By Oleksandr N.
[Note: Oleksandr originally posted a link to this intriguing paper in the comments section, where it has generated a considerable amount of discussion. Oleksandr has developed one of the most intriguing hypotheses about the Inmarsat data to emerge in a long time. In a nutshell, he suggests that data that has long been viewed as spurious might in fact be an important clue as to what the plane was doing during two crucial and as-yet poorly understood periods of its final flight. — JW]
Introduction
There are two obviously abnormal BFO values of 273 Hz (18:25:34.461 UTC) and -2 Hz (00:19:37.443 UTC) recorded by Inmarsat. The first of them is inconsistent with the other BFO records in the same cluster of BFOs 18:25 – 18:27, and it is also inconsistent with the known heading and speed of the aircraft by 18:22.
The second abnormal BFO value of -2 Hz considerably differs from the BFO value of 182 Hz just 8 seconds earlier. Should this value be correct, it would imply an extreme descent rate (~15,000 ft /min).
While attempts took place to explain the BFO of 273 Hz as a result of some maneuver, such as a lateral offset, the second anomalous value of -2 Hz is widely believed to be erroneous.
This technical note provides an alternative view, suggesting that both the anomalous BTO values are valid, but they are the results of the inability of AES to apply Doppler compensation due to missing position/velocity data.
You can find the whole paper here.
Carefully peeking now into the great document made by Oleksandr, there is passed something which was described as OCR error while scanning of original digitally-signed uneditable document into “Update v2” – its only formal thing but values are in fact 0x10, 0x11 and 0x15, and probably it seems they may be “octal” values(?) despite report 0x “hex” prefix (logs doesnt containt anything over 0x77) – only to clear it. So, it also seems that both ACK values after re-logon are really “unreliable”, which I remember I for sure saw in some tech article noted once already (cant find which one though), and this Oleksandr work is a proof of it?
The interpretation of the 18:25 event is of particular interest to me since it implies a flight direction consistent with my own belief of an extended loiter to the NW before the FMT. As the 19:40 event is moved farther to the North, the easier it is to produce an ISAT solution heading East shortly after the FMT.
While the 0:19 event is interesting, it does not have as profound an effect on terminal location of the aircraft
Dennis,
Agree with regard to your comment on the normal BFO on startup at KLIA. But the power issue (the use of external power source) would again remind that some clues are still hidden in the electrical system.
With regard to 00:19 event, the interesting thing is the descent rate. Indeed, it does not mean that the descent rate was stable, but if it was ~20 m/s after 2.5 minutes since the flameout, it would mean that the aircraft did not enter a spiral dive, at least immediately. Moreover, I guess 20 m/s or even less of the vertical component on the impact would be more consistent with the flaperon damages we saw… I mean in comparison with the spiral dive and the impact at 100 m/s (vertical component).
@Oleksandr
Yes, indeed. The French could shed some light on that subject as well. Not sure if we will hear anything from them on the damage details, bit I have hope…
@Oleksandr: 20 m/s = 3,937 fpm. Although that is not a “spiral dive”, it is also much steeper than a glide before a controlled ditch. I am still thinking about the implications.
Falken,
I think I just copied/pasted from the “Update…” as is. I presume Ox1S should be read as 0x15. But we have what we have.
In such a case it is a proof that Inmarsat edited their logs line by line, despite their claim that the logs were provided “as is”. Or somebody re-typed logs with errors.
Anyhow, the main point of my paper is that the two abnormal BFOs are likely to be reliable. And the respective hardware/software designers have answer.
And if so, there will be a lot of implications.
@Oleksandr: It may be that the Inmarsat logs provided to Malaysia were then “machine read” by Malaysia to “digitally decouple” the electronic files. The OCR process produced a number of errors, such as confusing Os and 0s and 5s and Ss.
