It’s been two months since I last posted about MH370, so I think I’m overdue for an update. The big news that’s happened in the meantime is that on June 26th, the Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB) released a report that laid out in admirable detail what the authorities felt they knew about the circumstance of MH370’s disappearance and how they had come to narrow down its likely location to the current search area. We now have a much clearer understanding of just what Inmarsat’s data reveals about the last four hours of the flight.
In the report, the ATSB explains that sometime after the plane vanished from radar screens at 18:22 GMT, whoever was in control most likely became incapacitated and the plane flew on autopilot until it ran out of fuel and crashed into the depths of the Indian Ocean some time after 0:19 GMT. Its impact point, according to the ATSB’s calculations, was most likely somewhere in a region 1,000 miles off the coast of Western Australia.
As you’ll notice, that last sentence is extremely vague. The reason is that, as we now understand, the data is incapable of telling where the plane went with any degree of certainty. That is to say, you cannot recreate the airplane’s flight path using Inmarsat data alone. This is kind of a shocker, because for months now, Inmarsat has been telling the public that their mathematical wizardry had allowed them essentially to solve for the plane’s final location. This turns out to be false. For any given flight path, we can now calculate the expected BTO and BFO values; but given a set of BFO and BTO values, we cannot derive a unique flight path.
Take a look at the route chart at the top of this post, which comes from page 31 of the ATSB report. It shows the actual path of a Malaysia Airline jet that flew on the same day at MH370, as well as an “estimated” path generated from the BFO and BTO data recorded from that same airpline. If you’re like me, when you first saw this chart, you assumed that Inmarsat had decoded the BFO and BTO data so thoroughly that they could generate specific flight paths like this one. Give them BFO and BTO data, and they could draw you a line on the map; no wonder they say they know exactly where to spend $56 million scouring the sea bed. But if you read the accompanying text, what it says is: “Using only the starting location and an equivalent number, and approximate time spacing, of BFO and BTO values as the accident flight, predicted paths were created and compared against the actual flight paths.” Reading between the lines, the ATSB was able to generate not just the route illustrated here, but dozens or possibly hundreds, and chose this one as the most promising for MH021.
There’s another disappointing realization embedded in the ATSB report. Many have long assumed that before its final straight leg to the south, the plane made a single turn from its northwest heading. However, as the ATSB report makes clear, the data that Inmarsat received from MH370 does not actually allow such a simple scenario. If the plane flew straight on its final leg, then between 18:22, when the plane vanished from above the Malacca Strait, and 19:41, when the first “handshake” ping was detected, the plane would have had to have taken a long time to fly a short distance, as the chart from the Independent Group experts illustrates:
In order to fit all the data points, then, the plane would have to have loitered near the Malacca Strait for the better part of an hour before heading south. It could have flown around in circles, or it could have landed somewhere, waited, and then taken off again. Or, alternatively, the plane didn’t loiter, and did take a single leftward turn — but then, instead of flying straight, followed a curving path during its final hours. Either way, rather than a simple turn and straight-ahead run, “The data suggests that a more complicated path was followed, which may have included changes in speed, direction, and altitude,” as Victor Iannello puts it.
In short, whatever happened to MH370 had to be more complex, and more puzzling, than the scenario that the authorities initially expected. All of which makes it harder to come up with a convincing explanation for what might have happened aboard the missing airliner that night.
Given all that, I think it’s an appropriate time to recognize that we’ve wrung out everything we can from the data on hand, and see what we can make of it. So I’d like to throw open the doors. Do you have theories that you’ve been cooking up about MH370 that you’d like to share with the world? If so, feel free to let loose in the comments section. Or if your ideas require more space, write it up your theory in whatever form you like and shoot me a note via email form on this website. If it’s fit for human consumption I’ll give it a page and link to it from here.
I’ve already started compiling scenarios, and here’s what I’ve gotten so far. In each case, clicking on the headline will take you to a separate page devoted to that theory. You can comment about each one either on its page or here. And if you’ve got your own (reasonably non-insane) theory you’d like to put out there, just let me know.
LANDING IN BANDA ACEH
Victor has come up with a scenario to explain the mysterious loitering that seems to have occurred between 18:29 and 19:40, based on our understanding of the BFO and BTO data.
THE SUICIDE SCENARIO
Kent Smerdon, a 767 pilot, has come up with a very detailed description of how a suicidally minded captain might have made his airliner permanently disappear.
While it has been months since I have spent time studying the data and all of the conjecture I remain convinced that there is a tendency to mold the data and the models to fit the theories. It should be obvious to everyone that this is a human tendency and those in charge of this investigation are following the normal route of human beings.
With such glaring holes in the theory as mentioned in the article I do not believe that a Northern route can be excluded. There is no solid data and I predict that $50 million dollars later the plane will not be found in the ever changing search area.
They are just now realizing that the call at 18:40 requires a southern path at that time? Those of us that have analyzed the data have pointed out this discrepancy after the ATSB report was published, and the statement from the Independent Group documented this.
This also suggests the plane really did “loiter”, i.e., circle or land, around northern Sumatra.
@Smith – I don’t think anyone actually believes they are going to find a bloody thing. I could think of much better places to be then down there this summer.
@Nihonmamma – That link with the bereaved family is a smoking gun if real. Was it a hoax? It just never grew legs and it was back in the time when the media was totally fixed on MH370.
