Newly emerged details concerning Malaysia Airlines flight 370’s electrical system indicate that whoever took over the plane was technically sophisticated, possessing greater knowledge of Boeing 777 avionics than most commercial line pilots. They also suggest that the plane’s captain, Zaharie Ahmad Shah, was not responsible for taking the plane.
The new information comes via Michael Exner, a satellite industry veteran who has been one of the most prominent independent experts investigating the airliner’s disappearance. Several days ago Exner gained access to a major US airline’s professional-grade flight simulator facility, where he was able to run flight profiles accompanied by two veteran 777 pilots. “This is a state-of-the-art 777 simulator, level D, part of one of the most modern training facilities on earth,” Exner says.
A little background. As is well known, approximately forty minutes after its departure from Kuala Lumpur for Beijing, someone turned off all communications between MH370 and the outside world. Around the same time the plane turned sharply to the left and headed back over the Malayan Peninsula. Among the systems that were shut off were satellite communications; the transponder; and two automatic reporting systems, ACARS and ADS-B. The plane went dark just as it entered the space between two air-traffic control zones and was temporarily unmonitored, a sign that whoever planned the diversion wished to avoid detection and was well versed in international air traffic control procedures.
For approximately the next hour, MH370’s progress was visible only to military radar. The plane flew straight and fast between established navigational points, indicating that the aircraft had not suffered mechanical accident. At 18.22 UTC the plane was heading west out into the Indian Ocean when it passed out of range of military radar. At that point, the plane became effectively invisible. Shrouded in night, with approximately six hours’ fuel aboard, the plane could have reached any point within a 3000-mile radius and no one on the ground would have been any wiser. But it did not stay dark. Less than a minute later, MH370’s satellite communications system was switched back on.
Over the span of several minutes, between 18.25 and 18.28, the Satellite Data Unit (SDU) transmitted a flurry of brief electronic messages with Inmarsat satellite 3F-1, which occupies a geosynchronous orbit above the Indian Ocean. In a report issued this June, the Australian Transport Safety Board stated that the signals were “generated as part of a Log-on sequence after the terminal has likely been power cycled.”
Until now, it has not been publicly known how such a power-cycling could have taken place.
At the simulator facility, Exner reports, he was able to confirm “that there is no way to turn off the primary power to the satcom from the cockpit. It is not even described in the flight manuals. The only way to do is to find an obscure circuit breaker in the equipment bay [i.e. the Electronic and Equipment bay, or E/E bay, is the airplane’s main electronic nerve center].” Both of the pilots accompanying him told Exner that “pilots are not trained to know that detail.”
Why the satellite communications system was turned back on is unknown. The system was never used; no outgoing telephone calls were placed, no text messages were sent, and two inbound calls from Malaysia Airlines to the plane went unanswered. Aproximately every hour for the next six hours, however, a geostationary communications satellite sent electronic handshake signals, and the SDU aboard the plane responded, confirming that the system was still active and logged on. Though the signals contained no messages per se, the frequency at which they were sent, and the time it took to send and receive them, have been used to determine the plane’s probable direction of travel.
The fact that the SDU was turned back on provides a window into the circumstances of the hijack. For one thing, since the SDU integrates information from other parts of the plane’s computer system, we know that the plane’s electronics were substantially functional, and perhaps entirely so. Second, the fact that the perpetrator (or perpetrators) knew how to access this compartment and how to toggle the correct switches suggests a high degree of technical sophistication.
Further evidence of the hijacker’s sophistication comes from the fact that they also managed to turn of the ACARS reporting system. This is can be done from the cockpit, but only by those with specialized knowledge. “Disabling it is no simple thing,” Emirates Airline CEO Tim Clark told Der Spiegel recently, “and our pilots are not trained to do so.”
For all its importance, the 777 E/E bay is surprisingly accessible to members of the flying public. The hatch, generally left unlocked, is set in the floor at the front of the first class cabin, near the galley and the lavatories. You can see a video of a pilot accessing the E/E bay inflight here. (In Airbus jets, the hatch is located on the far side of the locked cockpit door.) Once inside, an intruder would have immediate physical access to the computer systems that control communication, navigation, and flight surfaces. A device called a Portable Maintenance Access Terminal allows ground crew to plug into the computer system to test systems and upload software.
The security implications of leaving the plane’s nerve-center freely accessible have not gone unnoticed. Matt Wuillemin, an Australian former 777 pilot, wrote a master’s thesis on the vulnerability in June 2013 and submitted it various industry groups in the hope of spurring action, such as the installation of locks. In his thesis, Wuillemin notes that in addition to the Flight Control Computers, the E/E bay also houses the oxygen cylinders that supply the flight crews’ masks in case of a depressurization event and the controls for the system that locks the flight deck door. “Information is publicly available online describing the cockpit defences and systems located within this compartment,” Wuillemin notes. “This hatch may therefore be accessible inflight to a knowledgeable and malevolent passenger with catastrophic consequences.”
Wuillemin reports that, among others, he sent his thesis to Emirates’ Tim Clark. A vice president for engineering at Emirates responded that the airline did not perceive the hatch to be a security risk, since the area is monitored by cabin crew and surveillance cameras. Wuillemin notes that cabin crew are often called away to duty elsewhere, and that the surveillance cameras are only routinely monitored when someone is seeking entry to the cockpit; he adds:
Emirates considered the possible requirement for crew to access the area should there be a ‘small’ in-flight fire. Research indicated there is no procedure, checklist or protocol (manufacturer, regulator or operator) to support this latter position. In fact, Emirates Operations manuals (at that time) specifically prohibited crew accessing this area in flight. Emirates amended the Operations manual recently and re-phrased the section to ‘enter only in an emergency’.
