In the latest in series of aggressive maneuvers by Russian military planes in European airspace, the Financial Times is reporting today that a Russian intelligence plane nearly caused a mid-air collision with a Swedish passenger jet on Friday while flying along a Flight Information Region (FIR) boundary with its transponder turned off.
An SAS jet taking off from Copenhagen on Friday was warned by Swedish air traffic control to change course to avoid a Russian military intelligence flight, said Swedish authorities.
Peter Hultqvist, Sweden’s defence minister, said it was “serious, inappropriate and downright dangerous” that the Russian aircraft was flying with its transponder — used to identify its position — switched off. He told Swedish reporters: “It is remarkable and very serious. There is a risk of accidents that could ultimately lead to deaths.”
The incident is the latest in a series involving Russian military aircraft over the Baltic Sea this year. In March, an SAS airliner came within 100 metres of a Russian military aircraft shortly after take-off from Copenhagen, Swedish television reported.
In the most recent incident, the Swedish and Danish military detected the Russian aircraft in international airspace on radar and warned the SAS flight, said to have been bound for Poznan, Poland.
A story about the incident in WAtoday links to a YouTube clip of ATC audio combined with speeded-up playback the commercial flight from Flightradar24.com, which indicates that the incident took place near the boundary between two FIR zones, Sweden and Rhein-UIR, with the Russian plane flying west to east along the boundary.
As I wrote in an earlier post, military pilots have been known to fly along FIR boundaries with their transponders turned off as a means of escaping detection. In what may or may not have been a coincidence, after it deviated from its planned course to Beijing, MH370 flew along the FIR boundary between Malaysia and Thailand with its transponder turned off. The pilot in Friday’s incident may have been testing NATO air defense systems to see how well the technique might work over busy Europeans airspace.
@Bobby: You said, “Banda Aceh is quite plausible, but the only way to go there and fit the satellite data is to land there and wait on the ground before taking off again (this scenario was done by Victor Ian[n]ello).”
For the path over Banda Aceh, it is possible to fit the satellite data with a “loiter”, which can be produced by a landing/takeoff, a circling, or a slow descent/ascent. In my opinion, if you are going to consider a landing attempt, the attractiveness of a long runway with ILS capability outweighs the requirements for a loiter to fit the data. In fact, reduced speeds in the vicinity of the airport is more likely if the scenario includes a failed landing attempt.
Update to Signalling Unit Logs December 2014
Requests have been received from external interested parties to release any information from the SU logs (recorded at the ground earth station for the communications with
the terminal on 9M-MRO) containing BTO and BFO values prior to those originally published. There are two logs that contain BTO and BFO data prior to 1600 UTC while
9M-MRO was powered-up at the gate in Kuala Lumpur. The two additional log messages have been incorporated into the first two lines of the table below. As the two
message are from Channel R600, a 4,600 microseconds calibration needs to be subtracted (19380 – 4600 = 14780) when comparing with subsequent R1200 messages.
This is the same as applied for the messages at 18:25:27 and 00:19:29. The remainder of this document is as previously released by Malaysia in May 2014.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5185657/Upate%20to%20Signalling%20Unit%20Logs_Dec2014.pdf
@Flitzer
Thank you. I suppose we are all feeling a bit frustrated at the moment and easily annoyed. As my better half, herself a PhD EE, said yesterday “why can’t you just play nice with the other scientists?”. Good advice there.
@Victor
I slept on your question regarding the search, and in a calmer state would recommend continuing in the area now being searched. A crowd sourced answer (and it is a competent crowd) is always far better than a singularity which is what I was referring to relative to further investigation of alternative routes.
@Dennis: Thank you for that note. Please continue to investigate alternate routes and scenarios, as I will also.
Victor
Thanks for your reply, Dr. Ulich.
I see there’s a very brief time window for what was probably a crucial event during the flight (based on the set of assumptions and the analysis results).
Oleksandr.:
“I suspect the initial intent was to return back to KLIA, but the plan changed when the aircraft was around Penang.”
Welcome to my end of the piste! I will post my holisitc frame prior to Santa’s arrival, but first I will share with you, and then for the benefit of my good friends Brock, Nihonmama (and Matty, by designation) that I have a certain advantage in foil fencing, in that I am left-handed. I have most often, of course, been paired against right-handed/left-brained types, while my oppenents would have much more rarely found themselves up against the likes of me, a left-handed/right-brained opponent. A quick roll out followed by a feint in would usually result in the righties blocking over-aggressively, leaving them exposed to an easy kill under their over-extended sword arm. I was never all that good at fencing in college (girls where sooo much more interesting than practicing), but it was fun to play the piste to my advantage, no matter that it really had nothing to do with “me.” Afterall, the Left Hand is there to balance out the ubiquity of Right, and thus provide a route to integration of our brain hemispheres, yielding a fuller view of reality.