Just an example of a possible track starting with a turn south at 18:40 UTC using a Fixed Frequency Bias (FFB) of 147,5 Hz to end in the priority search area. The third plot compares the BTO (x) and BFO (+) calculated with Yap’s BTO&BFO calculator to the logged data.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/0uxvv2fx3picsl1/BFO_Track_1.jpg?dl=0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/4ba8q9s0u4s94bw/BFO_Track_2.jpg?dl=0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/e1doffnewr3i93c/BFO_Track_3.jpg?dl=0
Matty: “That link with the bereaved family is a smoking gun if real. Was it a hoax? It just never grew legs and it was back in the time when the media was totally fixed on MH370.”
You’re right. But thus far, I’ve received no indication that it’s a hoax. When I queried someone in Malaysia about this, got the following response: “Making a statement about responsibility is not typical for a Malay.”
Having worked in and traveled around Asia for almost 10 years, I found the response to be “loaded”: very Asian, 100% culturally accurate and also evasive.
Matty:
I forgot to mention (and it’s in the link to the Twitter post) that I cc’d that story to 4Corners (AUS). Never heard a peep.
@Ron
I have read the discussion about the implications on your blog with interest but am now unsure about your conclusion. Is the second turn still considered “impossibly” sharp?
Are you able to possibly post two zoomed images of both sharp turns, then overlay circles with your calculated radii?
I think such images would be very easy for anybody to interpret.
I’d suggest 2 circles for the vietnamese turn, one each for the two bank angles. And 4 circles for the KLIA turn, that is the two bank angles for two different reasonable ROCs at the time of turn (or only one ROC, if we are certain to know the ROC at that time).
Another thought: the ROC-effect you mention for the KLIA turn has potential implications for the vietnamese turn. An “impossibly” sharp turn could indicate a sharp climb or descent combined with a tight turn of a single plane, that in turn indicating a sudden emergency situation or a deliberate pilot reaction to one.
Cheers
Will
the suggestion that it landed and then took off again seems a plausible explanation for that time period if that is where they dropped all the passengers so the plane could be utilized in the future rather than destroyed. If it didn’t crash and we certainly have seen zero proof of debris that would have shown up by now in some form, they had to have taken the people somewhere.
@MuOne,
I guess we can estimate the ROC near KLIA from FlightAware (FlightRadar24 links doesn’t work anymore but the data was saved by some people). However, I guess that the effect of the ROC is minor compared with the factor 4 provided by the Vietnamese speed being about double that of KLIA. In other words you have to multiply the KLIA radius by about 4 before comparing it with the Vietnamese radius. That will make it much less sharp.
If you want an absolute not a relative test then the KLIA radius should be measured. It should be larger than 1.5-3 Km. Since a grid cell height is 55.5 Km we are talking about 2.7%-5.4%.
In 400% the Vietnamese corner doesn’t seem to have a radius. KLIA seems to be a bit round.
I can take screen grabs from the PDF but I don’t know how to overlay circles with prescribed radii.
I have always thought that something similar to the James Bond movie “Thunderball” occurred.
Mainly, the plane went to high altitude to kill the passengers due to lack of oxygen. Then the pilots flew low to elude radar.
Finally, the pilots landed the plane somewhere. Now, someone has a fully functional 777, including avionics and any other software, to study at their leisure.
They will soon know exactly where to plant a bomb, or how to modify the software to make the plane a guided missile.
@Ron
I have created a CAD drawing with an overlay of your suggested 25° and 45°
banking angle turns for both sharp turns (hope the drop box links work):
http://www.dropbox.com/s/kshuuojamzrjc5o/RonsImpossiblySharpTurn.pdf?dl=0
with explanation on how I arrived at the graphics.
The following is a link to the graphic only.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/8xbmphaq5zjvypl/TurnRadiiToScale.pdf?dl=0
If your assertions about maximum banking angle for emergencies are right, it
appears that the radar tracks pre and post the apparent “sharp turn” may indeed
belong to two separate planes.
Cheers,
Will
@MuOne,
Thanks a lot! It looks very good!
I think the Boeing bank angle protection kicks in at about 25-30 degrees(?). The pilot can still override it by applying force proportional to the bank angle, i.e. it’s becomes harder to keep the bank angle as it gets larger. The pilot can switch off this protection. Passengers carrying planes try keep bank angles below say 20 degrees.
The point I’m trying to make is that the KLIA corner is a legitimate turn. MH370 took off then immediately turned and there is no problem. However the very sharp corner after 1722 is just too sharp to be a turn so it must be the crossing point of the paths of two planes.
Assuming it’s a crossing point and not a legitimate turn we must ask why parts of the two crossed paths are missing and the only answer I found is the ID duplication effect described in the EASA document.
Yes, it’s a far reaching conclusion based on a tiny part of a radar track.
Background on the radar track discussion
The Preliminary Report said that MH370 turning back was only a possibility not a fact. Some independent researchers went further and declared that MH370 didn’t turn back. However most route analysts and the general public accepted the turn back.
For some unclear reason the ATSB/SSWG report released a JIT made combined and processed radar track of MH370. This is surprising because the JIT kept very quiet until now and didn’t release anything except maybe the terse Preliminary Report.
Analyzing the new radar track seems to show that MH370 crossed paths after waypoint IGARI with a plane coming from the direction of Singapore and this plane had crossed Peninsular Malaysia, flew along Malacca Straits then followed the route usually ascribed to MH370. Unfortunately this analysis can’t say what happened to MH370 after the path crossing.
The new analysis should be checked further, e.g. with ATC experts. If found correct it may provide a key to unlocking the mystery.
