UPDATED 1/29/16: Here’s an image from Victor Iannello showing how EY440 diverted from its normal flight path about two minutes after takeoff on January 7, when it was still climbing and at an altitude of 5000 feet:
Just to clear up any potential confusion, it seems most likely that this incident does not have anything to do with MH370, but it’s very interesting in its own right. What is the dynamic at work here? Is it part of a trend? If so, does it potentially represent a system-wide vulnerability?
Here’s another image from Victor showing the plane’s continued path over Malay Peninsula. He writes: “I re-examined the FlightAware ADS-B data and noticed that there is a gap starting at BIBAN and ending at Kota Bharu. The FlightRadar24 coverage looks more comprehensive than the FlightAware data, especially in the South China Sea (SCS). I have re-plotted the flight path such that each underlying FlightAware data point is shown, and estimated the path in the SCS from the FlightRadar24 video. The path does indeed seem to follow airways across the SCS. (It would be helpful to have the underlying FR24 data.) The route seems to be ANHOA-L637-BIBAN-L637-BITOD-M765-IGARI-M765-Kota Bharu-B219-Penang-G468-GUNIP-HOLD-Langkawi-B579-Phuket.”
ORIGINAL POST:
The case of missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 is an incredible strange one, as we all know. But what only the true obsessives know is that orbiting around the giant mystery is an Oort Cloud of lesser enigmas. I’d like to briefly diverge from this blog’s main line of inquiry to cast a glance at some of these issues.
My first installment concerns Etihad Airways Flight 440, which took off on January 7 for Ho Chi Minh City bound for Abu Dhabi. Scheduled to depart at 20:10 UTC, it actually left 13 minutes early. Then, instead of flying along its normal route, to the northwest, it flew almost due south, crossed waypoint IGARI, then flew along the Thai/Malaysia border to the Malacca Straits, where it flew in circles for an hour before finally heading off in the direction of Abu Dhabi. By this point, however, the plane no longer had the fuel to reach Abu Dhabi, so it stopped to refuel in Bombay and reached its destination many hours late, leaving some passengers irate. (Special thanks to reader @Sajid UK for bringing this to our collective attention via the comment section.)
This is all very strange, but what makes it interesting to the MH370 crowd is the fact that a portion of its bizarre route was an exact match with that taken by the Malaysian 777 when it initially took a runner. Had EY440 been taking part in some kind of experiment to recreate MH370’s route, perhaps to get a better understanding of the Inmarsat data or the radar data?
We may never know. Katie Connell, who heads up Etihad’s media relations for North America, was very friendly when I called her and asked her what had happened. She said she’d check with her colleagues at the head office in Abu Dhabi. “It was simply a scheduling decision by ops that was later adjusted,” she wrote me in a text earlier today. I wrote back, asking if her contacts had been able to explain why the plane had flown south instead of northwest, and why it had flown a holding pattern over the Malacca Strait. She answered: “No; I did not get into that level of detail. I go with what my folks said.”
So there you have it. Make of it what you will.
UPDATE: I should have pointed out that this topic has been discussed for quite a while in the comments section of “Free the Flaperon!” and “A Couple of MH370 Things.” One of the ideas mooted there was that the flight crew inadvertently entered the wrong route into the Flight Management System, somehow overlooked the fact that they were heading in the wrong direction (scary!) and then circled for an hour until they could get the proper flight plane figured out, filed and cleared. This would be embarrassing enough to the airline that they would prefer to call it a “scheduling decision that was later adjusted.”
UPDATE #2, 27 Jan 2016: I’ve received a clarification from Etihad via Katie Connell, who writes: “The standard route flown by Flight EY440 from Ho Chi Minh City to Abu Dhabi on January 7, 2016 was automatically amended by the Flight Planning System which calculated and filed an alternative route as the most favorable, due to high winds. Shortly after takeoff, a new route was re-plotted which required Flight EY440 to fly through Thai airspace. While awaiting the overflight clearances the aircraft went into a holding pattern which resulted in the aircraft needing to refuel in Mumbai prior to continuing its journey to Abu Dhabi.”
So it sounds like the problem was not a human mis-entry, but a faulty flight-plan solution by a computer, which then had to be fixed while in transit. Software bug? Non-optimal algorithm? It will be worth keeping an eye out for more incidents like this one. Here’s one that took place in December involving a Malaysia Airlines flight from Auckland to Kuala Lumpur.
UPDATE #3: Victor Iannello has directed my attention to a Wired article suggesting that hackers have disrupted flight plans in the past and could do so again.
Here’s a chart showing the path the flight took as it circled over the Malacca Strait, created by reader Oleksandr:
sk999,
A fixed bank angle of 15° is part of the aircraft cruise manoeuvre dynamics that define the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Is it relevant for the definition of the prior state based on radar data discussed in chapter 4 ?
The actual path of the airplane is accurately known until the loss of SSR data past IGARI. Therefore the green line in your graph is certainly not the actual path followed by MH370. We cannot know what the black line represents until we have seen the actual radar data.
Jeff,
I agree with many of your points made above. The diversion per “official version” defies explanation. You mention that nobody has yet provided even a hypothetical scenario explaining a reason for a flight south.