Dennis: While you find the process of having identified IG posters rather “sad” and percieve Victor and the IG as trapped in a certain “paradigm,” I would suggest that it is rather sad to witness how you are rather trapped in your own paradigm re Christmas Island. Christmas has, perhaps, been likely reserved for Santa, and I would suggest that a fault logic analysis of your process begins with your likely error in making the bit fat assumption that the pilots of MH370 were flying south with an intended destination. It is, quite simply, not necessarily so.
There may be some big, nasty error in the Imarsat data set/analysis that as Matty and I have previously argued could be manifesting the demon of confirmation bias or simply the dead animal of bunk data. But as time goes on and Airlandseaman and Victor have so patiently argued, the assumptions inherent to the analysis continue to be pursued by the IG (and its detractors here and elsewhere) with a level of rigor that borders on paranoia in terms of seeking the reduction of error. The obective is locate the damn plane wherever it may now be, while the process involves working with an incredibly sparse data set and a form of location science that has never been ultilized previously. The IG, as but one party in the mix, is constantly questioning and tweaking its own analysis, its members have no other agenda other engaging the scientific process to locate the debris. Meanwhile, nobody knows where it is to be found, and the search area has only barely begun to be searched.
The IG is well credentialed, transparent and publishes its findings in volume. Furthermore, they engage people here on this blog, and then at length, in the interest of testing their assumptions and analysis, as well as defending them, both of which are elemental to the scientific process. As for Airlandseaman, he is but a quarterback in the process, and I would even venture to guess that he was indeed a quarterback in high school, given the form and structure of his communication. He does not suffer fools lightly, while Victor is much more forgiving. At the end of the day, if you want to bitch, then bitch to the ATSB, where its inherently bureacratic nature (of course!) has it being a bit less than communicative and transparent. It’s a flaw but not a fault, really, as the ATSB simply doesn’t need to tell you much of anything, while SOPs direct them even not to. As for the JIT, you can take a page out of Brock’s book and bitch all the more, while recognizing that the JIT is a Malaysians org, no matter that it is supported by an alphabet soup of foreign agencies. I would even go so far as to suggest that there aren’t any alphabet agency types on site in Kuala Lumpur, as I can’t imagine bureacrats from DC or London or wherever kissing their spouses goodbye and saying, “see you at Christmas” (the last referenced with deep irony). No, they are communicating by telephone and email occasionally, while they most likely do not have a shared blog, as we do.
I don’t see any point in bating the members of the IG and holding them suspect, no matter your feelings of suspicion or barely concealed contempt. Rather, I would suggest that your contempt, as with your fixation on Christmas Island, has rather blinded you to the fact that the IG is simply attempting to locate the debris of MH370. Sadly, it also has you experiencing less than optimum feelings and projecting them here, much to the clear annoyance of our quarterback, who is only trying to win the game. This is what he does best.
As for what happened that otherwise quiet night, it would be great if an investigation into the criminal investigation would indeed reveal what happened, but, sadly, there simply isn’t anyone investigating this side of things, save for a few nonsensically passionate souls to be found here and elsewhere. Perhaps you could consider joining us?
Dennis: I just read your previous posts; please ignore the bulk of mine. Good for you, and welcome back.
Please google MH370 and note how Marc Dugain is now dominating the information networks (to include a number of mainstream outlets) with his nonsense. Hopefully it will all fade to nothing, but I can tell you that there are some people in KL clapping over just this sort of tripe, as it deflects attention from a non-existent investigation and plays to the ‘mystery.’
Reference the press as presenting intriguing much less factual information at your peril.
@airlandseaman – I don’t believe anyone can bash the BFO data because without it, one cannot define a reasonable search area. However, is there a reason to believe that current models are more accurate than the 145NM and 200NM, respectively shown in Figures 30 & 31 of the ATSB’s June 26 report?
@Victor – I would be interested in seeing your endurance/range calculations. How do they compare with my very rough formula of BR (in metric tonnes/Hr) is equal to KTAS/41-(1.5+(1.5 x altitude/10,000))? As explained below, this equation does not account for the fuel burn improvement as weight is reduced, which makes it inaccurate for MH370 and/or long trips.