Duncan Steel: King of Whakapohane
and Other Things I Need to Say About
the MH370 Investigation
August 29, 2014
By: John E. Fiorentino
It isn’t often I write about such dalliances as Whakapohane. In fact, until recently, this descriptor was only slightly active in the rather murky recesses of my mind. Many years ago I was treated to a discussion for some long forgotten reason relating to the origins of this rather obscure word. In the US we know it as “mooning.”
In any event, this is the term used by Duncan Steel himself to describe his banishing from his blog (and apparently even from his private e-mail) those who in some way offended his sensibilities. I myself am one of the vanquished.
My “crime” was to make a statement and ask a question which the good doctor didn’t like. Duncan, (hereinafter referred to as the “King”) said my statement was “false.” When I tried to post a response to his claim, it was removed from his site. Subsequently, after I sent him a private e-mail wherein I stated it was “good to be the King” I was blocked from posting on his site and also blocked from any further private e-mails.
What was this blasphemy of mine? I merely stated that there was no direct evidence of a “flameout” in the Inmarsat data. Not being given the opportunity to respond nor elaborate on the Kings decree that my statement was “false” certainly seems to be a rather harsh action.
Let me say here that the Kings site is his own and as such he certainly can do essentially as he wishes. The site is however a public one which makes statements and elicits responses from those who frequent it. While many times it is necessary to remove a post and block a poster, these things are usually done to those who violate the ordinary rules of civil behavior like using profanity, etc. Most people are not egotistical, arrogant, short sighted nor thin skinned enough to remove people who they may simply disagree with. It is however as I’ve said, the Kings parade.
I should of course get to the point and that is MH370.
Jeff Wise and I have had communications in the past and our relationship is also not what it should be. Jeff of course was a CNN aviation analyst on the MH370 story. Jeff was there as I fought for over a month to get CNN to break my story on the “pings” which the official investigation touted as coming from MH370’s black boxes. I submitted numerous pieces of research and information to CNN which was pooh-hooed and ignored by the news organization and its hired analysts. Some repeatedly shook their heads “no” and said the “pings” had to be from the plane. Jeff, it must be said wasn’t one of those.
After a month of writing articles, sending press releases and hounding those reporting the MH370 story, CNN finally broke the news on “Newday Saturday,” May 10, 2014. My research showed that the “pings” were in fact not likely to be coming from MH370. Shortly thereafter, the Australians admitted as much. The travesty of course was the wasted time, money and effort as the investigators chased their own tails.
Some have said that the “lead” produced by the recording of the underwater pings had to be investigated. Especially since the MH370 case was severely devoid of any type of lead which may point to the location of the aircraft. To which I basically agree, except to say the problem was all other investigative avenues (with the exception of the airborne search for ocean debris) were suspended while the Australian research vessel Ocean Shield wandered back and forth in its search for fools gold. It is unclear whether some of the other options such as a search on land were ever effectively instituted.
The King for his part didn’t think much of any discussion about the underwater impulses. He claimed all of that nonsense was unscientific and he always “knew” it was just a waste of time. When I contacted him and indicated there was indeed much research (1) and science involved in the acoustics, that overture also went unanswered. Of course after JACC and ATSB finally admitted they had been pissing in the wind, a veritable host of know-it-alls crawled from the woodwork proclaiming that they to “knew” all along this acoustic stuff was just a waste of time. None of these geniuses apparently had the brains or fortitude necessary to relay their brilliant deductions in real-time to the proper authorities, the news media, or apparently anyone else. The King obviously thought that an endless debate about BTO and BFO values was more important than wasting a months time looking for the aircraft in the wrong place.
Let me say also that it wasn’t just the King, the media and more specifically CNN who seemed to treat proper scientific research with such disdain. I repeatedly contacted the JACC, ATSB and other official investigative groups, all to no avail. For their part, JACC and ATSB have refused to even release the recordings of the putative “pings.”
Yes, while the CNN analysts shook their talking heads “no,” unscientific acting “scientists” thumbed their noses in the air and the various prime ministers predicted imminent success in the search, valuable time was frittered away as a cloud of ignorance permeated the air.
“I remember asking a wise man, once . . . ‘Why do Men fear the dark?’ . . . ‘Because darkness’ he told me, ‘is ignorance made visible.’ ‘And do Men despise ignorance?’ I asked. ‘No,’ he said, ‘they prize it above all things–all things!–but only so long as it remains invisible.”
― R. Scott Bakker, The Judging Eye
The Continuing Inquiry
During the course of our own continuing investigation we have developed some new leads from an initial analysis of the available audio recordings between MH370 and the ground. This is still preliminary and replete with conjecture. I do believe however I’ve identified the person who diverted the aircraft and ascertained where the plane was headed. Perhaps even a little bit of the why.. This will have to stay with me for the time being and for various reasons.
As Jeff Wise has so correctly reported it turns out our analysis of the Inmarsat data was akin to counting the number of fairies dancing on the head of a pin This of course only accentuates the true value of the acoustic ping research.
Final Musings
While it may appear that “Johnny simply doesn’t play well with others,” I will for what it’s worth offer some explanation. The fact is I’ve apparently managed to tick off many of those I’ve come in contact with during this investigation. True, it seems I’ve been critical of many and have had reservations about much. I can though back it all up with hard cold facts. If some find that annoying, then so be it.
I can only hope no one will accuse me of exposing my buttocks.
Partial Notes and References
(1) http://research-investigations.newsvine.com/
(1989). Hydroacoustics Manual. Biosonic, Inc. USA, pp: 1-15.
