Independent Group member Bill Holland appears to have sorted out the head-scratcher concerning the location of the QZ8501 tail section. His explanation jibes with where we’d expect the plane’s fuselage to wind up, given the fact that just before it disappeared from radar it was descending with alarming speed. I’m pasting here Bill’s recent email in toto:
I think I have the tail GPS coordinates figured out…
I kept finding references to the tail being found that translate as:
The mapping experts who are in MGS Ship Geo Survey finds it precisely in the coordinate 03.3839S (South latitude) and 109.4343E (East Longitude).But, I searched and found a version that seems to make more sense:
Aga pun menyampaikan titik koordinatnya, yakni: Latitude 3;38;39S, Longitude 109;43;43 E.
…in English:
Aga also convey the point coordinates, namely: Latitude 3; 38; 39s, Longitude 109; 43; 43 E.The numbers being quoted are correct, … Only the punctuation was wrong!
-03° 38′ 39″ 109° 43′ 43″ (degrees minutes seconds)
This is about 2.5nm South East of the last SSR/ADS-B location (Google Maps measures 3.03 statute miles = 2.63nm)In my screen grab [above]:
– the lower yellow start marke the tail section (and the blue annotation is the distance from the purple star)
– the purple circle is the last lat/lon from the SSR (ADS-B),
– the purple star is the approx location from the primary radar image.
– The red box is supposed to be “Most Probable Area 2”,
– the black tilted rectangular outline is the left (Western) section of the “Underwater Search Area”.
– The yellow diagonal line is Route M635 between TAVIP to RAFIS.
– The black diagonal line is the FR24 estimated flight path (the inverted teardrops are individual extrapolations from FR24 after the last valid ADS-B data data they received)[ignore the white square, the blue square, the Northern yellow star, and the green diagonal line]
-Bill
Really, it’s remarkable that searchers didn’t scour this location right away, and instead spent a week searching far down-current. There appears to have been some confusion between the nature of floating debris, which disperses as it’s carried by currents, and debris on the seabed, which will tend to remain where it falls, more or less directly under the point where it impacts the water.
The latest news is that preparations are underway to raise the tail section and hoist it onto a ship. Hopefully, the black boxes will be found within, and the cause of the accident one step closer to being revealed.
@ Victor I:
On the MH370 thread on PPRuNe on 29 October 2014 ALSM provided this link to the Boeing FCOM for Lauda Air’s 777-200ER/GE90-90B :
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/32349391/B777_Manual.pdf
That post is still there, but the document is not. Perhaps ALSM can help.
@Gysbreght,
I stand by my statement: “That is why there is always an entry in the table for an altitude 2,000 feet above the ideal LRC altitude.”
The shaded altitude entry in the LRC table is the optimum altitude. The highest altitude (non-blank) entry is the maximum altitude allowed for that particular aircraft weight subject to either thrust or buffet limits. In all cases for the weights applicable to MH370 after 17:07, there is an additional entry 2,000 feet above the optimum altitude. Thus it is possible and allowable, within the limits you described, to fly at that higher altitude (2,000 feet above optimum). Since none of these entries is marked with an asterisk, that means they are all buffet limited, not thrust limited.
There is a slight fuel burn penalty for not flying at the optimum altitude, whether you are higher or lower, but it is small and transient. Step climbs are simply a method for staying close to the optimum altitude (on average) while not requiring frequent or continuous altitude changes
@Spencer: thank you so much. It is particularly heartwarming to receive (and give: the feelings are mutual) kind words such as yours from someone with whom I’ve DISagreed. By contrast: my twitter account is infested with rude messages from folks who AGREE with me, but didn’t get enough CREDIT in my report (sheesh.) So thank you.
@Victor: as usual, I agree with everything you’ve said, and I think we’ve hit a good “consensus plateau”. FWIW: if viewed in isolation, I agree simple error is likely. But in combination with the rest of the search: highly suspicious – to me. We can leave it at that.
@Oleksandr,
You said:
“It is hard to imagine somebody recovering SDU and entering WPs till 18:25 having severe difficulty to breathe to get incapacitated in as short as 5 minutes”.
