Last week we discussed what we know about the first hour of MH370’s disappearance, based on primary radar data and the first Inmarsat BTO value. Today I’d like to talk about the BFO data and what it can tell us about MH370’s fate.
As longtime readers of this blog well know, the Burst Frequency Offset (BFO) is a type of metadata that measures how different the frequency of an Inmarsat signal is from its expected value. It is an important value to a communications satellite operator like Inmarsat because if the value gets too large, the system will be operating outside its approved frequency limit. One cause of such a change would be if a satellite begins wandering in its orbit, which indeed was the case with MH370. The fact that the Satellite Data Unit (SDU) aboard MH370 did not properly compensate for drift in the Inmarsat satellite overhead is the reason the BFO data contains a signal indicating what the plane was doing.
While each of the BTO values recording during the seven “pings” tells us fairly precisely how far the plane was from the satellite at that time, the BFO data points taken individually do not tell us much about the plane was doing. Taken together, however, they indicate three things:
- After the SDU logged back on with Inmarsat at 18:25, the plane took a generally southern course. If we didn’t have the BFO data, we wouldn’t know, from the BTO data alone, whether the plane followed a path to the north or to the south (see above.)
- The plane had turned south by 18:40. The BFO value at the time of the first incoming sat phone call at 18:40 indicates that the plane was traveling south.
- At 0:19:37 the plane was in a rapid and accelerating decent.
However, as I’ve previously described, if all of these things were true, then the plane would have been found by now. So at least one of them must be false. In the course of my interview with him, Neil Gordon said that the ATSB is firmly convinced that #3 is true, and that as a result he suspects that #2 is not. Specifically, he points out that if the plane were in a descent at 18:40, it could produce the BFO values observed. Thus it is possible that the plane did not perform a “final major turn” prior to 18:40 but instead loitered in the vicinity of the Andaman Islands or western Sumatra before turning and flying into the southern ocean. If this were the case, it would result in the plane turning up to the northeast of the current search area. An example of such a route has been described by Victor Iannello at the Duncan Steel website.
It is worth nothing that such a scenario was explicitly rejected as unlikely by the Australian government when they decided to spend approximately $150 million to search 120,000 square kilometers of seabed. The reason is that it was deemed unlikely that the plane would just happen, by chance to be descending at the right time and at the right rate to look like a southward flight. For my part, I also find it hard to imagine why whoever took the plane would fly it at high speed through Malaysian airspace, then linger for perhaps as much as an hour without contacting anybody at the airline, at ATC, or in the Malysian government (because, indeed, none of these were contacted) and then continuing on once more at high speed in a flight to oblivion.
Well, is there any other alternative? Yes, and it is one that, though historically unpopular, is becoming imore urgent as the plane’s absence from the search area becomes increasingly clear: the BFO data is unreliable. That is to say, someone deliberately altered it.
There are various ways that we can imagine this happening, but the only one that stands up to scrutiny is that someone on board the plane altered a variable in the Satellite Data Unit or tampered with the navigation information fed back to the SDU from the E/E bay. Indeed, we know that the SDU was tampered with: it was turned off, then logged back on with Inmarsat, something that does not happen in the course of normal aircraft operation. It has been speculated that this depowering and repowering occurred as the result of action to disable and re-enable some other piece of equipment, but no one has every come up with a very compelling story as to what that piece of equipment might be. Given the evident problems with the BFO data in our possession, I feel we must consider the possibility that the intended object of the action was the SDU itself.
When I say BFO tampering has been “historically unpopular,” what I mean is that almost everyone who considers themselves a serious MH370 researcher has from the beginning assumed that the BFO data was generated by a normally functioning, untampered-with SDU, and this has limited the scenarios that have been considered acceptable. For a long time I imagined that search officials might know of a reason why tampering could not have occurred, but I no longer believe this is the case. When I questioned Inmarsat whether it was possible that the BFO data could have been spoofed, one of their team said “all Inmarsat can do is work with the data and information and the various testings that we’ve been doing.” And when I raised the issue with Neil Gordon, he said, “All I’ve done is process the data as given to me to produce this distribution.” So it seems that the possibility of BFO spoofing has not been seriously contemplated by search officials.