(2004). Fishbase: a Global Information System on Fishes. World Fish Center. [Online] Available:
http://www.fishbase.org
(2004). Furuno FQ-80 Scientific Echo Sounder, Furuno Electric, Co. Ltd. Nishinomiya, Japan.
Foote, K.G. (1990a). Averaging of Fish Target-Strength Functions. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 67: 504-515.
Foote, K.G. (1990b). Importance of the Swimbladder in Acoustic Scattering by Fish: a Comparison of Gadoid and Mackerel Target Strengths. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 67: 2084-2089.
Gauthier, S. and Horne, J.K. (2004). Potential Acoustic Discrimination within Boreal Fish Asemblages. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 61: 836-845.
Hazen, E.L. and Horne, J.K. (2003). A method for Evaluating the Effects of Biological Factors on Fish Target Strength. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 60: 555–562.
Horne, J. K. (2000). Acoustic Approaches to Remote Species Identification: a Review. Fisheries Oceanography, 9(4): 356-371.
Horne, J. K. and Clay, C. J. (1998). Sonar Systems and Aquatic Organisms: Matching Equipment and Model Parameters. Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 55: 1296–1306.
Jech, J. M. and Horne, J. K. (2002). Three-dimensional Visualization of Fish Morphometry and Acoustic Backscatter. ARLO, 3(1): 35–40.
Jorgensen, R. (2003). The Effects of Swimbladder Size, Condition, and Gonads on the Acoustic Target Strength of Mature Capelin. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 60: 1056-1062.
Kang, D., Iida, K., Mukai, T., and Hwang, D. (2004). Acoustic target strength of Japanese common squid, Todarodes
pacificus, and important parameter influencing its TS: swimming angle and material properties.
OCEAN’04.MTTS/IEEE TECHNO-OCEAN’04, Japan, Vol. 1, pp. 364-369.
Kloser, R.J., and Horne, J.K. (2003). Characterizing uncertainty in target-strength measurements of a deepwater fish:orange roughly (Hoplostethus atlanticus). ICES Journal of Marine Science, 60: 516-523
Ona, E. (1990). Physiological Factors Causing Natural Variations in Acoustic Target Strength of Fish. Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom, 70: 107-127.
Sawada, K., Mukai, T., and Sadayasu, K. (2004). Estimation of the Variation in Target-Strength of Fish under Pressure Condition. OCEAN’04.MTTS/IEEE TECHNO-OCEAN’04, Japan, Vol. 1, pp. 389-400.
Sawada, K., Takao, Y., and Miyanohana, Y. (2002). Introduction of the Precise Target Strength Measurement for Fisheries Acoustics. Turk J Vet Anim Sci. 26: 209-214.
Zhao, X. (2006). In Situ Target Strength Measurement of Young Hairtail (Trichiurus haumela) in the Yellow Sea. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 63: 46-51.
IMPLANTABLE ACOUSTIC-BEACON AUTOMATIC FISH-TRACKING SYSTEM Robert J. Mayhue, Ray W. Lovelady, Tobert L. Ferguson and Clarence Richards, Langley Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Sept., 1977
For further information contact:
John E. Fiorentino
Fiorentino Research
P.O. Box 324
Oakhurst, NJ 07755 USA
e-mail: jefiorentino@optimum.net
Tel. 732-361-8599
@MuOne,
Thanks again for transforming this idea from a speculation into a theory…
You wrote:
“Another thought: the ROC-effect you mention for the KLIA turn has potential implications for the vietnamese turn. An “impossibly” sharp turn could indicate a sharp climb or descent combined with a tight turn of a single plane, that in turn indicating a sudden emergency situation or a deliberate pilot reaction to one.”
This is a good point.
A fighter plane could probably do a combined dive and turn that the Vietnamese radar will see as a very sharp turn. A 2D projection of a 3D low curvature curve can have high curvature. We need more information on the 777-200ER aerobatic capabilities and more calculations to know if it could do that.
@John Fiorentino
Below is a quote from an April 23, 2014 e-mail from David Gallo, senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, to William Meacham:
“I don’t know any underwater acoustic people that think the pings have anything to do with the plane.”
It wasn’t the mainstream view by any stretch but there was a vocal minority questioning the accoustic pings.
That’s not what Gallo told David Soucie and I’d need to see just where this minority was so “vocal.”
Please post a link.
Everyone’s a genius now!
Thanks
Behave yourself, Mr. Fiorentino.
Thanks, John! I hope someone responsible for ultimately resolving where MH370 ended up (and why) will consider the points you have so nicely laid out.
Vern Grose
@John Fiorentino:
As Jeff mentioned, a number of us questioned the acoustic pings. Here was my plea to David Soucie to consider aquatic tags:
https://twitter.com/RadiantPhysics/status/462568176052871168
It’s all water under the bridge now and not worth rehashing.
Victor
I see nothing in your tweet to Soucie referencing “aquatic tags.” You were requesting that he verify his position The date of your tweet was also almost a month after the impulse detection.
But good for you Victor……….Persistence on your part however, may have yielded much benefit…….although probably not when I think about it.
Kudos to you!
@John: Did you read the entire Twitter conversation? I specifically sent him a reference to a Sonotronics fish tag. He never responded.
https://twitter.com/RadiantPhysics/status/463679196485914625
@Victor
Sorry Victor, I didn’t read it all.
My apologies
PS. I enjoyed reading your posts on Duncan
1. 2 ex navy seals died on cargo ship at Garcia Diego possibly.