I disagree. If the flight crew were on supplemental oxygen in an aircraft full of toxic smoke, and the oxygen supply ran out, how long would it take for them to become incapacitated? I don’t think is “hard to imagine” at all. There is no means of “taking care of the air” as you suggested. In this scenario it is not only possible but probable they became incapacitated within a very few minutes. How long can you hold your breath?
I never said that the last waypoint was entered before 18:22. I suspect that it happened no sooner than ~18:27.
I also don’t think “the “SDU came back shortly after AP was switched on”. I believe the AP was engaged during the period from 18:00 to 18:22. Thus it was on for more than 20 minutes before the SDU was turned back on. That 20 minutes is not “short” IMO. It is long enough to potentially decouple the two events in terms of their intent.
The 18:40 phone call was not only unanswered, it was unanswerable. It did not ring in the aircraft. That was my point. If an incoming call did not work, then an outgoing call might not work as well. You are assuming that because a sat call was not received from MH370, one was not attempted. My point is that if one were attempted and it failed because of an onboard problem, it might not appear at all in the data logs.
@ Bobby:
“I stand by my statement: “That is why there is always an entry in the table for an altitude 2,000 feet above the ideal LRC altitude.””
If the table intended to show only altitudes 2000 ft above and below the optimum altitude, why does it show FL250 for all weights?
“Since none of these entries is marked with an asterisk, that means they are all buffet limited, not thrust limited.”
The asterisks and buffet margins are in the preceding tables, which I understand from Victor that you don’t have. They cannot be shown in the table you have because the thrust limit varies with temperature. Buffet limits depend on the required margin to buffet onset, and do not appear in your table for the reason explained in the text quoted in my post of 4:49 AM today.
@MikeChillit is reporting a selective shut-down of AIS position data from MarineTraffic, affecting only the MH370 ships.
As a result, he has received no new position data on the now-FOUR search ships for 48 hours, now.
Is anyone else experiencing similar suppression from this (or any other) AIS data provider?
@Brock – Fine job on your paper. I’m in your camp along with Dr. Ulich that before widening the search area they need to move southwest. Any debris in this area had floated further west by the time the air search began.
@VictorI – The Table on page 3.2.23 of the Boeing 777 – 200ER GE90-94B includes data for this a/c cruising at FL410 while at 210,000kg indicating this a/c could reach FL400 while weighing 209,000kg. However, the “94” on this GE engine means a nominal 94,000lb thrust (93,700lb actual max) while the “92” on on the RR 892 engine means a nominal 92,000lb thrust (90,000lb actual max).
The table you posted for LRCC w/RR engines includes data for 220,000kg at FL390 and 200,000kg at FL410. These values do not prove that MH370 could reach FL400 while at 209,000kg in LRC mode but it would appear to be achievable in another mode.
I find your concept of speed being reduced by the A/P during a LRC flight after the FMT to be plausible, but challenge the ATSB’s assumption of a constant speed and altitude after the FMT. Here’s why:
At constant temperature and pressure, a s the fuel burns the a/c gets lighter so it needs less lift and “wants” to climb. Because a change in altitude requires ATC approval, the A/P will not increase altitude without pilot input. Therefore, it reduces pitch and also reduces throttle since the reduced pitch reduces drag but the speed stays constant. After a while, the pitch cannot be reduced further. What does the A/P do? I do not know, but I’ll guess it reduces throttle to reduce the speed. Look at a plane at 280,000kg at FL350 on LRCC table and you will see a speed of 287KIAS. As the weight drops to 220,000kg the speed stays at 287KIAS. It then drops to 281KIAS at 200,000kg, and to 270KIAS for 180,000kg. Note, this drop in speed is not indicated in the the above referenced table (Page 3.2.23), so I could be completely wrong about this.
My thoughts: What would be the weights and range if MH370 dropped to FL150 (or less) in the Malacca straight to avoid radar then went to FL410 after the FMT? The flight path could have been MEKAR, ANOKO, BEDAX, ISBIX so as to never be approaching Indonesia’s lands and therefore not be considered to be a threat and is ignored by Indonesian radar operators. This path would be almost exactly one hour earlier than Kate Tee’s observation reported to be at 19:35 UTC, but not sure if FL150 is low enough for her to see cockpit windows.