Victor,
Yes it is steeper, but:
1. For the studied locations in the SIO (or IO, whatever you prefer to call it).
2. For the “successful” gliding/ditch. For unsuccessful – who knows…
3. If I am not mistaken most of good modern cars have safety requirement on the survival in case of the head collision with a concrete wall of ~80 kph = 22.2 m/s. Destruction is ‘proportional’ to the square of the collision speed. Say you would have 25 pieces of the flaperon instead of a single one (not to be taken as a scientific statement).
@Oleksandr
“two abnormal BFOs are likely to be reliable”
ya, I understood; as they are “defined and computable”, as you documented; there really was somewhere published that very first(only?) reported values after logon might be somehow “weird and not in-line”, but there was no explanation as in your report.
@Oleksandr, Forgive me for stating the obvious, but it seems to me that the primary radar data not only gives us the plane’s location at 18.25, more or less, but also its velocity: in order to get to MEKAR at 18:22 the plane must have been traveling close to 500 knots all the way from IGARI. Planes can’t just shed 200 knots instantaneously; thus I think it’s pretty safe to say that at 18:25 9M-MRO was still traveling at pretty close to 500 knots. Thus, if your idea is right, a very strong default assumption is that the plane was descending at 5 m/s on a heading of 335.
BTW, what’s the error bar?
@Victor: Re: OCR: I hear you, but are you actually in the mood to ASSUME there’s nothing to see, here?
Even if it’s a red herring, I think we still need to audit these people. HARD. If the log has been altered – despite professions of authenticity – Inmarsat/Malaysia need to PROVE it was inadvertent, by publishing both source file and OCR software, so we can replicate these errors ourselves.
Allowing those two entities to point at each other – then duck behind cover until the coast is clear – just won’t cut it this time around.
I’m afraid that’s the mood I’M in.
So what does the “IG” say…..
@Oleksandr
“if AES received wrong velocity/position data or did not receive the required data
at all.”
How could SDU get the wrong or no velocity/position just for 2 BFOs?
If IRS is not available, it would throw the error : 35 IRS–PRI Primary IRS failed (or 36 respectively).
I doubt satcom would be allowed to transmit with failed IRS as this would lead to off range frequencies.
My feeling is that the IRUs were fine just not calibrated yet (see my last post on previous thread).
@all
Do we know how often and through which links GPS position is fed to the SDU and/or IRU?
@Brock McEwen: I assume nothing. However, I choose which battles to fight.
For the Inmarsat Journal of Navigation trajectory the BFO=182 Hz logged at 00:19:29.416 corresponds to a rate of descent of 3850 fpm. That is a momentary value some 3 minutes 40 seconds after dual flameout and autopilot disconnect. It is not necessary to assume that this RoD was maintained until touchdown possibly 15+ minutes later.
@Brock
This incident really stretches the boundaries of public involvement. In the US we use an incident command system, ICS, which carefully details the responsibilities for incident management and the interface to the public. I cannot think of an incident that would serve as a model for handling the disappearance of 9M-MRO. A public information officer in our ICS is not a scientist. It would take several highly skilled people working full time to interact with the likes of us – a tough group. As I tried to imply in an earlier post, you cannot assign critical resources to non-essential functions. At the end of the day we are all non-essential from the point of view of the parties in charge. Frankly, if I were the incident commander for this event, I would tell my public information officer to find a polite way to tell the “public” to stay out of the way and let us do our jobs.
Unlike many others out there, I do not sense a cover up or deliberate attempts to mislead (i.e. some sort of conspiracy). I think most of the ambiguity we could point to is the result of simple incompetence. Incompetence in this instance is not meant in derogatory sense, just meant to mean “not up to the task at hand”.
I don’t know at this point if it really matters if it’s deliberate or not, I do think it’s possible for people that have the capacity to assist those that don’t. So whether the pertinent information debacle is intentional or not and whether the accountable issue is welcomed or not shouldn’t matter if the main issue here is helping the nok and anyone else who cares find answers.