2. Captain makes call to wife on early reports.
3. Has Diego Garcia in simulator
4. Agents smuggled onto plane
5. Carlyle company freescale behind the plan
6. Cloaking device in hands of British/American Diego Garcia
7. Plane flew on a wire to diego Garcia while everyone was knocked out by climb.
8. Crew were experts in cloaking/painting and others.
9. Plane was retrofitted prior to trip from alleged accident.
10. Dark picture
Victor: with respect: the public deserves to know why it took two months to discover that wrong-frequency acoustic pings – loudly trumpeted by the Australian PM as authentic – were in fact emanating from their own naval…navels.
As does pretending that taking away fuel moves the search 1,100km NE on March 28, when it demonstrably does not.
Taken together, a pattern emerges: a concerted effort to move – and KEEP – the search DRAMATICALLY closer to port than where they’re going to move back to next week.
At next week’s press conference, I dearly hope attending journalists are good and ready.
For a change.
@Brock
There’s really no evidence to support the idea that the detected impulses were coming from naval assets.
In fact, what little can be gleaned from the available data/descriptions of the impulses points to the detection of 2 separate sources/targets acting in 2 different ways. 1 appears to be moving (slowly) and 1 appears to be stationary.
There is also circumstantial evidence that those aboard Ocean Shield were aware very early on that the “pings” were not from the aircraft.
ATSB/JACC should be pressured to release the recordings for independent analysis, even though it may be a moot point at this juncture.
As far as keeping the search closer to Port, I sent my own recommendation to ATSB to requesting (among other things) that they extend the Eastward variable to 150 kms rather than 55kms.
Here’s one of many e-mails I sent to them………
From: John Fiorentino [mailto:jefiorentino@optimum.net]
Sent: Tuesday, 10 June 2014 9:54 AM
To: ATSB – Info
Subject: Re: Flight 370 [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]
Analysis of the released Inmarsat data is essentially complete:
Findings: It appears, based on Inmarsat’s data and a better understanding of the methods used in determining the BTO and BFO values along with the overall workings and capabilities of the Inmarsat satellite system, that;
1. Flight MH370 did indeed take a Southern as opposed to a Northern route.
2. Airspeed/fuel burn rate and available fuel load will affect the total distance traveled South. (Calculations assume a straight line course)
3. In a statement, the ATSB said that based on all the independent analysis of satellite communications and aircraft performance, the total extent of the 7th arc reaches from latitude 20 degrees S to 39 degrees S.
“At the time MH370 reached this arc, the aircraft is considered to have exhausted its fuel and to have been descending, said the ATSB.**
“As a result, the aircraft is unlikely to be more than 38km to the west or 55km to the east of the arc.”
(**Note – There is no firm evidence the aircraft was “descending” as indicated by ATSB)
I differ with ATSB in 2 regards, 1. I believe the plane may be farther South than indicated by ATSB and 2. I would extend the Eastward variable in regards to the 7th arc to 150kms rather than 55kms. (This is based on a projected 80-100mile glide path from 35,000ft).
4. I believe there remains two possible interpretations of the final data lines of MH370 as reported by Inmarsat.
(1). A flameout (fuel exhaustion)
(2). A (crash) or safe wheels down on land.
It appears a better case can be made for a safe wheels down rather than a crash if the Flight of MH370 terminated on land.
I would still request that Inmarsat release its comparison data between the planes flying the Northern and Southern routes. Also Inmarsat should release data from previous MH370 flights for at least a week prior to March 8, 2014.
(Note: I have previously requested release of data for up to a month after the event to include any anomalous signals received in the post 30 day period)
Data showing previous “power-ups” and “power-offs” of the missing aircraft as well as others should be released for comparison purposes.
Copyright 2014 – J.E. Fiorentino — All rights reserved
John E. Fiorentino
Fiorentino Research
PO Box 324
Oakhurst, NJ 07755 USA
e-mail jefiorentino@optimum.net
Tel: 732-361-8599
=========================
I do agree journalists should be good and ready — For a change
@Ron,
Mike Exner, aka airlandseaman, is in contact with “informed sources” re radar trace. He has tweeted that MH370 was tracked during turn back, but that there were data drop outs.
I have asked him to find out whether the radar trace around the sharp corner in the trace has high density of radar returns or not. He responded that he is working on it.
I have put a few thoughts down regarding an alternative explanation for the sharp corner in the trace. In short, the radar trace may be missing a complete right hand loop back.
See https://www.dropbox.com/s/8ln4kmrgxukx6hq/ThoughtsOnRadarTrace.docx?dl=0 for more details.
Cheers
Will
@Ron
You commented on Christophe’s blog (https://plus.google.com/app/basic/stream/z13lwrkx4zylf1kfb22zihyo1qrmuzrsb#)
“MuOne clearly disproved the MH370 turn back claim and showed there were two planes involved”.
I think you give me too much credit. The work was all yours. I merely pointed out the similar sharp corner near KLIA and then created the CAD image to help visualise your results. But thanks for the laurels anyway ;o)!
Cheers
Will
@MuOne…
You may want to repost your last couple comments in Jeff’s latest article 😉
@Jocet,
Lol. You reckon no-one looks here anymore?
@MuOne,
Thanks a lot!
* The KLIA corner radius calculations were refined using ADS-B data. This increased the original estimates by about 12%. I guess this wouldn’t change much the fit quality.
* A calculation mentioned in the comments without details gave a reasonable radar sampling rate, that’s why this argument was dropped. Should I post the calculation in detail?
The results for a right angle turn (90 degrees) at 471 knots were:
for bank angle 25 degrees the track should consist of 8-17 points, depending on the radar. At 45 degrees 4-8 points. The calculations were based on official Vietnamese radar antenna rotation speed info.