If we allow ourselves to grapple with the possibility that the BFO data was deliberately tampered with, we quickly find ourselves confronting a radically different set of assumptions about the fate of the plane and the motives of those who took it. These assumptions eliminate some of the problems that we have previously faced in trying to make sense of the MH370 mystery, but introduce new ones, as I’ll explore in upcoming posts.
@stendec
“As for my previous suggestion of taking into consideration who (or rather what) lies in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which may have had a certain psychological draw for whoever was at the controls, I’ll leave you with a date, and you can draw your own conclusions from there: May 2, 2011.”
Maybe I’m not connecting the dots, but why is bin Laden’s death and subsequent burial at sea relevant?
@PaulC
Indeed one of the more arcane points of the FI.
But didn’t MH370 order more fuel in Kuala Lumpur because it is cheaper than in Bejing, so it paid off despite greater weight?
@DennisW”I also do not understand Irving’s reference to the frequency of inflight reporting.”
The one that has me perplexed is the “329 people”.
Me thinks he has accuracy issues
@Susie Crowe
Yes, that too. I think he interchanged a couple of digits in the actual headcount of 239 people.
@DennisW, @SusieC – AU/CN patience with MY is indeed mind boggling. For me the article was a confirmation of the car crash this investigation (if one could call it that) turned out to be. Further funding will likely not happen if MY doesn’t show all their cards.
@Wazir, Nice post on the BUK. My gut is also telling me it was an egregious “mistake”. As we have seen with KAL007, Russia provided data after only 8 years and have their excuses at the ready in such tragic events.
Dennis,
“…and with respect to Boeing there is not a shred of evidence there was anything aircraft related in the disappearance.”
How come? It is true there is not a shred of evidence pointing on Z., but there are too many indications that something wrong was with the aircraft.
Dennis,
Just in addition to the previous. There was a recent discussion that the passengers and cabin crew possibly were not aware of the diversion. Given that the indended flight duration was somewhat 2 hours shorter than it was, and given the presence of the portable ELT in the cabin, the only possibility is that all the cabin crew and passengers were incapacitated at least two hours before the crash. Just think of Etihad EY-450 and Swiss Air 111.
@Oleksandr, There are many layers of evidence indicating that the plane did not divert due to accident or mechanical problems. This is one of the better understood aspects of the case. I don’t think it’s productive to keep beating this particular dead horse.
@Susie Crowe, One of the most frustrating aspects of the MH370 case is the utter worthlessness of most of the contributions by mainstream aviation journalists. Clive Irving’s writings on the subject consist almost entirely of misinformation, and Christine Negroni’s book is complete nonsense. Irving on Negroni is just garbabe on top of garbage. I agree with DennisW, the frequency of the ACARS reporting was irrelevant in the case of MH370.
Jeff,
“There are many layers of evidence indicating that the plane did not divert due to accident or mechanical problems”.
What are these layers of evidence? I understand you leaning towards conspiracy theories, but nothing can be ruled out until the aircraft is found. I found it very interesting that both EY-450 and Swiss Air cases encompass many features attributable to MH-370. Why do you prefer avoiding discussion of relevant topics? So far I heard no reasonable argument why you so confidently rule out mechanical failure (including deliberate damage) and ghost flight scenarios. If you can, please provide. If not, don’t make false statements only to satisfy conspiracy lovers.
@Nederland
‘Arcane’: understood by few; mysterious or secret. An excellent word to describe it – did anyone here know about it?