The fact that someone must have entered the E/E bay during MH370’s disappearance diminishes the likelihood of one of the more popular MH370 theories: that the captain barred himself in the cockpit before absconding with the plane. Even if he locked the copilot on the far side of the door and depressurized the cabin to incapacitate everyone aboard, emergency oxygen masks would have deployed and provided those in the cabin with enough air to prevent Zaharie from leaving the cockpit before the next ACARS message was scheduled to be sent at 17:37, 18 minutes after the flight crew sent its last transmission, “Goodnight, Malaysia 370” at 17:19.
It’s conceivable that Zaharie could have acted in advance by leaving the cockpit, descending into the E/E bay, pulling the circuit breakers on the satcom system and then returning to the cockpit to lock himself in before making the final radio call and diverting the plane to the west, depressurizing the cabin, and waiting until everyone was dead before returning to the E/E bay to turn the SDU back on. But if his goal was to maintain radio silence he could have achieved the same effect much more simply by using cockpit to controls to deselect the SDU without turning it off.
As it happens, Wuillemin’s efforts to draw attention to the potential hazards afforded by unlocked E/E bay hatches proved too little, too late. MH370 went missing just two months after he submitted his work to the Australian government.
@Matty – exactly, an “ambiguous” path.
@Nihonmama – I don’t have an opinion on a shootdown, although I stopped ruling it out sometime in mid-July for obvious reasons. I think it’s at odds with the BTO/BFO data, so for the moment it’s off the table.
What I do think, though, is that any hijacker in today’s world knows that detection is probably a 50/50 chance, and if a hijacking is detected it will be met with fighter jets. So if there were hijackers in control, they would be very careful to appear as routine as possible as a precaution.
The interesting question would be whether anyone at any candidate airports ever believed, or was alerted, that a flight was coming in. Any communication or indication that a landing was needed would reduce the chance of a military reaction.
Yeah, what Victor said.
While Capt. Zaharie was not necessarily a leading opposition figure, we can aggregate Jeff’s line of reasoning together with Victor’s and perhaps reduce the probability of Capt. Zaharie’s culpability (while not eliminating it). More importantly, we can garner greater focus on the behavior of the Malaysians, picking up on the thread of obfuscation associated with something that is potentially or actually quite embarrassing to the regime. It begins with generalized incompetence: a 777 apparently flew unchallenged over Malaysian airspace and lives and property were subsequently lost; this would be enough to bring down the Ministers of both Transportation and Defense (you gotta love the irony of it) in many countries. From here, one could follow Des Roos’ incredulity over the lack of transparency and develop evidence of criminal malfeasance on the part of the Malaysian authorities in terms of actions that have transcended Malaysia’s state secrets laws and impeded the official investigation. An independent investigation of these actions could perhaps then lead to the discovery of that “something very embarrassing for the current regime.” The people that would perhaps prove best able to take up such a pursuit are independent journalists on the ground in Malaysia or the leaders of the opposition in Parliament.
Where to start? I would suggest pursuit of the Voice Box transcripts, the redacted satellite data, an analysis of the SOPs of MAS ops, the DCA and the RMAF and, perhaps most importantly, the development of human contacts that create the nodes in the communication network of what must be a relatively complex effort to suppress information within Malaysia. People leak, people crack, people become beholden to a different pay master; complex systems of any form are inherently fragile. The obfuscation effort may very well only be intended to cover-up violations of SOPs and protect a Minister. Then again, there could just as easily be more that further exposes members of the Malaysian crony pyramid, “something very embarrassing” indeed. There might even be indications as to why a hijacked MAS aircraft came to terminate its flight in the SIO.
And don’t make me quote the Sound of Music once again.
Victor, Rand:
“The obfuscation and stonewalling of the Malaysians continues. Why, if not because there is something very embarrassing for the current regime?”
And that, dear friends, would have been the reason NOT to give Malaysia a seat on the UN Security Council.
#bringontheleakers
Nihonmama: …which again indicates how whatever happened aboard MH370 and concomitant events within Malaysia are secondary to larger foreign policy objectives. Nobody really gives a tinkers toss, they will only want ensure that the security fault has been closed – which is why the remains of the aircraft must be found.
Has CNN gone back to ask that “US official” why (s)he “confirmed” to them on April 14 that the co-pilot’s cell phone pinged a tower?
I ask because I’m always interested in understanding WHY I am being deceived by high-ranking officials.
I researched the April 13 New Straits Times article whose bombshell claims CNN was “confirming”. The original piece’s lone source? “Unidentified investigative sources”…
I think we would be wise to keep our minds WIDE open as to how the dots ultimately connect, here.
@Spencer
I agree with you on this point of moral superiority. He is tactically well prepared for this interview!
A key question for me is why MH 370 was not seen as a threat!
– They were in contact and knew what was going on
– They were involved from the beginning
– They got information
– They had no idea of what was going on and committed incredible error in the action chain
“KL ACC queries Malaysia Airlines’ operations center, Which replies that they are able to exchange signal with flight and it is in Cambodian airspace.” hm …
I see no motive to hijack a plane to let it fly in the SIO … I like the idea of a stopover! Unfortunately, I am a mechanical engineer and my knowledge of BFO / BTO does not go beyond read;)
Correction: NST article date = Apr.12, not Apr.13.
@airlandseaman: two questions:
1) can you give me any sense of average change in turn radius per unit time (or per revolution)? I.e. did your sim paths spiral around a hypothetical cylinder? Cone? Pseudosphere (http://www.courseweb.uottawa.ca/Mat3155/)?