“accountability”
Jeff,
Re: “Planes can’t just shed 200 knots instantaneously…”
Why instantaneously? We have 3 minutes between the last radar fix and 18:25 log-on. We don’t actually know if MH370 reached NILAM by 18:25 or not. If I am not mistaken, AirAsia Flight 8501 was also loosing approximately 100 knots per minute. Dual flameout? Or the turn towards IDKUT with descent to avoid radar detection?
Oleksandr’s Abnormal BFO assumption:
dFcomp = BFO1 – BFO2
applied to the Inmarsat end location:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/gpdi555583pl64w/TN-ABFO_2.jpg?dl=0
sinux
Re: “I doubt satcom would be allowed to transmit with failed IRS as this would lead to off range frequencies.”
Not necessarily. I think Don, or somebody else mentioned the tolerance of order 1 KHz. Also, messages with BFOs 273 Hz and -2Hz went through, proving that they were not off the tolerance range.
But what AES does if it receives “error exception” is known only to its designers… In my opinion, it is better to proceed with no correction because there is still a good chance that a message will go through.
With regard to your question “How could SDU get the wrong or no velocity/position just for 2 BFOs?” I do not have precise answer. I think one of possible explanations is that the first BFOs were fed from ADIRU, which has its own power backup. Reboot of some other units (FMC?) triggered ADIRU to reset/re-calibrate in the air using data from GPS. This process may take some time, during which velocity/position was not available to AES. Basically the mess caused by in-air parallel reboot of various units.
What are some similarities in circumstances between the shoot down of KAL 007 in 1983, and MH370 that may be pertinent to the investigation of MH370’s disappearance?
– both were civilian aircraft
– both incidents happened during a time of high tension between Russia and the West (not Asia)
– both carried predominantly Asian passengers
– both shot down/disappeared in international waters
– both incidents appear to implicate Russia as culpable
So it would be interesting to find any direct connections between the two incidents. It just so happens that there is one such connection that does appear to be very intriguing.
Gen A Kornakuv was the person who gave the direct order to shoot down KAL007 in 1983. He died under unknown circumstances Jul 1 2014, a few months after MH370 disappeared, and a few days after ATSB released it’s redefined search area analysis.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/europe/anatoly-kornukov-who-led-russian-air-force-dies-at-72.html?_r=0
He is an ethnic Russian born in the Luhansk region of what is now Eastern Ukraine, the same area as the 2 Ukrainians passengers on MH370. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
After the shoot down of KAL 007, instead of being demoted, he rose up the ranks to become Commander of the Russian Air Force in 1998 under Yeltsin, and carried out deep cuts to the Russian airforce. One year later, he launched massive airstrikes in Chechnya. A few months after becoming President in 2000, Putin awarded a state prize to him.
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/07/opinion/yarim-agaev-putin-not-peacemaker/
He resigned in 2002, and advised the Russian govt. on missile defense and how highjacked passenger airlines could be used to attack Russia. He also advised a constructor of Marine Military vessels. (Wikipedia)
President Putin has publicly stated that he entrusted the task of getting back Crimea to true Russian patriots.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t42-71RpRgI
@CliffG, Incredible. Nice work.
Don’t know if this bit of information is of interest to anyone:
http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/fsb/b-777%20_r7.htm
“If DC power to the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) fails, the ADIRU is then powered by the standby hot battery bus.”
Main battery is supposed to be able supply power for ~30 minutes operation. As usual, YMMV.
Modern IRUs seem to have the ability to calibrate while “in motion”, but doubt that an older generation ADIRU such as that of MH370 would have been capable of such.
Oleksandr et. al.
The purpose of the AES Doppler compensation is to reduce the total carrier frequency offset at the satellite L band receive antenna to less than 200 Hz (see Rockwell patend), not 1kHz. The system depends on it. The worst case adjacent FDMA channel interference is exceeded when the center frequency exceeds this spec.