There have been many rumours concerning the TOW:
1) Tankering – i.e. flying to Beijing with excess fuel to minimise fuel purchased (at a high price) for the return leg. MAS refused to comment when asked. Tankering might appeal to the bean-counters but the decision was the sole responsibility of the pilot. Would a pilot fly excess fuel, knowing it would be a risk in the event of an emergency, or would take longer if fuel had to be dumped. etc etc. I am far from convinced and there is no evidence to back this rumour up … except more speculation. The speculation reached PPRUNE but even there, no pilot came forward saying “Yeah, we do that all the time.” Is there any proof that anyone actually does it?
2) A rumour that 50 seats were blocked due to weight – in addition, there were several (early) rumours that the plane was carrying a heavy load. These are obviously linked as one is the corollary of the other. Whilst this idea remains a rumour, there is some circumstantial evidence that there was something in it. MAS initially said there were 5 no-shows for the flight and 4 people boarded standby. This was later amended to 4 no-shows and 4 standby. But why would there be any standby passengers when the plane left with 55 empty seats? As I understand it, standby passengers are accepted only after the weight calculations have been done. So whilst it was a straight swap between no-shows and standbys – why was anyone on standby? Were the 55 seats blocked because of weight considerations? We do not know if there were any additional passengers on standby who did not get on the plane.
Unless someone comes forward to tell the truth, we will not know. That does not mean, however, that we should accept page 30 of the FI report! It is a disgrace! There is simply no reasonable excuse for it. Who ‘invented’ Jinan and Hangzhou as the alternate airports and why did they do it? Was it a deliberate attempt (on the part of parties unknown) to mislead? It is clear evidence that questions the integrity of the whole report.
Thanks to various people who pointed out that Ms Negroni’s new book was not worth buying. I could see from Amazon that readers weren’t too happy with her earlier book either.
@Oleksandr
Just starting with raw statistical data, it is well know that mechanical failure accounts for less than 20% of hull losses. You are going in at 4:1 against a hull loss without any additional information. Add the information that the plane continued to fly until fuel exhaustion, and the probability of a mechanical problem diminishes greatly. Add the information that there was no communication, and you go from diminishes greatly to extremely unlikely. Add the SIO points on Shah’s sim and the point at which the diversion began, and you drop to virtually zero probability.
It would take an extraordinarily contrived sequence of events to explain the disappearance on the basis of mechanical problems.
All of the evidence points to a preconceived action on the part of Shah.
Well, if ACARS had sent a position report every 5 minutes, we would perhaps know more about the events around IGARI, at 17:12, 17:17, 17:22, perhaps 17:27, 17:32, etc.? Now we only know that SATCOM was switched off sometime between 17:07 and 18:03.
@Gysbreght
I would probably not be helpful to know that ACARS was switched off at 17:17 rather than 17:07. We already know the aircraft had to turn West at IGARI to make it to the 18:25 ping ring on time. The data (radar data) between IGARI and a location West of the Malay peninsula has never been shown to be useful for any purpose whatsoever.
Dennis,
1. We have discussed the statistics, and mechanical failure fraction takes the second place after a pilot’s error. As long as you and I agree that it was not a pilot’s error, mechanical failure goes to the top most likely reason. So why do you still consider what falls into 1:10 category?
2. If the information about the cause of EY-450 on Sep 27 incident is correct, this B777 could also continue its flight, who knows for how long. The pilots took immediate decision to return back. The pilots of MH370 could act similarly. Do you disagree with this?
3. Swiss Air 111 remarkably close resembles the lack of communications, including the downed ACARS, which stopped transmitting 40 minutes before the crash. I heard many arguments that this is virtually impossible. But it did happen. Why can’t it happen again?
4. MAS is the only airline, which previously had issues with ADIRU on B777. Add to the “basket” the very suspicious fire event, which destroyed some MAS documentation. Maintenance issues? Add misaligned ADIRS incident on the other Malaysian carrier last year. Coincidences?
