Here’s a link to the report broadcast today on Australian 60 Minutes about the search for MH370. Part 1:
Part 2:
Discussion after the jump…
The main thrust of the piece is that an independent air-crash expert, Larry Vance, has looked at photographs of the Réunion flaperon and decided that their relatively intact state, and the lack of debris from inside the aircraft, means that the plane must not have impacted the water at high speed, as would be expected if the plane ran out of fuel as a “ghost ship” and spiralled into the water. He interprets the jagged trailing edge of the flaperon as evidence that it was deployed at the moment of impact and was worn away when it struck the water.
I find it discomfiting when people say that the mystery of MH370 is not mystery at all–that they are absolutely confident they know the answer. Vance undercuts his credibility, I feel, by taking this stance. There is indeed a strong argument to be made that the plane must have been under conscious control to the very end; to me the most compelling is simply that the plane has not been found in the current seabed search zone. However it is less clear that someone attempted a ditching. What the show does not mention is that debris from inside the aircraft has indeed been found, suggesting that the fuselage could not have survived the impact and sunk to the bottom of the ocean intact. Indeed, the program doesn’t mention the other debris at all, with the exception of the Pemba flap, which is the other relatively intact large piece. The fact that most of the debris found so far is rather small is to me indicative of a higher-energy impact. But I have no strong opinion one way or the other; I feel that proper experts must look at the debris close up to determine what forces caused it to come apart.
The program cites the recently revealed flight-sim data from Zaharie’s computer as further evidence that the plane was deliberately piloted to fuel exhaustion and beyond. For the first time, the program showed on screen pages from the confidential Malaysian report. The producers of the show reached out to me as they were putting the program together, and asked me to comment on some of the data they had accumulated. Here are the pages of the document that they showed on-screen:
It’s worth noting that these pages offer a summary of the recovered flight-sim data which are described in greater detail and accuracy elsewhere in the confidential Malaysian documents. Here is a table showing a subset of what the documents contain:
Note that the numbering systems for the two data tables do not match. (Please do not ask me to explain this.) I suggest that for the purposes of discussion, the point saved at Kuala Lumpur International Airport be called point 1; the three points recorded as the flight-sim moved up the Malacca Strait to the Andaman Islands be called 2, 3, and 4; and the points over the southern Indian Ocean with fuel at zero be called points 5 and 6.
In order to understand the fuel load numbers in the second table, I made some calculations based on the fuel loads in a real 777-200ER. I don’t know how closely these match those in the flight simulator Zaharie was using. If anyone can shed light I’d be happy to hear it.
Worth noting, I think, is that the fuel difference between point 4 and point 5 is enough for more than 10 hours of flight under normal cruise conditions. The difference between these points is 3,400 nautical miles, for an average groundspeed of less than 340 knots. This is peculiar. Perhaps the flight-sim fuel burn rate is very inaccurate; perhaps the simulated route between the points was not a great circle, as shown in the second page of the report above, but indirect; perhaps Zaharie was fascinated by the idea of flying slowly; or perhaps points 5 & 6 come from a different simulated flight than 1 through 4. Readers’ thoughts welcome.
Also note that neither the locations nor the headings of points 1-4 lie exactly on a straight line from 1 to 4, which suggest perhaps that the route was hand-flown.
@Johan
But the Helios should be used as a guide to what conditions would be like following a deliberate depressurization. In the Helios accident, the outflow valve was only partially stuck open, the air pack output valves remained open, so the cabin altitude never dropped below an estimated 19,000 to 24,000ft, if you read the accident report, see references section of Wikipedia.
In a deliberate depressurization scenario, the air con pack output valves could be selected fully closes, and the outflow valves fully opened. The cabin altitude would drop to 35,000ft quite rapidly. The temperature would also drop sharply.
The SDU reboot at 18:24, suggests to me that the cabin was re-pressurized at this time, as well. The aircraft was deoressurized fo about one hour, any longer and the pilot would have been dicing with hypothermia, Imo. He couldn’t afford to risk that outcome, as he intended to stay in control until the end. He appears to have succeeded, witness the flaperon and outboard flap section (controlled ditching)
Oxygen.