The AES will not transmit if it does not have valid NAV data on the 429 bus. See MCS7200 manual.
There is no evidence that the AES Doppler compensation was not working normally for the entire flight. Unusually large and small values are more rationally explained by vertical speed and/or OCXO warm-up bias.
A high descent rate 4 minutes after fuel exhaustion is not only possible, it should be expected based on the evidence, experimental data and historical data for similar accidents. Moreover, 15,000 ft/min is not extreme. For example, the TU-154B descent rate exceeded 32,000 ft/min (see ATSB Report June 26th, pg 49). Many other examples exceeded 15,000 ft/min. Since 15,000 ft/min is not unexpected or unusual under the circumstances, the most logical conclusion is that the plane went down close to the 7th arc, probably near S38.
The notions that BFO and BTO errors could have a “common reason” is inconsistent with the AES and CU designs. These observations have completely independent error sources and the measurements are performed by independent means. Thus, there is no connection whatsoever between BTO and BFO errors, bias, accuracy, etc.
From MCS7200 manual, page 216:
The SDU defers testing of sensitive equipment until a positive indication of
settling is detected, or sufficient time passes so the lack of settling itself can
be classified as a failure. Deferral of these sections of POST also result in
normal operation being deferred, including access to the user interfaces
(SCDU, CFDS, and CMT) and all automatic calibration processing.
Consequently, the SDU suspends POST until the SDU detects the first of
the following conditions:
• OCXO heater monitor indicates it has achieved operating temperature.
• Power supply unit (PSU) temperature sensor indicates a reading above
25 °C.
• Channel filter module transmit and receive PLO lock detectors both
indicate that lock has been achieved.
• More than 4 minutes have elapsed since primary power was applied.
@airlandseaman, you wrote “the most logical conclusion is that the plane went down close to the 7th arc, probably near S38.” The seabed of that area has been searched to 25 km inside the 7th arc and 65 km outside it. It is not logical to say that the plane went “close to the 7th arc” in this area, since it manifestly didn’t.
I’ve asked you several times, but you haven’t yet given me a reply: what is the furthest you think an unpiloted plane could reasonably expect to fly from a point at which it is plummeting earthward at 15,000 fpm?
Which is another way of me asking: when are you prepared to acknowledge that your prediction of the SIO endpoint has not been born out, so that you can move on to option B and help us all figure out what happened to this plane? We need you, Mike!
It is important to understand what bullet 1 above means. (OCXO heater monitor indicates it has achieved operating temperature) It means the temperature of a single descrete point in the AES has reached the thermal control loop set-point temperature (±0.3C typ.) This is not the same as thermal equalibrium. There are thermal gradients throughout the AES that take more time to stabilize. Thus, it is possible for the AES to complete the POST, self calibrate, and transmit, once the OCXO passes the setpointbtest. But the carrier frequency can still be off OTOO 10s of Hz.
Jeff:
I haven’t answered because the question has been answered so many times in the past. It is probably within 10-20 NM of the 7th arc. Probably. Nothing certain. The fact that it has not been found does not change the math. It only means they have not found it YET. Either they missed it or it is NE or SW of the areas searched so far. It may also be further inside of the arc than they have looked so far. Note that there are many cases where the adjacent ship tracks reached a marginal spacing at best, and they skipped a number of patches here and there. In short, your assertion that the lack of a find = proof the plane is not in the area is simply wrong.
@airlandseaman, you wrote, “The fact that it has not been found does not change the math.” Indeed, it does not change the math. In fact, I think everyone has been on the same page about the math for more than a year now. What it does change the assumptions to which the math has been applied. Your assumptions circa July 2014 were the most reasonable that could have been made at the time, but they have shown to be ever more vanishingly unlikely. Who cares? We’ve all made hypotheses and guesstimates that turned out to be wrong. I think it would be wonderful if you could say, “You know what, if the second search area is scanned, and all the cracks and mystery spots are filled in, and the wreckage isn’t found, I’ll acknowledge that the ‘ghost ship’ scenario does not fit the data.” The we could all look forward to a day in the future when the plane is either found or you re-join the mission to figure out what happened to the plane.