5. Do you notice a recent spike in B777 incidents/accidents?
What both you and Jeff Wise fail to recognise is that mechanical failures are rare due to multiple redundancies. Due to a large number of flights, they do, however, happen, and they are most likely caused by a chain of events previously considered as impossible.
You wrote:
“It would take an extraordinarily contrived sequence of events to explain the disappearance on the basis of mechanical problems.”
Not really. Take the cause of EY-450 incident as a basis, but consider slightly different angle of tire debris at different stage. Just an example of what could happen.
You wrote: “All of the evidence points to a preconceived action on the part of Shah.”
Blah-blah-blah, where is this “evidence”? I saw no single fact pointing on Z. I can possibly agree with you if you downgrade this so-called “evidence” to the level of a new working hypothesis.
To make it clear, in contrast to you and Jeff, I do not rule out other possibilities. What I am trying is to understand your basis to discard mechanical failure scenarios.
@DennisW:
Two isolated geographical locations on Zaharies computer have never been shown to be useful for any purpose whatsoever either.
Dennis,
“We already know the aircraft had to turn West at IGARI to make it to the 18:25 ping ring on time.”
This is false, and you know it, right? We discussed it details: the locations from 4 to 12N (if I recall correctly) along the 18:25 ring are reachable. Then what?
@Oleksandr
How would you explain apparent lack of willingness to reduce altitude and try and do emergency landing, despite the fact that the plane was piloted until at least the FMT and came close to a number of diversion airports? Why, then, divert in the first place?
i don’t have the details with me, but I remember the ACARS were reporting an engine was performing poorly.
@Gysbreght
Not only have they “never been shown to be useful for any purpose whatsoever”, they were first reported back in in June 2014:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/malaysia/10917868/MH370-captain-plotted-route-to-southern-Indian-Ocean-on-home-simulator.html
So why was this non-issue recently resuscitated and given prominence as if it was some newly discovered revelation? Who is behind that? The whole thing has an unpleasant odour (attempt at a stitch-up) about it.
On 29 March 2014 the FBI stated there was nothing of any relevance on the computer.
Finally I just do not buy that anyone would plan a ridiculous suicide 6 months in advance ‘just in case’ something came along that meant they urgently needed a suicide plan.
There have been a number of major crashes caused by overheating of tyres or wheels, such as:
1)Swissair 306, 4 Sep 1963
2)Mexicana 940, 31 Mar 1986
3)Nigeria Airways 2120, 11 Jul 1991
In all these cases the crisis was noticed soon after takeoff and the crash occurred in less than 30 minutes or so. Surely this type of accident would not have occurred here as the malfunction would have been noticed well before “Good Night MH 370”.
Electrical fires, could occur at various stages of the flight, but the lack of any communication from the plane regarding this emergency is quite unexpected.
@Oleksandr
Thoughtful post, and I do recall our prior discussion on the points you raise.
The Bayesian prior here is the hull loss as evidenced by the debris findings. There is no way to rule out any possibility, and to elevate mechanical failure to a more likely position. We simply do not know what happened and mechanical failure remains at 20%.
One might ask what the probability of a mechanical failure at exactly the time of ATC hand-off is given that the mechanical failure could have occurred at any time of the flight. If we use a nominal 6 hour KL to Beijing flight time and use a generous one half hour sampling interval, the probability of the mechanical failure at the ATC handoff is one in twelve. The ATC handoff point is a crucial piece of evidence pointing to intentional diversion.
The fact that the plane continued flying to fuel exhaustion is huge negative relative to a mechanical failure scenario. I don’t even know how to quantify it, but certainly it is less than a one in five probability. Lets call it one in five.
So just combining the above we (0.2)*(0.08)*(0.2) = 0.0032. We are looking at less than a one percent probability without even including lack of communication or the SIO data points.
I see after your post that Gysbreght weighed in with a glib remark relative to the data points in the SIO. As I said before, the usefulness of the SIO data points resides in their existence. They represent the final straw relative to concluding a premeditated diversion by ZS is what took place. (BTW, these are not isolated points. I don’t know why you keep bringing up garbage like that. They are among a small family of points that were the only points deleted from the shadow drive. Your glib remark simply makes you look bad or uninformed or both.)