What if the perpetrators were not as sophisticated as they appeared? At around 17:22, they shut of the transponder, shut off ACARS, put on flight crew oxygen masks and pulled the breaker for the cabin pressurization system and then opened the vent valve. Ten minutes at FL350 and the pax would be incapacitated. Pulling this breaker also had the consequence of shutting down the SDU. They did not even know about the BTO. After they had exhausted their one-hour emergency oxygen around 18:22 they re-inserted the breaker to re-pressurize the flight deck and cabin. The SDU took a few minutes to kick in. Problem was sufficient re-pressurization took longer than expected and the preps became hypoxic around 18:35 and prior to inputting a waypoint after ISBIX. Possible? Yes. Probable? I doubt it.
@Gysbreght,
Why do you imply I said things I did not say?
I never said the table intended to show “only altitudes 2000 ft above and below the optimum altitude”. I simply said that altitudes 2,000 feet above the optimum are shown and are allowable for the full range of aircraft weights applicable to MH370. You said they were not. You are wrong.
Why do you continue to waste other people’s time?
@ Bobby;
You again avoid answering my question. Sorry if you feel I’m wasting your time, I’m certainly wasting mine.
@Lauren H: You said, “Because a change in altitude requires ATC approval, the A/P will not increase altitude without pilot input. Therefore, it reduces pitch and also reduces throttle since the reduced pitch reduces drag but the speed stays constant.”
I suspect that while in ECON mode and flying at LRC speeds (i.e., CI=180), the plane is flying with a near constant angle of attack, which translates to a constant pitch for level (constant altitude) flight. As the plane gets lighter, I suspect the pitch does not change very much. Rather, the plane just slows down, which reduces the lift in accordance to the reduction in weight.
It is hard to know exactly what happened between 18:28 and 19:41. There could have been significant changes in speed, heading, and altitude during that time interval, although I do believe the flight was “straight”, level, and at cruise speeds after 19:41. As part of the IG, I presented a scenario with an end point around 37.5S latitude that has one major turn and a LRC speed profile. I’ve also proposed a scenario that includes a landing at Banda Aceh and ends directly south of BEDAX at 34.24S latitude. Other solutions are also possible. Assuming the solutions satisfy the BTO, BFO, and fuel exhaustion models, they can only be subjectively ranked as to which is more likely.
Victor,
Here’s a link to a 777 family FCOM template which contains data for the 777-200ER/Trent892 in sections PI.20 through PI.28. The data for LRC matches what Bobby posted here, and the Holding data completely correlates with data Brock had provided a long time ago at
www(dot)metabunk(dot)org/threads/mh370-preliminary-report-released-full-text-and-files.3580/page-4#post-107415
The below link is a template for FCOMs and marked in red “Do not use for flight”, but I think we can rely on the data.
lukas1992(dot)bplaced(dot)net/_777-family.pdf
I don’t understand how MH370 could continue to fly for another 4 to 5 hours if there was a fire and/or smoke on-board. if there was a fire wouldn’t it damage the ability of the aircraft to keep flying?
@ Dave Reed:
Thank you so much for the second link. Page 529 presents Bobby’s table, and pages 527 – 528 show the tables that explain what we have been discussing and he is apparently missing.
Bobby,
I think the crew must have been aware that they had 5 minutes or so left. In addition, passengers would apparently be affected earlier. In case of smog, the first choice, which is a landing in Kota Bharu, could be discarded because the situation was not that bad at that time, or because the runway is too short. But if the situation got worse at Penang, why didn’t they try to land there or Langkawi?
You say there is no means of “taking care of the air”. If onboard aircon is functioning, it constantly supplies some fresh air from outside. I believe ‘mechanical’ alteration of the air circulation system could provide some temporal relief. De-pressurization of the cabin at 1 km altitude and 400 kph speed could also be helpful. I believe pilots have some hardware tools in the cockpit, such as a simple hummer and screwdrivers… Please correct me if I am wrong.
With regard to AP and SDU issue in case of a mechanical/electrical emergency, my version would be that once crew managed to stabilize the aircraft, they attempted to reboot SDU (and succeeded). I don’t think anyone onboard except pilots had sufficient knowledge how to restart SDU, but the pilots could not be simultaneously in the cockpit and at SDU bay. That explains why after manual flight, AP was switched on again at ~18:00 despite of ongoing emergency.
If one discards unanswered phone call 18:40 as an indication of incapacitation, then, I think, there are no sufficient grounds to believe that the crew was incapacitated by 18:40. A cluster of BFOs 18:40 is the most deviating from the “trend line”.
