If you were leading a high-profile international aircraft investigation, in command of the world’s most qualified technical experts and in possession of all the relevant data, would you bother listening to a rag-tag band of internet commenters, few of whom actually work in the space or aviation industry, and none of whom have access to all the data?
Most likely, you’d say: certainly not! But as time goes by, and the puzzle remains curiously impenetrable, you might find it worthwhile to pay a listen to what the amateurs were saying. You might even abandon some of your own conclusions and adopt theirs instead.
This appears to be the case in the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which disappeared en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing back in March. From the beginning, the authorities running the investigation — first, Malaysia’s Ministry of Transport, and later the Australian Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) — held their cards close to the chest, releasing very little information about the missing plane and maintaining a posture of absolute conviction. The investigators’ self-confidence reached its apex in April, when their methodology led them to an area of ocean where underwater accoustic signals seemed to be coming from pingers attached to the plane’s black boxes. Officials assured the press that the plane would be found in “days, if not hours.” But then it wasn’t. A scan of the seabed found nothing; the pingers were a red herring (perhaps literally!). Back to square one.
Meanwhile, on the internet, a group of amateur enthusiasts had come together from all around the world to trade ideas and information about the missing flight. The group, which came to call itself the Independent Group (IG), emerged from various online comment threads and eventually grew to about a dozen individuals. This was a truly spontaneous, self-assembling crowd: there was no vetting of credentials, no heirarchy of any kind. (Full disclosure: I count myself among this group.) Basically, if you seemed to know what you were talking about and could comport yourself in a collegial fashion, you were accepted into the crowd.
While the mainstream press was reporting the ATSB’s pronouncements as received wisdom, the IG was raising red flags. IG members were among the most vocal critics of the ATSB’s contention that the accoustic pings probably came from black-box pingers. And later, after a public outcry led Inmarsat to release a trove of data received from the aircraft, and the ATSB issued a report explaining how it had come to identify its current search ear, the IG dove into the new information with abandon, quickly identifying holes in the data and weaknesses in the official approach. In a pair of papers, the group recommended its own search area, hundreds of miles to the southwest of the ATSB’s officially designated zone.
Today, the ATSB has released an update to its earlier report, explaining why it has decided to reassess its conclusions and move its search zone to a new area — one that overlaps, as it turns out, with the IG’s recommended area. (In the graphic above, the white bracket shows the ATSB area; I’ve added a yellow dot to show the IG area.) Needless to say, this has caused elation within the ranks of the IG, who see the move as vindication of their methods, and indeed validation of their combined efforts over the last few months.
A few observations on the new report:
— One of the reasons the ATSB gives for the shifting of the search area is the recognition that Inmarsat data related to an unsuccessful ground-to-air telephone call attempted at 18:40 indicated that the plane had already turned south at that time. The IG had been basing its analyses on this data point for months.
— Since the June report, the ATSB has improved its BFO model by taking into account various factors — such as temperature shifts caused by the Inmarsat satellite passing through the Earth’s shadow and the mis-location of the Perth ground station in an important Inmarsat algorithm — that IG member Mike Exner has been working through in detail for months.
— The ATSB has fundamentally changed its approach in how it is assessing the plane’s likely path. In its June report, the focus was on what I call the “agnostic” approach: it generated a large number of flight paths based on as few initial assumptions as possible, then graded them based on how well they fit the timing and frequency data received by Inmarsat. This resulted in a population of potential flight paths that fit the data well, but did not make any sense in terms of how a plane might be flown. Some of the routes, for instance, involved multiple changes in heading and airspeed. Today’s report explicitly excludes such flight paths. The ATSB and the IG alike now assume that the last several hours of the flight were conducted without any human input — the crew were presumed to be incapacitated by hypoxia or other causes, so the plane flew on autopilot until it ran out of fuel and crashed. This has been the IG’s starting point for ages, and the fact that the ATSB has now adopted it is a major reason for why the two group’s search areas have now converged.
— You can see in the graphic above how an emphasis on matching the Inmarsat data will tend to lead you in one area (“Data error optimisation”) while an emphasis on routes that comport with real-world autopilot functioning will lead you to another (“Constrained autopilot dynamics”). To be sure, they overlap, but the peak area of one is far from the peak area of another. I think it’s important to realize this, because it helps us to understand why it has been so hard to get a handle on where MH370 went, why the official search area keeps moving, and why knowledgeable people have been furiously debating possible flight paths for months: the BFO and BTO data just do not match up that well. In order to arrive at its recommended area, the IG has been willing to accept much wider deviations from Inmarsat data points than the ATSB has been comfortable with.
— Finally, it’s worth nothing that the ATSB approach is superior to the IG’s in one important regard: it is at heart statistical, looking at families of potential routes rather than proposing and assessing one at a time. There is a tendency, as an individual–and I have fallen into this myself–to cook up a solution, run an analysis, and to be so impressed with the result that one wants to shout about it from the rooftops. (Ask me about RUNUT some time.) The IG has come up with a search area essentially by pooling together a bunch of individual solutions, each of which is generated by a different set of procedures and different set of assumptions. It’s a herd of cats. To really move the ball forward a more rigorous approach is needed, one that takes each procedure and sees how it would play out if the assumptions are methodically modified.