The only remaining question is why.
A mechanical failure explanation cannot be ruled out, but it is hard to understand how it can be taken seriously.
@Oleksandr,
You make an important point about the chains of events previously thought to be impossible.
One need only look at the Tenerife crash, the worst one ever, to understand this. In that crash, there were no mechanical failures and a human error that on most days would have had no effect. The chain of events was extraordinarily “contrived,” if only by fate: two fully-fueled 747s, diverted by a bomb threat at a different airport, rushing to beat the weather out of an airport without a taxiway so as to avoid violating Dutch work rules, speaking different languages in the cockpit, talking over radio transmissions, and ending up in flames on a runway together. None of these events alone were enough to cause a disaster.
Eastern flight 401 crashed, indirectly, because of a mechanical failure – a burned out light bulb – and a string of poor responses by the crew. Had the bulb been an LED, the same crew and plane would have landed safely.
KAL007 was shot down because of a combination of pilot navigation errors, Soviet ground command stubbornness, and Soviet pilot misidentification. Or, quite probably, because the Korean pilots had the music up too loud to recognize what was going on.
Challenger – a long chain of ridiculous events. Political pressure, poor design, high winds and an icy night before.
I could go on and on but accidents happen when strings of normally harmless errors pile up. We don’t get to read about all the times when only 9 out of 10 errors in the chain occurred and an accident never happened.
It would be very difficult to imagine a single cause of the MH370 disappearance. Even if we blame the pilot, something appears to have gone wrong with his plan, too.
@Oleksndr
you said:
“This is false, and you know it, right? We discussed it details: the locations from 4 to 12N (if I recall correctly) along the 18:25 ring are reachable. Then what?”
Yes, of course there are a range of positions on the 18:25 ring that are reachable. To that I say “so what?”. We don’t know where the plane was on the 18:25 ring in any case. The Malay radar graphic is a joke worthy only of the rubbish bin.
@JW
” Some people have proposed that he went into the E/E bay and just randomly pushed and pulled circuit breakers, but I don’t think any pilot would do this.”
no pilot would do that in normal circumstances but when you are in panic and trying to open the door then you take every opportunity
btw I’m with Dennis on this, also because BFO is fully compatible with many of the flight paths further to the north
it’s humans from ATSB/IG and their assumptions that must be questioned, not poor electronics and huge conspiracies to tamper with them
Dennisw: “The Malay radar graphic is a joke worthy only of the rubbish bin.”
How about the DSTG “Bayesian Methods” report?
OK I answered my own question, The article that re-started this sim deleted data issue again was this:
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/07/mh370-pilot-flew-suicide-route-on-home-simulator.html
It was widely reported the following day in media around the world and was presented as new and incriminating information – in my view it was neither new nor incriminating.
@DennisW
You said: “They are among a small family of points that were the only points deleted from the shadow drive.”
Do you have a source for this please.
It was widely reported on March 27 2014 that: “All the game logs in the personal flight simulator of Captain Shah were reportedly deleted Feb 3” – I have searched several similar reports and none suggests the data was selectively deleted.
@DennisW
“All of the evidence points to a preconceived action on the part of Shah.”
Who said “Goodnight Malaysian three seven zero”?
@Gysbreght
Good question relative to DSTG book. My initial impression was that it seemed like a complicated way to draw the same conclusion that was drawn much earlier using non-Bayesian vector algebra and the ISAT data.
Since looking at the report in more detail, in particular the BFO statistics, I have come to appreciate it much more that I did originally. If we (by that I mean the entire analytical community) had access to the 20 flight paths which included ISAT and ACARS data, I think our collective approach would have been much different than it was. The reality is that the non-ergodic nature of the BFO errors makes them essentially useless for refining a terminus. The heavy weighting of the BTO data as was done by the DSTG is the correct way to proceed. I still think the DSTG analysis is burdened by the over-constraining of flight dynamics, but that is a detail unrelated to the basic soundness of the approach they took.