I have done so, and I believe this is the simplest scenario of all: an attempted air turn back for the airport of origin. Such a turn-back is plausible given the flight time to alternates from the point at which the aircraft disappeared. Assuming that pilots were incapacitated soon after the turn-back, the route discontinuity at WMKK would result in a constant magnetic heading/track thereafter – and I point out that this flight path end provides a close match with the area where hundreds of potential debris objects were sighted by satellite at 45S 8-16 days after MH370 went missing.
Like any other theory of what happened to the flight, there are unanswered questions – most notably the mismatch with the “authorised version” of events 17.21 – 18.22 (according to the “radar data”) and the mismatch with BTO-derived range.
Unless and until a more convincing set of radar evidence is made available, I believe that this theory of events deserves serious consideration. Perhaps one of your readers with expert knowledge in the satcoms field can suggest a technically cogent reason for systematic errors on BTO that could fit the hypothesis.
I have posted the theory at http://www.findMH370.com where the full PDF can be downloaded.
@jeffwise
“@StevenG, It seems quite evident that MH370’s disappearance was carefully planned — after all, the plane went electronically dark just six seconds after passing IGARI, within a tight time window between handoff from Malaysian and Vietnamese ATC. And recall that the SATCOM was not left on; very significantly, it disconnected from the satellite and then re-logged on, which would require deliberate action.”
I know that, but the sequence of later events isn’t consistent with disappearing the plane forever. He could have used it just for temporary going dark.
@MH
yes it is, look at the ATSB graphs&maps
@Paul Smithson
there was an obvious intention to fly along thai border and around Indonesia, it’s not consistent with incapacitation
Paul Smithson,
I don’t want to discourage you, but all this was discussed in details at Jeff’s and Duncan’s sites over nearly 2 years.
The theory you described at your website is not correct. Your path is inconsistent with 18:25 BFO besides radar data. In addition, all the “camps” agreed that someone was actively managing the aircraft by 18:25 based on the detailed analysis of the information we have.
Anyway, what is the novelty of your scenario? I think by “nobody has yet provided even a hypothetical scenario explaining a reason for a flight south”, it was implied that no official explanation was given. There are many scenarios and explanations were discussed here, but as Victor noted long time ago, each of them has some inconsistencies and drawbacks.
If you want to jump into this, first you need to get familiar with the works and comments of many contributors here, as well as official Australian and Malaysian reports.
Sometimes we have disagreements, sometimes discussions are getting very hot, but this is a normal process of the refinement and defending your position. You have to stay in this “pot” if you don’t want to get rusty and jump with “Hey, I know what has happened!” repeating some publication dated March-April 2014.
Another excellent IG Member report published here today: http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2213.
@StevanG @jeffwise
if I can speak for myself, it all triggered ultra wide band scan and search of what the heck is going on, based on initial articles wording and total absurdity of it; and I was focused on Ukraine, having by 180 degree different angle of view than today
Thanks, Oleksandr. As you are aware, there are reputable BFO/BTO folks that believe the BFO prior to 19.40 may be anomalous, and so do I. There are also good reasons to believe that the “radar data” is suspect in multiple ways.
I don’t think that it is a coincidence that the BTO/BFO and the NW malacca strait radar align with one another. It seems pretty clear that the former was used to support the latter (cf Najib’s 15 March “confirmation that the radar return belonged to MH370”) even though it lacks more convincing corroboration by radar.
Thanks anyway for framing your critique in “friendly language”. Although I have not been writing in the discussion fora until recently, I have followed this since day dot and have read very widely on the subject. So I am not jumping in here as a total neophyte. If you have a look at the report you will see that it refers to the many official and independent reports issued as well as building on the expert contributions of folks on this and other forums. Happy to debate the issues on basis of evidence, with due regard to the debates that have already been discussed to death.
A few off-the-cuff comments about Richard Godfrey’s recent paper:
Mach 0.84 is not the maximum cruise speed of the Boeing 777-200ER with Rolls Royce engines. The minimum speed at FL340 is not Mach 0.74 but of the order of Mach 0.5 – 0.6.
Under the assumptions stated in Conclusion he forgets the most important one, that the airplane autopilot is in a fixed heading/track mode and its parameters are never changed.
Airlandseaman,
“Another excellent IG Member report…”
The member is excellent or report is excellent?
Agree with Gysbreght. But forgetting about minor details, what is new?
I think the most important recent discovery was made by Gysbreght with regard to the altitude derived from the energy balance. It is consistent with the original “rumour” about large altitude variations.
Paul,
On contrary, the specialists in BTO/BFO state that this data is very reliable and accurate. Unless you want to involve multi-national conspiracy (at least 4 countries: Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and UK), it is hardly possible to explain a very good agreement of the radar and Inmarsat data.
I would say the weaknesses of any emergency scenario are:
– No distress signal was sent given SATCOM, 3 VHF and 1 HF links.
– SDU reboot 18:25, but without ACARS.
– No known landing attempt.
The rest are minor things, including the turn NW at Penang instead of KLIA, which can be logically explained. I strongly disagree with StevanG on the “obvious intention” to fly along FIRs etc: chances are 50/50 in my opinion. This can hardly be called “obvious”.
