the aircraft has not been found in the current search area. Multiple linear features are visible in the satellite images taken in visible light, but these do not now appear to be associated with any aircraft, including MH370.
The case for the curved feature north of Banda Aceh is a bit less clear. Again, the humidity seems to have been too low for normal ice contrail formation. That area is almost totally clear of clouds at the time. The curved feature in the infrared satellite images I showed is dark and very low in contrast; it has similar contrast values at two infrared wavelengths. That is not the signature expected from an ice contrail. Perhaps it is caused by variations in the sea emissivity, or possibly it is an airborne smoke trail (which would simply dim the sea emission and not show a strong wavelength dependence as ice contrail emission does). Perhaps it is the wake or the smoke trail of a ship.
The ATSB commissioned a group to look for contrails, and they apparently found none (but to date I have seen no report from them). Based on all the evidence I have seen so far, I now think it is very unlikely these image features were created by 9M-MRO.
Bobby,
Re “The ATSB statement regarding magnetic track and magnetic hold navigation using the MCP is unambiguous. ”
Yes, it is in the Assumptions.
Re: “The quote you provided from the FCOM with respect to waypoints is not relevant.”
It was only demonstration of how “magnetic heading” can be interpreted. Can you refer to any FCOM, where it would be clearly stated that aircraft maintains constant magnetic heading or track if magnetic reference is selected on the MCP?
Re: “My result for your coordinates has very large air speed errors once you actually achieve a constant mag heading by tweaking the leg bearings.”
1. How large?
2. Since June 2014 a number of parameters were refined, so you compare apples and oranges. I haven’t updated respective models.
3. Did you properly account for the wind at suggested altitude? If you use wind from FL350 or so, you may really get large errors.
4. We already saw that your model tends to give the smallest BFOs among the 4 models we compared. If it is a general trend, you may have additional 2-3 Hz discrepancy. Knowing your opinion with regard to BFO errors, you need to account for this.
Re: “Perhaps that is why the DSTG result does not show a signifificant probability near 31S. It may not exist.”
It might be a reason, but then this result is sensitive to DSTG criteria to discard a route. Without details in DSTG book, my current opinion is what SK999 suggested. DSTG either did not realise that they are effectively “cutting out” magnetic scenarios by imposing lower limit on Mach, or worse: they did it on purpose to help ATSB to justify the current search area.
Re: “have never read that the IG disputes the possibility of magnetic track or magnetic heading navigation methods.”
That is probably because you don’t follow all the discussions, or don’t read them carefully.
“So I maintain that (so far) there is no acceptable mag heading route.”
I would suggest you to “scan” altitudes before jumping to conclusions. I am sure you have not done this.
Re: “because there are at least two auto-piloted routes that satisfy all the Inmarsat data and end outside the current search area (both near 34S).”
I am sure, there are many trajectories besides yours, which satisfy Inmarsat data, and which terminate above 30S: Victor’s, Niel’s, mine… also Dennis’ (if you relax BFO criteria).
Bobby,
“Faster is also possible. My best-fit magnetic track route averages M0.74 at FL350, and my best-fit true heading route averages M0.75 at FL360. Both are flown at Holding speed.”
You again repeat the same mistake as all of us did. It is time to realise that “best fit” does not mean anything. It is important to distinguish between ‘favor’ (Sk999) and ‘possible’ (yours) in this context.
Bobby: Thanks for the explanation! I assumed the “contrail” had lost traction, butdidn’t know why. Was interested because it seems to me that only contemporaneous data [which could also include also satellite images of debris field, or additional radar] seem to me the only possible leads that would narrow enough to make it worth anyone reopening a seabed search. It really seems that the probability of anything at this stage suggesting a narrow search area [as opposed to explaining failure of the present search] seems dismal to none..
@Oleksandr:
On TRK/HDG NORM/TRUE –
See FCOM 10.10.31 HDG REF switch
See FCOM SP.4.1 and SP.4.2 (and other procedures on polar navigation)
See ATSB AE-214-054_mh370_-_18aug2014.pdf page 37, and footnote 26.
Gysbreght,
My version of FCOM (D632W001-TBC, June 16,2008) reads “ND Approach Mode” on 10.10.31. HDG REF switch is described in 10.10.42. This section does not state that magnetic heading is maintained. It states that “…selects the heading reference for the PFDs, NDs, AFDS, and FMCs”.
How does my question relate to polar operation? Normal reference does not work in the polar areas, then what?
I admit that footnote 26 on p37 of ATSB August 2014 report is indicative of the existence of the magnetic HDG/TRK hold.
@Oleksandr:
The HDG REF switch selects the heading referencefor the autopilot (AFDS).
If that isn’t clear enough, then the procedures adressing navigation in polar regions should make it clear.