Notwithstanding the Payne Stewart ghost flight, I can confirm the previous posters are correct and the B-777 AP will not increase the flight level without pilot input.
I still believe that an analysis of the known, average 6.14MT/HR fuel burn rate and handshake distances might help narrow the search area. The Boeing 777-200ER GE90-94B Flight Performance and Planning Manual referenced by Richard Godfrey gives a lot of information regarding the effect of weight reduction on the burn rate. To wit: By 17:07 the a/c had burned 5,300kg of fuel bringing the total a/c weight down to 217,900kg. It will burn 43,800 kg of fuel over the next 7h 08min for a ZFW of 174,000kg. At 35,000ft and the maximum endurance speed a 220,000kg Boeing 777-200ER burns 6,270kg/hr fuel but after 40,000kg of fuel has burned off, the burn rate drops to 4,970kg/hr at the same altitude and speed. That’s a 20% reduction. (These burn rates are for a “racetrack” shaped holding pattern and should be reduced by 5% for straight and level flight.)
The real question is, “can the autopilot maintain constant speed and altitude while the required lift is reduced by 20%?”
Another Honeywell AP question: If two intersecting routes do not have a waypoint where they intersect, the FMS will create one. However, in LNAV Mode, if there isn’t a route between two successive waypoints, the FMS will not bridge the gap by inserting a leg into the flight plan. The leg must be inserted by the pilot. What does that mean? For example, for a plan of MEKAR, NILAM, NOPEK, there isn’t an established route between NILAM and NOPEC. If those 3 waypoints a entered in succession into the flight plan, the FMS will not bridge the gap from NILAM to NOPEK but will continue on its 297° heading towards IGOGU. I’ll guess this means it’s more probable that someone was still flying the plane through the FMT.
@Oleksandr – I would think if KLIA was the destination after the diversion, the a/c would have turned right, not left.
@Myron – It’s IGARI not IGIRI
@Matty – In the US, “no one” is two words, not one, and favored by a majority 500 to 1. In Britain, the favor drops to 12 to 1. Not sure about Perth. To me, “noone” is more like a minute after 11:59AM.
@Oleksandr,
There are several indications that no significant descent(s) were made between 17:22 and 18:22. First, the initial reports to that effect from radar data are not generally accepted as being accurate. Second, the average air speed actually increased during the trip back over Malaysia and across the Strait. The very high average air speed (~500 kts) seems incompatible with a significant descent to low altitude.
The course taken upon diversion shortly after 17:22 was directly to the airport at Kota Bharu, which was the nearest airport at that time. After passing within a few miles of that airport, 9M-MRO then headed to the (second) airport at Penang. Perhaps these routes to nearby airports were flown at high altitude (~FL350) in order to avoid a collision (sans radio and radar).
Car Nicobar would have been about 200 NM NW at 18:25, too far to reach by 18:40, but then it would also be much farther from the 7th arc, which is a fuel problem. Why go there instead of Maimun Saleh or Banda Aceh, both of which were much closer?
All,
We know that some equipment (the SDU at least) was without electrical power from about 17:22 to 18:25. Perhaps this shutdown was a purposeful attempt to suppress what was perceived to be an electrical fire. It appears the SDU was off the air during this period of time, but the plane continued flying to airports, apparently both manually until past Penang and then on autopilot past MEKAR. If the flight crew was unable to land during that time, what malfunction (besides hijackers) could have prevented them from doing so? Next, why did they restore power? Was this the beginning of a desperate attempt to land that failed? I don’t think just the SDU was powered up at 18:25. The flight crew did not need this to do anything except perhaps communicate. If that was the sole purpose, then why didn’t they initiate a satellite phone call? What other equipment shares a common electrical breaker with the SDU, and is one of those items needed for landing the aircraft?
@Lauren H,
If the radar data from 18:02 to 18:22 are accurate, 9M-MRO did not fly exactly through VAMPI and MEKAR. The radar track during that time is straight, indicating lateral navigation via autopilot, but the path is slightly south of both VAMPI and MEKAR. In addition, there is no indication of the slight northward turn at MEKAR needed to follow N571 NW up to IGOGU.
It is possible that the FMS was not following N571, but instead was simply headed to ANOKO. The extended radar track goes right to ANOKO. Later on, adding a new and overriding waypoint, such as WITN, at about 18:27, would initiate an immediate turn southward toward Maimun Saleh. This could all be done using the FMS autopilot and does not require a “manually-flown” final turn.