* The dropbox link seems to be bad. “the radar trace may be missing a complete right hand loop back” sounds very interesting.
* You deserve this credit…
@MuOne,
I didn’t find the notes for the radar sampling rate calculation so I did it again inside the post:
https://plus.google.com/102683253990040028382/posts/YuamykWxhdw
Hopefully it’s correct.
@Ron,
Sorry, I have removed that doc temporarily, until a possible misunderstanding that was pointed out to me is addressed.
Hopefully, I can repost it soon.
Re refined calcs, I will try to find some time to post an updated CAD drawing.
Cheers
Will
@Don
I am happy to exchange emails (@Manvbrain?) and forward a draft copy of that doc and discuss.
Any other means of exchanging emails? You could go to my website via duncansteel, then address to me. Or post your twitter handle, etc.
Cheers
Will
I have yet to see any evidence that MH370 was flying at 35,000 ft, yet nearly all the recent model runs assume 35,000 ft while testing different speeds, autopilot modes, starting points and starting times. Early in this investigation, we looked at slower speeds that end up progessively further NE as the speed is reduced. Now that several of the models are quite advanced, I would like to see a set of new model runs that assume 275 kts TAS at 10,000 feet from a variety of starting point assumptions. This is the speed and altitude that the crew would have used if there was a decompression event.
I certainly agree about the use of 35,000ft. I used 35,000ft in my own calculations.
However, I question the real value of continued modeling efforts. What exactly is the end game? And I ask this question even though a move NE may fit my own theory of what happened quite nicely.
Thank you for picking up the dialogue for MH370.
The principal factor driving the most probable final ‘southern’ location of MH370 is the time of the final south turn (sometime from 18:30 to 19:00).
Based on ATSB most recent ping data – I have developed three ‘final’ south turn scenarios (for 18:30, 18:45, and 19:00).
The 18:30 Scenario is essentially the Independent Group’s (derived by Dr. Bobby Ulich).
The 19:00 Scenario is mine and represents the most northerly MH370 could have flown before the final south turn.
I have also analyzed the recent ATSB report regarding the BFO value at 18:40.
I have presented a possible explanation of the significance of the BFO value and the reason for the ATSB selection of the Priority Search Area.
If MH370 actually did fly south – then I believe that the ATSB Priority Search Area is the correct area.
Please see these at:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/efpm4qpwl28bwp2/MH%20370%2020140809.pps?n=334297775
A few notes:
There are three scenarios for the ‘final’ south turn at 18:30, 18:45, 19:00 (at different locations and speeds).
The 18:30 scenario (Independent Group) is technically a better mathematical fit of the satellite data relative to the 19:00 scenario by approximately 30 nm. An interesting observation for all scenarios is that the 21:41 ping ring appears to be in error (too much time delay).
Possible sources of this error are described in Slide 1 – including a suspected non-repeatable ping time delay (BTO value).
The ATSB report of late July contained three or four BTO values for MH370 at Kuala Lumpur airport in the time period of 16:00 to 16:30.
Considering there was also satellite position variation during this time – I did not see more than about 10 micro seconds of possible
non-repeatability in BTO values. However, it is possible that the 21:41 ping encountered approximately 200 – 400 microseconds more time delay than normal (in the communication equipment). If there was this amount of additional time delay –
then the 19:00 Scenario is a perfect mathematical fit.
The 18:30 Scenario and the 19:00 Scenario are significantly better mathematical fits than the 18:45 Scenario.
The existence of the 18:40 BFO value rules out the 18:30 Scenario.
Two possible direction changes regarding the 18:40 BFO were considered.
1. A small NW->N>NW over a short time period, then followed at 19:00 by the final south turn.
2. A large NW->S final south turn (the 18:45 Scenario). This would generate the same BFO value but would be heading in the opposite direction to 1. Because the 19:00 Scenario is a significantly better fit than the 18:45 Scenario, it is believed this is how ATSB
used this BFO value and why they selected the 19:00 Scenario and the Priority Search Area as shown in the slides.
I welcome any comments and or input in regard to the above.
Best Regards,
Greg Yorke Ph.D, P.Eng.
Vancouver, Canada
@Greg Yorke Ph.D, P.Eng.
I’m of the opinion that the pilot did it. I don’t believe the 6 hour accident theory. I also think that Captain Z took deliberate steps to broaden the search arcs by throttling the plane back & forth, loitering, while changing altitudes along the way to oblivion. With this said, one would have to agree that he did it. A Captain killing his crew & passengers on such a massive & mysterious level leaves us all dumb founded, or at least myself. While proof of this does not exist, the travel pattern, lack of communication from the cockpit, pax, aircraft as a whole proves it…IMO.
To Chris Butler and anyone else.
I am not sure if MH370 actually flew south to ~ S30.5 E96.
I am saying that if MH370 flew south beginning at 18:30 to 19:00, then the ATSB path to S30.5 E96 is more probable than the Independent Group 18:30 final south turn scenario.
I agree that the pilot probably started things at ~ 17:20 by perhaps locking everyone out of the flight deck. From that point on – anything could have happened.
If MH370 actually flew south beginning at 19:00 – I don’t think that was the pilot’s initial plan. In this case, I think there was a second event by others on MH370 at
19:00 to gain control.
There may be ATSB and Independent Group people who think that these ‘perfect fits’ to the south – mean that the northern route is not possible. This is not true at all. There is a ‘symmetric’ northern route for any and all southern routes. It also seems that the 18:40 BFO confirmed only the southern route. This is also not correct.