The ND displays the current heading and track, normally magnetic unless TRUE is selected. If Brian Anderson’s ramblings(*) had any merit, the actual values would diverge from those selected on the MCP.
(*)jeffwise.net/2016/08/31/mh370-flight-simulator-claim-unravels-under-inspection/
September 4, 5:22 PM (page 7) and September 5, 4:46 PM (page 8)
Gysbreght,
The standalone “The HDG REF switch selects the heading referencefor the autopilot (AFDS).” can be interpreted in both ways: (1) AFDS maintains magnetic course, and (2) desired magnetic heading can be entered and displayed, but it will gradually drift. The former appears to be consistent with ATSB June/August 2014 footnotes.
Besides Brian’s comments, there was also extensive discussion at Duncan’s site (need to search).
@DrBobbyUlich
On your quote to @Oleksandr:
‘With respect to a “ghost flight”, I think you mean an auto-piloted route such that, after the FMT was commanded, no additional pilot inputs were made to modify the navigation’.
This is what I meant in a way also. What was taken as a “ghost flight” could as well has been a piloted flight with the pilot entering a final waypoint in the FMC just before FMT.
IMO it would be valuable for once to asumme a pilot entered this final waypoint (in the SIO).
And then deduce what AP-mode(s)that fit the data would be the most logic a pilot would choose in such a case. What would a ‘normal pilot’ do in such a case?
I mean creeping into the mind of a skilled pilot/hijacker who has the goal of letting a plane vanish with leaving as less evidence as possible.
What most efficient AP-mode, altitude, speed, location etc. would he choose?
@Oleksandr
you said:
begin cut-paste//
Bobby,
“Faster is also possible. My best-fit magnetic track route averages M0.74 at FL350, and my best-fit true heading route averages M0.75 at FL360. Both are flown at Holding speed.”
You again repeat the same mistake as all of us did. It is time to realise that “best fit” does not mean anything. It is important to distinguish between ‘favor’ (Sk999) and ‘possible’ (yours) in this context.
end cut-paste//
Yes, words have to be looked at carefully. My own “hot button” is the use of the word “compatible” by the ATSB. In particular that the drift studies are compatible with the current search area. In this context it (compatible) implies that the critical value relative to a chi-squared test might lie around 0.95 relative to rejecting the null hypothesis. That is that the current search area contains the aircraft. I just made up those numbers for illustration.
It has been several hundred posts since drift studies were mentioned, and it appears that Brock has gone underground for awhile. I do miss him.
My own feeling is that we collectively have not given enough weight to what drift analysis and bioforensics are trying to tell us. My recent efforts here have attempted to reinforce the notion that the ISAT data falls in the category of a necessary rather than a sufficient condition relative to qualifying a terminus. Likewise flight dynamics are useful qualifiers.
I think it is safe to say that the search effort has become a “tar baby” for the Australians. They cannot wait to put it behind them, and it will take an extraordinary set of circumstances for them resume an underwater search once the current area has been completely scanned. We need to adjust our expectations to the fact that the current search area will be completed, and that will be the end of it.
Realistically, I believe the probability of finding the aircraft is very close to zero.
@CliffG:
Anyone parachuting into one of the Nicobar islands would not be able to get far without running into someone from the Indian government or the armed forces (even if the radar at Car Nicobar was not working). Entry into these islands (unlike the Andamans) is highly restricted even for Indian citizens who live elsewhere, so any strangers would be quickly noticed. Is there any scenario which involves connivance of the Indian government? And what would the Indian government gain from this?
@Oleksandr:
B.A. doesn’t have a definitive reference for his theory or he would have provided it. I just don’t see the logic of designing the system to work like that, with a ‘drift’ built in.
I suppose you can get (2) if you select a magnetic heading in NORM and engage AP mode HDG SEL, wait until the wings are level, then change HDG REF switch from NORM to TRUE to engage HDG HOLD. Similar for TRK modes.
@DennisW, Spot on as to “tar baby” for Australia. Even if they wanted to continue the search, there is a matter of the funding also. MY and CN are not going to spend another dime and AU tax payers are not going to want to spend more than they already have. Short of finding a big donator, probability of finding it are indeed, as you said, zero. We will never really know what happened :(……
@Ge Rijn
But what SIO Waypoints would you suggest? There are not many options unless McMurdo/NZPG/NOBEY are in the Malaysian 777 data base. I am using SkyVector which does not have NZPG as air field option but I can use NOBEY or I can use any Long/Lat as a Waypoint. But I do not know what a 777 pilot can choose.
In agreement with @DennisW re:
“My own feeling is that we collectively have not given enough weight to what drift analysis and bioforensics are trying to tell us. ”
If the isat data is correct there might be other ways to see it that are not being currently investigated.