@Nederland. About those cabin bottles, the cabin crew might feel obliged to share them with passengers who have run out, depending on whether they need them for their own mobility. That might extend some passengers but maybe would entail a shift to high rate regulators and shorten bottle life.
Difficult choices. I would not suppose there to be airline guidance on that.
@Ge Rijn. Extra masks would not of themselves help with duration since the generators feed into a common manifold for the local seats, that is the oxygen flows to all masks on the manifold once the generator is started irrespective of there being a user or not. However any ‘unmanned’ seat ‘sections'(ie in each row there is a generator on either side and in the centre (maybe two there) and there are a few others scattered about eg lavatories. So those generators including in unmanned sections would be a source.
As an individual’s supply finished I would hope that they would be unaware of that.
@Rob. A 777 pilot informed me that the fastest way to depressurise would be to select ram air.
@Johan
Correction to my previous post, the Helios accident should NOT be used as a guide to conditions following a deliberate depressurization. Sorry, shouldnt have tried typing on a smartphone, before breakfast.
@buyerninety
If you are that keen to clarify the IFE load shedding question, please feel free to email smartcockpit. And you might also check that the security camera system was installed on MH370, as it appears to be an optional extra, anyway.
Flight simulation anomalies
20,000 kg of fuel mysteriously evaporated between points #3 and #4 (*)
The pitch attitudes do not correspond to the flight path angle
The rates of climb are unrealistic:
Point #1 FL230 3507 ft/min
Point #3 FL400 3570 ft/min
Compare those to the MH370 ACARS Position Report: https://www.dropbox.com/s/o1ltweegdst8cje/ACARS_RoC.png?dl=0
Then at Point #5 with both engines out, still climbing at 2029 ft/min.
(*) The point numbers are those of the “Subset” table above.
@David
The oxygen bottles are normally reserved for the cabin crew, as, for example, with Helios 522. In that case, one bottle was left unused. Passenger oxygen lasts for 22 minutes, the only possible way to deal with 227 passengers is to try and get into the cockpit.
@ROB
Except that probably all 10 cabin crew members (and any locked out pilots) would have survived decompression of an hour or so (75 minutes being the absolute minimum). Why then depressurise in the first place? It only brings additional risks, for example, the locked-out pilot may decide to cut off oxygen supply to the cockpit in the e/e bay.
The reboot seems to coincide with MH370 reaching the maximum range of radar coverage. Had there not been a reboot, MAS would have been unable to call MH370 soon after.
Here’s a guideline from Airbus:
“The priority of the cabin crew is to consider their personal safety.
Incapacitated or injured cabin crewmembers will not be able to assist other cabin crewmembers and passenger during the post-decompression phase.”
http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/media_gallery/files/safety_library_items/AirbusSafetyLib_-FLT_OPS-CAB_OPS-SEQ09.pdf
So, there does seem to be guidance in that.
“The affected passenger or crewmember usually recovers a few minutes after receiving oxygen.”
Since we are into the e/e bay and a scenario with a captain/hijacker locked into the cockpit (perhaps silly question):
What could n o t be performed from the e/e bay, if the FO and/or anyone in the other crew could be expected to know anything about how to make things happen there (which perhaps could be doubted)?
Could you unlock the cockpit door, switch off and on all systems, override the cockpit, set oxygen to normal levels, etc.?
Another question: there was once if I recall mentions of a secondary emergency flight controls briefcase in the cockpit, which pilots could take with them if having to evacuate the cockpit. Is there such a thing and what can it do? Perhaps impossible to use while the plane is blacked out?
I am trying to get at what person and capacity had needed to be (or not be) in what position at what point in time. I am not suggesting Shah locked himself up in a back room with most of the spare oxygen and overrid and evacuted the oxygen from the rest of the plane from there, while passengers were trying to force the door to the cockpit in front. But must we not conclude that either one pilot was incapacitated immediately or this one would have had at least reasonsble odds for making life hard for the hijacker. Or else both pilots were in on it, which only really makes sense in a very, very specific scenario.
@Nederland:
Do you know if that sat-call would suffice in itself to get a location on the plane, then and there, or after calculations?