@ALSM
Not wishing to be argumentative for the sake of argument, but for the sake of correct messaging.
“The fact that it has not been found does not change the math. It only means they have not found it YET.” – ALSM
Well, Bayes has something to say about that. A 99% probability (your estimate a while back) that the plane is in a given location coupled with a 10% probability (AF447 report estimate) that a sonar search will miss it reduces the 99% probability to 9%.
Of course, I recognize that your 99% was figurative, and intended to refer to a broad general area rather than some constrained curved box on the 7th arc. Still, the fact that the search has so far come up empty does change the math. Not the math pointing to your preferred terminus, but the math associated with the probability of the plane being there.
Two remarks:
In the simulator test that ALSM has published, the rate of descent exceeded 15,000 fpm, but it took much longer than 8 seconds to increase from 4000 fpm to 15000 fpm.
My personal opinion about Oleksandr’s assumption is that an explanation based on loss of navigation data due to power switching is unlikely. If the SDU transmits the first SU after a logon request uncompensated, then the explanation is probably within the SDU itself.
@airlandseaman: I attach a new graphic based on my old stochastic simulation results, designed to offer insight into the 15,000 fpm interpretation of the 00:18 BFO.
If you stack the columns on top of each other, then view the result from the perspective of the Y axis, you replicate the key green bell curve from that study (distribution of distances from impact point to 7th Arc @FL(0)).
GIVEN the flight path intersected Arc7 3min & 40sec after 2nd engine flameout, -15,000 fpm a) is itself an outlier in the distribution of descent rates at 00:19 among all randomly generated flight paths which “hit” Arc7, and b) leads to impact points which are much more TIGHTLY distributed around the 7th Arc than are those scenarios under which altitude is being maintained.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-r3yuaF2p72STRjV0pzYy1Ycms/view?usp=sharing
Translation: an assumption that the plane was losing altitude rapidly by 00:19 strongly suggests an impact point very close to the 00:19 arc.
This simple logic was universally accepted as unassailable a year ago. It concerns me how many fundamental conclusions we’re needing to shred in order to justify further widening of the search zone.
@airlandseaman
I’m not denying that OCXO temperature fluctuation and vertical accelerations are good candidates to explain these BFO fluctuations.
I’m just trying to find alternate possibilities that would explain those oddities plus explain why :
– first BFO after powerup is closer to average of stabilised BFOs than subsequent ones.
– Nobody has ever explained why the test paths used by ATSB to confirm validity of BFO method suddenly fork.
– Why was the 00:19 ACK triggered from plane side.
(if it was temperature warming up, wouldn’t it be possible to model that and account for it – same as was done with satellite?)
@sk999
Thanks for this information!
Let’s assume for now ADIRU remained powered.
Are we sure SDU uses ADIRU?
On some schematics it looks like it can have it’s own IRUs. The data is then fed by the SCU (signal conditioning unit). Which is only powered by 115V.
In that case until GPS positioning is back (any information on how GPS work in B777?), SDU doesn’t know where it is. It only knows how fast it’s travelling, which is enough to compute deltaFcomps within 200Hz. Steering of antenna has a backup if position is not available.
Now the question is does it have non-volatile memory to keep the last position? And what was really installed on that specific B777?
@all
Oddly enough, On 1 August 2005 a serious incident involving Malaysia Airlines Flight 124, occurred when a Boeing 777-2H6ER (9M-MRG) flying from Perth to Kuala Lumpur also involved an ADIRU fault resulting in uncommanded manoeuvres by the aircraft acting on false indications. (cf wikipedia Air_data_inertial_reference_unit).