Myron – yes you are right. A decent fire normally takes a plane down in 20 minutes tops. The “on board emergency” is an invention and indications are this plane was airworthy. But it got right off the beaten track and they need to explain it without tainting the data, because one can’t with a clear mind continue to torture those numbers with comfort if you have a pair of technically sophisticated perpetrators in mind, much better to have smoke, oxygen masks, and pandemonium.
@Victor, @Gysbreght: I asked around on Metabunk for performance tables, and was steered towards two UNLABELED TWITPICS whose twitter account owner claimed belonged to each other. I asked all Metabunk pilots to confirm those two tables belong to the same engine – 8 months later, I’m still waiting for a reply. So I abandoned them.
My concern was that, as you’ll see, the two tables don’t come close to dovetailing into each other. If you can make sense of them, fine, but please treat with caution – and please don’t attribute them to me, regardless.
I came away from Metabunk with a PROFOUND concern that I was being systematically steered away from further investigation.
@Dave Reed: Thank you. Many of us have the first document but not the second.
@Dave – I found the two tables – are they on pages PI.21.3 and PI.21.7? Looks like it. If so, two comments:
1) Wow, this is EXACTLY what I’ve been begging for since May 25, 2014. Great job. CRUSHINGLY unfortunate timing, what with my report released last night. Oh, well.
2) But this is great, because I can re-(re-(re-(re-)))ask my question with a single document to reference:
Suppose I weigh 200,000kg, and am flying at 25,000′. What is my range of appropriate speeds? I’ve been told weight & altitude, once specified, pin speed to within a narrow range – yet the two tables show drastically divergent speeds for that combo (and others):
PI.21.3 (LRC): KIAS=290
PI.21.7 (Hold, flaps up): KIAS=229
That’s a huge discrepancy – how can BOTH be listed as the speed which corresponds to this weight/alt combo?
This has been my question to aviation experts for months.
@Brock: In a holding pattern, the objective is to minimize fuel consumption (i.e, maximize endurance) while during cruise, the objective is to optimize the speed based on the cost of fuel and time. You would expect the hold speed to be lower since you’re not trying to go anywhere.
@Victor – thanks for responding.
So if I’m flying a 777-200ER weighing 200,000kg, with Trent892’s at FL250, I can
1. safely go 290 KIAS (heck, it seems to be RECOMMENDED if I’m in a hurry to get from A to B),
2. go 229 KIAS if I’m trying to maximize endurance (per Holding table), or
3. go considerably LESS than this, if I simply wanted to go as SLOW as possible (cared about neither getting anywhere NOR endurance)
(I am inferring the possibility of 3. from your description of 2. as an optimum endurance speed.)
…?
If 3. is even SLIGHTLY below 2. – say, 195 KIAS – then I have an incredible range (195-290 KIAS) of speeds I could conceivably cycle through without changing altitude – and without stressing the plane. This is in STARK contrast to…
– how the speed/altitude/weight relationships have been described to me by pilots (any 2 essentially force the 3rd)
– the basis the IG used for ruling out material altitude swings during MH370’s westbound leg (speed=x, thus altitude=y).
I am truly confused. Please help.
@Brock:
FYI, your report is the subject of Ben Sandiland’s (@planetalking) latest:
http://t.co/KGDosEvTRs
@Brock: Let’s look at the 200 MT plane at FL250 and FL350 and compare holding flaps up (HFU)and LRC speeds.
FL250 – HFU: 229 KIAS = 344 KTAS; LRC: 290 KIAS = 435 KTAS
FL350 – HFU: 253 KIAS = 430 KTAS; LRC: 281 KIAS = 478 KTAS
The range of speeds is reduced at higher altitudes because of lower density and Mach number effects.
If the plane was flying at 480 knots at 25,000 ft, it was flying 10% faster than the LRC speed. It would be burning a lot of fuel as the IAS = 320 knots. The engines would probably have enough thrust. I don’t know at what IAS structural problems occur.
@matty. So if you say 20mins Max time to rectify I then say look 20 mins if where the issue started. Near IGARI
Folks,
I only realized today (when Victor said we only had the one page of data) that people generlly hadn’t seen the FCOM document. I posted it on page 8 of “In Search for Missing Airliner, Peanut Gallery Shows the Way” on October 20th.
