Brock McEwen has released a new reverse-drift analysis of the MH370 debris that has been found in the western Indian Ocean. The executive summary is below.
Broadly speaking, Brock’s new paper supports the conclusion of his earlier work on the subject, and also parallels the findings of GEOMAR and Météo France, as I’ve written about earlier–namely, that reverse drift analysis suggests that the debris did not originate within the current search zone.
In conducting his analysis, Brock has erroneously included objects found in the Maldives which did not come from MH370, but my understanding is that the inclusion of this bad data did not materially change his results.
The Australian is reporting that “Despite finishing his term as the head of the ATSB without finding MH370, [Martin] Dolan said he remained hopeful the aircraft would be found” and believes the search should continue. The full story is behind a paywall but Amanda Rose has provided a screenshot here. Also of interest in the article is the assertion that, due to bad weather, the search might stretch on through October.
Meanwhile the New Straits Times says that “The ministerial tripartite meeting on the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 will be held on July 19, Transport Minister Datuk Seri Liow Tiong Lai said Friday… Liow reportedly said that the meeting would deliberate on the next course of action regarding the search for the aircraft, which went off radar on March 8, 2014, with 239 people on board while on its way from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing.” China, Malaysia and Australia have long said that the search will end after the current 120,000 sq km search area has been scanned, but some observers hold out hope that the rash of recent debris finds will encourage officials to press on.
@Gysbreght possibly as the plane may have been at a bank angle and pointing near downwards position objects within the fuselage would gradually be moving to the front of the plane increasing the weight at the front making the front heavier.
ir1907: It is time to stop repeating preliminary information subsequently retracted. Here is what Inmarsat published in October 2014:
“JON Paper, Sec 5.4: Refinement of BFO Samples. Detailed analysis of BFO samples taken from other flights showed a high degree of consistency for the signalling message frequencies, with the exception of those that were performed immediately after the initial logon process. This called into question the BFO measurements after the log-on sequences at 18:25 and 00:19. However it was also determined (by the same method) that the first message transmitted by the aircraft in the logon sequence, the Logon Request message, did provide a consistent and accurate BFO measurement. This means that we can use the Logon Request message information from 18:25:27 and 00:19:29, but it is prudent to discount the measurements between 18:25:34 and 18:28:15 inclusive, and the one at 00:19:37.”
From this, we know Inmarsat initially discounted all of the 18:25 and 00:19 BFO data, but shortly thereafter they come to conclude *at least* the first values of each of these logon sequences were accurate. Thus, at the very least, the 00:19:29 data is deemed accurate by Inmarsat (-5000 ft/min). After the paper was written, the ATSB SWG came to the conclusion that the other values might also be valid, in which case, the 00:19:37 BFO indicates -15,000 ft/min and the data between 18:25:34 and 18:28:15 could indicate maneuvering as discussed here.
Remember the other bookend here: the lack of an expected IFE logon at ~00:21. The fact that we have the 00:19:29 and 00:19:37 data, and nothing at 00:21 as expected is certainly consistent with, if not conclusive proof of impact by 00:21.
@Joseph Coleman:
Ahhh, the mangosteens rolling again!
@Gysbreght
Not just the Mangosteens anything within the fuselage not strapped down.
@AM2
You have said:
“@all
Someone recently (Ron?) made a comment about a cover-up which could in fact be justified… maybe that poster can provide some background this?”
Well, if the cover-up is justified I shouldn’t be undermining it, at least not publicly. You are invited however to use my Gmail address dreamer371.
@airlandseaman
In your diagram you put 00:11 at the ‘0’ point of neg. RoC, that’s why I assumed this descent started there.
But I understand the BFO’s in that final minutes/moments show to prove a very high speed impact around mach 1 and that’s what this discussion/point of view is about.
IMO the debris till now (and especialy the outboard flap section) tells another story IMO, so something must be wrong or not complete there. IMO it’s contradicting eachother but I realize there is (still) no way to prove this without sufficient other information.