There are an infinite number of possible variable speed-variable heading north and south routes from the last known location at ~ 18:15.
The more important issue in the search for
MH370 is,
As Jeff Wise points out in his above graphic and comments – the biggest shocker of all is the significant discrepancy of BTO data with any actual flight path.
I am now very suspicious of the usefulness of the Inmarsat handshake data
because I think there are significant non-repeatable values of the BTO data.
I have indicated a possible 400 microsecond error in my last comment (21:41 arc).
In March-April, I corresponded with Jeff Wise when he was trying to get more data from Inmarsat regarding the time period of ~ 18:00 to 21:00. Inmarsat told Jeff that according to their data MH370 was flying easterly (the BTO values were getting bigger than the 18:26 value). These bigger values were actually caused by additional time delay in the communication equipment. This error was approximately 150-200 nm !
(This is about 1600 microseconds of total time delay error).
A few months later – Inmarsat corrected this assertion and indicated that the 19:41 and 20:41 arc were actually west of 18:26 value.
This has huge implications as to the final location of MH370.
All these arcs now have a statistical width of as much as 100 nm !
It also increases the target area arc length by more than approximately 500 nm !
What if Immarsat got everything exactly backwards?
@Greg Yorke & Crew
All of this begs the question….Why haven’t their been any test flights? The operating cost vs the surveying ships w/crew has to about the same.
I’m still with my first instincts because nothing has shown me otherwise. When it first happened I grabbed maps, assessed the area, did fast math figuring for fuel and came up with a northern area as most logical. My heart broke for the people unwillingly involved. My dad was a pilot & I grew up flying with him. I am sure that a proper investigation would reveal those involved as this took months to plan. I’m still shocked that was not done. I was thrilled Jeff Wise was behind a northern route! I have been a fan of his from before this & know when he gets his mind on something, he’ll have a very hard time letting go without finding all the facts. Go Jeff! So I know I’m just a girl n Montana. Not as many theories as little foot, or as cool as being Matty from down under, but I’m still gonna go with my first instincts. Until someone shows me different. And I have a day dream Jeff just goes himself and finds it!
Rhett, thanks for your kind words. I have indeed gone down the rabbit hole on this one. I am working on something right now that will either pan out or won’t. Either way, I’m not with the conspiracy theorists; having had a chance to talk with Inmarsat, after long wondering what they were up to, I’ve come to the conclusion that like the rest of us they’re trying to figure out a baffling situation using a very small and somewhat weird data set. I think that most of the information that’s germane to this case is out there, and most of the misreporting and false rumors have been swept away. In other words, we know what we know and we know what we don’t know.
Interesting report here. Relatives of passengers being detained for 24 hours http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1587448/relatives-mh370-missing-say-authorities-have-turned-them
Jeff,
I will be very interested to see what you are “working on”.
Proposal for 5 Test Flights:
I have proposed 5 Test Flights for the MH370 Mystery.
(From your initial opening topic, and a response on September 12.)
Please see the link below for the details (7 slides),
Slide 1 is the proposed 5 test flights.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/efpm4qpwl28bwp2/MH%20370%2020140809.pps?dl=1
Jeff, I think these 5 test flights support what I think you are working on.
Further, I think there is a possibility that the Inmarsat ‘raw’ handshake data has been “reverse – engineered”
and has unfortunately driven the south-only route.
The method I use to calculate the most probable flight path (knowing the handshakes) is,
Guess the 19:41 flight coordinates (on the 19:41 handshake ring), guess a speed, then calculate coordinates for the 0:11 handshake,
then calculate flight coordinates for 20:41, 21:41, 22:41, 0:11 times (using the speed). Calculate the coordinate differences – then
predict a new speed value, then iterate to minimize the differences.
This method can be reversed. For a given flight path, what is the actual time delay and doppler. Initially, guess the 0:11 time delay.
It is possible that the following has occurred.
In the March 12 timeframe, Inmarsat found large random variations (for unknown reasons) in the time delay data from 300 microseconds to as much as 1800 microseconds. This is probably affected by the SATCOM non-repeatable time delay.
Using the 0:11 ‘raw’ handshake value and the above variations, Inmarsat began by ‘predicting’ the time-of-flight part for 0:11 handshake.
As a method of reducing this variability – they could use the BFO data which would not be affected by time-delay variability,
but may have had other non-repeatability problems.
Another approach is that Inmarsat could assume a flight path/speed after 18:30 to the predicted 0:11 handshake.
They would then calculate differences with the actual handshakes. This would give them some estimate of the average BTO value
but not the actual time-of-flight value for each handshake. They needed to decide on a north or south route for this analysis.
They choose the south route because the constant speed and heading scenario was more reasonable and useful for their analysis.
From the south route – constant speed – constant heading approach, Inmarsat then calculated the 19:41, 20:41, 21:41, 22:41 handshakes. These values were then ‘added’ to the log.
I believe the statistical width of any handshake ring is approximately 100 nm. This completely changes the search areas.
Everthing is back in play – and the south-only route was falsely constructed.
Any thoughts/comments ?
Does anyone on this site believe MH370 went North, and not south? If so, is there any satellite data backing it up?
@D Hatfield
@jeffwise
Re: Possible New North Route
Please link below.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/mqkeuekjkvw03qm/MH%20370%2020141002.pps?dl=0
In March – Inmarsat said that from their BTO analysis for the 18:26 to 21:41 hand shakes -MH370 was moving away from the satellite(19:41, 20:41 radii were greater than the 18:26). Some explanations are,
1. Due to the abnormal conditions for the SDU, there was additional time delay relative to the reference/calibration value.