2) did the ATSB tell you whether THEIR turn was LEFT or RIGHT?
I am happy to refine my model to reflect any input you have the time and energy to provide – thanks.
Brock – In Para.4.4 of Dr. Ulich’s White paper he used a turn radius of between 6 and 10nm and a rate of 1deg/sec. He said this 1/3 the normal rate but consistent with a 25deg bank angle.
You should check it for yourself to make sure I didn’t misstate his model.
Two articles concerning MH317 which may or may not have a bearing in relation to facts forthcoming or not forthcoming in regards to MH370 information.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article40226.htm
http://www.globalresearch.ca/scandal-last-seconds-of-mh17-flight-were-snapshot-by-a-us-or-uk-spy-satellite/5414148
Brock: The ATSB Oct 8 Update states:
The simulator activities involved fuel exhaustion of the right engine followed by flameout of the left engine with no control inputs. This scenario resulted in the aircraft entering a descending spiralling low bank angle left turn and the aircraft entering the water in a relatively short distance after the last engine flameout. However when consideration of the arc tolerances, log on messages and simulator activities are combined, it indicates that the aircraft may be located within relatively close proximity to the arc.
Our “fuel exhaustion simulations” included 3 cases tested: (1) left engine 1st, (2) right engine 1st, and (3) simultaneous fuel exhaustion (within 1 second). In cases 1&2, the TAC compensated for the first engine flameout, as expected, with ~4 degrees opposite rudder to maintain the same track and heading as before the 1st engine loss. The speed starts slowing down immediately, while the altitude is maintained (35,000 feet in all our sims), until the speed drops to 225kts IAS, at which point the altitude starts to drop as required to maintain 225 kts IAS. Once down to ~24,000 feet, the aircraft levels off at 24,000 and 225kts. (For ZFW=400,000 lbs; CG=28%) This would take about 10-15 minutes if the fuel imbalance was sufficent to keep the second engine running that long. Note that these numbers would be different if the remaining fuel was much higher. In all our cases, the fuel was down to 800 lbs when the first engine fails, leaving only 4-5 minutes for the remaining engine. Because we had the fuel imbalance set to give us 4-5 minutes for cases 1&2 (per ATSB/Boeing estimates), we did not observe the altitude start to drop before the second engine failure.
We expected the aircraft to start a turn in the direction of the last rudder position set by the TAC, before the 2nd engine flamed out. But to our surprise, the aircraft turned to the right in all three cases. It turns out that the TAC returns the rudder to the *manually trimmed position* immediately after the second engine flames out. A turn typically starts soon after the 2nd engine flameout, but it is in the direction of the manually trimmed rudder position, regardless of which engine flames out first. For cases 1&2, we used 1 degree right trim in cruse because in Paul’s experience, all the 777s are slightly “bent”, and most require about 1 degree rt rudder trim in cruise. For case 3, we set the fuel imbalance to zero and the manual rudder trim to zero. After both engines flamed out, a turn started, but more slowly than in cases 1&2, but it did start turning right away. 01:26 minutes later, there was a successful left engine restart that only lasted about 2 seconds. This caused a huge transient, and the aircraft rolled into a very steep right turn. Somehow, it recovered from the steep turn and entered several Phugoids with wild up/dn speeds up to Mack 0.9, and descent rates >>10,000 ft/min (off scale). In this case 3, the flight ended north bound 13 minutes after the engines flamed out. In the other 2 cases, with 1 degree rudder trim, the turns were steeper and the flights ended much sooner. In all three cases we observed huge Phugoid swings in TAS and vertical speed. They were usually superimposed on modest turns and steep turns (up to 90 degree bank angles).
I don’t think it is possible to estimate the actual path over ground from the observations we made. The turn rates were constantly changing with very high rates of change in speed and attitude common for at least part of every sim. The highest turn rate I recall was 2 degrees per second, but we also observed bank angles up to 90 degrees…almost going inverted, and vertical speeds that must have been 20-30,000 ft/min for brief transients. All I can say is that there were always turns, and depending on the manual rudder trim setting and the success or failure of the auto engine restart, you could be in the water in 4 -13 minutes, probably within 1-5 NM of the 7th arc.
I got around to seeing the Miles O’Brien doco and you keep hearing from people who are stuck on the debris question. It took me back to the crew remarks of the US Poseidon sub tracker, who like the other sub trackers involved can detect pretty small objects on the water. They were slightly exasperated at scanning large areas of sea for no return, with sophisticated gear. Unprecedented?
@airlandseaman: thanks vey much for your time and expertise – appreciated.
Puzzled by the confusion. Zaharie did it.
@ airlandseaman,
You wrote: “The speed starts slowing down immediately, while the altitude is maintained (35,000 feet in all our sims), until the speed drops to 225kts IAS, at which point the altitude starts to drop as required to maintain 225 kts IAS. Once down to ~24,000 feet, the aircraft levels off at 24,000 and 225kts. (For ZFW=400,000 lbs; CG=28%) This would take about 10-15 minutes if the fuel imbalance was sufficent to keep the second engine running that long.”
225 kts IAS is the optimum single-engine drift-down/cruise speed for 400,000 lbs, and 24,000 ft is the level-off altitude at ISA according to the s.e. performance data in the OPS Manual. Apparently the AP/AT switched from ALT hold mode to SPD hold mode when the speed reached 225. Was the mode change annunciated on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator)?
I’m surprised you encountered those large phugoid variations in airspeed and V/S. Perhaps this is because of the bank angles.