About the object found in Maldives. Why it would be a part of a surface to air missile used to down the mh370.it look like a cavity resonater.
@DrBobbyUlich
Thank you for paying such serious attention to my suggestion.
@airlandseaman
kindly please, only to ensure – are all calculations related to inmarsat timings compensated also to general relativity consequences? (different time at sea level and on geostationary satellite), I hope that yes and/or it may be insignificant; I just saw some lectures about this and quantum theory basics and prof. Kulhanek, very funny guy, notes that without such compensations even GPS will be useless having 2km error just because of that – but you are here searching for hundereds or thousands kilometers match in fact – or may something depend on how are the calculations made with very small timing values?? of course I expect that inmarsat and all number crunchers knows what they are doing and kudos for that, sure
@Brock as always, heat info from you too; interesting that search are is in “offside”
@jeffwise did you deleted some posts and blocked @falken account without warning? why?
Ge Rijn:
re the 00:11 ref on page 3, note that the chart is valid for 00:19. It would look slightly different at 00:11 and the 6th arc, but barely noticeable.
The time the first engine flamed out (right side) is not known precisely. It was sometime between ~00:02 and 00:17, thus possibly before or after the 00:11 handshake. Whenever that happened, the plane did not immediately start descending. It started slowing, but did not descend. Descent does not start until the plane slows down to the minimum speed required for the flight level at the time. Once it reaches that speed, it starts to descend until it gets down to ~25,000 feet (weight dependent). As the charts show, slowing from 500 to 300 knots barely changes the BFO, so it is unlikely that the BFO started showing any change in the trend line until 00:17 or maybe a few minutes before, if the right engine flamed out early (00:02).
@ALSM
“The fact that we have the 00:19:29 and 00:19:37 data, and nothing at 00:21 as expected is certainly consistent with, if not conclusive proof of impact by 00:21.”
Or loss of AES power at or before 00:21. Which could be attributed to APU fuel starvation. It is certainly not conclusive of a crash by 00:21.
A lot is known about the nature of the impact by the BEA forensic analysts. That information has not been forthcoming. Who knows why? I’ll wait on those details. Might be a long wait.
DennisW: Yes, as I have cataloged many times here and elsewhere, there are at least 6 possible explanations for the fact that there was no 00:21 logon. APU flame out is possible, but unlikely (I won’t repeat that whole line of reasoning again; ATSB says up to 15 minutes of post flame out APU fuel). Loss of AES HGA LOS due to unusual attitude is another. But something happened that caused it not to logon, and whatever it was, it was consistent with a crash very soon after 00:19:37 when the plane is known to have been descending in excess of 5,000 ft/min…certainly not consistent with a glider flight at best L/D.
@ALSM
I can only think of two explanations for the significant change in the measured BFO:
1> A rapid rate of descent as you are postulating.
2> Transients in the AES frequency compensation resulting from reference oscillator power cycling.
At this moment, I don’t have a strong reason to prefer one explanation over the other. Debris forensics or finding the flight data recorder are the only ways to know for sure.
DennisW: Why do you dismiss the ATSB statement above, repeated here: ” However it was also determined (by the same method) that the first message transmitted by the aircraft in the logon sequence [00:19:29], the Logon Request message, did provide a consistent and accurate BFO measurement.”? [ROC= -5000 ft/min]
DennisW:
I would also note that, WRT the OCXO stability, there is some uncertainty about the the data between 18:25:34 and 18:28:15 due to warm-up after power off for some time, but the AES power was only off for ~1 minute at 00:17:30-00:18:40…not enough time for the OCXO to change temp significantly. The data at 00:19:29 is good, like Inmarsat and ATSB say it is.
@ALSM
Do you have a reference to the methodology used by Inmarsat or the ATSB? I have not seen it.
Dear Brock and Mr. Exner
Aside from the fact Mr. Exner blocked me from the @airlandseaman twitter account (which says lots but that is an entirely different topic)…
I just posted on @aeromilitarytec a picture of my reverse examination of Mr. Exners expert analysis of the debris that was found on Mauritius.