@Lauren: Here is how I performed the fuel burn / range calculations:
1. Using the LRC performance data for the RR engines, I fit an equation to determine the Mach number and fuel flow rate vs. weight.
2. Starting at 17:07, I assumed 43.8 mton of fuel and a ZFW of 174.628 mton.
3. I numerically integrated in time to determine the weight, Mach number, and fuel consumption as a function of time until fuel exhaustion. There was some fuel left at 00:15.
4. I applied a correction factor of 1.83% to account for PDA and temperature effects. With this correction, fuel was exhausted at exactly 00:15. This correction factor is well within the expected value range for the engines.
5. I then fit the Mach number as a function of time so it could be easily used by others.
The Mach number is 0.838 at 17:07 and 0.785 at 00:15. The fuel flow rate varies from 6.82 mton/hr at 17:07 to 5.46 mton/hr at 00:15. The average fuel flow rate is 6.14 mton/hr over this time interval.
This Mach number fit is what Richard and I have used for our speed profiles for our path predictions. (I have also supplied this fit to Bobby.) Our flight paths are then by definition in accordance with the predicted LRC range without regard to MRC limits presented in the ATSB report. (For a number of reasons, I do not trust the MRC curves presented in the report.)
@Lauren: I neglected to mention that the LRC calculation were performed for an assumed constant altitude of 35,000 ft.
Dr. Ulich & VictorI
Thank you both for your explanations. I was trying to help by finding anything that might not have been addressed. You have these items pretty well covered.
Lauren H:
Regarding: “However, is there a reason to believe that current models are more accurate than the 145NM and 200NM, respectively shown in Figures 30 & 31 of the ATSB’s June 26 report?”
Yes, there is quite a lot more known now than back in May. Of course, we don’t have the Inmarsat model details, so a direct comparison is academic. But I can tell you deviations of the type seen in Fig 30/31 are not likely with IG models today.
There is also the question of whether figures 30&31 even have real comparisons. The two flights, MH009 and MH021, are not valid flight numbers for the paths illustrated. ATSB has never answered questions raised months ago about these errors. What were the real flights in Fig 30 & 31?
Lauren, Bobby,
If you import the KML file, referenced below, into Google Earth it’s evident that the a/c track, depicted by the RADAR targets over the northern Str of Malacca, is not a straight path. The first leg originates somewhere south/west of Penang Island; that leg terminates at the crossing of E98deg with the next leg routing out to MEKAR.
To Lauren’s question concerning FMC legs for autoflight: the path, to a leg destination, can be defined in the FMC through many options (over 20 variations). Considering the basic ‘track to fix’, a waypoint may be defined as a global nav database waypoint or an explicit lat-long. Airways don’t have to be followed.
To Bobby’s point that the SDU was powered down between 17:22 (or even 17:07) and 18:25: it’s only true that the SDU had lost P-ch sync with the GES between 18:02 and 18:25. There was a failed outbound, GES-AES, message transmission at 18:03. It’s not certain at what point between 17:07 and 18:02 the AES lost P-ch sync.
Google Earth KML download at: http://goo.gl/jmNqrr
:Don
@airlandseaman:
I seem to recall an MAS announcement that MH370 also is not a valid flight number anymore.
Hi Bobby.
1. I am glad that we have same or similar technical questions, which means that I am not asking nonsense.
2. Re altitude. “First, the initial reports to that effect from radar data are not generally accepted as being accurate”. Yes, altitude data are probably inaccurate. However, is it a sufficient reason to state that the radar data is completely wrong, and to conclude that the altitude was constant on the basis of this? I feel the public is self-convinced that the term “inaccurate” is equivalent to the term “wrong” in this case. There is a gap in the radar data just before VAMPI, which could be explained by a low altitude. While some say this gap is due to the mountains, I did not find a proper analysis. So, the only high average air speed can be used to implicitly justify an assumption of the constant altitude…
3. “The course taken upon diversion shortly after 17:22 was directly to the airport at Kota Bharu”. Its runway is of 2,400 m length. May be insufficient length…
4. “Why go there instead of Maimun Saleh or Banda Aceh”? The runway of Maimun Saleh is also too short (1844 m). As about Aceh – it is more difficult question. Perhaps the proximity of mountains can be used as a supporting reason. Perhaps because the approach is over the water at both ends of the runway. Perhaps the pilot of co-pilot was more familiar with the Car Nicobar runway than with Aceh. I am not saying that Aceh or Maimun Saleh is less likely option, but I am saying (for a long while) that Car Nicobar appears also a reasonable option.