@Johan
the problem is, all that was washed already few times by other people here during whole 2+ years, in latest weeks its returning again to be processed by others… hope you can find something new, always possible, but too much data means again less of information, in fact; and people who know most about the case may get tired; hope not the reason
@Johan
I think the cockpit door has a mechanical lock and not just the electronical lock. The electronical lock requires the hijacker to actively prevent access to the cabin crew who have an emergency code. The FI, however, does not mention any mechanical lock. In the past, there have been discussions that isolating the left AC bus overrides the electronical lock. My understanding is that can be done from the e/e bay too. Some cockpit doors seem to unlock automatically in case of depressurisation.
If one suspects a meticulous plan, it is likely that the hijacker wanted to make sure his plan is fail-safe, but many doubts can be raised, e.g. how long for hypothermia to kick in, what happens to the cockpit door in case of depressurisation and/or resistance by passengers or crew, how about the portable ELT in the cabin and so on. These seem to be questions that noone can answer inn advance.
The satcall did not deliver any BTO values. It has been argued that it is somewhat bewildering that the control centre tried and called the aircraft only twice, with several hours apart, although they were urged to try and contact more often, and the network registers the call as successful, why not try more often then. Especially since there was a chain of misleading information (aircraft over Cambodia and so on) preceding the first attempt. That has not so far been investigated either.
@Nederland
Yes, still a lot of unanswered questions.
I remember a previous discussion here concerning the door lock. Apparently, but don’t quote me on this, the door can be locked manually from the inside, in the event of a power failure. BTW, the electric door lock is powered from the LH main AC bus
@Nederland
The lack of communication events indicates to me that high level Malay officials knew very well what was going on, and were engaged with third parties relative to “negotiations”. If you know what is happening, there is little motivation to contact the aircraft especially when you know that contact attempts will not result in a response.
@Gysbreght
I thought point 5 in the second table was the same as point 6 in the first.
But now you mention it I see point 5 in the second table is probably not complete.
The last number of that altitude is probably missing and mentions 40000+ instead of 4000.
The first table mentions an altitude of 3999 for point 6. That gives a totally other picture.
What will be right altitude; point 6 in table 1 or an incomplete point 5 in table 2?
@Ge Rijn: I don’t understand your question. 3999 ft in table 1 is given as 4000 ft in table 2, a difference of 1 ft. Have you looked at the speeds I provided earlier?
@ Ge Rijn
You are asking a good question. Table 2 indicates 3999 for Point 6 and not the apparent 4000 in the spreadsheet. Yes, a small difference, but why aren’t they the same?
Secondly, looking at the spreadsheet, why are the column headings only roughly equivalent to the values in the altitude row — e.g., why FL320 instead of FL322?
As for the truncation you noted, it would seem the spreadsheet value for altitude under the column for Parameter = 5 is quite possibly the same 40003 value listed for altitude under the column for Parameter = 3.
That is a heck of a lot of things for a single man to control. He must have incapacitated the other pilot and taken a hostage from the passengers. And been equipped with (fake) grenade or something. Of course, the captain would have been in a good position to plan for this, but how could he be sure he would carry it through?
Or would he have faked a hostage situation to buy time to carry out his extended suicide?
@DennisW:
Dare I ask what the demands could have been that a hijacker would have put forth? And by what instrument could he have communicated with a negotiator? (Or do you suspect that MAlaysia have given us selective data?)
@Brock
Re: Modelling of flight path in the case of piloted flight
Away from my path models at the moment, but some thoughts on what might be possible.
Even if the Investigation states that examination of the flap piece indicates it was deployed in a slow-speed impact with the sea (possibly a ditching and therefore piloted) there are still unknowns. The particular point is when the flaps were extended, since this requires hydraulic power which would have been lost with the second engine. Neither the Gimli Glider nor Air Transat Flight 236 were able to extend flaps in a similar situation. There has been mention of residual hydraulic pressure, but no evidence (that I am aware of) that this is true for the 777/Trent combination. A flap deployment before loss of the second engine (between 00:11 and 00:19) requires a different and deliberately selected speed/altitude profile. Deploying flaps that early is also not consistent with achieving maximum glide distance.