What do you estimate the statistical probabilities that Mr. Exner had to cut along the dotted line in the picture on the left in order to fit into the picture on the right.?
Of note, as the distance between the A to the B to the C in the picture on the left is equal spacing the proportionate distance is the same on the picture on the right.
As you will see in the pictures just posted at @aeromilitarytec it is painfully obvious that Mr. Exner had to manipulate reality in order to facilitate the debris to fit into the picture on the right.
Next, what do you think are the statistical probabilities of Mr. Exners “theory” that MH370 impacted at plus or minus Mach 1 and did NOT generate a registered notation on the Curtin sensors of the 5 billion or so pounds of kinetic impact energy?
You have done a remarkable job Brock and please keep going.
Respect,
Andre Milne
Unicorn Aerospace
@aeromilitarytec
DennisW: I think it was Square Peg and Thales that tracked down the root source of the BFO and BTO anomalies. However, it was Inmarsat that provided the data from many other flights that allowed them to validate the analysis. I do not have many details I can share, except for what was published Dec 2014: https://goo.gl/2thvvv
Dear Brock
The truly fascinating aspect about Mr. Exner and companies obsession with validating obviously inconclusive and outright nonsensical data is that they all actually believe the Inmarsat data is genuine and in compromised.
One has to wonder how men of such superior intelligence as Mr. Exner amd his associates so clearly have are able to dismiss the fact that zero physical evidence supports their belief yet there exists a vast amount of now measurable scientific evidence exists that nullifies their now somewhat delusional belief that MH370 is in the SIO.
The amount of SIO 7th Arc back peddling going on to attempt to save face is absolutely unprecedented in anything I have ever studied.
When the last drop of salt water drips off the tow fish in the SIO after the search is canceled the cold hard inescapable truth will prevail of which no one wants to accept.
Everyone will start pointing fingers and babbling on about ridiculous BTO versus BFO values versus fuel consumption blah blah blah…
But not one will have the moral courage to admit nor accept a simple fact.
They were all wrong and had no clue from the moment MH370 went dark.
End of story.
Respect,
A. Milne
@Andre Milne,
Commentators like you tend to be short lived around here, for better or worse, so before you get bounced, could you elaborate on why you think the ISAT data is unreliable? And could you clearly delineate which parts are your opinion vs actual knowledge?
It’s obvious the assumptions leading to the search area are wrong. If you are simply restating that, well, it’s not really news.
On the other hand, if you are suggesting the ISAT data is flawed, that is news, but only if there are new facts to back this up.
@Andre Milne
“I just posted on @aeromilitarytec a picture”
If the site you posted that picture on does not allow you to give
a more specific location of that picture so we can find it to view
it, perhaps you should find another site to post pictures on.
@airsealandman
DennisW’s seems to be concerned over the methodology. For instance,
is their method to test using a ‘static AES’ mean they used a fixed
satellite groundstation rather than a 777 in flight?
@all
Probably allready known to many but for those who did not read it yet I thought it gives a nice fairly recent overview of the position of the ATSB, how they work, their findings and with which other partners they coöperate in the investigation:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/correcting-the-record.aspx
@ALSM
Mike, I did find the link you provided by Googling around prior to asking you for some additional info. It does not really address BFO accuracy after power cycling.
There is also not a lot of information in the public domain on oscillator retrace, which is what this is usually referred to by the NIST and the manufacturers. The consensus admonition is “don’t power cycle oscillators”. They do not like it. That has been my experience as well. Certainly 250Hz at L-Band is a fairly small error (1.5 parts in 10E-7)
I was hoping that Inmarsat or the manufacturer had actually conducted some experiments and published data that I missed.
@buyerninety re Andre Milne
See figure 2 in the following report, where he got the picture from.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5770467/debris-examination-updated_24may2016.pdf
@JS
Well put. You are right, ranters come and come go.