5. “Car Nicobar would have been about 200 NM NW at 18:25, too far to reach by 18:40, but then it would also be much farther from the 7th arc, which is a fuel problem”. It is not really required to reach it by 18:40. Both sets of BFO 18:25-18:27 and 18:40 could indicate some maneuvering. The timing to initiate a descent at 18:25 is just right. It is not really much farther from the 7th arc – the terminal point would shift towards the Broken Ridge (around 31-33S if I recall correctly) with the trajectory still satisfying BTO/BFO data.
6. “It is possible that the FMS was not following N571, but instead was simply headed to ANOKO”. Yes to the former, no to the later, in my opinion. It appears that the trajectory slightly turns at VAMPI towards MEKAR. For some reason it is not clearly seen in the ATSB’s report, but it is clearly seen in the “Lido Hotel snapshot”. Given this turn at VAMPI, I think it was following waypoints VAMPI, MEKAR and likely NILAM. In contrast to others I do not think it is sufficient to state it was following N571 route. Just waypoints. ANOKO – probably. But NILAM first.
Regards,
Oleksandr.
P.S.
Figure 15 in the Journal of Navigation article shows the measured BFO for flight MH21 that travelled from Kuala Lumpur to Amsterdam at the same time as the MH370’s final flight, overlaid with the upperand lowerBFOpredictions(±7Hz) usingthe refined BFOmodel.
P.P.S.
Sorry for the missing spaces in the last part of the sentence. Just copy/pasted it from the article.
Don,
If you still think that the path from 17:22 to ~18:00 was pre-programmed rather than manually flown, could you please provide your version with regard to my previous question about a ‘straight’ path IGOGU to MEKAR?
Thanks,
Oleksandr.
Lauren H:
” I would think if KLIA was the destination after the diversion, the a/c would have turned right, not left”.
If you mean the first turn 17:22-17:25, you need to account for the range of mountains. To avoid flying over these mountains, one has two options: either as it was realized, or over Johor Baru. The latter path is longer. The former is nearly orthogonal to the shore. I don’t think MH370 was flown on AP till it reached Penang.
The real puzzle appears to be a question why it turned right at Penang instead of left. Close look at the trajectory presented by ATSB contain some ‘traces’ of an attempt to turn left, which was then aborted (thought it could also be interpreted as the avoidance of flying over Penang, or inaccuracy in radar data).
Rand:
Could you please remind your version with regard to KLIA?
Oleksandr.
Oleksandr,
A routing directly from the IGARI turn-back to MEKAR would have intruded into Thai controlled airspace. A routing from the IGARI turn-back towards Penang is a common routing for flights to/from Penang Int’l/WMKP and Vietnam, HK, Sth Korea, etc.
Check out one of the flight tracking websites that offer a playback facility for traffic into a specified airport & choose WMKP. Set playback to max speed & enjoy!
:Don
@GuardedDon, @Oleksandr,
Could have MH370 tailed another aircraft that was flying from Vietnam towards Penang? That way it was trying not be be spotted on radar?
@GuardedDon,
You said “it’s only true that the SDU had lost P-ch sync with the GES between 18:02 and 18:25.”
What would cause this? If this is true, why did the same thing happen again at 00:19 after flame-out?
@Oleksandr,
I agree that 9M-MRO could have flown over NILAM (and then turned shortly thereafter, or continued on past NILAM toward ANOKO before turning south).
I also agree that the radar overlay looks like there could be a very slight left turn before VAMPI, even though the ATSB Figure 2 shows a straight path.
By the way, I have tried unsuccessfully to fit routes through SANOB and/or ANSAX after NILAM.
Don,
I would suggest you to open google maps and check the area around Padang Besar, Langkawi. You will find similar zig-zag border between Malaysia and Thailand. Over-land intrusive path would be approximately 50 km, which would take less than 4 minutes to cross. Do you really expect Thai Air Defense to launch interceptors within this time? Well, you can round up to 10 minutes to account for over-water approach. Any better argument?
Regards,
Oleksandr.
Myron,
If my memory is correct, the nearest was an aircraft bound to Japan, which tried (and, btw, succeeded) to contact MH370 within minutes after the disappearance. Unfortunately that contact was not informative in any sense.