@Matty, Regarding your decoy idea, it certainly would explain some of the inconsistencies of the data around IGARI, and while I’m not ready to endorse it myself, I know that there are smart people who are looking at this idea seriously.
JS,
Yes, indeed it could reach the 7th arc at the equator. But then residual “drift” speed would be large, especially by the end of flight, and not constant. Why? EY440 had an apparent fix point, but MH370 would not have it. Why? In other words, such a path has to be flown manually or intentionally preprogrammed.
Oleksandr,
I don’t think you necessarily need a conspiracy involving so many parties.
What you would need to be willing to countenance is: a) that the “radar narrative” is a misdirection to save face if the flight did indeed overfly KL with nobody noticing in real time; b) that the BFO values 18.25-28 are anomalous; c) that the BTO-derived distance lost fidelity post-disappearance and is skewed in a systematic way.
To be honest with you, the one that troubles me most is the last – and I have yet to come up with an explanation for the error pattern predicted under the scenario set out.
@Oleksandr – that’s what I was getting at – whether it’s impossible from an autopilot setting.
Flying it manually in such a way would be both difficult and pointless. However, I still wonder if there is a path that leads to the 7th arc that is not straight and not a gradual curve yet still a path that has some pattern to it. Early on in Duncan’s forum someone mentioned I being an Archimede’s spiral.
So, for example, what would be the effect of flying with the missing flaperon under a constant stick and constant throttle (but no autopilot)?
Just throwing this out there – not pushing a theory but wondering if we can fit a point even further north. Motive, of course, would be a failed return to airport.
Paul,
Re (b). Why would 18:25 cluster of BFOs be wrong, but subsequent BFOs correct?
Re (c). If you discard post- dissappearance BTOs as unreliable, you don’t have sufficient data to say something about trajectory. Not even the 7th arc. If BTO drifted in some systematic way, then the trajectories shown at your website are wrong. And given no radar data under your assumptions, how could you conclude that the aircraft headed to KL at all?
Please remember that in this case everything is interconnected. IG, Bobby and Dennis/StevanG have to throw away some ‘facts’ to make the whole picture consistent, but meanwhile they implicitly use the same ‘facts’ as supporting reasons.
Finally, logical questions:
What event could made crew and passengers unconscious quick enough to prevent them from sending a distress signal, either from the cockpit or cabin via Data-3 interface? Apparently simple depressurization is not an answer, as discussed here many times.
And finally: what has caused SDU reboot if everyone onboard was incapacitated? The only explanation in this case would be dual flame-out, but this again does not fit your theory.
Regarding Richard Godfrey’s recent paper:
1. The radar track speed (as estimated by Victor and by me) is greater than the ECON 52 mode being flown just before the Diversion past IGARI. Why would the pilot increase the speed then? Perhaps the initial intent was to return to Malaysia ASAP for an emergency landing.
2. The routes found by Godfrey as having the smallest BFO errors require a much slower post-radar speed. His routes for smallest BTO errors also indicate a slightly slower speed. Why would the pilot first speed up and then slow down?
3. In my opinion, it is more likely an ECON route was flown than a constant Mach number. In the ECON mode, the speed is reduced as the plane burns fuel and becomes lighter. In addition, as one gets farther south the air was cooler and the TAS dropped for the same Mach number. Thus there are two effects which can significantly reduce the TAS near the end of the flight. Godfrey’s paper does not address the ECON mode.
4. ECON routes with Cost Index greater than 52 can be found that are consistent with both the radar track speed and all the satellite data. In this case there is only one speed change – the increase at Diversion from a CI = 52 to some higher CI. These routes terminate near the SW end of the ATSB search area (which has not been completely searched yet).
@Oleksandr,
Did you read my post on February 6 at 6:23 PM?
@Oleksandr,
You said “Please remember that in this case everything is interconnected. IG, Bobby and Dennis/StevanG have to throw away some ‘facts’ to make the whole picture consistent, but meanwhile they implicitly use the same ‘facts’ as supporting reasons.”
I would appreciate it if you would list the “facts” I have to throw away but that I also use for support.
@Oleksandr
I am not aware of throwing away any facts. Please elaborate.
Paul,
” the “radar narrative” is a misdirection to save face if the flight did indeed overfly KL with nobody noticing in real time”
I understand that this is a straw man, but I have to say I’m not really buying that part.
You will probably remember that a lot of the early speculation was around catastrophic failure given the sudden loss of transponder. In a very large percentage of cases, the wreckage of an aircraft meeting with disaster is found close to the last point of contact, hence the strong search focus in the SCS. To suggest an alternative search location (ie on the other side of the peninsula) would require substantive evidence and the Malaysians were clearly nervous about this. They shared both commercial and military radar data with the FAA and NTSB prior to 11th March, and these parties confirmed by 12th March that there were reasonable grounds on the basis of the shared radar data to extend the search to the Straits.
This was clearly a CYA exercise by Hishammuddin Hussein who, as acting Minister of Transport AND Minister of Defence, was in a uniquely uncomfortable position, being simultaneously in the firing line for any criticisms directed at both the early civil response to the disappearance of the aircraft, and the detection of a rogue flight in Malaysian airspace.
If the Malaysians did cook the radar books then they did it very quickly and in a way that apparently satisfied experienced third party scrutiny.