Brock,
Did I misunderstand your reply last October? I thought you had read the document, but didn’t believe the data.
@Nihonmama: thanks for the link. Credit for what Ben deems the “on point” parts belongs to this whole group; blame for what Ben deems the “silly” parts is mine alone.
Though I would not be surprised to see at least a partial retraction of his criticism of the cell phone story. I think he’s confusing the call I’m analyzing (co-pilot mobile phone pings Telco tower, reported in NST Apr.12) with the 18:40 satellite phone call attempt (“newly” reported Aug.28, but known and digested by the IG months earlier).
To be fair to Ben: I could have written up a “Concern” page on EITHER story.
@Brock:
I think you’re right, hence my tweet to Ben on this.
And just a thought: adding a “concern” page on the 18:40 SAT call might be good idea.
@Dave – I certainly hadn’t even ACCESSED the link – maybe I hadn’t properly pasted it in, or my browser didn’t properly prepend – I honestly don’t recall. I read the sentence before your link to mean you couldn’t verify the authenticity of my tables yourself, even with that data in hand, so I didn’t try all that hard.
No worries – we have it now.
I hope it reconciles to the ATSB’s performance limit. Its generating paths (whose speed is held constant by definition) have their range maximized by maximizing endurance – which means HOLDING, I’m hearing.
I’ll try to reverse-engineer that table into something that lets us look-up (endurance-maximizing) altitude and fuel flow, for any given KTAS. Mapping over to KGS (i.e. adding wind) could be a last step.
@ Brock:
“If 3. is even SLIGHTLY below 2. – say, 195 KIAS – then I have an incredible range (195-290 KIAS) of speeds”
At 195 KIAS you are flying too slow and are at risk of stalling the 777. The minimum maneuvering speed at 200t flaps up is 215 KIAS – see FCOM PI.10.1 and PI.10.2.
@Brock: You said, “I hope it reconciles to the ATSB’s performance limit. Its generating paths (whose speed is held constant by definition) have their range maximized by maximizing endurance – which means HOLDING, I’m hearing.”
I am not sure why you came to that conclusion. I think the ATSB MRC paths have little to do with HOLD speeds. More likely, they are close to LRC speeds. We were talking about HOLD speeds only in relation to what speeds are flyable. As Gysbreght has shown, a better measure for the lower end of the speed range are the minimum maneuvering speeds obtained from the FCOM.
@Brock: OTOH, the high end of the authorised speed range is the Maximum Operating Speed of 330 KIAS up to 30477 ft, and M.87 above 30477 ft. (Just to complete the speed envelope)
But as Victor mentioned, you’ll burn your fuel more quickly if you fly that fast (assuming you have sufficient thrust to achieve those speeds in level flight).
@Brock McEwen
Hello, Brock,
I enjoyed your doc regarding the investigator`s investigation.
The best point for me is, You proofed them (ATSB) to be incorrect, due to their own data.
All other critical points can or better said have been easily discredited. Thus, I would await a “0” answer to your questions from the officials.
I would like to say “thank You” to the IG, for their highly intelligent and continuing efforts, allthough I think, the datas are some way wrong or misunderstood. But for sure it is of huge value to check the calculations of the investigators.
– At this point I want to say “sorry” for my grammars/vocabular – as You know from reading my 3rd word, it is not my first language, I would be happy to say, it is my 4rth, but that is not true. –
When I am trying to look from the oversight,
there are a lot of questionable points, which a lot of different people have addressed, regarding the handshakes and the calculations, regarding the alleged radar sighting(s), other wittnesses or regarding tomnod-images :
– handshakes/calculations: up to now I have not read a better (and sharp-witted) contradiction to official narrative than of Alex Siew, which he had shared here and on other blogs. If merely he is right regarding “MH370 flew to WP BITOD”, the official narrative is obselet. I am not able to judge, if Alex Siew is right with all the other points he has mentioned and wery well reasoned, but they seem to be quite substantial.
– radar sighting(s): We shall have to take , what is available for us and that is only the blips dedicated to Butterworth AFB and “officials” talking about “we tracked it..”