Then you wrote: “For case 3, we set the fuel imbalance to zero and the manual rudder trim to zero. After both engines flamed out, a turn started, but more slowly than in cases 1&2, but it did start turning right away. 01:26 minutes later, there was a successful left engine restart that only lasted about 2 seconds. This caused a huge transient, and the aircraft rolled into a very steep right turn. Somehow, it recovered from the steep turn and entered several Phugoids with wild up/dn speeds up to Mack 0.9, and descent rates >>10,000 ft/min (off scale).” That is rather unexpected. Engine spool-up would be expected to be quite slow, so what caused the “jerk” you describe earlier, and the “huge transient” you describe here?
Quoting from the Ops Manual:
Non-Normal Checklists – ENG FAIL L,R
Engine may accelerate to idle slowly. The time from fuel control switch to RUN to stabilized idle may be as long as two and a half minutes. If N2 is steadily increasing, and EGT remains within limits, the start is progressing normally.
Matty: the issue of a lack of debris gnaws at me like recollections of an old girlfriend, the one that perhaps I should have married, who even after 25 years still tells me, “I told you so.”
Anyway…
It doesn’t help matters much that you are in Perth and have yet to drink the Kool-Aid on the SIO being a mighty big place, Western Australia being apparently inhabited by only you and your neighbors, the gyre having sucked everything up and mixed the debris together with a couple of million PET bottles and a few hundred shipping containers…any number of explanations have been offered. Really, whenever you raise the debris issue, I get a sinking feeling in my innards, for you are, in fact, ‘there’. Jeff appears to be steadily building towards a reveal, and in him I have high hopes, but for this we will yet have to wait.
Seriously, where is that damn proverbial seat cushion? OK, this element of the mix I acknowledge to be a bonafide mystery. Regardless, if the flight did terminate in the SIO, my guess is that someone has bet quite heavily (i.e., everything they have) on the wreckage never being found.
Gysbreght:
Just reporting what we observed. it is possible that the Sim software encountered a state not properly simulated, but I dought that. I suspect that a restart at 400kts is very different from one on the ground. The fans are turning well above idle speed when it lights up.
airlandseaman,
Apologies if this is slightly off-topic.
The checklist is for in-flight relights, the recommended speed is “above 270 kts”. That is IAS, TAS is not important. The text is about N2, not fan speed. Even if above idle, it would still take considerable time for the engine to accelerate to substantial thrust levels.
I take it you did not observe autopilot and autothrottle modes?
@Gysbreght: Is this checklist for an RR engine? If so, I am surprised it was not N3 that was referenced.
Is it possible for someone to hide in the E/E bay before the flight took off? In this case, the information on passengers and crew may not be that fruitful. May be what happened at KUL on ground and prior to the plane took off could provide additional insights.
@Steve,
One possible explanation on why the plane was never considered a threat, as you suggest, was that some communication occurred. That is consistent with the airport overflight possibility.
Basically, if the pilot radioed trouble, he might have been directed towards one of the runways.
The pilot (in charge) would only need to communicate ONCE to get out of the “threat” category.
By the time the ensuing confusion on the ground set in, the plane, at 470kts, was long gone. Those who were duped may not be eager to discuss the matter, for obvious reasons, but they would be less eager as the days wore on. That could explain the number of early leaks, followed by silence.
Now, one critical detail is whether flying directly toward any of the nearby airports puts the plane on a landing course. If the plane is ignoring the runway alignment and approach paths, that should have raised additional flags. But it depends on the airport’s orientation.
Matty – pretty soon I’m going to dust off my mistaken identity theory, which suggests that the BTOs/BFOs belong to a different flight on the mirror image southern route from Jeddah to Johannesburg.
@ VictorI,
Good point. The page of the Lauda Air OPM that ALSM linked on the PPRuNe MH370 thread (Page NNC.7.6) does not indicate a specific engine type. Anyway, the point I’m making is that a sub-idle condition cannot be inferred from fan speed only.
@Gysbreght:
Lauda Air became a fully owned subsiduary of Austrian Airlines and operations merged in 2005 (including planes). Lauda Air ceased to exist in 2013.
Its 3 777-200ER (OE-LPA, OE-LPB, OE-LPC) all have engines manufactured by General Electric (GE90-92B).
In case the Operations Manual you got hold of details on something specific of their engines it is surely referring to the GE engines.
JS – is there one that lines up timewise? And whose plane?
Going hypothetical – if there was and the numbers were the same would you(Inmarsat) play dumb?
@Matty – there is no currently scheduled passenger flight matching in times. I don’t know if that was true on 3/8. It is not a typical flight time for passenger flights. The flights that serve the route run several times a week and fly B777s. The owner of that route has a plane with an ID that is one digit off, but it’s an Airbus. I believe it’s Saudia.
The route appears to be nearly mirror image of the SIO route, flipped along the 64.5 meridian. The BTO matches fairly closely. The BFO likely can be fitted as well because it’s the symmetrical southern route, so the same logic applies. I did not consider the actual path flown, so there may be some variations that fit and some that don’t. Those that fit may not be actually be used in real life – for example if they are unnecessarily over too much water or over the wrong territory.
I can’t rule out that a cargo or ferry flight flew the route that day. But, for the moment, lacking any proposed flight, it’s a coincidence. Then again, the mere fact that a route with a matching BTO/BFO profile exists should give us pause.
If I’m not mistaken, the strongest objection to this theory was the unlikelihood of a number swap in the logs, rather than a BTO/BFO misfit.
JS: Your reference to overflight of airports and possible air-to-ground communication is an interesting suggestion.