@M Pat
I’ll say it again. The radar information is superfluous (and most likely useless). If one believes the ISAT data, and I do, it is very clear that the aircraft flew almost directly West from Igari, across the Gulf of Thailand, across the Malay peninsula, into the Malacca Strait, continued on a North Westerly course, and then turned South.
There is no other flight path that is even remotely plausible. It is also true that the radar information we have (anecdotal as it is) also supports that flight path.
The fact that the aircraft has not been found in the SIO does not reflect poorly on the earlier flight path described above. The location of the flaperon finding is consistent with a terminus far to the North of the current search area which is also completely feasible relative to ISAT constraints. We are not at a dead end here. The search is simply being conducted in the wrong place, IMO.
Dennis,
Agree that the ISAT data does quite tightly constrain the possible routing of the aircraft post IGARI.
Disagree that the radar data is superfluous or useless. We have independent corroboration of BTO interpretation prior to the IGARI event from ADS-B data. It is VERY nice to have similar corroboration of BTO interpretation post-event from radar observation(s) close to the 18.25 arc, and to help place limits on the possible locations of the aircraft on that arc, however third-hand the radar data is at present.
Given the importance of what happened at IGARI, anything that may shed light on the way that the aircraft was handled at that time deserves deep scrutiny, to the limits of the quality of the data.
“The location of the flaperon finding is consistent with a terminus far to the North of the current search area”
The location of the flaperon finding is consistent with almost any location on the 7th Arc in the SIO you care to choose.
“We are not at a dead end here. The search is simply being conducted in the wrong place, IMO.”
I fear that we may soon be at a dead end, given the stated intention of those backing the search to cease activities at the end of the current phase (though there were those on this forum that were supremely confident that it would not make it past the first 60,000 km2, so who knows). There is no shame in failure, if indeed that is the way that it ends. Nice boxes and ship tracks on maps make it easy to forget how appallingly difficult the search has been in this remote corner of the ocean with no well defined starting location. If there was any clear rationale to spend the scant resources searching anywhere other than the chosen area, I have yet to hear it. And before you ask, yes I have read your blog 🙂
Bobby,
Somehow I missed your previous comment. Perhaps it appeared later as it contains two links. I haven’t seen your linked paper either.
I meant several issues. One is radar related. You needed climb to explain BFOs in the 18:25 cluster. You also needed it to justify “contrail”. However, the climb would cause re-appearance on the radars. How do you explain this?
The other issue. According to the initial reports altitude was varying. This turned out to be consistent with recent Gysbreght’s finding, at IGARI. However, you discard altitude as unreliable, while use longitude and latitude as accurate and reliable. Why? Did you see EY440 plot? It flew very accurately via GUNIP. Compare with VAMPI and MEKAR, MH370. Horizontal deviation 5 to 10 km. Either radar data are inaccurate, or MH370 did not flew via VAMPI and MEKAR by AP.
Also, logic-wise. You need incapacitated crew and incapaciated passengers to explain the flight mode after 18:40. But you also need someone with clear mind and appropriate knowledge to explain SDU reboot 18:25 and perform a series of turns and climb during 18:25-18:40… someone being unable to use SATCOM after 18:27, and even simply pick up incoming call. How could it be possible?
The other logical question. Why would a pilot keep constant high cruise speed of 500 knots and constant FL in case of emergency? And why would FL change only during 18:25-18:40? You need one to justify one thing, and the other one – another thing. But these assumptions are incompatible.
I already have some comments on your paper, and I will post them later.
Dennis,
That is simple. But the tricky part is that StevanG often replies comments addressed to you, while you reply comments addressed to him.
There many such issues and we discussed all of them. A few things from the long list:
– You rely on the 18:22 radar blip, but discard previous data. You called it “amateur snapshot” or so, even not data. You even stated several times that MH370 flew westward from IGARI. Why do you selectively believe in 18:22 position?
– To explain discrepancy with BFO, you stated that BFO is not reliable and affected by vertical component. StevanG explained it by a fight in the cockpit, and even was going to prove that your path is consistent with this assumption (how is it going?). The same time you relied on BFO to justify the turn at NILAM. And actually you implicitly used the AP assumption, as the turn south is a result of the AP assumption applied to BTO and BFO data.
– Motive. According to you (well, StevanG, who says it is obvious) the first part of the flight was done as silent as possible, along FIRs to avoid detection, with switched of communication… To make a loud political statement at the very end… From the location a few of us knew before. How come? When you need to justify flight along FIR, you are forgetting about the ultimate goal. And when you are talking about motive, you are forgetting about FIRs.
– First you said the co-pilot was playing with EE-Bay to explain SDU reboot. Then you are saying the captain was negotiating with Malaysians. So the co-pilot interrupted these negotiations? And did not use a chance to send sms/email during next several hours?
May I again suggest you and StevanG to write a complete story, from ‘a’ to ‘z’?
@Oleksandr
StevenG and I are not collaborators. We just happen to believe in approximately the same flight path. Even within that constraint we have many differences.
I don’t know of any facts that I am discarding. I think my scenario accounts for all of them although certainly not to everyone’s satisfaction.
I don’t have any BFO discrepancies that I am aware of.
I don’t rely on any radar data. In fact, I ignore it. We have been over that before.