The upshot is that, since the early days of the investigation, the attitude of search officials has changed radically. Once dismissive of amateurs’ efforts to understand the incident, they have clearly begun to listen to the IG and to turn to it for insight and ideas. Indeed, you could say that since the release of Inmarsat data and the issuance of the ATSB report in June, the search for MH370 has become effectively crowdsourced: a de facto collaboration between the professionals and a spontaneous assemblage of knowledgeable experts.
UPDATE:
The overlap between the ATSB’s analysis and the IG’s is more evident in the image below, courtesy of Don Thompson. It shows the fan of values calculated by ATSB to match likely autopilot settings.
A very helpful person tweeted me a third source for drift analysis; it corroberates what we’ve all (so far) been saying: that Australia – and not Indonesia – is the shore to which debris generated at 7th & s38 is far more likely to drift.
After selecting a start month, clicking on any part of the main map produces a graph of 5 multi-year paths, each simulating a typical random-yet-current-affected drift of a “corked bottle” dropped at that coordinate.
All 5 paths originating at (s37.5, e87.5) drifted due west, to the SW tip of Australia.
None ever made it to Indonesia.
http://oceanmotion.org/html/resources/drifter.htm#vishead
Given this, it seems irresponsible to turn Aussies away from a shoreline search. No matter how big the haystack, those would have been very valuable needles.
Matty, do you have a source for the assertion that bit of AF447 were still turning up two years later? I’ve Googled around and been unable to verify it on my own, it’s a very interesting data point if true.
Brock,
please read the AF447 saga to learn how accurate drift models are. They were no help at all.
Victor:
“I think that marketers and corporate officials are capable of distorting technical facts for what they believe is for the good of the company. I have a hard time believing that a group of engineers and scientists would be asked to publicly do the same.”
I just have to say — that is a fascinating world view — and belief system. But we’ve been exchanging for a while, so it’s also not a surprise.
It also seems clear that many of those looking at the MH370 mystery (whether they’ve come out and said it directly or not), on this board and elsewhere, share that view. Likely why some of the non-technical aspects of the MH370 ‘story’ (read: the nefarious human component and geopolitics) were disregarded, or even dismissed, by many, until recently.
I’m not accusing a particular group of engineers or scientists of a crime. I’m merely sharing information (surprising though it may be to some) that people are free to take in, or dismiss.
Here’s the reality Victor (although it may be one that you’ve not been exposed to): we live in a world where executives (or their agents), and employees, on all levels (and from all disciplines), commit fraud and other crimes of moral turpitude. Everyday. Let’s not even get into the technology (and start-up) world, where some of the most outrageous behaviour imaginable – sexism, racism, misrepresentation, the defrauding of investors (and clients) and other, occurs with regularity — at the hands of people who are trained in science and engineering. I’m not one of those who has to read about this to know that it happens. I’ve worked with (or for) engineers, scientists, doctors and software developers – and seen some really nasty acts (immoral AND illegal) perpetrated by the same. Because while very “smart”, they were also fallible and flawed beings. Read: not gods. Imagine that.
We live in a world of humans, where behavior (a function of nature and nurturing – or lack of it, for some), not technology or science, is the driver. Just look around. Love, hate, greed, jealously, duplicity, lust, deceit, compassion, openness, selfishness, generosity. All of these (and more), live in each one of us. And none of it can be explained by a mathematical formula, algorithm or schematic. The only question is how our individual values and psychological wiring (which drives our choices) influences which behaviors manifest – and which ones remain stifled or suppressed.
The idea that one would be more (or less) likely to misrepresent, distort, dissemble, lie or perpetrate a fraud based on their profession (or area of study), has not only not been my experience (and I know that I’m not alone), it’s not supported by the evidence of what we see happening out there in the world everyday.
But everyone is entitled to have and to hold on to their view. Because we live in a world that is both incredibly beautiful and ugly. And sometimes, we have to tell ourselves stories to get through it.
Since we can’t post links here, the best discussion I’ve seen of the use of drift models in AF447 is “In Search of Air France Flight 447” by Lawrence Stone. My takeaway from his work is that reverse drift models based upon the location of the 33 bodies found June 6-10 were given a low weight (30%) in defining the (ultimately successful) search area because of uncertainties in the estimates.
Stone also notes that reverse drift modeling was not done for the recovered debris because there were no good models for the effect of wind on debris.
In the case of MH370,buoys were deployed in the South Indian Ocean in March in order to measure drift and the data was recovered. I would guess that difference from AF447 was sufficient to make debris modeling useful.
I’ll also guess that finding debris at this point would not be indicative of much more than into which ocean MH370 crashed. As far as I have read, the only debris found 2 years after AF447 was on the ocean floor.