In fact, MH370, while over peninisular Malaysia, was basically flying a base leg to either Penang or KLIA. For Penang, it would have involved a follow-up approach leg turn to the north within the approach pattern; for KLIA (twenty minutes away), a 90-degree approach leg turn to the southeast would bring the aircraft in along an established flight route for the approach.
That the aircraft did not descend would be of no consequence in your frame, as even with VHF communication, the lack of transponder would have cloaked its altitude to KLATC; similarly, primary radar would most likely not have been able to inidicate that it was not descending for an approach to Penang. Meanwhile, any descent to KLIA not being executed is congruent with the fact that the approach leg turn at Penang was never executed.
Was there, in fact, any ground-to-air VHF communication with the aircraft while it was over peninsular Malaysia? We do have reports that the radio transcripts were apparently edited, and then they did end rather conveniently at the point of hand-off from KLATC to HCMATC. I have stated this previously: perhaps it only appears that someone on the flight deck ceased all VHF comms after “…goodnight, Malaysia…” and that this is rather simply where a supposedly edited/redacted transcript ends. In terms of anyone investigating the loss of MH370, the publicly disclosed radio transcripts in general and this specific node in the official sequence of events in particular should be tested for veracity.
One can look at the ‘uncanniness’ of the end of radio comms at the ATC handoff point as a result of actions on the flight deck OR someone on the ground. The action of a perp on the flight deck would be to not answer any radio calls (a long-standing assumption in virtually any scenario), while someone in the DCA would perhaps ‘need’ to narratively end radio comms by way of editing the transcripts, so as to make it appear that communication ended after the sign-off to KLATC. As for opportunity, the transcripts and the voice recording were not released for weeks. As for motive, it is perhaps rather ‘convenient’ for the Malaysian authorities that the radio comms record ends just prior to the aircraft being diverted at IGARI. They can then raise their hands and shrug their shoulders and join the rest of us on the crazy mystery train.
MH370 effectively ‘disappeared’ with the termination of VHF voice comms. The question, then, is who actually made it disappear? I would suggest that this question has not been properly answered, while JS has pointed the way.
@JS said, “If I’m not mistaken, the strongest objection to this theory was the unlikelihood of a number swap in the logs, rather than a BTO/BFO misfit.”
The primary objection to a mirror-image flight is that BFO bias would have to be very close to what was observed for MH370 when it was on the ground, i.e. 150-154 Hz. It is unlikely that another AES on another plane would have the same bias, as this frequency offset is somewhat random.
Rand, JS, anyone else who is interested–while going over the list of coincidences, a very striking and inarguable one is that the AC stays within the Malaysian FIR until a turn south. (If the purported track is correct that is)
To me, that implies wanting to stay in communication/or being able to establish communication, with Malaysian authorities, and a well-planned and knowledgeable avoidance of other countries airspace.
@VictorI, JS,
What is the range of frequency offsets exhibited by different planes? Is this in the “couple of hundreds” of Hz or much larger?
150 – 154 Hz shows an uncertainty for MH370 of around 2 – 3%.
If in the “hundreds of Hz”, the sheer number of planes in existence or in the air simultaneously would calculate to a reasonable probability, that several different planes would exhibit similar bias values.
If, on the other hand, the range of biases are in the “many thousands or more Hz”. The likelihood would of course diminish significantly.
Cheers,
Will
Lucy: Yep, you have nailed it. If IGARI was the point where the aircraft diverted, the SIO as the supposed terminus for the flight is the ‘diversion’ is apt to misappropriate our thinking. Meanwhile, the meme of mystery leaves our imaginations wide open to speculation.
The fact is indeed that the aircraft remained in the KLATC FIR until the turn south.
Meanwhile, the flood of books on ‘what really happened to MH370’ will now soon begin, as anyone will be able to rashly claim the laurels of Truth if the remains of the aircraft are not found, which is at this point a reasonable possibility.
@MuOne: Assuming there was nothing special about this AES, I would think the range would be +/- 150 Hz or more. If two terminals that are within 5 Hz are not distinguishable, that would put the probability of two terminal having the same bias at 5/300 = 1.7%, but this is a SWAG. Others could probably give you a better answer.
Sorry for the American slang:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_Wild-Ass_Guess
In the wake of the disappearance of MH370, there were legions of people searching through images on the Tomnod (owned by Digiglobe) website, in the hopes of finding possible wreckage. And like many on Twitter, I was bombarded with Tomnod photos from people (with the best of intentions) asserting that the images were unquestionably debris from MH370. The problem with the images I saw is that I could never see what the presenters claimed they showed – most were too far away (and unclear) to be even remotely discernible. So like most everyone else, I eventually threw up my hands and refused to look at one more thing from Tomnod.
But a few days ago, I happened upon a Twitter conversation (involving @drewrat81 , @dizzyoz1, @kstaubin) that caused me to take note. What stopped me specifically was @drewrat81’s (aka Michael John, who I’ll refer to hereinafter as ‘MJ’):
1. IMAGE – of what pretty clearly appears to be an AIRPLANE (or what’s left of one),
OFF THE COAST OF THE ISLAND OF SUMATRA, INDONESIA — WEST OF BANDA ACEH.
https://twitter.com/drewrat81/status/532257581272936448
The coordinates MJ provided for that image are as follows:
LAT: 4.629154
LONG: 90.72408
Remember (even though it defies credulity): Indonesia says it’s radar didn’t *see* MH370. But radar data from Indonesia has not been made available for analysis. Moreover, the radar narrative warrants (as I’ve said previously) ruthless scrutiny. Something (or a few things) don’t add up.