The article on aviation-safety.net (linked from wikipedia) has been removed…
BTW it seems that in some aircrafts ADIRU can be depowered from the cockpit… (from same wikipedia article : In the event of a NAV IR fault the directed crew response is now to “select OFF the relevant IR, select OFF the relevant ADR, and then turn the IR rotary mode selector to the OFF position.” The effect is to ensure that the faulted IR is powered off so that it no longer can send erroneous data to other systems.)
Is this also valid for B777?
@Airlandseaman
Sorry forgot about that :
Isn’t the EE bay pressurised and at ambient temperature? Even cooled because of all the heat generated by the equipment?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_data_inertial_reference_unit
Disregard that, it did not properly transfer, if you search the flight sk999 referenced the information is listed
@CliffG
it’s an interesting coincidence but nothing more I’d say
A plane that was hit wouldn’t last 7 hours.
sinux:
Re:
“Isn’t the EE bay pressurised and at ambient temperature? Even cooled because of all the heat generated by the equipment?” Yes and yes and yes. But what is the point? None of the AES equipment, including the OCXO, is located in the E bay.
“first BFO after powerup is closer to average of stabilised BFOs than subsequent ones.” True, but no surprise. The oven warm up process typically results in some small scale underdamped “ringing” as the temperature gradients settle out.
“Nobody has ever explained why the test paths used by ATSB to confirm validity of BFO method suddenly fork.” It would be worth investigating whether the descent at the end of those flights was taken into account. We know they got the flight numbers scrambled. What else? I don’t put much weight on this observation other than the macro conclusion that the method works.
“Why was the 00:19 ACK triggered from plane side.” It wasn’t. The log is recorded at the GES. The GES received the request at 00:19:29 and responded to the AES in the subsequent 5 packets. The final packet at 00:19:37 was the AES acknowledging the previous 5 packets from the GES.
“…if it was temperature warming up, wouldn’t it be possible to model that and account for it – same as was done with satellite?” No. The exact warm-up transient (frequency vs. time) is unknown.
@StevenG, I think what CliffG is suggesting isn’t that MH370 was shot down like the Korean airliner, but rather that General Kornakuv both had experience studying the hijacking of civilian aircraft and demonstrably was willing to destroy them. And also had personal links to separatist Ukraine.
@DennisW, This horse has been thoroughly beaten in the past, but it is a widespread misconception that the bottom search for AF447 failed to find the plane on the first pass. In fact, the area where the plane came to rest had earlier been excluded from the search zone because the black-box pingers were assumed to have been working after the crash, and none were detected here. Once this assumption was jettisoned and the correct area scanned, the plane was found within a matter of days.
Therefore, I don’t know where the “10 %” figure comes from but it sounds suspiciously high and at any rate would not apply in the case of MH370. The authorities are not spending hundreds of millions of dollars to achieve a 90 percent confidence level. They have repeatedly said that “If it’s there, we’ll see it,” and based on the resolution of the imagery I believe them.
Speculation that the seabed search might miss the plane’s wreckage smacks to me of denial. When independent analysts were urging the ATSB back in 2014 to switch the search area to circa 38 degrees south, there was no language to the effect of “but by the way your equipment might pass over it and miss it.”
@airlandseaman
First of all thanks for your patience and your clear explanations! It sounds so easy after reading you 🙂
My bad :
A few quotes from the SDU manual :
“The SDU is packaged as an ARINC 600 6 MCU LRU suitable for mounting in the equipment bay.”
“The SDU draws an additional 20 W during the first 10 minutes (maximum) of operation at 77 °F(25°C) because of the OCXO. The OCXO continuously dissipates this additional 20 W at –67 °F(–55°C).”
“The HSU is packaged as an ARINC 600 4 MCU LRU suitable for mounting in the equipment bay. ”
“The HSU draws an additional 20 W during the first 10 minutes (maximum) of operation at 77 °F(25°C) because of the OCXO.”