So, why not to chose a shorter path to MEKAR knowing the aircraft was being tracked by radars anyway? Two the most plausible in my opinion explanations are: either original intent was different, or there was a mechanical/electrical failure, so that pilots struggled to take the aircraft under control.
Oleksandr.
Bobby,
Thanks for the info re SANOB and/or ANSAX. Did you try only constant altitude & airspeed scenario?
Btw, in my opinion ANOKO is closer to extrapolated path than IGOGU. There are quite many other points, so before testing all of them I would like to understand a general strategy for landing, or any other intent to follow waypoints.
Oleksandr.
Don,
One more thing. If one wanted to reach Penang Int’l/WMKP (or mimic such an attempt), why the trajectory is curved?
Oleksandr.
@Victor
The IG team has probably already seen the linked pdf below which I obviously borrowed heavily from for my preferred flight path (in terms of speed and altitude). Of particular interest is Table 1 on page 15 which includes fuel burn as part of the simulated flight test log. If you have already seen it, please ignore. A response is not expected.
I post it only to provide additional input to the fuel burn question you were discussing above. There is simulated data for a number of different altitudes and speeds.
I was obviously looking for a way to confirm that the plane would have run out of fuel close to the end point of my path while flying at highly suboptimal altitudes.
https://saucysailoress.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/a-simulated-flight-of-mh-370-2.pdf
@Dr Bobby Ulich.
In reverse: a power loss between 00:11 and 00:19 is most definitely a consequence of the second engine flameout in the terminal phase with the RAT deploying to restore (limited) power generation
However, it’s not a simple set of circumstances to sustain a power generation/distribution interruption in the period 17:21 & 18:25 and conclude that the AES Log-On was a consequence of that interruption being resolved.
To consider removing power to only the AES requires at least one of three circuit breakers, located in the MEC, to be ‘pulled’. Alternately, an entire buss and all its loads must be isolated via the limited set of selectors on the flight deck o/head panel. Following the 747-400 systems design, the B777 electrical system is highly automated so the automated failure recovery must be overridden.
The AES comprises the SDU itself, an RFU, an splitter/combiner, an HPA, a solid-state relay, two BSUs & their associated apertures. It needs antenna steering updates from AIMS to (coarsely) ‘focus’ to the satellite and switch the (side mounted) apertures. The route WMKK-IGARI-WMKP-“FMT” implies an aperture switch at each turn. The turn in the vicinity of WMKP occurred at apprx 17:50. The AES is a highly reliable system, however, this one demonstrates two anomalies: the outage and the later failures to complete setup for the C-ch/voice calls (while successfully maintaining packet data service). A power interruption explains only the outage up to 18:25.
:Don
@Oleksandr
I think this aircraft was taken over by some other pilot with intent on delivering it to some unknown location.
In my thought this might have been aborted due to electrical fire or structural issues in which case SIO happened.
I think most likely the aircraft tailed another to this unknown location.
Oleksandr,
I am now quite familiar with the territory concerned. I’ve always doubted Langkawi as a diversionary destination: it’s closed at night (no runway/approach lighting), a missed approach requires avoidNce of high ground, there’s only approach over the sea.
After the IGARI turn-back a diversion to WMKP will look entirely feasible: route along B219, pick up the typical DME arc around WMKP feigning to intercept the top of approach but then head straight out over the sea rather than turning into the airport approach.
No transponder operating so any operator picking the aircraft up with their primary surveillance radar assumes the aircraft is heading to Penang International.
At this time, when 9M-MRO is running down B219 towards WMKP, LUMPUR ACC, as we’re so reliably informed, is still in a state of confusion over the FIR handover with HCM ACC.
:Don
Oleksandr: My basic frame is that the flight was diverted at IGARI with the intention of returning to KL, while there was a loss of onboard equilibrium that culminated at or near Penang that interrupted the intentional diversion. The aircraft was then directed the aircraft out over open water.
I began with the premise that all aircraft push back and take off (or in this case, are diverted) with an intended destination in the mind of the pilot. Having to select from a number of destinations involving whatever inherent elements, I determined that the destination with the highest probability was Malaysia. From here, I selected for Penang (the base of the opposition) or KL, while favoring KL (the airport of departure, the highest value for whatever form of politicalization/militarization of the aircraft, etc.). Thus, the flight from IGARI to Penang would have amounted to a base leg route, while a “missing” 90 degree approach leg turn at Penang would have put the aircraft on a direct approach leg route to KLIA.