As I remarked earlier in relation to useable fuel, dynamic pitch changes do not change the acceleration experienced by items of mass.
The loss of thrust at the second engine flame-out results in a deceleration of about 0.06 g, equivalent to unaccelerated pitch change of 3.4 degrees. That doesn’t really cut it.
@ Andre Milne
‘Mr Exner blocked me’
I can see why. Your only ‘evidence’ that this piece is not from the plane is a matter of very simple perspective, basically the bit you say can’t be where it ought to be (C) is obviously just hidden from view behind the grey object in the foreground.
I’ve not seen such a ridiculous example of ‘evidence’ in a long time.
@ Buyerninety – it’s his twitter account, thus the ‘@’.
Click on tweets and replies.
I’m afraid (and he too perhaps) mr. Milne has to pay that crowdfunding money back.
Hopefully not too many people did put stakes on this ‘evidence’.
@airlandseaman. As you know the ATSB says there would have been enough residual fuel for a maximum of 13 mins 45 secs of APU running with the aircraft remaining at 1 deg pitch. However it goes on to say, “The pitch attitude would have an effect on the usable fuel for the APU” and notes that phugoids might reduce the quantity accessible. It makes no mention of increasing pitch down.
Again as you know, after fuel exhaustion at 00:17:30 and an APU start then, accessing this fuel, the APU needed two minutes of fuel to start then reboot the SDU for the 7th arc log-on request.
However you indicate that just on two minutes after flame out the aircraft is descending already at 5000 ft/min, increasing to 15000 ft/min 8 seconds after that. This has the look of a pitch down before the two minute mark, raising whether the APU would have flamed out then, before SDU reboot.
The ATSB view is that it would indeed have run for at least two minutes but is this with the descent rates you portray in mind? In other words was its view formed in light of these BFO data and the pre-two minutes’pitch down they imply? Or were they supposing a flatter and more gentle entry into the spiral?
A second point is that the aircraft can recover from a dive, in a phugoid type pitch up, depending on altitude, bank and roll rate and these I think can vary.
If it did dive then pull up it could fly on for a while and its crash might be slower.
Are you confident these two possibilities can be be discounted, the first in particular?
(Since pre-consumption of the residual fuel by the left engine has been discussed amply I leave that aside.)
OMG, somebody gave him money??!!
@Andre Milne: When you make such obviously false claims about the authenticity of the Mauritius debris, your credibility sinks even further. Your swipe at Mike only reinforces the belief that you should not be taken seriously. My prediction is that you will soon disappear from this blog, by your choice or by the moderator’s.
@Paul Smithson
Maybe some did..:
http://www.ibtimes.com/flight-mh370-aviation-expert-begins-crowdfunding-effort-launch-search-near-maldives-1895232
David:
Re phugoids: Based on the simulations we performed, I would say phugoids were quite likely, but they don’t typically start until 2-3 minutes after FE. When they happen, the aircraft goes into a slow oscillation (1-2 minute cycles) where it pitches up until a stall occurs, then it pitches downward (near 0 Gs at the top), picking up speed rapidly until it reaches a very high speed at the bottom, pitches up gaining altitude quickly, slows down again and stalls, repeat. At the bottom of these cycles, the speed is very high and the positive G forces are also high as the plane transitions from a steep dive to a steep climb. It is at this point that the plane is most vulnerable to loosing gear doors, flaperons, etc.
It is important to understand that phugoids are not limited to a 2 dimensional phenomenon, taking place along a straight flight path. More often than not, phugoids are superimposed on a turn that may also be increasing in bank angle while the phugoid oscillation is taking place. It is very 3D. This is important because at the top of one of these cycles, if the plane stalls in a turn, the low wing will always stall first, tending to roll the plane inverted, in the direction of the turn. (Inverted in this context does not necessarily mean a roll of 180 degrees making the aircraft “upside down”. It means a roll of more than 90 degrees. So the plane can end up with the wings nearly vertical at the top, nose low, accelerating down very fast.)