@Oleksandr,
Let me address your points one by one:
You said “You needed climb to explain BFOs in the 18:25 cluster. You also needed it to justify “contrail”. However, the climb would cause re-appearance on the radars. How do you explain this?”
You are correct on the first point. A climb is required to match the 18:25-18:28 BFOs, as I showed last November in my Addendum 5, Figure 8. This climb fit did not consider contrails at all, just the BFO data. Based on my analysis of the high-altitude temperatures, I now consider it unlikely that MH370 created an ice contrail at FMT. In this regard, I believe Simon Proud was correct. The local conditions appear to be too warm for that to occur. In addition, the faint IR signatures I detected do not have the expected wavelength dependence for an ice contrail. What I did see appears to be a very faint dimming of the ocean signal that does not vary much with wavelength. This extinction signal could in principle be caused by a smoke plume trailing the aircraft. This type of signal would not vary noticeably with altitude or temperature. With regard to the possibility of reappearance on radar after a climb, my understanding is that the last contact at 18:22 was near the maximum radar range. I have not seen any definitive LOS analysis that demonstrates that a descent at 18:22 caused the loss of contact. Therefore, based on my current knowledge, I would not agree that a climb would cause a re-appearance.
You said “According to the initial reports altitude was varying. This turned out to be consistent with recent Gysbreght’s finding, at IGARI. However, you discard altitude as unreliable, while use longitude and latitude as accurate and reliable. Why?”
Based on what I have read, I consider the initial altitude estimates from radar to be unreliable. That does not mean the radar data proves they did not occur. It just means it does not prove they did occur. I have not seen any reliable estimates of altitude near IGARI after Diversion occurred (from Gysbreght or from anyone else). It is clear that the radars measure range and bearing, and therefore latitude and longitude, with very much greater accuracy than altitude. That is why I consider the lat/lon position estimates to be reliable but the altitude estimates to be unreliable. This is apparently also the ATSB’s conclusion.
You said “Did you see EY440 plot? It flew very accurately via GUNIP. Compare with VAMPI and MEKAR, MH370. Horizontal deviation 5 to 10 km. Either radar data are inaccurate, or MH370 did not flew via VAMPI and MEKAR by AP.”
I fail to see any connection between EY440’s path after Penang with MH370’s path. I am sure that the GPS locations from EY440 are more accurate than the MH370 radar positions, but so what? That is to be expected. The MH370 radar data appear consistent to me, within the expected radar location errors, with actual LNAV using VAMPI and MEKAR. It is not clear from the radar plot exactly when the track to VAMPI / N571 was initiated. The radar path around WMKP is curved, but I think some of this “circling” may be due to the non-correction of the position for the true altitude. What I mean is that the true slant range is (incorrectly) interpreted as a horizontal stand-off distance. As Victor has previously pointed out, this curved-path effect is also seen when passing Kota Bharu. I will note that the “offset” of MH-370’s radar track south of WMKP is about the same distance as its altitude. Therefore it seems possible that 9M-MRO may have even passed directly over WMKP.
You said “Also, logic-wise. You need incapacitated crew and incapaciated passengers to explain the flight mode after 18:40. But you also need someone with clear mind and appropriate knowledge to explain SDU reboot 18:25 and perform a series of turns and climb during 18:25-18:40… someone being unable to use SATCOM after 18:27, and even simply pick up incoming call. How could it be possible?”
Those are your inferences, Oleksandr, not mine. What I infer from the data is that the SDU was powered up at about 18:22:47. See Table 4 in Addendum 5. I agree that a human was controlling the aircraft at least until about 18:31. Nothing in the ISAT data (including the first phone call at 18:39) requires human intervention to explain it from about 18:39 onward. I’m not saying the ISAT data proves people were incapacitated then. Possibly the flight crew were incapacitated, but the lack of discernible action cannot distinguish between them being unable or being unwilling to act.
You said “The other logical question. Why would a pilot keep constant high cruise speed of 500 knots and constant FL in case of emergency? And why would FL change only during 18:25-18:40? You need one to justify one thing, and the other one – another thing. But these assumptions are incompatible.”
If I were a pilot facing an emergency that did not demand an immediate descent, I would return to an emergency airfield as quickly as possible. That means setting a higher speed (since speed is now more important than fuel economy) and also adjusting altitude to an even flight level (heading westward) to minimize the risk of collision. Based on the higher speed setting and the fact that the flight crew already requested a flight level above FL350, I believe they went to FL360 upon Diversion. That was the first climb. What kind of emergency would put a higher priority on speeding up than on immediately descending to 10,000 feet? In my opinion, this rules out main cabin decompression, because if this were the case the passengers would be dead before you could return to make a landing. It may also rule out a classic fire onboard. However, suppose the flight deck and possibly the main cabin filled with toxic fumes (including CO) and smoke, and the source of the smoldering fire was unknown. Will descending help in the near term? Probably not, and it might make things worse be providing more oxygen to a smoldering fire. One might try to localize the problem and then extinguish the smoke/fumes source before descending. Perhaps this was the activity that took place between 17:21 and 18:22, with the power restoration being an attempt to restore communications. Immediately after power restoration, 9M-MRO began a U-turn to head back to Malaysia (based on my fit to BTO/BFO data). At this same time they made a second climb to a more efficient altitude for their current weight and also chose an odd flight level (FL410) since they would be heading eastward. This was the second climb. So in my view the the FL did not “change only during 18:25-18:40.” None of my assumptions are “incompatible”, as you put it. I also did not say the cruise speed was a “constant . . . 500 knots.” I used the ECON mode since that was the flight plan, and the last on-board speed data are consistent with the planned Cost Index of 52. A speed change is required at Diversion because 9M-MRO could not follow the radar track and reach the 18:22 position with an unchanged CI = 52.