The state of disequilibrium would have then given way to a new form of equilibrium that began circa the FMT at 18:28 – 18:40 and continued until the flight terminated in the SIO.
I have argued that many have conflated the intended destination for the diversion with location of the terminus of the flight in the SIO, suggesting rather that the SIO was never the intended destination.
If there was an intent to return to Malaysia, then there would have had to have been onboard events (e.g., an intervention) subsequent to the diversion/hijacking at IGARI.
The logic against there having been a technical malfunction at IGARI is that the aircraft apparently did not descend as would be SOP with such a development, while it also did not make a final approach/attempt a landing at any airport. Meanwhile, there are other elements that support a hijacking for the diversion rather than a technical malfunction.
The theory includes that the Malaysians are presently not actively pursuing a criminal investigation and rather leveraging the extraordinary amount of time involved in discovering the location of the terminus of the flight in a risk assessment process geared largely to determining how much will be required to be revealed by the Malaysian authorities. Meanwhile, the West/the US was perhaps largely called off MH370 according to its status of forces agreement with Malaysia re: its large, in-country counter-terrorism presence, once the Malaysians provided enough information to placate the Americans that MH370 did not represent a threat to Western interests. In fact, the Americans quickly lost interest in MH370, which is congruent with the proposed frame of the event(s).
And now I can focus on Christmas and Santa’s arrival and good times with the kids, while I have spared everyone here one my lengthy, rambling tracts. Happy holidays, everyone!
Randxoxo
Don,
Thanks for the explanation of your hypothesis. However, Langkawi also has an internation airport. Also long runway. Why would not Thai operators think the aircraft is heading to Langkawi? Just swap LangkawiPenang in your explanation, and you will have almost identical situation.
So, my question is not about “Langkawi as a diversionary destination”. My question is why Langkawi could not be used in the role of Penang if the purpose was to mimic a routine flight? IGARI->Langkawi->MEKAR.
Oleksandr.
Oleksandr,
If your hypothesis involving Langkawi holds up for you, you’re welcome to it.
It doesn’t work for me.
I think we’ve run this discusiion to its conclusion.
:Don
If there was an emergency it still make more sense to land at an airport on the eastern side of Malaysia rather than loiter around the west side of Malaysia.
Lauren H:
Regarding: “However, is there a reason to believe that current models are more accurate than the 145NM and 200NM, respectively shown in Figures 30 & 31 of the ATSB’s June 26 report?”
I believe the reason is that the accuracy of path reconstruction shown in figures 30 & 31 of the ATSB’s June 26 report deteriorates at the end of the paths because the paths become more westerly. Therefore the calculated course becomes more sensitive to small errors in the BFO than on the almost due southern paths towards the current search area.
It has to do with the fact that the BFO only reflects the north-south velocity and is insensitive to east-west velocity components.
Myron,
Citation from Wikipedia that was added in late October:
“Soon after the turn, military radar suggests the aircraft climbed to 45,000 ft (14,000 m)—above the aircraft’s 43,100 ft (13,100 m) approved flight ceiling—then descended unevenly to 23,000 ft (7,000 m) as it approached Penang Island. A source close to the investigation told media that the aircraft descended as low as 12,000 feet (3,700 m).”
This information was circulating around for a long while, but I think its formal inclusion may indicate that significant changes in the altitude did really occur.
It may not have much sense to attempt to land at an airport on the eastern side of the Malay Peninsula if there is a much longer runway not far away (I mean Penang: 3,352 m vs 2,400 m of Sultain Ismail airport). Btw, in case of an emergency this could also be a strategy: try landing at Penang, but keep Sultan Ismail airport as a spare option.
I have to say that radar altitude data are consistent with this hypothesis.
Oleksandr.
so maybe they did try to land but also maybe they tried to make it look like a landing?
(something rings in the back of my mind — maybe they were forced not to land)
Altitude determination with primary radar alone is sketchy at best. I would place zero credence on Malaysian altitude reporting.
Hi Dennis,
Sketchy would be a way more than zero is this case… In addition, altitude accuracy near Penang should be much higher than at IGARI or MEKAR, and it should be available from both Malay and Thai radars. Once again, a rough assessment of the gap in the data between VAMPI and MEKAR corresponds to 3 km altitude, which is consistent with the reported numbers.
Anyway, does zero credence justify the assumption of a constant altitude? Why the data is rejected on the basis of low credibility?
Oleksandr.