@Dennis W. You make it sound as if to have happened at exactly that moment is incredibly unlikely. The same could be said for any particular moment during the flight.
What else “might” have been happening at the time?
a) A change of course (IGARI turn for IGARI-BITOD leg) – the first such turn and attendant additional thrust at altitude during this flight.
b) Galley activities? Not sure what the typical MAS nightflight routine looks like, but serving drinks/meals after climb completed, 40 mins into flight sounds highly likely. There’s a history (so I read) of spillages making their way into EE bay from business class galley above, with obvious potential for causing electrical havoc.
@PaulC
http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2798
Point 5 in the linked reference above.
@Paul S
The timing of the turn West between ATC handoff is the logical place to execute a diversion that would go unnoticed for the maximum time. This point has been made over and over again. I was being generous with giving it a half hour window.
@Paul C
more…
You, Oleksandr, and anyone else is free to put mechanical failures at the top of your list. I cetrainly cannot rule it out. I am merely pointing out why I have discarded it relative to my own thinking.
@DennisW
Thanks.
Quote
5. Within the Shadow Copy Set, there were two additional coordinates that were recovered for an aircraft parked at KLIA. No other coordinates recovered from the Shadow Copy Set, if there were any, were included in the RMP report.
Unquote
Not seeking to be a pedant but I don’t think that actually supports your assertion that: “… a small family of points that were the only points deleted.”
In fact the item queries whether any other points were deleted. We don’t actually know how much was deleted or recovered.
I get the feeling that “The Malay” radar is worthy only that of garbage. Unless we get collaborating radar data from the region.
@DennisW:
You expressed an opinion about the “Malay radar graphic”. My question asked your opinion about the DSTG’s analysis of those radar data in Chapter 4 of their report.
“For the accident flight, primary radar data provided by Malaysia is available
from after the loss of communications up until 18:22:12. The radar data contains
regular estimates of latitude, longitude and altitude at 10 second intervals from
16:42:27 to 18:01:49.”
@Paul C
Yes, you are correct, and I do not think you are being pedantic. The conclusion I presented is true, but also based on additional conversations I have had with authors of the report I linked.
@Paul Smithson
” the first such turn and attendant additional thrust at altitude during this flight.”
Are you alluding to what happened to British Airways flight 38?
Nederland:
“How would you explain apparent lack of willingness to reduce altitude and try and do emergency landing, despite the fact that the plane was piloted until at least the FMT and came close to a number of diversion airports? Why, then, divert in the first place?”
These points have been explained many times. If there was smog in the cabin, a natural response of the crew would be to return ASAP before finding the source of fire, meaning flying at high speed and high altitude. As in the case of Swiss Air 111, the crew could opt to pull circuit breakers – a ridiculously trivial explanation. Upon assessment of the situation they could realize that landing with >30 tons of kerosene, without communication means and without support of ground emergency services, a landing attempt would be equivalent to suicide, especially if the problem was localised around the nose landing gear. It was not possible to dump the fuel because jettison pumps do not work when the left bus is depowered. If a blast-like event damaged the ADIRU or made it malfunctioning, the most of the high-level AP functions would be lost, and the crew would have little choice.
Does this sound like a possible explanation?
@Gysbreght
Sorry. I did not connect the dots on your question. I thought you were asking about the report in general.
I have no opinion about the DSTG radar comments. I put them in the domain of remarks made in passing. The only thing I considered noteworthy was that the last radar contact consisted of a single point at 18:22, and that the DSTG was not able to reconcile this point with their prior Kalman filter output and the 18:25 range ring.
Frankly, I have not given that portion of the flight much thought since I gave up on trying to understand it long before the DSTG report was published.