2. STORY — namely, that MJ submitted his Tomnod find (tagged on March 18) to the FBI, who told him that if the images were good, they’d be passed on — which the FBI apparently did, because one Debra Galwey (from AMSA) then contacted MJ and asked him for more. MJ says that was around the 18th or 19th of March; he had ‘daily conversations’ with Galwey, who told him that the images were ‘positive’. I asked MJ if AMSA/Galwey qualified or explained what positive meant, but he said she did not. Moreover, he says that once JACC got involved, all of the communication about the ‘positive’ images he’d submitted stopped. After asking Galwey why the communication had ground to a halt, MJ says her final reply (about three days after the SMH article was published) was “your images are still being analysed”.
Now, it would be reasonable to assume that JACC didn’t communicate with MJ because upon further inspection, the image(s) may have been found not to be MH370. But if they weren’t MH370, why wouldn’t JACC have just sent MJ a quick note saying that? After all, he had been going back and forth with AMSA. The simple answer is that JACC was probably swamped and didn’t bother. After all, being non-responsive is how bureaucracies typically behave and why vary on the theme when there’s an airplane missing?
But there’s more.
In the course of our Twitter convo, @kstaubin (Ken) brought up the March 21 Sydney Morning Herald article by Peter Hartcher:
Missing Malaysia Airlines plane: US satellite the unspoken source that sparked search for MH370
I posted a link to that same article on this board (see November 3, 2014 at 3:29 PM in “Where is the Debris?”) to make the point (which had been disputed by some commenters) that US satellites were the source of images being used in the search:
“The images were from a US satellite. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority’s John Young did not mention this to the media.
When asked, he avoided the question.
And when reporters phoned Australian defence officials to ask the same question, they were given a firm “no comment” or ‘we can’t discuss'”.
BUT, when I re-read that article in the context of the convo with MJ, Ken and DizzyOz, THIS next bit jumped off the page:
“This may seem odd, because the satellite’s owners, the US company DigitalGlobe, were only too happy to tell the media.”
So, while the Australians refused to comment on the source of the images, Digiglobe was announcing (to the media) that its images were being used in the search for MH370. Note that this is the same company whose subsidiary (Tomnod) told MJ that they couldn’t comment on the images he’d found — for “legal” reasons. Well if that’s the case, wouldn’t the parent (Digiglobe) have been bound by the same legal restrictions? Even more interesting: MJ says Tomnod also told him to “stop searching for more debris as they were closing down” after his find.
And where was the LOCATION of the debris in those images that we now know came from Digiglobe? According to the SMH, 2260 kilometers south-west of Perth. Well, a whole lot assets were sent to look over there and we know how that turned out.
So let us ask: what happened to the (per AMSA) ‘positive’ Tomnod images that MJ found? And what did AMSA’s Debra Galwey mean exactly by ‘positive’?
Please read carefully through the conversation thread in the aforementioned URL. MJ also tweeted an email with AMSA (Debra Galwey), additional images (NB the green and orange shot) and measurements of things in another image he tweeted (how accurate, I cannot attest), compared to what would be corresponding parts on a B777.
A search is currently underway (again) in the SIO, and as of yet, not even a seat cushion from MH370 has popped up. Anywhere. So while we’re all waiting to see what might emerge, and before dismissing this out of hand, I’d suggest that it might be prudent for those following MH370 (and the families and NoK in particular) to take a look at MJ’s image(s) and chat with him and the others who’ve been trying to get attention on that specific image. Add AMSA’s Debra Galwey too.
BTO, BFO and other ‘canonical’ data notwithstanding, it may be that the plane we’re all searching for is right under our noses.
@Victor – yes, that was raised. Thank you for pointing it out.
However, to Will’s point, we have no context within which we can evaluate the bias. I suspect you are right about the 154 being unique. But, if the doppelgänger flight had a bias of 174, for example, does it change the course dramatically? The distances won’t change, but what is the effect on the speed and the path?
So I guess the question is how much variability is permissible in the BFO to still match the BTOs, and second, how much variability exists among different aircraft? If either the first is high, or the second is low, there could be additional matches, no?
One comment about the coincidence. It’s a one-way coincidence, of sorts. If we took any scheduled flight and logged its BTOs and BFOs, we could likely find a compatible route into the middle of nowhere. We would not call that a coincidence. It is only a coincidence when two flights with KNOWN origin and destinations produce the same profile.
In this case, it remains a coincidence that the SIO route might match a scheduled route ONLY as long as we believe the plane is actually in the SIO. If its not, then there’s no coincidence whatsoever. The SIO route becomes just one of millions of random routes producing the same profile as a scheduled route.
With nothing to do but wait, then, we might have time to forensically examine some of the decisions taken by the JIT in the first key months of the search.
I’ve already detailed how “flew faster in Malacca Strait” – the only STATED reason for moving the search March 28 – could not possibly have been the ACTUAL reason (if you still doubt this, I refer you to the ATSB’s blog, in which Martin Dolan, in his response to my request for clarification, himself admitted the search moved DESPITE the reduced available fuel).
What I haven’t commented on is the rest of his response, in which he explained to me the NEW “true” reason:
“The most probable path…on Mar 28 was based on the best match paths to the BTO/BFO data…using the Doppler model at the time. Despite increased fuel burn calculations near Malaysia the speed/altitude combination BTO/BFO match path moved North into S3…the Doppler model is the driving force used in calculating probable flight paths and therefore defining the search area.”
Okay, let’s examine THIS rationale:
Five members of the IG each fed the BTO/BFO data into their own Doppler models – here are their results (E longitude of 6th arc crossing):
IG1: 89°
IG2: 89°
IG3: 87°
IG4: 90°
IG5: 88°
Avg: 88.6°
(FYI: Dr. Ulich: 84°)
All six of the above estimates were in search zones S1/S2.