@Oleksandr
Read up on it. There is a lot out there. A primary radar has a broad beam in the vertical direction. That is why those antennas are very typically long in the horizontal and short in the vertical dimension – to produce a narrow beam in the azimuth and broad in the elevation direction. The radar determines azimuth by rotating the antenna. There is no corresponding motion for the elevation.
Why don’t you describe for us how a primary radar might determine altitude.
Dennis,
Firstly, this depends on a radar system. I am familiar neither with the RMAF Butterworth radar complex nor with Thai, thus I cannot comment on their specific capabilities / characteristics.
Secondly, if you ever seen a real radar complex (for instance temporally installed at the places of airshows), you could notice different types of radars. You described only one of them. Also note that radar systems often comprise several radars; it is not a single ‘antenna’.
Thirdly, a quick ‘googling’ confirmed that my memory is correct. Just a couple first references:
http: slash slash en.wikipedia.org slash wiki slash Height_finder
http: slash slash http://www.radartutorial.eu slash 01.basics slash Calculation%20of%20height.en.html
Replace word ‘slash’ with slash (Jeff’s blog does not like my posts with links).
Regards,
Oleksandr.
@Oleksandr
I did not mean to be brief, but height determination from a primary radar is a vexing problem. I spent a bit of time on Flaxman Island, A DEW line station, in the late 1980’s. The station has since be decommissioned I believe. While I had nothing to do with operating the radar, I did work on aspects of the calibration. At that time the ability of that radar, which was truly state of the art, was pretty much limited to determining whether an incoming target was breathing air or not. Altitude determination, especially at longer range, used an extremely complex set of diffraction models, and was not considered highly reliable. I think if you look at the subject closely you will these models are still in place today. If it was easy and reliable ATC radars would be used for that purpose today. They are not.
I would look very very closely at any claims relative to the Malay radar before basing any modeling on them. Your earlier question relative to credence being related to the assumption of constant altitude did not parse for me. I am not sure what you meant by that question. To be clear, I would have little confidence in any altitude information from the primary radars.
Dennis,
I totally agree with all you said above.
There is a difference in opinions with regard to whether MH370 was on AP or it was flown manually from 17:25 to ~18:00 (around Penang; Fig.1 p7 of the report you posted). There is also a gap in the radar data between VAMPI and MEKAR, MH370 passed by. This gap does not appear in ATSB’s report, but it appears in “Lido Hotel” snapshot. Respectively changes in altitude may indicate some technical emergency, and a possible attempt of landing. Or a different initial plan of ‘hijackers’ (whoever was in control).
Btw, I just noticed by a chance that the trajectory suggested in your report passes by Langkawi rather than Penang. This is exactly a topic of my discussion with Don in this thread (see above). If one wishes to reach MEKAR (in your report it goes directly to SAMAK), why the turn was made at Penang rather than Langkawi?
Why this thing is important: ATSB and IG believe that FMT was made between 18:25 and 18:40. If Kate (the sailoress) really saw MH370, both ATSB and IG are incorrect. Ironically, some other scenarios based on the minimization of BTO/BFO residuals are in a better agreement with Kate’s observation. But there is a difficulty to explain what was going on between 18:25 and 19:41. The assumption of a constant altitude, gives a little room for imagination. However, this assumption is based on two things: (1) unreliability of radar data, and (2) high average airspeed. I am arguing that point #1 is not a valid reason to assume a constant altitude, while point #2 requires a proper analysis (I haven’t seen such an analysis yet).
Regards,
Oleksandr.
Don,
Thanks for your opinion.
I just noticed by a chance that in the report posted by Dennis, the trajectory passes by Langkawi. I haven’t seen that report before, and the trajectory is indeed wrong. But it is exactly what I meant as a logical choice if one wishes to reach MEKAR from IGARI and cause a confusion of Malay and Thai air forces.
Regards,
Oleksandr.
@Oleksandr
My interest has been limited to what happened after 18:40. The report I posted was to aid Victor in fuel range issues. I have no opinion of the report other than that.
Sorry, but I cannot endorse the report at all relative to paths before 18:40. Not saying it is wrong. I have just not personally looked at it.
I need to see all data chain from IGARI to VAMPI to be convinced of the final destination is SIO. However I see with the discussion there are missing data to connect this path fully to the last big turn. The longer Aus/Malay withhold it and not much debris showing up the more likely other locations shod be checked. Maybe MH370 got away by tailing another aiines path.