@Dr. Bobby Ulich,
With all due respect, are you suggesting that MH370 climbed to 41,000 feet during an emergency?
Unless you are suggesting it did this to fly high enough over a busy airport to avoid traffic, this sounds ridiculous. Even if it was to avoid traffic, why not just land?
@Victor – In a post from several weeks ago you mentioned that all of the original Chinese contributions have been shown to be false. I have lived in Shanghai for the past 7 years. The Chinese almost never openly share information. If what they did share was shown to be false they are almost certainly hiding something. This is their typical pattern, see Google March 2009. They are the only country capable of hiding something like this and xizhang is on the 7th arc, home to the Uighurs.
@JS,
I am saying that 9M-MRO climbed at about 18:25 when it made a U-turn to return to WMKP or WMKK. The 18:25 (first FMT) turn was not to WITN or WITT. The distance to either airport was sufficiently large then that an immediate descent was uncalled for. With no air control direction, the pilot would have picked an even FL, and the FMS would recommend a higher altitude because of the current weight. The BFO data indicate a 2,000 fpm climb for several minutes duration. It does make sense if the initial plan at the 18:22 power-up was to return to Malaysia.
@DrBobby, You wrote “If I were a pilot facing an emergency that did not demand an immediate descent, I would return to an emergency airfield as quickly as possible. That means setting a higher speed (since speed is now more important than fuel economy) and also adjusting altitude to an even flight level (heading westward) to minimize the risk of collision.” No, if you were facing an emergency of this severity you would “aviate, navigate, communicate”: initiate an emergency descent, head for the nearest landable airfield, and hit transmit on your radio to declare an emergency. The observed behavior of MH370 is so completely incompatible with an emergency scenario that it truly beggars the imagination that anyone who wishes to be taken seriously would continue to propound it. You are obviously a man of obvious technical abilities, knowledge and energy, and I wish you could explain why you feel it is necessary to continue beating your drum when the band long since packed up and gone home–I mean, like, years ago, at this point.
@ALSM
You said:
“Another excellent IG Member report published here today: http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2213.”
First a simple question. Is Richard’s paper the new IG official terminus or is it simply Richard speaking for Richard? I assume since you brought it to our attention that you endorse it. My assumption is that things posted on Duncan’s blog are the the “official” IG position. Is this correct?
Now a comment. As is usually the case with IG members, the report is clear and well written. However, I struggle with how anyone can postulate a terminus below 30S given the overwhelming preference that drift modeling of the flaperon finding shows for locations North of 30S. Richard makes no reference of the flaperon finding in his paper. Is the official IG position to regard drift modeling as inaccurate and irrelevant, and to ignore it?
@jeffwise,
We obviously disagree about the meaning of “aviate” and about the significance of assigning motive to the accuracy of predictions of aircraft location.
You are saying that a rapid descent is the only way to “aviate” when an equipment problem occurs on an aircraft. Sometimes that is an appropriate action, but sometimes it is not appropriate.
First, if there was some sort of equipment failure aboard 9M-MRO at about 17:21, we do not know how severe the flight crew initially assessed the problem to be. We can probably discount decompression because the flight crew would in that case immediately descend to 10,000 feet. What if the apparent problem was as simple as just loss of communications (as we believe indeed was the case). Why descend immediately? That would make no sense. The aircraft is flying perfectly well (at that time), but a return to an airport in Malaysia appears to me to be preferable to continuing the original flight route. Of course, it is also possible that more severe issues arose after power was restored shortly before 18:25.
If the flight were hijacked, and if the intent was not an immediate crash, then no immediate descent would be made upon diversion. People have discussed spoofing, but I don’t think one could shut off the radios and radar transponders remotely, so if spoofing were involved it would have to be done with onboard cooperation. Thus spoofing becomes a subset of hijacking. It seems there are two possibilities left which are consistent with no immediate descent – equipment failure(s) not including decompression, and hijacking.
I don’t know of any reliable evidence to exclude either of these possibilities. Do you? If not, why do you reject one of them?
I have not seen any convincing arguments, much less real evidence, for hijacking motives. A more frequent cause of aircraft loss is equipment failure. However, even if we knew with absolute certainty today whether the plane was hijacked or suffered equipment failures, would that indicate a more probable search area? I don’t think it would. We have had two years to make those motivational assumptions and figure out where the plane went. It hasn’t done us any good. We are still left with figuring out post-radar-track routes using satellite data that is independent of motive or purpose. That is what I have been doing – analyzing the radar and satellite data to figure out where the plane went without knowing or assuming why it was flown there.