@Nihonmama: You are not understanding my statement. I never said that technically-versed individuals are not capable of committing fraud. And I certainly never said that technical experts were gods. What I said was I would have a hard time believing that the corporate officials, i.e., execs, would have a strategy in which they would parade around a team of technical experts in public spouting technical lies and even encourage those experts to publish their falsified research in a technical journal. When there is a crisis, and when there is a sensitive matter in which the company has significant liability, communication would be tightly controlled and left to the communications professionals, not the technical experts. This is the reality of how industrial technology companies run.
I say this because I have served as a founder, engineer, researcher, executive, board member, and major shareholder in a number of companies of various sizes and breadth–from start up to multi-billion dollar. I can’t imagine that Inmarsat would allow the technical experts to be the communications channel for a fraudulent message that, if improperly delivered, could destroy the company. That kind of message would be delivered by the likes of Chris McLaughlin, who would understand exactly what should be said and could later hide behind the curtain of plausible deniability.
Victor, Mike:
These are the questions I posed in my first post about the WSJ Boeing + RR story (09.16):
“Where did this story, written by two well-regarded aviation journos (who, it should be noted, DID NOT IDENTIFY THEIR SOURCE), come from?
1.The WSJ reporters made up the original story.
2. Rolls Royce and Boeing told the WSJ MH370 “flying for hours” but that story was not true.
3. ACARS was off but neither Boeing nor Rolls Royce knew that when they (presumably) talked to the WSJ journos.
4. Rolls Royce and Boeing talked to the WSJ journos and told them that their data showed MH370 “flying for hours”. But RR and Boeing were subsequently directed to deny the story.
5. The source for the original WSJ story was neither Rolls Royce nor Boeing. If so, who was the source? And if there was a third source and if the source’s information was correct, why would Pazstor and Ostrower have needed to CHANGE the story?”
Both of these WSJ reporters COVER aviation. And neither one of them is a novice.
So when I used the term “red flag” in yesterday’s post (and I stand by it), it very simply means this: look closer.
Victor:
Believe me, I understood everything you said.
@Nihonmama: In a previous post I said, “Regarding the WSJ story, I think the reporters simply got the technical facts wrong, either through their own misunderstanding or through something misunderstood by their source. Once they learned of their mistake, they corrected themselves with a retraction.”
So, to go down your list of questions:
1. No, I do not think that the WSJ reporters fabricated the story.
2. RR and Boeing might have told the WSJ that the plane was flying for hours, but the primary source for that information would have been Inmarsat or SITA. I suspect that WSJ was talking to Inmarsat directly.
3. I suspect either Boeing or RR would know whether or not ACARS was off after 17:07 UTC.
4. The part of the story that was retracted by the WSJ was that the engines continued to transmit data. I do not believe that the WSJ retracted that there was satellite data for hours. I attribute this retraction to a false understanding of the distinction between the satellite link and ACARS performance data. The reporters may be aviation experts, but it would be quite unlikely that they would be aware of the technical details of satellite communications. I still see incorrect statements made in this regard.
5. It is possible that neither Boeing nor RR were the source for the WSJ reporters, although I suspect that the reporters were talking with Boeing, RR, and Inmarsat. Again, I think they got it wrong about the engine data and then corrected themselves.
Okay, I think this discussion has gone on long enough. Victor, thank you for your patience. Let’s consider this matter closed.
@Gysbreght: thanks – this is the kind of context I was hoping to gather. I didn’t expect to have stumbled onto the definitive word on the “where and when” of MH370 debris on the stregth of a couple of public domain algorithms. And I’ve watched an unpaddled canoe drift UPstream in a slow river and a high wind – I understand the role sustained winds can play in this kind of exercise.
But aren’t both prevailing currents AND winds fairly constant at (s38, e88)? Some parts of the ocean exhibit “unstable” drift patterns (like water dropped on a mountain peak), but doesn’t this region of the SIO drift fairly predictably eastward?
And regardless: doesn’t your comment extend to the drift analysis ostensibly performed by AMSA? Isn’t it irresponsible for the ATSB to throw around phrases like “far more likely to have drifted west” – essentially telling Aussies that searching is a waste of time?
@Bruce: too bad AMSA pulled all those buoys out of s38 on March 28 – after only ten days adrift – and didn’t return them there until September.
Which they must have done, what with all that overwhelming performance, track, and/or acoustic ping evidence culminating in such “high confidence” in s21-s30…
ATSB News:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/mh370.aspx#.VFBoyBxixFM.twitter
Jeff – the “wreckage two years later” line was trotted out a couple of times that I saw, around about the time that the serious head scratching set in over the absence of MH370 debris. If they were indeed referring to seabed debris then I guess it’s a misrepresentation. I will have a look around.
Victor/Mike – engine data – could I put it this way? Would RR now maybe prefer a system where some rogue couldn’t pull the plug on them?
I am new to this blog , so don’t know if this has been asked or addressed before – – – can video data be recovered from cell phone and pc devices used by the passengers after the prolonged submersion?