If the 00:19 BTO/BFO data was not related to loss of the second engine then MH370 could be anywhere, so that case is not worth considering.
So can just two BTO data points be used to reject (at a reasonable level of certainty) the possibility that the aircraft was slowed to flap deployment speed before loss of the second engine? Given the uncertainties in the times of engine loss, this looks difficult but I haven’t tried the numbers yet.
@DennisW
Something like that could be suggested by Dunleavy’s remark:
“As far as the families were concerned, the plane had been hijacked by terrorists, the Malaysian government was negotiating with them, and we weren’t telling them. I knew that wasn’t happening — there had been zero communications from MH370.”
http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/london-life/the-plane-truth-malaysia-airlines-boss-hugh-dunleavy-on-what-really-happened-the-night-flight-mh370-9556444.html
@Nederland, @DennisW
The lack of communication attempts is a significant slip. I’m not sure it proves that the Malaysian officials knew what was going on, as they could have been being fed a cover story to stall for time as the real event unfolded. I suspect their military could have had a better idea of what was really happening.
I still think the flight SIM data is a complete red-herring, as either the Malaysian police or the FBI could easily have written the ‘incriminating’ data to the hard disc to indicate the chosen final cover-story – pilot suicide and mass murder. Even if the data were genuine, it proves nothing beyond the fact that Zaharie Shah enjoyed messing about with flight SIMs.
Another curiosity is that the annual multilateral air force exercise, Cope Tiger was due to start just two days before MH370 disappeared. This involved military aircraft and missile units from Thailand, Singapore and USA. Lots of extra eyes and military air traffic arriving in the area just before the event happened. I wonder if they saw anything unusual?
@Gysbreght @PhilD
There are differenties in the tables indeed.
Table 2 states FL04 above columm 5 but all those last digits are missing.
AGL??? (why????) says for point 4; 37653 and for point 5: 3765.?
I would like to see the complete numbers of point 5 in table 2
@Gysbrecht; I haven’t seen speeds yet mentioned by you in this regard (cann’t find them either)
@Ge Rijn: You can see the complete .jpg picture when you click on it.
Thanks for the clarification, Gysbreght, but why should there be more faith in the Altitude = 4000 value for Parameter = 5 rather than the AGL value = 37654.
@Johan
I have no idea what the negotiations “could have been” about – lots of choices there, actually. A person claiming to have inside knowledge told me that the plane would be contacted in an “agreed upon way” pending the outcome of the negotiations by third parties in KL.
I say “could have been” since I have no solid evidence whatever that this is what actually took place. It does connect a few more dots, however.
@ROB
For deprussurization it won’t be necessary to close the airco output.
It would be an unwise thing to do for also the pilot/hijacker will subject himself to unbearable cold for no use at all IMO.
If he re-pressurized the cabin again after some time and he noticed someone would still be alive he could have decompressed the cabin any time again I think.
@Gysbreght
Thanks.
Leaves the question of @PhilD on the AGL figures of point 5 table 2..
@PhilD: I posted the speeds calculated from the table data on page 5 of this thread.
The speed of 195,9 kTAS for Parameter=5 corresponds to 184,9 kCAS (=kIAS)at 4000 ft and is close to the lowest speed a clean B777 can safely fly at. At FL400 that speed would correspond to 98,3 kCAS, which would not be possible for a B777.
@DennisW:
Hm. I see. Thanks for letting us in on it.
I could see a couple of dots, too, if it weren’t that secrets probably are extremely hard to keep, and that most extortionists probably would not like to get a really bad reputation among U.S. secret service, and possibly also Russia and/or China. Apart from those who gladly would announce it immediately but haven’t done so.
If Shah himself had some idea to get his alleged political role model off of his verdict, he would have been better off before the decision fell. He could just as well have tried to ask for a pay-raise. It would have been the wrong method.
@Ge Rijn
I think it still unclear whether or not it is possible (in theory) to depressurise the aircraft but without causing dramatic drops in temperature.