Move on March 28: S1/S2 (88°) -> S3 (96°)
Move on April 01: S3 (96°) -> S5 (103°)
I.e. both moves were EMPHATICALLY counter-indicated by the BTO/BFO data Mr. Dolan’s puppeteers would have us believe was the “driving force” behind the search area determination. They did not dip their ship’s bar fridge detector – sorry, I mean their black box detector – into the water until they were a TIME ZONE away from where the data was pointing them.
In rationalizing the place they chose to START listening for acoustic pings, the JIT has tried – and failed – to pretend it was due to shortage of fuel, and it has tried – and failed – to pretend that it was due to refined signal data interpretation.
They are now down to a few hand-wavy statements about path circuity NW of Sumatra (not even MENTIONED before late June, and soon after quietly and permanently dropped from their assumptions) – a fig leaf unlikely to survive the winds of investigative journalism.
On the flipped mirror path idea could have it flown north westerly from IGIRI meeting the bfo/bto data? Or if a north westerly from that last radar spot with bfo/bto data match . at one time DS thought it headed north .
Only if it was that last radar was known to be correct ….
The BTO/BFO data available can only support a southeast path if it came from MH370.
If it came from something other than MH370, the southwest path might be possible as well.
I don’t believe the two northern paths are ever viable.
Rand/Nihonmama – Seat cushions: for every seat there is at least one bright orange life jacket. A crash at close to mach 1 would have essentially obliterated the plane and dispersed potentially hundreds of them? They will still be out there??
JS – Jeddah/Jobourg – I would feel better if this query was formally addressed. With a 56 million dollar search underway, can you imagine a bigger schemozzle.
MH 370 flight has crashed in china only. Malaysia, Austrialia are searching in india ocean. its is waste of tima and money.
I have details about flight crashed. Anyone can contact me. i will give details.
that flight crashed in china valley. this place and bejieng distance 1100 km.
plane srashed in south western direction of bejing. we found through divine vision and power. its is truth belive me.
@Brock,
Perhaps the reason the ATSB moved dramatically NE to search for pings from the data recorders was that the ATSB was supplied coordinates based on acoustic signals being heard by another nation’s submarine or by an undersea listening array.
Acoustic signals at ~1 Hz pulse repetition frequency and 30-ish kHz frequency were subsequently reported on at least 8 occasions by surface ships, air-dropped sonobuoys, and possibly a British submarine. However, none of these detections matched the expected MH370 signal characteristics. The sources of these signals were most likely similar commercially-available pingers attached to fishing nets that were drifting with the local current. The somewhat tortured explanations for the move of the search area are not credible, as you have pointed out many times. I would suggest that the ATSB is, in this case, obfuscating because they have agreed not to reveal sources or methods. In addition, the ATSB’s proffered explanation that the detected sounds were generated by the ship or the detection gear is also not credible. This explanation is more difficult to understand. If they actually believe it, then there must not be one oceanographer in the bunch. What would be the harm in simply saying the most likely source of the noises was pingers attached to drifting fishing nets? It is puzzling, but currently only of academic interest.
@Dr. Bobby: I was re-reviewing your work just yesterday. Thank you again for the phenomenal (quantity x quality) of your efforts interpreting the signal data. I would not be surprised to see Equator start bathy surveying your portion of the arc next week.
But when an event this grave takes place, I consider the deception of search leadership to be the OPPOSITE of academic.
In fact, I consider its exposure by the media to be the key to solving this mystery.
@nihonmama
questions:
you have posted an image, and said that it CLEARLY appears to be what is left of an aircraft? did you check the scale?just how big do you think a nosecone is? the scale shows something much much bigger than a nosecone.
What are the orange & green images?
MJ says it shows it is something? What is THAT something?
Where are these conversations via email? MJ has tweeted that emails have been deleted? Without evidence it is hearsay.
Why is a positive finding assumed to be positive that it was MH370? IF it was then why would further analysis needed?
Tomnod told everybody to stop searching because the search was being shut down. Tomnod made the very same announcement to all searchers.
I clearly don’t see plane parts. Whatever objects those images are, the scale shows that they don’t match the sizing parts of a B777
These images have been posted on Facebook in the past, on another blog & relatives of MH370 have seen them. Sarah Bajc has been sent them several times. The scale shows the size, and the size doesn’t stack up.
Matty, Rand:
“They (life jackets) will still be out there??…can you imagine a bigger schemozzle.”
The question is: WHERE is THERE?
And yes, think you can gather (by now) that I can absolutely imagine a schemozzle. Of the orchestrated variety. And since you used that very important word (imagine), please ponder: IF the current 56 million search is a throwaway, what, pray tell, is the (very obvious) misdirection trying to hide?
One message I received last night:
“what is going on?
Did Tomnod lie to its users and the maps
were really in the SIO?
Did AMSA lie to the whole world and now we have a search in the SIO despite the images taken near Sumatra?
Who is the culprit?”
It gets even better.
Last night,’MJ’ (Michael John) shared that he’d challenged Shay Har-Noy (Tomnod’s co-founder) directly about changes Tomnod had made to map locations in their database (waiting for more info on this).
Har-Noy’s response:
“Hi Michael,
You are trying to reverse engineer the database through the URLs, which is not the intention of the system. Every map has a location saved in the database.”
MJ (to us): “I noticed after I contacted Luke Barrington things started changing.”
Luke Barrington is the Senior Manager, Geospatial Big Data at DigitalGlobe (which acquired Tomnod).
According to MJ, Barrington was trying to distract him from looking at images near Sumatra.