I suspect it came down near where the first debris was found.
@TBill – I’m not sure why OLPUS does not show up in the SkyVector map but can be included as a waypoint in a flight plan and it will then be seen on the map near S37 E95.
@TBill
I did not mean a known specific waypoint.
I meant coördinates manualy entered as a final waypoint in the FMC.
If vanishing with the least possible evidence was the objective I would opt for a ditch somewhere above Broken Ridge on the deepest/roughest spot possible.
Gysbreght,
“I just don’t see the logic of designing the system to work like that, with a ‘drift’ built in.”
Over short time intervals the magnetic heading is nearly constant if the true heading is constant and vice versa. A simple ‘binary’ switch allows for entering and monitoring desired true or magnetic heading with effortless conversion between them. In other words the logic of such a design could be: convenience, backward-compatibility, and back-up (in case the magnetic compass has to be used).
Now it is my turn to ask: what is the logic of designing system, which can maintain magnetic heading or track for several hours?
Dennis,
“My own feeling is that we collectively have not given enough weight to what drift analysis and bioforensics are trying to tell us.”
That is true. There is certain uncertainity in drift studies, but knowing limitations and capabilities of drift models, as well as taking into consideration the bioforensics analysis, I think it is safe to impose an additional constrain on the terminus area, which should be from approximately 20S to 30S.
Re “We need to adjust our expectations to the fact that the current search area will be completed, and that will be the end of it.”
This is one of the reasons why recently I am somewhat reluctant to spend more efforts, but rather producing noise at Jeff’s blog. Even if one day we collectively converge to some new terminus area, there will be neither funding nor political will to resume the search operation. Malaysians are having headache how to get rid of the NOK; Australians – how to plug the black hole in their budget; Boeing is obviously afraid to open another can of worms; Chinese do not care at all.
@Oleksandr: it doesn’t need a binary switch.
@Dr.BobbyUllich @Oleksandr
I’m curious about which Boeing tables you’re using to figure consumption in a hold. Oleksandr quotes:
FCOM, PI.21.3, FF in LRC mode:
GW200, M0.695 at FL250: FF/Eng=3123;
GW180, M0.667 at FL250: FF/Eng=2881;
The flaps up hold tables for RR892 that I have in my possession do not match these. Nor do they indicate a Mach #. Nor have I ever seen a hold table that indicated a Mach #. Mine show:
GW200 @ FL250: FF/eng=2800, 229 KIAS
GW180 @ FL250: FF/eng=2470, 209 KIAS
These figures also contain a 5% consumption increase because they assume a racetrack hold. If they’re being applied to MH370, you’d reduce flow by 5%.
Furthermore, if the intent was to extract endurance in the last half of the flight, optimum hold altitudes would have been as follows:
GW200: FL200 @ 216KIAS
GW180: FL250 @ 209KIAS
@Oleksandr
” I think it is safe to impose an additional constrain on the terminus area, which should be from approximately 20S to 30S.”
That is my thought as well.
@Dr.BobbyUllich
“My best-fit magnetic track route averages M0.74 at FL350, and my best-fit true heading route averages M0.75 at FL360. Both are flown at Holding speed.”
I’m confused by your “averages” with respect to the actual holding speed data of an RR892 B777. The 35,000′ pressure altitude box in my flaps up hold table shows:
GW200: FF/Eng 2950; 253KIAS
GW180: FF/Eng 2600; 239KIAS
If “holding speeds” were indeed used to derive your averages (using the historical temp aloft from Perth that night which was -45.9C at FL350), you get as follows:
GW200: M0.750, 441TAS
GW180: M0.712, 418TAS
What I’m getting at is that almost the entirety of the SIO leg of the flight, if it WAS flown at holding speed, was flown BELOW M.75.
Would love to see which box you’re working from.
@Ge Rijn,
You said: “I mean creeping into the mind of a skilled pilot/hijacker who has the goal of letting a plane vanish with leaving as less evidence as possible.
What most efficient AP-mode, altitude, speed, location etc. would he choose?”
I have no idea. Such a scenario does not seem rational to me, so your guess is as good as mine.
Oleksandr,
Why would you build a system that does not work according to how the documentation says it works? The FCOM is unambiguous (even if it doesn’t use the words you would like to see). It can’t be hard to implement, either in software or hardware. All you are doing is making the plane fly so one number (the measured heading) matches whatever is cached in some register. Whether magnetic or true shouldn’t matter – both values are available. As far as backward compatibility, the Boeing 747 can maintain constant magnetic heading, so why would a 777 be any different?
I seem to recall that this whole misconception started when someone read a generic chapter on FMCs (which do all their internal calculations in true coordinates) and blindly assumed that the description applied to the 777 AFDS as well, even though they are completely different systems.