To return to the first question, in my opinion the aircraft did “aviate” at 17:21 by continuing to fly normally, and it did “navigate” by making a turn back to Malaysia. If there was a comms failure, they were unable to “communicate”. Again, whether this was by choice due to hijacking or not by choice due to equipment failure, we do not know. Even if we did know, it does not change the predicted end point.
It seems your “band” marches to a different beat, but I fail to see how agreeing or disagreeing about motive gets us any closer to locating the aircraft. I also disagree with you that this is a settled issue.
@StevenG – “yes it is, look at the ATSB graphs&maps”
why bother now as that wasn’t up to date to the current realizations. so until something new comes from them that is parked…
Also @DrBobbyUlich, please tell us when you stopped beating your wife!
I have not noticed a MH370 commentator more rigorous, capable, sensible or informative than you. I hope you will not let our blustery moderator muffle your voice or make you doubt that you have an appreciative audience here.
@Dr.BobbyUlich
“If there was a comms failure, they were unable to “communicate”. Again, whether this was by choice due to hijacking or not by choice due to equipment failure, we do not know. Even if we did know, it does not change the predicted end point.”
The question has been unanswerd, which kind of failure would render all communication capability as inop. All the scenarios of technical failure had been severe ones, from nose wheel well explosion to eebay fire. Further action again does not support the simple failure scenario with a loss of all comms.
Wether the plane expierienced some failure or wether it was hijacked makes a big difference, how the plane was most probably flown. In the first case a crew would still stick to all normal flying procedures and observe rules and regulations to the most extent possible and would try to communicate. In case of a hijacking all those Econ profiles, aircraft and airspace restrictions are of no concern to a rouge pilot. And as far as I can see the interpretation of the BFO relies heavily on constant speed and altitude profiles with no vertical maneuvering.
Bobby,
Re: “With regard to the possibility of reappearance on radar after a climb, my understanding is that the last contact at 18:22 was near the maximum radar range.”
Radar range depends on the altitude of an object, and elevation of radar itself. In this particular case Malaysian state that it was the Butterworth radar. This yields about 12 km altitude at the moment of dissappearance. But there are three radars, one in Thailand, and two in Indonesia, which are closer. If one of them was used to source data (this was never formally admitted), there would be no reason for the dissappearance except low altitude.
Re: “I have not seen any definitive LOS analysis that demonstrates that a descent at 18:22 caused the loss of contact.”
Don and Victor presented a number of plots. You can do calculations by yourself: D=sqrt(2RA), where D is the distance (known), R is the Earth radius, A is the altitude of an object. In case you want to account for radar elevation H, the formula is D=sqrt(2RA)+sqrt(2RH).
Therefore, it is obvious the climb would cause re-appearance, or you need respective LOS distance increase to “compensate” increase in altitude. At a glance, the trajectory you suggested does not seem to satisfy absence of re-appearance condition.
Re: “That is why I consider the lat/lon position estimates to be reliable but the altitude estimates to be unreliable.”
That is absolutely wrong. The altitude estimates are as reliable as longitude and latitude. But it is true that altitude is a way less accurate, especially at large distances. So don’t mix reliability and accuracy.
Re “Those are your inferences, Oleksandr, not mine.” These inferences follow from your assumptions. Anyway, what is the difference from what I wrote? You agreed that no human input took place after 18:39, and the aircraft was controlled at 18:31. Sorry, a complex maneuvering and repair of SDU are not consistent with the loss of the ability to pick the call in 9 minutes, and inability to make a call any time from 18:27. They had at least 4 minutes of concious state according to your timing – sufficient to make a call via SATCOM. But no, they opted to maneuver, enter waypoints, and climb up. Why would they do it?
Re “I am sure that the GPS locations from EY440 are more accurate than the MH370 radar positions, but so what?”
That is simple:
– You can’t rely on the accuracy of the last radar contact to deduct a turn near NILAM, or even to use it as a supporting observation. The accuracy is not sufficient.
– You can not be 100% confident that MH370 flew via VAMPI and MEKAR, rather than just “straight” from Penang.
Re “If I were a pilot facing an emergency that did not demand an immediate descent, I would return to an emergency airfield as quickly as possible.”
That is absolutely wrong. There are procedures to follow, depending on a kind of emergency. The goal is to return as safe as possible, not as fast as possible. One thing is for sure: they would not climb to FL400 and use AP after that. Not close to the performance limit of 500 knots. Not without informing ATC by either of 5 communication channels.
Re “…with the power restoration being an attempt to restore communications.”
No. You apparently missed respective discussions with regard to IDGs, APU etc. They would need to lose both IDGs and APU, which is next to impossible. Alternatively, they manually isolated the left bus, but this would not affect their ability to send a distress signal via one of the VHFs.
Re: “suppose the flight deck and possibly the main cabin filled with toxic fumes (including CO) and smoke, and the source of the smoldering fire was unknown.”
B777 is equipped with a plenty of sensors. The smog could not cause the lost of all the 5 communication channels at a time. If something happened, it happened quickly.
Bobby,
Yes, we obviously disagree on the “significance of assigning motive to the accuracy of predictions of aircraft location”. I mean not only the ultimate motive, but also in-flight actions to achieve some goals.