I think most you share the opinion, that the Butterworth-image are at least questionable, maybe they are complete fake, maybe only assembled from the origin , maybe really the origin, but not MH370 , or maybe it is, what officials say it is. Regarding this point, I would follow Simon Gunson, as he has shared here and elsewhere, and it is me, who whispers “fake?”.
And – of course – “Jeff”´s question, what about all the other radar stations, first and foremost Indonesia, which under normal cirumstandces must have ssen something. But I think, these informations are indeed sensible in the meaning of categorical sensible, so we will not learn, if there are other radar trackings of MH370. If the investigators have these informations or not, I do not know. But if, they would have found the plane. This leaves two possibilities: There are trackings, but not til the end of Flight and not in the SIO, or the tracking ended near BITOD (or near MEKAR).
-Wittnesses: There have been a lot of reports about witnesses – I think, this overview from “mh370.bookofresearch” is helpful
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=zyNjo5riMZXQ.kMyqwz_neRoE&msa=0&ll=-4.039618,123.046875&spn=111.722514,158.027344
I hope, the link ist working – if not please let me know.
It is clear, that not all wittnesses can be right with what they thought they have seen or heard. If the oil rig worker is right with seeing MH370 “on fire” near Vietnam, then others must be wrong – for e.g. Kate Tee on her Boat on the other side of Malaysia (or Sumatra).
There are reasonable wittnesses which indicate, MH370 did enter the Street of Malakka, and also some, which would indicate, it did not, and went to BITOD and maybe further NE.
But no wittness indicates it flew to the SIO.
– tomnod images: We can see a lot of images from tomnoders, who have tagged a lot of images with potential debris. It is clear, that not every single image finds the way to the investigators, because they would be “flooded”. But neverhtelesse there are thousands of people who found something, which deserves attention. For my point of view, this attention has not been paid.
And another point seems to be, that TOMNOD not only changed the names of the maps, but also the locations – from west of Banda Aceh to South China Sea or Gulf of Thailand. If this ist true, and not only DonW Elliott (http://www.dwestudios.com/MH370passengers/MH370Truth.htm ) is mentioning this.
So in overall:
– The ATSB is contradicting itself, as Brock has demonstrated.
– For us the only proof for Radar tracking is questionable,
-following the official narrative, MH370 should have been on different radar displays, probably to the very end west of Australia
– we are not told, what are the results of investigating the different wittness reports, so there are contradicting reports for indicating MH370 was near Vietnam or in the Street of Malakka, but no one for SIO
– there are sat images, which clearly are worth of of investigating, which are ignored
– the location of the tomnod-images have changed (okay: may have changed)
So – no wonder, that there are hundreds of theories. From ligthning accident to hijacking by aliens.
The latter – for my point of view – is in hard competition with the official narrative for the biggest nonsense ever!
A plane loses all communications and nevertheless shall have flown for more than 7 hours, crossing from WP to WP, sharp turn here and there, and afterwards flying on autopilot to the south pole as long as fuel lasts- parallel with the satellite…
I think, we are told BS by the officials. I do not know why, but it cannot be the truth.
Until this ends, the families will have no closure.
I hope, You adn others are able to nail it
Another document that some may find interesting:
http://www.theairlinepilots.com/forumarchive/quickref/jettransportperformancemethods.pdf
See figure 32-8 on pdf-page 627 for a discussion of MRC vs LRC.
Here is an oddity. I was researching how easy it is to disable ACARS. Here are two flight manuals that have been linked here before. The manuals are not identical – not sure how Boeing’s documentation system works. However, both discuss the ACARS Manager.
The first is for Qatar Airways – go to pdf page 1000
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0Bxl9Zw66ZRDmMlBfUFlPOHF5Smc/edit
The second is for Continental – go to pdf page 1136
https://www.dropbox.com/s/a50entmsxvobfjd/Boeing%20777-200%20Continental%20Airlines%20Flight%20Manual.pdf?dl=0
The Qatar version shows two checkboxes – one to enable VHF radio, and one to enable SATCOM. Selecting both puts the system in auto mode. Deselecting both turns off ACARS transmissions. Simple.
The Continental version shows three radio buttons. One is for auto mode, one for VHF mode, and one for SATCOM mode. There is no option to disable ACARS transmissions completely.
Why the differences? And which version did MH370 have?