… and of course, most hijackers’ demands (as would Shah’s demand for a higher salary) would be agreed upon until the aircraft is back safely on the ground. And then they are somehow taken back. By the dishonest baste**ds. Which hijackers have learnt the hard way over the years.
@Middleton
@buyerninety
(@Ge Rijn)
It’s good that you challenged me on the backup generator/loadshedding IFE question, as it turns out I was wrong.
I’ve got the chance to raise it with Don Thompson (GuardedDon) who knows more about the B777 electrical power supply and distribution system than I do.
Switching to backup power would depower both LH and RH main AC busses, which means that the IFE and the video cameras would stop working. The backup generator would only power the two transfer busses, which in turn power the transformer rectifiers to maintain essential DC power for controls, avionics and instruments.
So it appears that the only way to delibeately de-energize the SDU from the cockpit, would be to isolate the LH main AC bus.
Rob please, a small request – planes have L and R side only, no Hands. TIA.
@ROB said:
‘So it appears that the only way to delibeately de-energize the SDU from the cockpit, would be to isolate the LH main AC bus.’
You’re still focusing on the SDU as the reason for turning off the left bus, if it was turned off.
But the perps wouldn’t have needed to disable the SDU in order to disable comms, and the ping(s) from IGARI to the Straits wouldn’t have mattered – they were being tracked on primary radar anyway and it was only c. 1 hour, so maybe 1 or 2 (vague) pings at most.
So the question is still: What else was on that bus that they thought essential to de-power?
I’m not asking you to answer that, just raising the question – the AMM will show what’s on that bus, if anyone has access to one.
The discussion regarding the length of time the passengers might have been conscious brings me back around to my previous question:
Just how strong is that cockpit door?
After futile shoulder attacks, I think most men would resort to running full blast at the door and jump kicking with both feet. I know of two inch thick solid wood doors destroyed in this manner.
If several men attacked the door in this manner, until each was too injured to continue, would the door and latch mechanism hold up?
@All
This makes good reading in the case of ‘Accessing Shas mind state ‘
http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/mi5s-minority-report-unit-foil-seven-terror-attacks-by-reading-the-minds-of-terrorists/news-story/0f3a888bcc005af7100f8a60023dce46
Cheers Tom L
@Mikeroo
I think it is impossible to force your way through the cockpit door – at least if it is locked electronically. It may, however, haven been locked mechanically as the electronic lock is linked to the left AC bus.
You may, on the other hand, end up compromising the structural integrity of the fuselage.
@Ge Rijn
@Netherlands
This has been discussed many times before, both here and in different places. If I remember right, the consensus was/is:
To depressurise, simply turn pressurisation to manual and open the outflow valves a little more. The AC pack(s) will still provide heat but the aircraft will slowly lose its pressure – you can monitor the pressure on the FMC/CDU. There might be a bit more of a breeze in the cabin, but otherwise everything might seem normal until the masks fell.
So if the perp(s) had that in mind then disabling the masks falling might seem to be a good idea – everyone first becoming sleepy and confused, then losing consciousness – cabin crew included. That would be a more certain way since no passengers would notice (no masks falling) and busy crew members might not notice the onset either unless they’d had hyperbaric training, hence few (if any) crew having time or a reason to grab bottles.
But in any case, and to make sure, increase altitude to over 37,500ft for a while – all masks/bottles in the cabin become useless and the flow of oxygen into the bloodstream can even become negative (ppO2) – ie. oxygen leaves the blood. Only four people would be able to survive – there’s only four (pressure) masks in the cockpit.
But you’d need a cover story, of course, since turning off & isolating the left bus would also kill the main cabin lights and IFE, which would be noticed: – “Ladies and Gentlemen, as you can see, we have a slight technical/electrical problem with the cabin lighting and also the IFE system, so for safety reasons we are returning to KL to have it fixed. Please accept our apologies for the inconvenience’.
@Middleton
My impression was that depressurising the aircraft inevitably leads to drop in temperature. I’d gladly read a source suggesting the contrary.
I’m also not aware that it is possible to prevent the masks from dropping down. The FI also doesn’t mention that this is possible.
And it has also been established that the aircraft decreased altitude to c. 30,000 ft in that decisive first hour. There were early reports about increasing altitude, which have since been refuted.