My position is between “ultra-motive-based” (Dennis/StevanG) and “do-not-care” (IG and you). You can construct unlimited number of trajectories to accurately fit BTO/BFO, but can you answer “why?”. Why would the crew perform 3 turns as per your paper? Why would they climb after 18:25? Why not 5 turns? I am sure you can reasonably well fit BTO/BFO with 5 turns. You are appealing to partially-incapacitated crew, who was capable to repair SDU by 18:25 and accurately perform 3 turns between 18:25-18:39, but unable to perform a simple task – pick up an incoming call 18:40, or a bit more complex task – make a call. Sorry, I am not convinced by this explanation.
Same about the turn at IGARI. How could they lose 5 independent communication channels without a severe damage? And if a severe damage occurred, they would not fly at 500 knots at constant altitude on the AP. Google on “Children of Magenta”.
An equipment failure that knocks out two transponders, three VHF units, two HF units, SATCOM and ACARS, but leaves functional flight computers, autoflight, a navigation display with navigation data stored in the FMS, a primary flight display. Well, not impossible, is it?
Bobby,
FYI. Posted by Sinux, October 8, 2015, 5:57 AM:
—–
“Regarding update rates, Table A-10 of the MCS7200 manual gives “ARINC 429 Data Requirements”. Orientation parameters (track, heading, pitch, roll) require updates rates no slower than 40-55 msec per update (depending on parameter).”
… the minimum rate for latitude and longitude is 334ms. And for ground speed 125ms.
—–
You assumed update frequency of 1 second in your paper if my preliminary understanding is correct, whilst it is supposed to be 8 times more frequent for the ground speed.
An equipment failure serious enough to cause complete loss of communication and an immediate turn back would IMHO require the airplane to land at the nearest suitable airport. Landing at Kota Bharu would require the descent to start without delay.
@DrB
you said:
“If there was a comms failure, they were unable to “communicate”. Again, whether this was by choice due to hijacking or not by choice due to equipment failure, we do not know. Even if we did know, it does not change the predicted end point.”
You cannot predict an endpoint using ISAT data alone. You must invoke other constraints. As a skilled mathematician you know this. What you can do is use the ISAT to qualify endpoints derived by other means.
I have always found it strange that the IG and others are loathe to consider motive or causality (which they cannot know) yet have zero difficulty injecting flight dynamic assumptions (which they also cannot know) into their analytics. This dichotomy goes back to the very early Duncan days.
@Bruce
Like you, I have a very high regard for DrB as well as the other “regulars” here. However, I completely understand Jeff’s position (and frustration) as well, and I share it. We can no longer tolerate scenarios that are based on a spreadsheet, and use the ISAT data plus flight dynamic assumptions. My personal ethic is that any scenario needs to include “plausible” causality and address the timing and location of the flaperon finding.
I still think it is under the sand where they first located the pings. As they said if it was under the sand it is game over.
@Bruce
(your JW reference) Blustery – “to be loud, noisy, swaggering”.
Very inappropriate “still beating your wife” comment albeit in jest, quite a lot of “swagger” in that.
@all
IF, a fight for control of the plane ended with the pilots unconscious and the perpetrator incapacitated or escaped
IF, the perp, prior to mental or physical exit was able to program AP sending the plane south until fuel exhaustion
IF, after flying in total darkness for many hours, daylight summoned a process of pilot awakening
IF, pilot awoke in a haze of reckoning but understood the immediate threat of the plane headed for the water.
Would his 1st priority likely be an attempt to land the plane as safely as possible forsaking anything else?
@Trip: Here is a short list of false data promoted by the Chinese soon after the disappearance:
1. Satellite image of debris in the SCS.
2. Embassy message from the US to China claiming that Americans based at U-Tapao in Thailand monitored a distress radio signal from MH370.
3. Acoustic data locating the crash in the SCS.
4. Acoustic pings heard in the SIO near 20S latitude.
In the hours after the disappearance, China issued a censorship directive on reporting of events related to MH370. A day later, China allegedly hacked into the computers of Malaysian officials involved in the MH370 investigation.
Some attribute these events to China’s desire to contribute to the MH370 investigation in ways that exceed its competence in order to demonstrate to the world its technical capabilities.
Perhaps this is true. As we have learned, it is often difficult to distinguish malfeasance from incompetence. Nonetheless, China remains high on my list of suspects in the disappearance of MH370.
@susie – well said !!
@Trip, Victorl
This may be worth a read, found an old link I had saved less than 3 weeks prior to March 8, 2014
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/02/17/us-military-exercises-in-asia-meant-to-send-signal-to-china-say-experts.html
@Tripp,Victorl
Obviously old much known info, only meant as a review
@Susie Crowe: There are many examples of how the US and China are vying for influence in the region. We can take this as a given.
@Victorl
Obviously a given, piece referenced only for narrow timing ruffling China’s feathers
Attempting return to kota bharu, I believe, can be ruled out because not operational at night. I have asked for comment from folks with 777 aviation expertise, adequate aerodrome knowledge and Jeppesen Database/MAS specific alternate listing; or, even better, which aerodrome was input on flight plan as en route alternate for WMKK to BITOD segment. If malfunction then this list is critical for surmising possible diversion intent and interpreting plausible pilot actions. To my knowledge nobody has ever posted this.