All three search vessels following spaghetti courses in same area as where they reportedly had “issues” prior to last port call.
https://twitter.com/MikeChillit/status/556987203256348672/photo/1
Cheers,
Will
http://www.watoday.com.au/world/no-evidence-so-far-of-terrorism-in-airasia-crash-indonesia-investigators-20150119-12tmti.html
Re MH370 from FlyingWithFish:
“I still have the information, but all investigative streams I have access to stopped updating investigations”
https://twitter.com/flyingwithfish/status/557250401964408834
@Gysbreght – Thank you for the link to the JTPM. I found it to be very informative and written in a way for people without a scientific background to understand most of the concepts. However, may I suggest that we, in the peanut gallery, continue to use speeds in Knots rather that the smoots per microfortnight referenced in the JTPM?
To reduce confusion: two versions of my report are circulating in media:
V1: Tweeted Jan.16 (link in post above), covered directly by Planetalking (and indirectly by others linking to this)
V2: Tweeted Jan.18 (link below), reflecting crowd-sourced feedback (including Ben’s, who suggested I tone down theorizing in Concern#4 (resource extraction), and “tone up” theorizing in Concern#1 (debris)).
This latter also has a link fix, additional hyperlinked references, and minor edits, and is the version I’m now distributing to media. Please use the version linked BELOW if you wish to forward.
Of course, peer review is always warmly welcomed, and never too late.
Thanks again.
Brock
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-r3yuaF2p72ZkNWN1U5bklEbTA/view?usp=sharing
(For the “number-crunchers” only)
To illustrate the equivalence of weight and altitude (discussed earlier), the following graphic shows the B777-200ER/Trent892 FCOM Long Range Cruise Control data, using:
delta = ambient pressure ratio to sealevel standard pressure
EPR = Engine Exhaust Pressure Ratio, a measure of thrust
SAR = Specific Air Range (NM/1000kg)
https://www.dropbox.com/s/x57aks82899x6t5/B777_LRC.jpg?dl=0
The optimum altitude of 30300 ft at 300 tons corresponds to a Weight/delta of 1024 tons, changing to 1026 tons at 42300 ft / 170 tons.
Gysbrecht – for number crunchers only – lol.
For anyone – is there any reason why the ATSB have not updated their search diagram since 23rd Dec? Are they going round in circles out there or is it going to be monthly?
http://www.atsb.gov.au/mh370.aspx
@Lauren H: A smoot is a perfectly acceptable unit of length, as any MIT alum would agree.
@VictorI – You said: “A smoot is a perfectly acceptable unit of length, as any MIT alum would agree.”
Agreed. It’s the microfortnight that gives me heartburn.
@Lauren H: We are in complete agreement.
For SERIOUS analysts, microfortnights are a snap; just eyeball speed in Smoots per Friedman, convert to furlongs per fortnight via the standard rule of thumb, and then just divide your megafurlongs by THAT.
(It’s been a long few months…)
So in other words, just take a WAG
@Myron: We only do SWAGs here.
Do they know something we don’t? Odd timing.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/uk-malaysia-airlines-disaster-idUKKBN0KV0BJ20150122
Isn’t it just the time required to select a contractor and then the time the contractor needs to prepare to mobilise in the next southern Spring? They have to assume in this exercise that the current search that ends in May will be successful.
Reuters: “Months of searches have failed to turn up any trace of” MH370.
Thus far, we haven’t found a scrap of MH370 or anything resembling it. So we don’t know where the wreckage will be (If found. And, ummm… is it even in the SIO?), how deep the wreckage will be, what the state/condition of the wreckage will be, what area the actual debris field will cover, or what degree of difficulty (and time required) to recover the wreckage.
In other words, there’s (wholly) insufficient information to inform that most critical question: SCOPE.
Nevertheless, we (the ATSB) are issuing a preliminary tender to allow us to “assess which organisations are able to supply the equipment and expertise required.”
[Please note that the due date is Feb 18 – less than 30 days from issuance of the request. A sure sign that the shortlist ‘winners’ have already been determined.]
aka Kabuki.
No Japanese needed
http://t.co/3S2xTODq88
If the assumption was that the search was going to be successful then you would do it at the beginning maybe? After all many people thought the search would be wrapped up well before now, but now that the chances of finding anything are sliding we have a tender process. Better late than never – or a phony tender?