Thanks Nederland, DennisW and all for the details and explanations. I can see you have been busy. (Don’t forget “the outdoors” — and I don’t mean an afternoon tv-show by that name.)
@RetiredF4,
You said: “The BFO at 1840 is just the tad of a second . . . .”
Actually the circa 18:40 BFOs began at 18:39:55 and ended at 18:40:56 for a duration of 61 seconds. I don’t think it is impossible for a brief descent to have occurred then, but that leaves two questions hanging. What would be the point of descending only a couple of thousand feet or less? How probable is it that a descent began only a few seconds before the phone call started and then ended only a few seconds after the phone call ended? I might accept one coincidental timing within a fraction of a minute, but two coincidences only about a minute apart is a bit hard for me to accept. If a descent was ongoing at 18:40 I think it might more likely be due to an “emergency” descent down to FL100.
While it is possible for a small portion of the MH370 route to have been flown manually, that would be unusual. I don’t see why doing so would “fail my reality check.” In my view it is most likely that waypoints/airways were used by the flight crew, or perhaps after 18:25 a cabin crew member set the course using the MCP.
@Gysbreght: re: sim data anomalies: thank you for compiling.
I’ve tried to follow, but may have missed prior discussions: does recording left & right bank angles as + & -, respectively, deemed “anomalous”, “normal”, or “unknown”? To this total neophyte, it seems modestly counter-intuitive: I guess I’d have thought a bank that increases numerical heading (i.e. to the right) would be recorded as a +.
@Johan
So an interesting question is – what sorts of demands, if agreed to, could not by taken back?
There’s another good article by Ben Sandilands today
https://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2016/08/09/australian-reality-check-mh370-analysis/ which refers to a ho-hum article in the Australian Business Review (Google some title words: “MH370 in catastrophic death dive, says analysis”)
@DennisW
You said “A person claiming to have inside knowledge told me that the plane would be contacted in an “agreed upon way” pending the outcome of the negotiations by third parties in KL.” This is new? Any more from that source?
@AM2
This person has requested anonymity, and I will honor that. I have no way to verify this information so I have been very reluctant to refer to it except in the hypothetical. At least one other person here of singular integrity is aware of these claims. There is really nothing more that can be said than that.
@Middleton:
This sounds like something workable.
I read somewhere that MAS served a hot meal on this flight soon after take-off; you may want to take that into consideration. Maybe they never came that far.
Also, the FO might be difficult to fool.
Another thought: in some cases of pilot-suicide, insurance fraud, murder (through sabotage on the ground), plain murderous sabotage, and perhaps a few rare passenger-suicide scenarios (read about that American guy who got on a plane with his Magnum to kill off his surprised former employer in mid-air!) the event would have had to look like an accident to cover the crime and the moral turpitude. With hijackers it is hard to see the same need for that, rather the opposite, so to speak.
On the other hand, could there be anything in the nature of the hijacking or an accident/criminal neglect/sabotage that would have made MAS prefer calling it a disappearance rather than what it was (despite having to pay more to compensate NoK than in a hijacking scenario, where they are insured by Lloyds and others)? Something that would have been much more detrimental for business — lethal food poisoning, failing security control? Just thoughts. MAS did go out of business.
@DennisW:
I provoked the same thought in meself.
I’ll sleep on that.
“Singular integrity”?!
@AM2
I should have mentioned that the “negotiating” scenario includes a flight path consistent with a menu of possible landing places. Banda Aceh, Cocos, CI, and Bandung were mentioned explicitly.
The “insider” does not claim to know exactly where the aircraft entered the water or what exactly caused the ditch to occur.
@All
New press release in Australia.
http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/incidents/missing-plane-mh370-dived-from-the-air-new-analysis-shows/news-story/fb85b268f2f968311160c3193cf5181d
Cheers Tom L
@Tom L.
Slow news day, I guess. 🙂
The ATSB could not find a 777 if it were parked outside their offices.
@DennisW
Agreed.
Greg Hood trying to dis Larry
I suppose he is trying to show he is on top of everything!!
Cheers Tom L