All of this is just to remind readers that phugoids, “dives”, “spirals” etc. are not separate possibilities. They can all happen together in a typical post FE 3D path. What this means is that the 3D path MH370 took post FE was probably not a simple dive or spiral, but a far more dynamic and probably violent descent. It probably started with a slow-down and modest descent straight ahead, quickly developing into a turn to the left with phugoids superimposed, alternating high and low speeds, reaching a steep bank angle, possibly going inverted, etc. It was probably descending at very high rates part of the time and climbing rapidly part of the time.
What we know with high confidence is that (1) it was descending at ~5000 ft/min at 00:19:29, (2) it might have been descending at 15,000 ft/min 8 seconds later and (3) an expected transmission circa 00:21 was not received, probably due to APU fuel exhaustion or loss of AES LOS to I3F1.
Re APU Fuel Exhaustion: In response to an inquiry I made, ATSB reported that the APU could have had up to 13.7 min of fuel available post FE. It was subsequently learned that the left engine can draw fuel from the APU reserve under certain conditions, if it restarts post FE. But even if the left engine did “rob” fuel from the APU reserve in the left tank, there was at least a few minutes of fuel in the long fuel line between the left tank and the APU in the rear of the plane. The APU fuel burn rate is known, and the fuel in the line can be estimated based on the volume in the line, so it is easy to estimate that the APU would have OTOO 2-3 minutes of fuel in the line. Thus, it is entirely possible that the APU had fuel for the 00:19 transmissions, but flamed out before the expected transmission at ~00:21. This would also be true even if the attitude of the plane prevented the APU DC Pump from accessing the residual fuel in the left tank.
@ALSM
“JON Paper, Sec 5.4: Refinement of BFO Samples”
Please provide a link to this paper. Try as I might, I simply cannot find it.
Dennis:
Page 16
https://goo.gl/1ja7Sa
@ALSM
No paper at that link.
Dennis:
Bottom of Page 16 in
http://www.rin.org.uk/Uploadedpdfs/staticpages/MH370%20Inmarsat%20Paper.pdf
The link works for m. Also available here: http://www.rin.org.uk/Uploadedpdfs/staticpages/MH370%20Inmarsat%20Paper.pdf
@airlandseaman
And the SAT-phone call data from 23:13 what did they reveal? There’s not much deeper info on this to be found or talked about (by me..).
F.i. I cann’t figure out decisively if the aircraft responded on this call (electronicaly wise) at all. Did it?
I assume it did but then there must be also BTO and BFO data from this point in time.
I cann’t find those pointed out.
It’s all about the 19:25>, 19:37> and 00:19> data.
Are those 23:13 data just not that important?
@airlandseaman
Another case of synchronicity I suppose..
In the time I asked this questions you posted the PDF with the answers I was searching for..
Ge Rijn:
The 18:40 and 23:14 calls were “received by the AES”, but no one answered. This type of packet data uses the C channel (21,000 b/s) and produces only BFO data, no BTO values. See Inmarsat log.
The 18:40 BFO data was important because it showed that the plane was in the process of turning south at that time (assuming level flight) or descending (at ~2000 ft/min?). The 23:14 data was important in that it told use the plane was on a path producing BFO values consistent with the temporal trend before and after, but no distance information. You can view the (BFO-BFO_Bias) trend line here: https://goo.gl/tVLNvr Note the 18:40 and 23:14 calls in Blue.
Note, From the same JON paper, at 5.3:
“In addition to the LOI related signals presented in Table 1, MH370 also exchanged signalling messages with the Perth GES at 18:40 and 23:14 UTC related to unanswered ground to air telephone calls. The signalling associated with these calls does not result in a BTO measurement, but did give BFO measurements of 88 and 217 Hz respectively which may be used. This results in a refined set of BTO/BFO measurement data presented in Table 6 for the flight path reconstruction work. The fit to the originally postulated northern and southern paths is illustrated in Figure 14 that fits the northern path until 18:25, but switches to the southern path by 18:40. The divergence between the measured data and the southern path suggest that a better match may be possible if we make some minor adjustments to the flight path.”