MJ’s email to Barrington:
“Finishing off with my wreckage sighting west of Banda Aceh.
Now according to Inmarsat the plane flew for approx seven hours after leaving the Malacca Strait & that is roughly the flying time before it ran out of fuel.
So I did the Math, drawing a line from Malacca Strait up to the 1st sighting, then down under Sri Lanka before flying over the Maldives & back to my wreckage site is 3500 miles give or take a 100, so if the Jet was doing approx 500 miles then it would take 7 hours to complete the circle.
Interesting coicedence do you not think?”
MJ then says:
“that was the email that got his attention, he (Barrington) recommended me ignoring the site here & focusing on the SIO. however he refused to elaborate on why he was keen we did not focus on this area any longer…HE WAS ADAMANT ON ME LOOKING AT THE SIO.” (CAPS mine).
Here’s a map that corresponds to the coordinates (LAT: 4.629154 LONG: 90.72408) for MJ’s image mentioned in my previous post: http://bit.ly/1u3mco6
MJ’s Tomnod image is one of several that were taken by Digiglobe on 03.16.14 at 4:44am.
Is this possibly why the ATSB asked INDONESIA (NOT Australia) to be on the lookout for debris — when most all of the drift models out of the SIO showed that debris would have gone WEST? And does anyone know why that directive was taken down?
Cue this comment by @RWMann, an MIT-trained former airline exec:
“Inmarsat data tortured beyond intended use, context and significance to “prove” Southern route; may have diverted attention.”
WHERE is THERE?
@Nihonmama: As you know, in the past, I have communicated with individuals that believe the satellite images near Sumatra are MH370. I have repeatedly asked them to produce an expert opinion from an image analyst to ascertain whether there is any validity to the claims. I have yet to see such an opinion. If images of aircraft debris could be corroborated by two or more experts, I think investigators would take a crash site off of Sumatra much more seriously.
Victor:
Totally agree with you and have had the same conversation with people — at times with great frustration. Precisely why I instructed MJ and cohorts to seek an expert analysis of that image ASAP.
That being said, I also believe there’s a larger story here, beyond the image in question — hence the time I took to relay it. What did AMSA mean by positive? What happened with the analysis of MJ’s image after JACC took over? Why did a Digiglobe exec “refuse to elaborate” but tell MJ to focus on the SIO and ignore Sumatra? Why their dodginess when MJ questioned Tomnod’s map locations?
MJ is not the first person to have questioned Digiglobe/Tomnod’s practices.
I’m not married to where the wreckage must be. Far from it. But I do see credibility and transparency issues everywhere. And obfuscation.
@Nihonmama – I can’t tell if you meant to link 4 degrees north or 4 degrees south. Can you clarify that?
Also, I’m not completely following the 2200 SW of Perth angle.
Finally, what was the deal with the URLs? Were the images “moved” to new lat/long pages?
@Anyone – the location (depending on clarification) seems to be pretty early in the flight. It also seems to fit the drift pattern to Indonesia.
But then, what is the theory on the SDU? Was it misinterpreted, and the plane flew in a circle for several hours? Or was the SDU data not related to the flight at all? Obviously, the images would be in conflict with the SDU data if they depict debris.
@Brock FWIW, my theory as to why the search moved on March 28 is because of a combination of two factors–1) Boeing did an analysis which recommended it and 2) the streetlight effect.
On March 28, the Malaysian Airlines CEO stated in a press conference that the new search area was due to “research and analysis and refinement done by the Boeing Team” in Seattle. Recall also that this was back in days when it was thought that the primary radar showed large flight level changes. I speculate that was partly because MH370 should have been visible on Malaysian primary radar throughout the Malacca Straits “blip gap” and beyond 18:22 provided that it was flying sufficiently high. I believe at that time also more value was given to the Indonesian contention that its radar did not detect MH370 it its airspace.
Under those circumstances, I can imagine that if Boeing assumed or was asked to assume that MH370 flew low and made a wide turn around Indonesia, it could have plotted a path to the new search area.
And with the bad weather, high seas and high travel times just getting to the search area associated with the current search area, I could understand why the searchers were all too ready to look where the light was better.
JS:
The link to the map was sent to me by someone last night. It may be slightly off (the coordinates may be rounded) but not by much.
The 2200 SW of Perth angle comes right from the SMH article http://t.co/uRG7ORKaKc
Didn’t intend to imply an angle per se – just an observation of where the expert analysis put possible debris at that time (vs the what MJ says he was being told by AMSA). The timing of it all is interesting.
As to the URLs, yes, apparently, the images were moved – and that’s one of the rubs. One person very familiar with Tomnod told me today: “[Digiglobe] gave us the way to get the co-ordinates originally, they changed the mapping system so it would make more sense. Old system no longer worked, but as crowd sourcing it was not necessary that we know where we looked.”
So under the new system, people didn’t know the location of the images they were looking at – which is interesting. But MJ was able to figure the location out. There also appears to be a ‘scale’ issue with some (or many) of the images. Digiglobe appears to have modified the scale on images, but it’s unclear why. MJ and at least two other people (today) questioned scale.
Hope this makes sense. I’m waiting to get more info. I’m sure others here will chime in on the SDU part of your question.
@Nihonmama – ok, thanks. I was actually questioning whether the 4 degrees was north latitude or south latitude.
One thing to keep in mind is that the images may have been degraded before going up on tomnod. So it’s possible that the company (or government officials) had access to higher quality original images from the same day. This might explain a change from “positive” to “nothing to see here.” Playing devil’s advocate, though, because it all sounds a little odd regardless.
JS:
It’s 4 degrees NORTH latitude.