“The HPA is an ARINC 600 8–MCU LRU suitable for mounting in the equipment bay or near the antenna system.”
“The SDU and HPA are installed in mounting racks (ARINC 600) typically in the equipment bay of the aircraft.”
From factual information :
“The SATCOM avionics are located on the E11 rack, which is in the crown area aft of doors 3 left/right.”
–end of quotes–
It appears then that the installation wasn’t typical…
This seem to indicate there is not one but two OCXOs.
Is the crown area not pressurised and not heated? That’s where the Crew Rest is, or is it not?
“It would be worth investigating whether the descent at the end of those flights was taken into account.”
The forking happens in the middle of the flight – above the north of India. The end of flight is not shown – possibly the fit was so bad it wasn’t worth showing 😉
Cheers
sinux :
“…suitable for mounting in the equipment bay…” does not mean it is located in the E-Bay. It means the SDU is designed to meet the ARINC 600 6 MCU LRU packaging standards, which is also the standard for the rack in the back of the plane where the AES is always mounted in the 777.
There is only one OCXO in the system, and it is mounted in the rear of the airplane on the l3eft side, above and behind the wing exit. Normally, the area is at near +23C and 0-7000 ft altitude. (per FI: “The SATCOM avionics are located on the E11 rack, which is in the crown area aft of doors 3 left/right.”)
@Jeff
I agree with your comments. I was trying to be generous. Just for closure, I got the 10% number from this comment.
“We assumed a 0.90 probability of detection in the searched region. This detection probability represents a conservative, subjective estimate of the ability of this sensor to detect a field of debris.”
The comment appeared on page 8 of the linked reference below. A report from Larry Stone (Metron) et. al.
https://metsci.com/Portals/0/Search%20for%20the%20Wreckage%20of%20Air%20France%20Flight%20AF%20447.pdf
@Jeff
Blast from the past. Duncan’s reply to my suggestion that the straight line path is arbitrary and restrictive, and other alternatives (such as a CI path) be considered.
https://tmex.smugmug.com/Other/My-Smug-Mug/i-WrVvftd/0/L/Screen%20Shot%202015-10-05%20at%2010.31.57%20AM-L.png
Ah, the early IG days were bristling with self-confidence. Today, not so much.
@DennisW
I remember this post, very narrow-minded for a scientist.
@DennisW: to the contrary, I fear bristling confidence may be an immutable constant which now IMPEDES progress.
By long before now, we should have been uniting together in a full-throated demand that investigative journalists turn over EVERY rock to do with radar, ISAT, fuel, acoustic, and drift data & analysis performed by inside investigators.
I certainly hope the plane is found on the next pass of the towfish. But the search has already taken an amount of time, covered an amount of ground, and been sufficiently dysfunctional to raise my hackles. If the plane is found – well outside the bounds Ockham’s Razor once imposed, and with no corresponding surface debris (save for this lone, spectacularly media-savvy, yet still arguably out-of-range flaperon) – it will RAISE more questions than it ANSWERS.
That’s why we need to move on a demand for accountability NOW. It is tremendously disheartening to me to see people cheerfully bury their heads back into avgeek minutiae, instead of acknowledging the obvious: someone, somewhere, knows what happened to this plane – and we the general public are meant not to know.
It means that many of us are HELPING – however unwittingly – to run out the clock on the FDR’s remaining life, liability deadlines, and the public’s attention span.
@CliffG all your links for sure provoke new questions; watched again whole Crimea document and wish the same to all of you with open heart and mind and time in line, thinking about democracy for ordinary people. Serious things happened there to prevent any lost lives where media means danger, these days.
@sinux – The BFO Fork: If I remember correctly, Gysbreght explained that the BFO of the test flights are less accurate in predicting location as the planes approached the longitude of the satellite.
@Lauren H:
I don’t remember having offered such explanation. Maybe someone else?