Possibly more than 1500 us.
2. MH 370 was actually flying within the 18:26 to 21:41 arcs with very little doppler, in a yellow north route or in a purple south route.
3. By undisclosed methods – Inmarsat/others were able to correct these ring radii for the 19:41 and 20:41 handshakes.
All ring radii were refined. The red south route (constant speed and direction) is the working scenario.
A correction of ~1500 us was applied here.
4. Another possibility exists – that there was a small amount of additional time delay –and MH370 was flying on the yellow north route.
This north route is very interesting because it avoids radar detection in India and China.
5. The ATSB also analyzed other flights with the same SDU equipment.
These flights indicated time delay errors in the range of – 360 / + 1000 us.
Greg,
Thanks for the satellite map link. One big factor in all of these calculations is the radar tracking which is being relied on.
First radar was a report by Reuters quoting Malaysian military sources which said before reaching Vampi, it turned north towards Gival and was last plotted heading northwest towards Igrex on P628 at 2:15 am.
The 2nd radar looks suspicious to me… only a screen shot for relatives March 21st. Not a complete radar and shows it flying w/nw on N571 at 35,000 ft. west of Vampi at 2:22am.
Duncan Steel on the IG report Sept 26, says this radar came from Thai military. I wonder if the Thai’s could have mistakenly plotted another plane on a regular flight west along N571? Especially if MH370 was flying north & northwest at very low altitude, possibly as low as 5000 ft.
The point is: the SIO plotting depends on this 2:22am radar. A north plotting depends on and makes more sense using the 2:15am radar.
Based on two satellite arcs, the July 19th IG report did calculate that it flew 195 miles in 73 minutes over the Andaman Sea area. That computes to an airspeed of 160mph. Not an insignificant airspeed, since 160mph is the APPROACH SPEED of a 777-200ER.
My feeling is (at this point in the flight), that everyone on the plane was overcome by smoke, and MH370 was flying as a “pilotless ghost” plane, controlled solely by the autopilot….. flying for 6+ hours at 160 mph and 10,000 ft. Thus when it ran out of fuel, it made a soft water landing resulting in no debris floating.
Since the 2:15am radar plotted it following P628 northwest, it could have easily continued flying in a northerly direction, never reaching land and crashing after running out of fuel. From 2:15am to 8:19am is 6 hrs 4 min.
Any opinions on this plausible scenario?
One question I have about the final couple of pings. Do they show any unusual readings or do they show it continued to fly in a projected straight line?
D Hatfield,
As I was writing this response to you, I have done some further analysis on the possible North route. I need to check with some other people first and do further analysis – before I can say more. I have made a small change to the dropbox slide 1.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/mqkeuekjkvw03qm/MH%20370%2020141002.pps?dl=0
If I am correct – I will have an important post in the next day or so.
I will now try to answer your questions.
1. My working scenario – is that MH370 was located at ~ N6.5 E95.6 at 18:30 on a heading
of ~ 300 at a land speed of ~ 480 – 490 knots.
2. Re your good question regarding last radar at ~ 18:15 – 18:22 etc.
I thought I read somewhere that the radar was located near Aceh – Sumatra (I1 location on DS website). However, another person (who has proposed a final south turn at 18:30) said that it was from Thailand. My thinking was that if it was Aceh and there was a final south turn at ~ 18:30, MH370 should have been flying back into the radar and been detected. Therefore, if MH370 actually flew south – the final south turn needed to be later. My current working scenario for a possible south turn is a completion time around ~ 18:38.
The most recent ATSB analysis of the 18:40 BFO value ~ + 0.5 / – 0.5 hz has 3 possible explanations/scenarios.
a. It supports the 18:38 south turn if there
was a small positive doppler.
b. It supports the 300 deg direction change
to about 330 at ~ 18:38. (with a smaller positive doppler than a.) Then continued to
about 19:00 when a final south turn occurred.
c. It supports 355 heading N or a 175 heading S at 18:40.
Now back to your North route question.
When the first revised Inmarsat 19:41, 20:41 pings ring radii were released – they were
now less than the 18:26 radius value (of March).
MH370 was now flying westerly as opposed
to easterly. However, the North Route scenario now required MH370 to reduce speed
to 260 knots for the next two hours, then
it needed to fly at 520 knots for the remainder. This did not look probable to me.
Re the July 19 IG report indicated it needed to fly at 160 mph for their south scenario. That was the number I was getting too.
However my approach/solution was different.
I then constructed the NW path to 19:00
and final south turn scenario. The speed does not change. I think the 19:00 scenario is the same as one of ATSB’s.
My working scenario is that if there was a
final south turn at 18:38, the speed is ~ 490 knots to the IGs location, if it was NW then south at 19:00 the speed is ~ 480 knots to the ATSB location.
I don’t support the 160 mph – 10,000 ft scenario.
For any final south turn to occur, I cannot
construct an event scenario for it.
That is, for MH370 to be directly flown/controlled(by presumably the pilot) in some NW direction at 480 knots, and then looses control to others on the plane in a short period of time (minutes), and MH370 is flying south in some Auto mode, and everyone is dead – is just not conceivable to me.
Re your north P628 scenario, MH370 needs to end up on the 0:19 arc (which is on land).
So it does not work.
The last two pings (0:11, 0:19) appear to be accurate to me – if considered together.
(If MH370 was in some ~ glide mode at about 200 – 250 knots.)
Please stay tuned !