Dennis,
If I understood you correctly, you have admitted that a mechanical failure cannot be ruled out. Do you still want to hang Z.?
Dennis,
You wrote “We don’t know where the plane was on the 18:25 ring in any case. The Malay radar graphic is a joke worthy only of the rubbish bin.”
The radar data is consistent with Inmarsat 18:25 ring. I am still not sure what you dislike about this data. Data as data.
@Oleksandr
Yes, I agree that a mechanical failure cannot be ruled out. I just consider the case for Z having diverted the plane for other reasons to be far more likely.
I think Z’s innocence will be preserved in perpetuity even if the black boxes are found and recovered. There will always be room for doubt.
@DennisW
I know others will not agree but I put mechanical failure well down the list of possibilities – for many of the reasons you cite.
I had not intended to put this suggestion forward just yet but in light of the current mood I will tell you what I think.
I prefer a far more bizarre scenario – on the basis that fact is far stranger than fiction. This is a tale of espionage, counter espionage and counter counter espionage.
A few days ago, you cited the old ‘motive means and opportunity’ method of investigation.
Opportunity – the flight was the only option for someone to do what had to be done.
Motive – I think the plane was carrying an undisclosed cargo. China wanted it and thought they had it. I am sure some of the passengers were Chinese secret service. This is also why China was so involved in the search – which I have previously noted, I regard as very curious. Disasters are common in China but rarely does the Chinese state mobilise as it did for MH370. I see the deliberate misdirection on page 30 of the FI report as supporting the idea that there is an ongoing cover-up of what was on the plane.
Means – The Chinese secret service were not the only people on the plane after the cargo – at least one and perhaps two other interests were represented onboard. All major parties knew about the cargo and they all had plans for it. Essentially, the plane was hijacked which led to a fight and a counter hijack. The BTO/BFO data was spoofed and the person who did that was sitting in seat 29A. Mohd Khairul Amri Selamat had 10 years experience as a flight engineer but his employer (ExecuJet Aviation Group) refused to confirm he was still employed by them at the time of the hijack. When interviewed by Reuters his father refused to comment when asked if his son was capable of such an act – he later did deny it but his initial doubt was clear. Inmarsat had known about the satellite wobble for some time, it was not a new ‘discovery’, it was just that they had no use for the technique until MH370. I could go on (and on and on)!
So not mechanical failure and not pilot suicide – more like ‘Gunfight at the OK Coral at 35,000 feet’. The most messed up hijack in history. The only question remaining for me is: ‘did the good guys win?’
@Oleksandr
Yes, it is consistent apart from some small anomalies mentioned by the DSTG which do not trouble me. My thrust relative to the radar data is that it has failed to add anything to our understanding of what happened. I don’t have any particular disdain for it other than the LIDO graphic which has never been corrected since it was presented. Again, I don’t think a corrected graphic will produce any new insights, it is just the principle that I find annoying.
My consistent theme is that the radar data has not been helpful in any way, and I stand by that..
Just a thought: if a piece of debris like in the case of EY-450 damages the frame/chassis, where the ADIRU is installed, the ADIRU itself may survive, but it will start producing rubbish output. And it is not possible to switch it off from the cockpit due to its internal logic.
@Oleksandr
have you counted the probability for a mechanical failure happening exactly at handover point, plane flying exactly along thai border and turning around Indonesia in almost perfect way to evade their national airspace?! I haven’t counted it but it’s one in a billion in the best case.
@DennisW
Radar data is extrapolated from their raw data and superimposed on the map, it’s not the most precise but in general it shows the approximate flight path with satisfying precision IMO.
Dennis,
You said: “I just consider the case for Z having diverted the plane for other reasons to be far more likely.”
How do you judge on the likelihood? Pulling bus switches to prevent spread of cabin fire is so trivial reason compared to malicious intents such as stopping CVR, or consequential disabling of various electronics by hypothetical gremlins.