What you are describing is not a phugoid. By definition, in a phugoid the angle of attack is constant. Since that angle must be less than the stall angle of attack, the airplane does not stall in a phugoid-type motion.
Also you are describing your simulator excercises with rudder trim. The phenomena you describe were not observed in the simulations conducted by ATSB and Boeing.
@airlandseaman:
How did you determine in your simulations that the airplane stalled? What phenomena did you observe that defined the stall?
@ventus45@ALSM
Got it thanks. Turns out I had the paper in my archives all along. In fact, I recall debating issues with ALSM relative to BFO accuracy early on using this paper. In particular my agreement with Inmarsat that a 7Hz confidence window on BFO was appropriate. Duh!
OK. The Inmarsat statement does not inspire confidence. It is really not clear what they mean by “consistent” versus accurate, and no supporting data is provided. Frankly, I would put it in the vague and hearsay category not in the “high degree of confidence” category.
In fact an ATSB paper published after the Inmarsat paper had this to say.
“The log-on request recorded at the final arc occurred very near the estimated time of fuel exhaustion. The recorded BFO values indicated that the aircraft could have been descending at that time.”
See “End-of-Flight-Scenarios”
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5163181/AE-2014-054_MH370%20-FlightPathAnalysisUpdate.pdf
“Could have been” and “highly confident” have a fair amount of separation. I remain doubtful that 9M-MRO impacted the ocean at anywhere near -15,000 fpm.
As an aside, looking at your calculated BFO of 259Hz at 00:11 versus the logged value of 252Hz, it would not be unrealistic to assign a ROC of -400 fpm at 00:11.
At the end of the day, you are not winning any converts to your end of flight postulate, Mike.
Gysbreght:
Do me a favor and stop nit picking details while ignoring the main points. You are probably right that there is no stall at apogee because the airplane is near 0 G’s at apogee. However, it is below the straight and level stall speed, which was what I intended to communicate, but technically not stalled because the wings are not loaded with the full weight of the plane at apogee.
Anyway, the main point, totally ignored by you, is that the plane oscillates between fast and slow, low G’s and high G’s. Do you not agree?
BTW…Please remind me…are you a pilot? How long? What aircraft have you flown? Just curious.
airsealandman said;
“Based on the simulations we performed” …
Something like this simulation in a 777-200 simulator?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RAnTQ0xb0pA
There is a (non-obvious) time break at 5:53 … at 5:54 simulation
of engines out begins (they assume left eng 1st out, btw)
Dennis:
Please re-read the previous posts on the subject of the 00:11 BFO. Nowhere did I calculate the 00:11 BFO value. All of the BFO values in the charts were calculated as of 00:19:29, not 00:11. The annotation only notes what the recorded value was at 00:11, and the graphic shows what the values were at 00:19. So you should not expect an exact match at 00:11.
re “…“Could have been” and “highly confident” have a fair amount of separation….”, please stop conflating statements. I said the we should be highly confident in the 00:19:29 data, and the 00:19:37 data could be correct. I did not say both statements in reference to either value taken individually.
Too many insist on trying to ignore the facts because they are not consistent with live pilot assumptions. But taken together, all of the observations and data we have fail to support a live pilot at the end. I am not interested in trying to convince anyone, but I will continue to point out what I believe to be factual errors. It is flat out wrong to continue to state that Inmarsat dismissed ALL of the 00:19 data.
Yes, that is typical for phugoid motion. Also the period should be between 1 and 2 minutes.
Are you a pilot? How long? What aircraft have you flown? I’m curious too.
@DennisW – You said “At the end of the day, you are not winning any converts to your end of flight postulate, Mike.”
How can you say that? I do not recall any votes for which scenario is most probable. I happen to think that ALSM’s end-of-flight is more probable than any other but that certainly does not make it a consensus either.